Slavery, Sacred Texts, and the Antebellum Confrontation with History by Watkins, Jordan Tuttle
UNLV Theses, Dissertations, Professional Papers, and Capstones
5-1-2014
Slavery, Sacred Texts, and the Antebellum
Confrontation with History
Jordan Tuttle Watkins
University of Nevada, Las Vegas, jordantwatkins@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/thesesdissertations
Part of the History of Religion Commons, Law Commons, and the United States History
Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Scholarship@UNLV. It has been accepted for inclusion in UNLV Theses,
Dissertations, Professional Papers, and Capstones by an authorized administrator of Digital Scholarship@UNLV. For more information, please contact
digitalscholarship@unlv.edu.
Repository Citation
Watkins, Jordan Tuttle, "Slavery, Sacred Texts, and the Antebellum Confrontation with History" (2014). UNLV Theses, Dissertations,
Professional Papers, and Capstones. 2156.
http://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/thesesdissertations/2156
   
  
 
SLAVERY, SACRED TEXTS, AND THE ANTEBELLUM CONFRONTATION WITH 
HISTORY 
 
By 
 
Jordan Tuttle Watkins 
 
Bachelor of Arts in History 
Brigham Young University  
2006 
 
 
Master of Arts in History 
Claremont Graduate University 
2009 
 
 
 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the 
 
Doctor of Philosophy – History 
 
History Department 
The College of Liberal Arts  
The Graduate College 
 
 
 
 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
May 2014 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © by Jordan Tuttle Watkins, 2014 
 
All Rights Reserved 
 
ii!
!
  
 
THE GRADUATE COLLEGE 
 
We recommend the dissertation prepared under our supervision by  
Jordan Tuttle Watkins 
entitled  
Slavery, Sacred Texts, and the Antebellum Confrontation with History 
is approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy - History 
Department of History    
 
 
David Holland, Ph.D., Committee Chair 
Elizabeth White Nelson, Ph.D., Committee Member 
Gregory Brown, Ph.D., Committee Member 
Colin Loader, Ph.D., Committee Member 
Anne Stevens, Ph.D., Graduate College Representative 
Kathryn Hausbeck Korgan, Ph.D., Interim Dean of the Graduate College 
 
May 2014 
 
   
 
 
iii 
ABSTRACT 
 
Slavery, Sacred Texts, and the Antebellum Confrontation with History 
 
By 
 
Jordan Tuttle Watkins 
 
Dr. David F. Holland, Examination Committee Chair 
Associate Professor of North American Religious History 
Harvard University 
 
In the first six decades of the nineteenth century, America’s biblical and 
constitutional interpreters waged their hermeneutical battles on historical grounds. 
Biblical scholars across the antebellum religious spectrum, from orthodox Charles 
Hodge’s Calvinism to heterodox Theodore Parker’s Transcendentalism, began to 
emphasize contextual readings. This development, fueled by an exposure to German 
biblical criticism and its emphasis on historical exegesis, sparked debate about the 
pertinence of biblical texts and the permanence of their teachings. In the 1830s, the 
resurfacing slavery issue increased the urgency to explore the biblical past for answers, 
which exposed differences between ancient and American slavery. Some still posited the 
persistence of the Bible as a whole and others rescued a Testament, a text or a teaching, 
but a few, including Parker, proved willing to let the old canon drift into the past.  
Slavery bound these arguments to another debate about a historical text from a 
more recent past. In the 1840s and 1850s, national observers in an expanding political 
culture focused their attention on the Constitution in hopes of resolving the growing crisis 
over the peculiar institution. The passing of the founding generation cultivated great 
interest in founding-era sources and antislavery readers began debating the interpretive 
importance of publications like Madison’s papers (1840). The Fugitive Slave Law 
   
 
 
iv 
(1850), the Kansas-Nebraska Act (1854), and the Dred Scott decision (1857) further 
nationalized the issue and put more pressure on constitutional interpreters, who, in turn, 
scrutinized the founding era for answers. From radical abolitionist Wendell Phillips to 
southern Supreme Court Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, readers aimed to recover and use 
the framers’ intent to interpret the Constitution. The resulting historical explanations and 
narrations indicated that much had changed since ratification. Even when antislavery 
constitutionalists like William Goodell and Lysander Spooner rejected the emphasis on 
contextual interpretation, their accounts highlighted slavery’s presence at the founding 
and traced the anachronistic rise of the Slave Power since that period. Some upheld the 
Constitution as a enduring national covenant, others read it in light of the Declaration’s 
egalitarian promises, and a few, including Parker, stood ready to dismiss it as outdated.  
More moderate antislavery interpreters, who acknowledged historical distance 
from the biblical and Revolutionary pasts, formulated readings that allowed them to 
maintain their religious and legal faith. Biblical scholars like William Channing and 
Francis Wayland contended that Christ and his apostles had inculcated principles meant 
to abolish slavery in time, while constitutional interpreters like Frederick Douglass and 
Abraham Lincoln contended that the framers’ had crafted their creation with the 
expectation that change would remove the national blight. Narratives focused on original 
expectations cultivated awareness that real historical distances separated Americans from 
their most favored and familiar pasts, but they also ensured these periods’ persistence as 
usable pasts. In contrast to the traditional view of the shallowness of antebellum historical 
thought, I argue that historical consciousness in that period took the form of an awareness 
of historical distance that allowed for and even encouraged the continued use of the past.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
On June 26, 1857, in a speech given in Springfield, Illinois, Abraham Lincoln 
crafted a historical narrative of the American founding that countered the one Chief 
Justice Roger B. Taney had provided in the Dred Scott decision three months prior. 
Taney had admitted that if “the general words” of the Preamble to the Declaration of 
Independence “were used in a similar instrument at this day” they would be understood to 
“embrace the whole human family,” but, as Lincoln explained, the Chief Justice had 
argued that “the authors of that instrument did not intend to include negroes.”1 In 
opposition to the assumption “that the public estimate of the black man is more favorable 
now than it was in the days of the Revolution,” Lincoln argued that “the change between 
then and now is decidedly the other way.”2 “In those days,” he noted, “our Declaration … 
was … thought to include all,” but now it was used “to aid in making the bondage of the 
negro universal and eternal.”3 The Kentucky-born lawyer conceded that the Declaration’s 
signers “did not mean to assert the obvious untruth, that all were then actually enjoying 
that equality, nor yet, that they were about to confer it immediately upon them. In fact,” 
he stated, “they had no power to confer such a boon.” Instead, he continued, the founders 
“meant simply to declare the right, so that the enforcement of it might follow as fast as 
circumstances should permit. They meant to set up a standard maxim for free society,” he 
argued, “which should be … constantly looked to, constantly labored for, and even 
                                                
1 Dred Scott v. John F A. Sandford, 60 US (19 Howard) 393, 410 (1857); 
Abraham Lincoln, “Speech at Springfield, Illinois, June 26, 1857,” in The Collected 
Works of Abraham Lincoln, ed. Roy P. Basler, 8 vols. (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 1953-55), 2:405 (hereafter as Collected Works).  
 2 Lincoln, “Speech at Springfield,” in Collected Works, 2:403, emphasis in the 
original.  
 3 Ibid., 2:404.  
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though never perfectly attained, constantly approximated, and thereby constantly 
spreading and deepening its influence, and augmenting the happiness and value of life to 
all people of all colors everywhere.”4 Otherwise, Lincoln explained, if the Declaration 
was a temporary measure and not meant “for future use,” then the “doings of that day had 
no reference to the present,” serving only as “an interesting memorial of the dead past.”5 
The premonition of a dead Revolutionary past, in particular, never loomed larger.6 
Lincoln harnessed the power of the founding era, but in noting the founders’ expedient 
approach to slavery, in identifying their original expectation of liberty’s spread, and in 
lamenting the proslavery betrayal of that expectation, he drew attention to the historical 
distance from the founding era. Although they fundamentally disagreed on the founders’ 
intentions, Taney and Lincoln concurred on a crucial point: times had changed. And 
while interpreters on opposing sides of the slavery controversy valued change differently, 
their efforts to either reject or privilege the interpretive importance of context 
underscored the distance that divided their own time from that of the founding 
generation. As Americans confronted the question of whether slavery was still morally 
acceptable—as they did so in a culture shaped by sacred texts, mythic pasts and a 
conflicted present—they awoke to an unprecedented awareness of historical distance. 
                                                
4 Ibid., 2:406, emphasis in the original.  
5 Ibid., 2:406, 407. 
6 I use the term Revolutionary past to refer to the period to which Lincoln and 
many other Americans appealed in calling on the framers of the United States 
government and its founding documents. This period includes the time between the 
writing of the Declaration of Independence and the ratification of the Constitution. In this 
study, then, Revolutionary past signifies not only the time in which England and its 
American colonies struggled for control of the eastern seaboard, but also the periods 
immediately preceding and following the war, including the founding moment, wherein 
the colonists formed a new nation. I also use the term founding to refer to this period. 
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Lincoln’s response to Dred Scott, along with Taney’s decision itself, followed 
from decades of interpretive debates over slavery and represented the culmination of a 
series of intellectual developments in the antebellum period. The historical nature of 
Taney’s decision and Lincoln’s response was symptomatic of the increasingly dominant 
approach to interpret the Constitution in particular and the founding era more generally 
through the use of historical exegesis. The potential for such an approach was evident at 
the founding itself, when the framers crafted national documents and a federal 
government meant to endure—compasses that their descendants would continue to use as 
guides even after their crafters had passed on. When the founding generation, and, more 
specifically, the last of the framers passed from the scene in the 1820s and 1830s, a range 
commentators and observers, including historians, orators, newspaper writers, lawyers, 
and politicians—in hopes of retaining the presence of their now deceased forebears—
sought to rescue the framers’ writings and apply their original truths to contemporary 
problems. As the slavery debates reached a fever pitch in the 1840s and 1850s, 
constitutional interpreters either upheld as paramount or dismissed as extraneous sources 
such as James Madison’s published papers. Soon, those privileging the use of historical 
evidence carried the day. Interpreters on either side of the slavery issue accepted the 
historical grounds of debate and crafted historical arguments meant to claim the 
Revolutionary past as either antislavery or proslavery. Thus, Taney believed that a 
historically grounded decision would settle the issue. Dred Scott affirmed the 
authoritative nature of historical appeals and critics of the decision, including Lincoln, 
countered with historical narratives of their own. In the process, these historical 
arguments—which illuminated historical context and change—uniquely exposed the 
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temporal distance from the founding era, an era culturally and socially distinct from the 
United States of the 1850s. And an awareness of historical distance simultaneously called 
into question the Constitution’s relevance and inspired innovative interpretive approaches 
that began to read it as a flexible text capable of adapting to historical change. 
That development depended on the constitutionalization of the slavery issue, 
whereby politicians and other commentators came to believe that an answer to the 
national problem over slavery depended on the right interpretation of the nation’s 
supreme source of legal authority. That process peaked in Dred Scott, when politicians 
looked to the Supreme Court to adjudicate the matter. The growing stress on a 
constitutional resolution developed in relation to the primarily historical debates about 
the Constitution’s relationship to slavery, which gained a wider audience via political 
developments in the 1850s. Thus, two already related and symbiotic intellectual 
developments, a then prevalent interpretive approach stressing the use of context and a 
growing imperative to defer to the Constitution to decide slavery’s fate, powerfully 
converged in Dred Scott. This high-level union had a profound potential to spread a new 
awareness of the kind of historical distance that results from the realization of the 
temporal dislocation between past and present that accompanies a recognition of 
profound differences in historical context.7 Historical debates about the nation’s hallowed 
legal text and its mythic Revolutionary past spread a knowledge of real temporal 
differences and changes since the founding era, which promised to foster an awareness of 
                                                
7 As explained in greater detail below, “historical consciousness” and “historical 
awareness” are scholarly terms of art that require some finessing. I most often use them 
to signify a growing awareness of historical distance between past and present eras, or, in 
this case, between biblical and Revolutionary times and nineteenth-century America.  
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historical distance from that period. This development alone warrants explanation in its 
own right, but a more complete and rich telling depends on a parallel account tracing how 
intellectual processes historicized another favored past, the biblical era. After all, the 
Constitution was not the only sacred text—and the Revolutionary era was not the only 
sacred past—to which antebellum Americans appealed for direction. 
The move to privilege historical examinations of the Constitution and the 
resulting realization of historical distance from the founding era followed from and 
overlapped with a similar, if more obscure, development in biblical hermeneutics. Indeed, 
I argue that an understanding of the constitutional debates that culminated on a national 
stage in Dred Scott and in the responses to it depends on an awareness of contemporary 
biblical debates, which, though somewhat esoteric, also stressed historical readings. Like 
their constitutional counterparts, antebellum biblical exegetes also prized historical 
approaches, which had begun to replace conventional interpretive forms in the eighteenth 
century. Those forms often ignored questions of historical specificity in discerning 
meaning and tended to flatten out time in making modern applications. The turn to 
historical explication in biblical interpretation began in earnest in the first two decades of 
the nineteenth century when the lessons of biblical criticism, and the emphasis on 
contextual interpretation in particular, infiltrated influential segments of antebellum 
religious discourse.  
Joseph Stevens Buckminster, who was elected as Harvard’s first professor of 
biblical criticism in 1811, explained that “instead of looking into every text, separated 
from its context, we should be content to understand the apostles, as they meant to be 
understood by those to whom they wrote. … They were not,” he stated, “on every 
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occasion, delivering a system of dogmas for the instruction of all succeeding time.”8 
Buckminster’s more theologically conservative contemporary, Andover’s Moses Stuart, 
agreed. In his lectures on hermeneutics, delivered around the same time, he urged his 
students to “let every writer be placed in his own age.” Stuart encouraged them “to reject 
the monstrous exegesis” that treats the apostles’ words as though spoken “but yesterday 
and with all our feelings and prejudices.”9 To be sure, Unitarians like Buckminster, 
Congregationalists such as Stuart, Presbyterians like Charles Hodge, and 
Transcendentalists such as Theodore Parker differed from one another in their selective 
incorporations of biblical criticism, but in combination their uses unmistakably, if often 
inadvertently and indirectly, exposed the Bible’s time-bound characteristics. Parker, who 
went further than perhaps any of his American contemporaries in engaging and 
incorporating the principles of German biblical criticism, drew attention to historical 
distance to privilege conscience and to damn outdated creeds. Even when Buckminster, 
Stuart, or Hodge partook of traditional approaches by ignoring historical distance in 
applying scripture on questions such as slavery, their studies highlighted the distance 
from biblical eras and thus problematized attempts, including their own, to conflate time 
and assert the continued relevance of certain biblical teachings. These relatively isolated 
discussions about biblical interpretation had far-reaching implications. The historical 
nature of these somewhat recondite interpretive discussions informed the constitutional 
debates that followed or, at least, readied participants in those debates, including some of 
the same figures, to engage in similar kinds of historical argumentation. Learned 
                                                
8 Joseph S. Buckminster, “Philemon,” in Sermons by the late Rev. Joseph S. 
Buckminster, 2d. ed. (Boston: Wells and Lilly, 1815), 83, 83-84. 
9 Moses Stuart, Lecture 6, Lectures on Hermeneutics, quoted in John H. Giltner, 
Moses Stuart: The Father of Biblical Science in America (Atlanta: Scholars, 1988), 54.  
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conversations about historical readings of the Bible among intellectual elites reverberated 
in public debates about historical readings of the Constitution. And, in both cases, the 
growing slavery crisis raised the stakes. It placed an unprecedented amount of pressure 
on the Bible and the Constitution through relatively rigorous historical examination, 
which accentuated the historical distance from the biblical and founding eras.  
In this dissertation, I demonstrate how the growing slavery crisis in antebellum 
America heightened the contestations in biblical and constitutional interpretation and 
brought those interpretive traditions together. And I argue that the parallel interpretive 
debates about slavery significantly historicized the nation’s two most favored and useful 
pasts. The Bible and the Constitution took on special meaning in the new republic. Many 
Americans began pointing to the era of Revolution and ratification as the starting point to 
their history as a Christian nation and singled out the Bible and the Constitution as their 
founding religious and legal texts. This set the stage for discussions about sacred texts 
and hallowed pasts with timeless appeal. Americans used these historical eras in ways 
that made them especially favored and uniquely familiar. However, the textual nature of 
these pasts also held unique potential to expose historical distance when slavery inspired 
unprecedented historical investigation of the Bible and the Constitution. This 
development in American historical awareness coincided with broader intellectual shifts 
and changes in the Western world, including an understanding of time as progressive and 
linear, rather than cyclical, a realization of the chronological depth of the earth’s history, 
and the development of more mechanistic and materialistic, rather than providential, 
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approaches to the natural world.10 The interpretive debates over slavery, then, contributed 
to the rise of a more modern historical awareness in American intellectual culture. 
This is not a study of the Bible and of the Constitution, or even of slavery, per se, 
but rather an exploration of the role antebellum slavery debates played in historicizing 
America’s sacred religious and legal texts and their venerated pasts. In particular, I aim to 
explain how the interpretive debates over slavery spread awareness of historical distance 
among a broad group of interpreters. Some minimized and some maximized the 
interpretive importance of historical distance, but in either case their debates brought new 
attention to it. Constitutional arguments like Lincoln’s, which stressed the antislavery 
expectations of the nation’s founders, and similar biblical arguments that emphasized the 
antislavery principles inculcated by Christianity’s founders, tended to disclose the 
historical distance from the very pasts to which Americans looked for answers. The idea 
that certain historical figures had articulated, in certain historical texts, specific universal 
promises that they could not realize in their own time but that future generations could 
and would, encouraged an emphasis on historical difference from and change since the 
biblical and Revolutionary pasts. I thus contend that biblical and constitutional debates 
over slavery combined with broader developments in historical thought to deepen and 
expand American historical awareness in ways heretofore overlooked. And the process of 
historicizing America’s sacred texts and favored pasts—historical documents and eras 
                                                
10 On the realization that the earth’s history stretched back well beyond available 
human records and, especially, on the efforts of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
scientific figures to understand that history, see Martin J. S. Rudwick, Bursting the Limits 
of Time: The Reconstruction of Geohistory in the Age of Revolution (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2005); and Martin J. S. Rudwick, Worlds Before Adam: The 
Reconstruction of Geohistory in the Age of Reform (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 2008).   
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with seemingly timeless appeal—contributed to the a growing sense that nothing existed 
outside of time and that everything bore the marks of temporal vicissitude. In essence, the 
crisis over slavery in America became a crisis of historicity. While the deepening 
awareness of historical distance led some to repudiate the Bible and the Constitution as 
products of foreign pasts, it also inspired innovative approaches wherein interpreters read 
them as flexible guides to the present and future. The development would allow Lincoln 
to assert that the proper circumstances had emerged in which he was duty-bound to fulfill 
the antislavery promises of the founders. Thus, the antebellum confrontation with history 
complicated but did not discourage the use of the past; instead, it compelled Americans to 
adopt new approaches to favored pasts and sacred texts. 
 
The Historiographical and Historical Groundwork 
Scholars often attribute the spread of European historical awareness to the failures 
of the French Revolution and the upheavals of the Napoleonic Wars.11 Historical 
                                                
11 For an analysis of how the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars 
deepened European historical consciousness, see Peter Fritzsche, Stranded in the Present: 
Modern Time and the Melancholy of History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2004). On the relationship between the French Revolution and German historicism in 
particular, see Georg Iggers, The German Conception of History: The National Tradition 
of Historical Thought from Herder to the Present (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University 
Press, 1968), 3-89. On the complicated relationship between the Enlightenment and 
German historicism, see Peter Hanns Reill, “Science and the Construction of the Cultural 
Sciences in Late Enlightenment Germany: The Case of Wilhelm von Humboldt,” History 
and Theory 33 (1994): 345-66; and Jonathan Knudsen, “The Historicist Enlightenment,” 
in What’s Left of Enlightenment? A Postmodern Question, ed. Keith Michael Baker and 
Peter Hanns Reill (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 39-49. For ways in which 
the French Revolution cultivated a new and renewed interest in history in France, 
specifically, see Andrew Jainchill, Reimagining Politics After the Terror: The Republican 
Origins of French Liberalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 31-35, 82-84, 
264-74; Martin S. Staum, Minerva’s Message: Stabilizing the French Revolution 
(Buffalo: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996), 4, 136-37, 218-23; and Tom 
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consciousness or awareness12 is often characterized as a belief that all aspects of human 
experience can best be explained historically, that is, in terms of historical 
development—a concept frequently labeled as historicism13—and a concomitant 
                                                                                                                                            
Stammers, “The Refuse of the Revolution: Autograph Collecting in France, 1789-1860,” 
in Historicising the French Revolution, ed. Carolina Armenteros et al. (Newcastle, UK: 
Cambridge Scholars, 2008), 39-63. On the development of European historicism more 
generally, see Maurice Mandelbaum, History, Man, and Reason: A Study in Nineteenth-
Century Thought (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971). Much of the 
historiography on the spread of European historical consciousness follows from Georg 
Lukács’s The Historical Novel (1937), wherein he argues that “the French Revolution, 
the revolutionary wars and rise and fall of Napoleon…for the first time made history a 
mass experience, and moreover on a European scale.” Lukács, The Historical Novel, 
trans. Hannah and Stanley Mitchell (London: Merlin Press, 1962), 23, emphasis in 
original. 
12 While focused on historical distance as a measure of modern historical 
consciousness, this study is also interested in a number of related ideas associated with 
the term, including a general realization that past, present, and future temporalities are 
self-contained and separate fragments of time, that unpredictable change constitutes 
human existence, and that historical development is a contingent process bound up with 
human action. These ideas inform and are informed by the historicist belief that societal 
and cultural forms and, in its more radical form, human nature are best understood as 
products of non-teleological historical forces. One might also describe historical 
consciousness as an orientation (e.g. classical, biblical, medieval, Revolutionary). For 
theoretical discussions about historical consciousness from the perspective of memory 
studies and psychology, see Peter C. Seixas, ed., Theorizing Historical Consciousness 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004). See also, Jürgen Straub, ed., Narration, 
Identity, and Historical Consciousness (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005). 
13 “Historicism,” like “historical consciousness,” is a tricky term with a 
complicated history. It has been used to signify a variety of historiographical practices, 
approaches and concepts, both overlapping and diverging from the meanings of historical 
consciousness. It also holds different if related meanings across scholarly disciplines. In 
the discipline of history, perhaps most frequently the term has been attributed to a 
popular strand of nineteenth- and twentieth-century German philosophical and historical 
thought and practice. Previously, thinkers used the term “historism,” or historismus, in 
reference to this intellectual tradition, but in the latter half of the twentieth century, 
“historicism” gradually replaced “historism.” Since that time, historicism has picked up 
more expansive meanings, though ones still tied to the German school of historical 
thought. For an account and critique of the German historicism of historians such as 
Wilhelm von Humboldt and Leopold von Ranke and their successors, who believed 
human existence could be best explained through historically and nationally determined 
values, see Iggers’s classic text, The German Conception of History. For an account that 
historicizes the crisis of relativism among early twentieth-century historicists by 
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widespread realization of substantial historical change and contingency. The rise of 
historical consciousness in the United States—which was insulated from the full 
intellectual fallout of the French Revolution—seems to have followed a different 
trajectory than European historical consciousness. Historians have largely assumed that 
Americans, as opposed to Europeans, did not develop a modern historical consciousness 
(in which periods of time were seen as shaped by materialist historical contingencies that 
rendered them fundamentally distinct and temporally distant) until the late nineteenth 
century. This narrative holds that the success of the American Revolution fueled linear 
millennial and cyclical republican notions, which combined to delay the incorporation of 
historicist thinking even among German-educated historians like George Bancroft. 
Unsurprisingly, the thesis of a delayed shift from the providential, Romantic, and literary 
approaches espoused by antebellum writers like Bancroft to the objective historicist 
outlook associated with late nineteenth-century thinkers and historians, first found 
articulation among the latter group.14 More recently, the thesis has come to rest on the 
                                                                                                                                            
describing it as a spatial issue resulting from historicism’s failure to solve the immediate 
problems of post-World War I Germany, see Colin T. Loader, “German Historicism and 
Its Crisis,” Journal of Modern History 48 (September 1976): 85-119. For a brief 
description of the displacement of the term historism for historicism, see Carl Page, 
Philosophical Historicism and the Betrayal of First Philosophy (University Park: The 
Pennsylvania State University, 1995), 11-45. See also, Georg Iggers, “Historicism,” in 
Dictionary of the History of Ideas, ed. Philip P. Wiener, vol. 2 (New York: Charles 
Scribner, 1968), 456-64.  
14 See, for example, James Franklin Jameson, The History of Historical Writing in 
America (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1891). In tracing the relationship between 
nineteenth-century German and American historical thought, one must also attend to 
different measures. One historian, at least, has challenged the assumption that the 
professionalization of history in the United States. followed the German model. See 
Eckhardt Fuchs, “Conceptions of Scientific History in the Nineteenth-Century West,” in 
Turning Points in Historiography: A Cross-Cultural Perspective, ed. Q. Edward Wang 
and George G. Iggers (Rochester, NY: The University of Rochester Press, 2002), 147-61. 
For a discussion of the Pragmatist contribution to a historicist outlook in the late 
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assumption that historicism was, in Dorothy Ross’s words, “closely bound up with the 
process of secularization.”15 According to this formulation, secular trends advanced and 
spread a sense among Europeans that real changes divided qualitatively distinct historical 
eras from each other, while religiosity—with its appeal to ahistorical and unseen forces 
that united surface level differences—blunted a similar development across the Atlantic. 
This narrative fails to identify how the efforts of antebellum historical writers 
advanced historical methodologies. More importantly for the purposes of this study, by 
focusing on how religiosity hindered the development of historical consciousness—and 
assuming that the process was strictly secular—this account overlooks the ways in which 
religion spurred that development both in Europe and in America.16 The traditional 
                                                                                                                                            
nineteenth century, see Louis Menand, The Metaphysical Club: A Story of Ideas in 
America (New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 2001).  
15 Dorothy Ross, “Historical Consciousness in Nineteenth Century America,” 
American Historical Review 89 (1984): 909-28, quotation on 910. In her discussion of the 
Progressives’ historical thought, Ross relies on Morton White’s, Social Thought in 
America: The Revolt Against Formalism, rev. ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957). For an 
alternative account that describes historical consciousness—defined as consciousness of 
historical thinking—as a unique aspect of Western Christian civilization, and which 
separates historical from scientific thinking, see John Lukacs, Historical Consciousness; 
Or, the Remembered Past (New York: Harper and Row, 1968).  
16 In The Plain and Noble Garb of Truth: Nationalism & Impartiality in American 
Historical Writing, 1784-1860 (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 2008), Eileen 
K. Cheng has recently challenged the traditional narrative on historical writing in 
America. She confronts the Whiggish view which posits a clear evolution from the 
shallow, mythic, and filiopietistic histories of amateur antebellum historians to the 
objective and critical histories of late-nineteenth-century professional historians. Her 
analysis of antebellum historical writers demonstrates how their conflicting nationalisms 
and exceptionalisms cultivated rather than hindered the development of modern 
methodologies, directing attempts at impartiality, objectivity, and originality. She also 
evidences that the rise of the novel shaped methodological and topical debates about 
historical writing, which set the stage for the emergence of history as an autonomous 
discipline. In a recent review of Cheng’s work, Dorothy Ross, a relatively recent 
purveyor of a more sophisticated version of the traditional narrative, grants that “Cheng 
makes her point,” and writes that “future examinations of nineteenth-century historical 
consciousness will have to take into account the ability of American exceptionalism to 
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understanding, then, distorts developments on both sides of the Atlantic. One corrective 
to this myopia might involve highlighting the religious underpinnings of the historicism 
of figures such as German historian Leopold von Ranke, which would help remedy the 
proclivity to see a yawning gap between American and European thought while also 
correcting the secularist assumptions about the rise of modern historical consciousness.17 
Taking a related tack, Thomas Howard argues that “theological presuppositions and 
religious attitudes shadowed and shaped nineteenth-century historicist thinking.”18 More 
                                                                                                                                            
dramatize contingency as well as extrahistorical foundations, to deepen historical 
awareness as well as annul the perception of historical change.” Dorothy Ross, “A New 
Look at Nineteenth-Century Historical Consciousness from the Modern/Postmodern 
Divide,” Modern Intellectual History 9, no. 2 (2012): 455-56.  
17 Historians have misinterpreted Ranke’s historicism, which relied on a 
panentheistic view, wherein the particulars of the past correspond to the totality of God. 
On the misinterpretation of Ranke, see Georg G. Iggers, “The Image of Ranke in 
American and German Historical Thought,” History and Theory 2, no. 1 (1962): 17-40; 
Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American 
Historical Profession (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 21-46; and 
Dorothy Ross, “On the Misunderstanding of Ranke and the Origins of the Historical 
Profession in America,” in Leopold von Ranke and the Shaping of the Historical 
Discipline, ed. Georg G. Iggers and James M. Powell (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse 
University Press, 1990), 154-69. For an example of Ranke’s panentheism, see Ranke, 
“On Progress in History,” in The Theory and Practice of History, ed. George G. Iggers 
and Konrad von Moltke (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973), 53. In Cheng’s reading, 
Bancroft and Ranke displayed important methodological affinities, as both shared an 
interest in primary sources, impartiality, and providence. Indeed, she contends that 
Bancroft’s interest in unintended consequences followed from his providential 
understanding, showing that religious views fostered the development of historical 
thinking. Cheng, Plain and Noble Garb, 143-51.  
 18 Thomas A. Howard, Religion and the Rise of Historicism: W.M.L. de Wette, 
Jacob Burckhardt, and the Theological Origins of Nineteenth-Century Historical 
Consciousness (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), quotation on 4. Howard 
defines historicism as “heightened sensitivity to history and to the ‘constructed’ character 
of one’s beliefs” (ibid., 1). He distinguishes between two variants of historicism, 
including “classical historicism,” associated with the scholarly practice of Ranke and his 
successors, and “crisis historicism,” identified with relativism. Howard allows that the 
first informed the appearance of the second in some settings, as in the case of Ernst 
Troeltsch, but argues that “crisis historicism” developed as a theological and 
hermeneutical problem within Protestantism. While focused on different eras of 
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specifically, he contends that the historicism of German historian Jacob Burckhardt must 
be understood as having developed in dialogue with the biblical scholarship of his 
mentor, the German theologian Wilhelm Martin Leberecht de Wette. Howard proposes 
that the historical-critical approach to scripture in nineteenth-century Europe “created in 
large part the preconditions for the emergence of historicism and for the academic 
independence of secular historiography.”19 He concludes, then, that European 
Protestantism served as a “codetermining factor” in the emergence of secularism.20 This 
dissertation demonstrates that American Protestant thought, and biblical scholarship in 
particular, played a similar role in the development of American historical consciousness, 
and in a growing awareness of historical distance in particular. Antebellum biblical 
scholarship spread a realization of the qualitative temporal divisions separating biblical 
from modern times and attuned participants in constitutional interpretation to historical 
approaches and arguments that led to a similar realization of the historical distance 
separating the Revolutionary past from mid-nineteenth-century present. Biblical debates 
                                                                                                                                            
American historical writing, a number of scholars have argued that religious worldviews 
stunted and that secularized developments advanced historical methodologies. See, for 
example, Peter Gay, A Loss of Mastery: Puritan Historians in Colonial America 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966); and Lester Cohen, The Revolutionary 
Histories: Contemporary Narratives of the American Revolution (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1980). For more nuanced discussions of the role of religion in the 
development of American historical thought, which nonetheless take cues from the 
traditional narrative of American historical awareness, see Caroline Winterer, The 
Culture of Classicism: Ancient Greece and Rome in American Intellectual Life, 1780-
1910 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 89-92; and Eran Shalev, 
Rome Reborn on Western Shores: Historical Imagination and the Creation of the 
American Republic (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2009), 91-93, 112-13.  
19 Howard, Religion and the Rise, 15.  
20 Ibid., 22. 
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among religious thinkers, then, had long-term implications for the emergence of a 
modern American historical consciousness.21  
A few scholars interested in antebellum biblical criticism have examined the 
historical nature of such criticism, but they have not explained how this relates to the 
development of American historical consciousness.22 As does this dissertation, Michael J. 
Lee’s recent work, The Erosion of Biblical Certainty (2013), traces American biblical 
interpreters’ growing emphasis on historical readings. Lee demonstrates that, beginning 
in the eighteenth century, theologically conservative American interpreters, including 
figures like Jonathan Edwards, Joseph S. Buckminster, Andrews Norton, and Moses 
Stuart used historical interpretation to defend the Bible. In the process, Lee argues, these 
                                                
21 More generally, a few scholars posit the importance of religious thought in the 
development of a modern historical consciousness. For example, Anthony Kemp argues 
that the continuous rejection of immediate pasts for the purity of primitive pasts in 
Christian thought created an awareness of supersessive change. Kemp’s narrative adds a 
deep Christian dimension to the revolution in historical consciousness that accompanied 
the Renaissance thinkers’ rejection of the “dark ages” and their appeal to the classical 
golden age. Anthony Kemp, The Estrangement of the Past: A Study in the Origins of 
Modern Historical Consciousness (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). Kemp’s 
account provides an alternative to that of J. G. A. Pocock, who argues that a realization of 
secular time and an understanding of substantial historical change arose in the post-
Renaissance period, when Florentine, English, and American civic humanists conceived 
of the republic as an institution meant to counter the chaos of a seemingly inevitable 
cyclical historical process. J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine 
Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1975).  
22 See Jerry Brown, The Rise of Biblical Criticism in America, 1800-1870: The 
New England Scholars (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1969); Richard A. 
Grusin, Transcendentalist Hermeneutics: Institutional Authority and the Higher Criticism 
of the Bible (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991); and Elizabeth Hurth, Between 
Faith and Unbelief: American Transcendentalists and the Challenge of Atheism (Leiden: 
BRILL, 2007). In his recent work, Sacred Borders: Continuing Revelation and Canonical 
Restraint in Early America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), David F. 
Holland contends that in their historical examinations of the Bible, liberal and 
conservative biblical interpreters “drove the historical distance of the ancient scriptures 
deeper into the center of Americans’ religious thought” (ibid., 105). This dissertation 
seeks to further explore this development.  
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interpreters undermined the traditional view of the scriptures as infallible divine texts. He 
thus corrects the impression that Americans did not deal with the problems raised by 
biblical criticism until late in the nineteenth century. I trace a similar development across 
an even broader scale of biblical interpreters. I include a discussion of Edwards, and 
focus on contextual interpretation among both antebellum conservatives like Stuart and 
liberals like Norton, but I also give sustained attention to more radical thinkers such as 
Theodore Parker. This inclusive approach introduces narrative complications. Displaying 
the varieties of approaches among different groups of interpreters can create confusion. 
However, it allows me to trace actual historical conversations and to highlight both the 
distinctive interpretive approaches and the shared emphasis on historical explication that 
emerged from those conversations. While I emphasize the growing emphasis on 
contextual interpretation and the undermining potential of that interpretive decision, I am 
most concerned with how these developments created and deepened awareness of 
historical distance and how the issue of slavery furthered that process.23 
A number of works on the biblical debates over slavery make mention of the 
historical nature of these arguments, but, with the recent exceptions of Eran Shalev’s 
American Zion (2013) and Molly Oshatz’s Slavery and Sin (2012), their projects are not 
concerned with the implications of the historical components of those debates.24 Shalev 
                                                
23 Michael J. Lee, The Erosion of Biblical Certainty: Battles over Authority and 
Interpretation in America (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
24 See, for example, Mark A. Noll, “The Bible and Slavery” in Religion and the 
American Civil War, ed. Randall M. Miller, Harry S. Stout, and Charles Reagan Wilson 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 43-73; Mark A. Noll, The Civil War as a 
Theological Crisis (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 31-74; 
and James Albert Harrill, “The Use of the New Testament in the American Slave 
Controversy: A Case History in the Hermeneutical Tension between Biblical Criticism 
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outlines the prevalence of “Old Testamentism” in the political culture of the early 
republic and the antebellum era, explaining how Americans’ Old Testament associations 
tended to bring together biblical and American times. He also describes the declining 
appeal of the Hebrew scriptures, which began around 1830, and attributes this 
development to democratization, the Christ-centered religion of the Second Great 
Awakening, and the biblical argument over slavery. Shalev explains that “the new 
historical consciousness that arose as a result of the repeated comparisons between 
biblical and American slaveries would further render the American Israel as an 
anachronistic image for exactly those who were its most ardent proponents.” Such 
comparisons revealed the contrast between the ancient and the new Israel. This 
dissertation expands on the process of historicizing the Old Testament, showing the role 
of biblical criticism in setting the stage for this development. It also shows how the 
slavery debates highlighted historical distance from primitive Christian times and 
troubled New Testament uses and associations.25  
In her study, Molly Oshatz more directly focuses on the antebellum slavery 
debates, which she ties to the emergence of liberal Protestantism. Oshatz traces how 
moderate antislavery Protestants, including William Ellery Channing, Francis Wayland, 
and Moses Stuart, began to develop an argument that although slavery was mala en se—
evil in itself—the revelation of that understanding evolved in relation to the varied 
circumstances and contexts of human existence. She contends that while these writers 
                                                                                                                                            
and Christian Moral Debate,” Religion and American Culture: A Journal of 
Interpretation 10 (Summer 2000): 149-86.  
25 Eran Shalev, American Zion: The Old Testament as a Political Text from the 
Revolution to the Civil War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013), quotation on 
152.  
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were unaware of the radical implications of their reasoning—that “individual moral 
responsibility varied according to social context”—their innovative theological argument 
for moral progress informed late nineteenth-century liberal Protestant understandings and 
articulations of the revelatory process as organic and developmental. Oshatz writes that 
the Civil War and emancipation, which confirmed and made obvious the insight that 
God’s revelation progressed in relation to historical context, concealed the origins of the 
insight. Similar to late nineteenth-century historians, post-bellum liberal Protestants 
failed to acknowledge that their antebellum predecessors had laid the groundwork for 
their positions. As with Oshatz’s narrative, this study also attends to the ways in which 
the antebellum biblical debates over slavery deepened historical awareness, but rather 
than explain that process in terms of the gradual emergence of relativism, it focuses on 
the related but distinct realization of historical distance.26    
This dissertation further reconsiders religion’s role in antebellum historical 
thought by exploring how Transcendentalists Ralph Waldo Emerson and Theodore 
Parker used biblical criticism to unhinge religious truth from its necessary connection to 
ancient biblical texts and actors and instead locate it in human intuition. Oshatz adds a 
neglected and useful context to the development of liberal Protestantism in America, but 
                                                
26 Molly Oshatz, Slavery and Sin: The Fight Against Slavery and the Rise of 
Liberal Protestantism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), quotation on 83. 
Although focused on a later cast of characters, Grant Wacker also examines religious 
thought to understand the development of American historical consciousness. As with 
traditional narratives, he focuses on late nineteenth-century figures. He trains his 
attention on the work of Baptist Augustus H. Strong, in particular, who stood between 
liberals who understood religious truths as mediated through historical processes and 
conservatives who asserted that such truths had been ahistorically received. Strong came 
to the conclusion that religious knowledge was a historical product but that religious truth 
still stood above and outside of time. Grant Wacker, Augustus H. Strong and the 
Dilemma of Historical Consciousness (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1985). 
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in doing so she lends credence to the caricature of Transcendentalist thinking as 
ahistorical by contrasting their ideas with the historical arguments of moderate 
antislavery advocates.27 This depiction, only the latest in a long line of similar portrayals, 
mischaracterizes the Transcendentalists by ignoring the historical components of their 
projects.28 Scholars have only recently begun to evidence the more nuanced historical 
nature of their writings, including their biblical scholarship.29 For example, Elizabeth 
Hurth argues that many of them, including Emerson and Parker, maintained that the New 
                                                
 27 See Oshatz, Slavery and Sin, 4, 61-62, 102-5, 123-27.  
 28 For an example of a treatment that identifies Emerson and Parker, in particular, 
as ahistorical thinkers, see R. W. B. Lewis, The American Adam: Innocence, Tragedy, 
and Tradition in the Nineteenth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955). 
For a list of other scholars who treat Emerson as an ahistorical thinker, see Eduardo 
Cadava, Emerson and the Climates of History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1997), 10. 
29 The historiography countering the ahistorical depiction of Emerson, in 
particular, is growing. A number of historians contend that an engagement with the past 
was crucial to Emerson’s intellectual project. For example, in demonstrating the 
influence of European Romanticism on Emerson, Lucy Pearce shows the centrality of 
history in his worldview. Lucy Pearce, “Re-Visioning History: Countering Emerson’s 
Alleged Ahistoricity,” European Journal of American Culture 26, no. 1 (2007): 41-56. 
See also, Patrick Keane, Emerson, Romanticism, and Intuitive Reason: The Transatlantic 
“Light of All Our Day” (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2005), 193-97. 
Similarly, in “The Metempsychotic Mind: Emerson and Consciousness,” Journal of the 
History of Ideas 71 (July 2010): 433-55, John Michael Corrigan argues that Emerson’s 
“intellectual engagement with history is…equated with the awakening of the soul’s 
power” (ibid., 437). Eduardo Cadava contends that Emerson understood language as a 
political and thus historical product, which allowed him to appropriate language and put 
it to use, as in his tropological associations and natural metaphors. Cadava, Emerson and 
the Climates of History. Others trace how the realization of deep time, through geological 
findings, created a sense of displacement that led Emerson to focus on the here and now 
and accept change as a powerful part of modern life. See James R. Guthrie, Above Time: 
Emerson’s and Thoreau’s Temporal Revolutions (Columbia: University of Missouri 
Press, 2001), and Thomas M. Allen, A Republic in Time: Temporality and Social 
Imagination in Nineteenth-Century America (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 2008), 186-216. These and similar works provide a useful corrective, 
though some of them tend to swing the pendulum too far the other way. In their focus on 
the Transcendentalists’ awareness and acceptance of historicity and historical change, 
they sometimes lose sight of their persistent appeal to religious universals. 
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Testament texts and the person of Jesus Christ correlated to historical realities.30 This 
dissertation shows how they used historical reasoning to escape the problems inherent in 
a historically grounded belief system and suggests that the critique of what they observed 
to be their contemporaries’ overreliance on certain biblical texts and figures had the 
potential to deepen attentive Americans’ awareness of temporal distinction and distance.  
As with the related developments traced in this examination, the deepening of that 
awareness was not necessarily an intended consequence or a straightforward process. 
Each of the writers discussed in this study approached historical explication differently, 
and each approach raised the issue of historical distance in unique ways, but all of them 
brought new attention to it. Awareness of historical distance helped historicize American 
Protestants’ sacred texts and favored pasts, but that process also called into question the 
timelessness of the Transcendentalists’ presumably ahistorical basis of faith. If 
Emerson’s and Parker’s writings indicated that all pasts, even the most useful and sacred, 
could be historicized, then why not the eternal now as well? As Parker used biblical 
criticism to exalt what he perceived to be a universal religious sense, his observations led 
him to conclude that religion progressed over time and in relation to varied 
circumstances. This position highlighted the contingent nature of divine illumination. 
Further, holding onto a few permanent truths as existing above time while pointing out 
the many transient ideas existing in time expanded the sphere of the material, a sphere 
that threatened to engulf Parker’s eternal basis of belief despite his best efforts to escape 
                                                
30 Elizabeth Hurth, Between Faith and Unbelief, 31-76. While highlighting the 
Transcendentalists’ historical thought through an examination of their biblical criticism, 
and thus helping correct the ahistorical label, Hurth contributes to the irreligious 
depiction in arguing that “the tendencies toward atheism were inherent in 
Transcendentalist thought” (ibid., 2).  
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it. In tracing these developments, this dissertation revalues the role of religion in the 
development of American historical awareness. 
Relative to the scholarship on biblical interpretation, there are even fewer studies 
on the process of historicizing the Constitution and the Revolutionary period in the 
antebellum era. There are a number of important works examining the role of the 
Revolutionary past in that period, but most of them focus on the usefulness of the 
Revolution rather than explore the ways in which historical epistemologies problematized 
such usage.31 Eran Shalev’s Rome Reborn on Western Shores (2009) provides a partial 
exception. In his final chapter, he argues that the early republic’s historians, including 
Mercy Otis Warren and David Ramsay, classicized the Revolution in their accounts, 
depicting it as an epic event filled with classical-like heroes. These writers described the 
Revolutionary era as a kind of classical golden age from which Americans, due to a loss 
of virtue, had since departed. Their declensionist tales created the perception of greater 
distance than actually existed. For a time, the Revolution seemed more like an ancient 
foreign event than a recent American undertaking. But upholding a past as a golden age 
also implies the possibility of its recovery. In other words, if these accounts introduced a 
kind of historical distance from the founding era, that perception was diminished by the 
implication that the nation’s citizens could reclaim that period through their virtuous acts. 
                                                
31 See, Michael Kammen, A Season of Youth: The American Revolution and the 
Historical Imagination (New York: Knopf, 1978); Alfred Fabian Young, The Shoemaker 
and the Tea Party: Memory and the American Revolution (Boston: Beacon, 1999); and 
Sarah J. Purcell, Sealed with Blood: War, Sacrifice, and Memory in Revolutionary 
America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002). See also, Margot 
Minardi, Making Slavery History: Abolitionism and the Politics of Memory in 
Massachusetts (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), esp. chaps. 3 and 5; and 
Harlow Sheidley, Sectional Nationalism: Massachusetts Conservative Leaders and the 
Transformation of America, 1815-1836 (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1998), 
esp. chap. 5. 
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Republican views of time were fundamentally cyclical; and those views persisted in the 
new republic. Such outlooks contributed to a growing sense of corrupting change, but 
they also lent credence to the idea of virtuous redemption.32 My dissertation is similarly 
focused on the emerging perception or awareness of historical distance from the 
Revolutionary era, but I am most concerned with discovering the ways in which debates 
over slavery contributed to a realization of distance from that period resulting not from a 
nostalgic desire to recover the past, but rather from a willingness to acknowledge that 
recovery might not be possible or even desirable. 
Studies examining the relationship between history and law in nineteenth-century 
America are scarce, and while a few works on specific thinkers, such as Supreme Court 
Justice Benjamin Robbins Curtis, or certain cases, including Dred Scott, attend to the 
historical components of constitutional interpretation, the relationship between 
constitutional construction and historical awareness remains largely unexamined.33 A 
recent study briefly explores the antebellum origins of originalist thought in America, but 
it focuses on the twentieth century and is not concerned with the implications of 
                                                
32 Shalev also attends to the Revolutionaries’ view that perhaps the new republic 
would escape the republican cycle of a rise and fall traced in Pocock’s Machiavellian 
Moment. Shalev, Rome Reborn, 73-113. On a sense of breaking free from history in this 
period, see also, Joyce Appleby, Capitalism and a New Social Order: The Republican 
Vision of the 1790s (New York: New York University Press, 1984). In The Elusive 
Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1980), Drew McCoy complicates the narrative of an abrupt transition 
from republican cyclical view to a liberal progressive view, arguing that figures such as 
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison aimed to restore first principles and increasingly 
felt that despite the preponderance of available land, America was also subject to the old 
cycle. 
33 On Curtis’s constitutional thought, see Stuart Streichler, Justice Curtis in the 
Civil War Era: At the Crossroads of American Constitutionalism (Charlottesville: 
University of Virginia Press, 2005). The classic work on Dred Scott and its historical 
aspects is Don E. Fehrenbacher’s The Dred Scott Case: Its Significance in American Law 
and Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978). 
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originalism for historical awareness.34 Two other recent works, David Rabban’s Law’s 
History (2013) and Kunal Parker’s Common Law, History, and Democracy in America 
(2011), attend to the historical nature of American legal thought. Rabban breaks apart the 
caricature of late nineteenth-century legal thought as dominated by deductive formalism 
in arguing that historical thinking pervaded legal scholarship in this period. His 
compendious and convincing study helps bridge the supposed gap between European and 
American thought. However, his analysis focuses on the post-bellum period, lending 
itself to the traditional narrative of America’s delayed turn to history. Thus, it threatens to 
obscure the rich historical nature of antebellum legal thought.35   
In contrast, Kunal Parker uncovers the historical components of legal thinking in 
America from the late eighteenth century up through the nineteenth century. He aims to 
look behind the modernist legal tradition that emerged in the work of figures such as 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who rejected what he perceived as law’s claim of 
atemporality and sought to unveil its temporal origins. Parker argues that throughout the 
nineteenth century, common-law thinkers knowingly subjected law to history even while 
they found it to embody the direction of history. He includes a discussion of the slavery 
debates, tracing, for example the thought of antislavery constitutionalist Lysander 
Spooner, who separated the natural and permanent antislavery laws he found embodied in 
the Constitution from the unnatural and temporal state laws upholding southern slavery. 
When he received pushback from Garrisonian Wendell Phillips, who critiqued his 
position as unrealistic, Spooner suggested that common law conformed to natural law. In 
                                                
34 Johnathan O’Neill, Originalism in American Law and Politics: A Constitutional 
History (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2005). 
35 David M. Rabban, Law’s History: American Legal Thought and the 
Transatlantic Turn to History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
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response to abolitionist arguments, southerner George F. Fitzhugh characterized slavery 
as a natural and universal societal law while describing free societies as unnatural and 
unsustainable. Similar to Spooner, however, he believed that common law embodied 
determinative societal law. In Parker’s account, these figures subjected common law to 
seemingly unchanging natural and social laws, even while suggesting that those laws 
aligned with the slow and gradual process of history.36 I likewise aim to outline the 
relationship between nineteenth-century legal thought and history, though I am less 
interested in showing how common-law commentators understood the relationship 
between law and historical contexts and circumstances than I am with demonstrating how 
the issue of slavery led constitutional thinkers to discover historical change and distance 
and to read the Constitution in the light of history. 
William W. Wiecek wrote the seminal text on the American constitutional debate 
over slavery. His narrative, which focuses on the period between 1760 and 1848, traces 
the development of antislavery argumentation until its concretization in the 1840s, when 
radical antislavery constitutionalists contended that the Constitution did not simply limit 
slavery as a state institution but actually made illegal that institution’s existence in the 
American South. Wiecek mentions the constitutionalists’ special focus on the Declaration 
of Independence and, though he emphasizes their dismissal of historical evidence as 
extraneous to constitutional interpretation, he also notes their attempts to locate 
antislavery sentiment in the founding era. His narrative demonstrates how even those 
                                                
36 Kunal M. Parker, Common Law, History, and Democracy in America: 1790-
1900: Legal Thought before Modernism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
In her review of Eileen Cheng’s work, Dorothy Ross also attends to Parker’s study and 
concedes that these works in tandem succeed in revising the narrative positing 
nineteenth-century Americans shallow historical consciousness. See note 16 above.  
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who downplayed historical sources were drawn into historical argumentation. Wiecek’s 
work provides an important starting point for an analysis of the historical implications of 
antislavery constitutionalism.37 Other works, although they too only mention the 
historical components of antislavery argumentation in passing, help fill out the story of 
antislavery constitutional discussion in the 1840s and 1850s. For example, James Oaks 
identifies Frederick Douglass’s and Abraham Lincoln’s appeals to the framers’ 
antislavery expectations, and John Burt, in a sophisticated reading of the Lincoln-
Douglas debates, lends further insight into the Great Emancipator’s discussion and 
application of the founders’ implicit promises.38 Burt offers the pregnant proposal that in 
the case of slavery’s abolition, Lincoln came to a position where “loyalty to the Founders 
is not expressed by repetition of their practices, but by allowing one’s self to be rebuked 
by the promises they knew they could not keep but made anyway.”39 I demonstrate the 
presence of such an idea among antislavery advocates in sources that predate Lincoln’s 
speeches. They uncovered an original expectation that historical changes would create the 
circumstances necessary for the realization of promises that the founders had made but 
that their eighteenth-century context did not allow them to fulfill. They also argued that 
historical changes had, in fact, made the nineteenth century an era in which slavery must 
be abolished, but that the rise of an anachronistic Slave Power had halted the progress of 
                                                
37 William M. Wiecek, The Sources of Antislavery Constitutionalism in America, 
1760-1848 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977).  
38 James Oakes, The Radical and the Republican: Frederick Douglass, Abraham 
Lincoln, and the Triumph of Antislavery Politics (New York: Norton, 2007), 14-20, 28-
37, 47-51, 61-80. 
39 John Burt, Lincoln’s Tragic Pragmatism: Lincoln: Douglas, and Moral 
Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2013), 4.  
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freedom. This historical narrative, I argue, which came to inform Lincoln’s politics in the 
1850s, indicated the reality of temporal distance from the founding era.40  
 
Historical Actors, Historical Methodologies, and Historical Distances 
This study moves attention away from the historical writings of self-conscious 
historians like William Prescott and George Bancroft and toward the biblical and 
constitutional commentaries of ministers, theologians, lawyers, reformers, judges, and 
politicians, including, among others, Joseph Stevens Buckminster, William Ellery 
Channing, Andrews Norton, Charles Hodge, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Lysander Spooner, 
William Goodell, William Lloyd Garrison, Wendell Phillips, Frederick Douglass, and 
Benjamin Robbins Curtis. Theodore Parker, Moses Stuart, Roger B. Taney, and Abraham 
Lincoln, in particular, play lead roles in the narrative. These historical actors weighed in 
on the slavery controversy from distinct and in many ways opposed religious and 
political positions and in doing so engaged one another’s historical arguments in both 
direct and indirect ways. The focus on these thinkers and their interpretive debates 
protects us from the tendency to equate historical consciousness with historical 
methodology by offering alternative means of gauging antebellum historical thought.41 
                                                
40 Eric Foner also traces connections between abolitionist thought and Lincoln’s 
politics. He notes that “Lincoln, after initial opposition, had come to embrace positions 
first advanced by abolitionists and Radical Republicans.” Eric Foner, The Fiery Trial: 
Abraham Lincoln and American Slavery (New York: Norton, 2010), 335. 
41 George H. Callcott’s History in the United States, 1800-1860: Its Practice and 
Purpose (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), was among the first studies to 
measure historical consciousness by attending to the work of non-historians. A more 
recent work that explores non-historical sources is Thomas M. Allen’s Republic in Time, 
which examines American conceptions of time through various written genres, objects 
such as clocks and watches, and images such as Thomas Cole’s The Course of Empire 
(1833-1836). Allen contends that time in modern nations is heterogeneous and layered 
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Because these sources are not straightforward articulations of historical awareness—as 
few sources are—and because historical consciousness often remains unexpressed or 
inexplicit even in historical writings, I read these texts in search of their multivocalities, 
their unwritten assumptions, and their complex relationships to various contexts, 
especially other texts. Taking a methodological cue from historian Dominick LaCapra, 
who writes that “intellectual history should be a history of intellectuals, of the 
communities of discourse in which they function, and of the varying relations ... they 
manifest toward the larger culture,” I examine the intersections among these thinkers and 
their texts, and between them and their antebellum contexts. To use terms employed by 
LaCapra, I seek to identify the presence of both the symptomatic and the critical, both the 
representative and the unconventional, in religious, legal, and political texts written by 
conservative, moderate and radical authors.42 Within each text I locate the presence of 
approaches, narratives, ideas, and concepts that reveal awareness of historical distance or 
that exposed that distance. Measuring an abstract concept like historical consciousness 
presents numerous challenges, but a careful reading of antebellum biblical and 
constitutional interpretation reveals much about the development of Americans’ 
understandings of their favored pasts and their distance from them. 
                                                                                                                                            
rather than homogeneous. He argues that religious and natural temporalities persisted 
even with the emergence of clock time. In a similar treatment, Archives of American 
Time: Literature and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2010), Lloyd Pratt argues that rather than creating a unique national 
temporality, antebellum American literature incorporated traditional European genres and 
bequeathed heterogeneous times. Eran Shalev’s Rome Reborn also directs our attention to 
alternative means of measuring historical consciousness. He examines rhetoric, orations, 
and plays alongside traditional histories to gauge historical thought in the early republic, 
which he describes as classical in orientation. 
42 Dominick LaCapra, “Rethinking Intellectual History and Readings Texts,” 
History and Theory 19 (October 1980): 245-76, quotation on 264.  
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Examining such sources also allows us to get beyond the ideas of a confined 
group of thinkers. To be sure, this dissertation devotes many pages to the sermons, 
lectures, speeches, letters and publications of figures like the learned ministers and 
lawyers and elite judges and politicians noted above, but their interpretations were aimed 
at and often reached broad audiences who not only believed in their right to engage the 
debates—and to interpret the Bible and the Constitution on their own—but who accepted 
the historical terms of those discussions. This is not to suggest that most interested 
readers actively participated in the debates, much less engaged in a rigorous historical 
examination of biblical and constitutional passages, but that they understood the nature of 
the discussion and that those who did participate, especially in dealing with the nation’s 
founding era, often crafted historical accounts to defend and advance their positions. 
Further, in an era when American political culture expanded, due in part to advances in 
communication and transportation technologies, and when issues resting on the margins 
of that culture came to occupy its center, a growing number of commentators voiced their 
opinions. That the slavery debate took a historical turn only emboldened them to enter the 
conversation. A writer for Putnam’s magazine wrote that the Dred Scott decision “does 
not rest so much upon any interpretation of the law as it does upon a construction of the 
facts of history.”43 The implication was that anyone could learn such facts, and thus 
anyone could take on Taney’s argument. Even when unaware of these debates or in 
choosing not to engage them, many Americans were deeply invested in the Bible, the 
Constitution, and slavery, and thus these discussions had far-reaching implications.  
                                                
43 “History, as Expounded by the Supreme Court,” Putnam’s Monthly Magazine 
of American Literature, Science, and Art 9 (May 1857): 541 (American Periodical Series 
Online (www.proquest.com), hereafter APSO).  
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Without question, many antebellum Americans, including many of the thinkers 
that populate this dissertation, retained traditional simplistic historical views, linking vast 
periods of time with grand narratives—such as providentialist millennialism or whiggish 
progressive liberalism. In both of these schemes there was a sacralized moment of 
creation and a sacred text: the biblical era and the Bible, and the Revolutionary era and 
the Constitution. In reading these pasts and their texts, many held onto conventional 
hermeneutical approaches, conflating historical difference and collapsing historical 
distance in applying canonical imperatives. To the extent that the sacred texts were seen 
as timeless, they contributed to an intellectual atmosphere in which epochs of time did 
not seem significantly different; a nineteenth-century American might consider Moses or 
Madison as contemporaries, uttering truths that were as valid and clear in 1850 or 1857 as 
they were in 1500 BC or 1787. Such assumptions partook of a long-standing ahistorical 
view. The Puritans believed that their generation may have broken an ancient covenant, 
or fallen from a primordial Eden, but obedience to timeless laws could immediately turn 
back the clock of declension. This was not a matter of time, but of holiness; in their eyes, 
Puritan New England lay closer to the ancient truth than medieval Rome.44 Even the 
generation of American Revolutionaries, who hoped to restore the glories of classical 
Rome or to recreate the non-feudal Saxon period of the English history, seemed set on 
measuring their progress in terms of the past.45 Such historical approaches understood 
                                                
44 On the purchase of the past in Puritan thought, see Theodore Dwight Bozeman, 
To Live Ancient Lives: The Primitivist Dimension in Puritanism (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1988). On the idea of claiming contemporaneity with 
the mythical past, see Mircea Eliade, The Myth of the Eternal Return: Or, Cosmos and 
History (New York: Pantheon Books, 1954).  
45 On the Revolutionaries’ classical associations, see Shalev, Rome Reborn. On 
the importance of the Saxon past in the Revolutionary imagination, and on the 
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past and present times as fluid and interchangeable eras of temporal conflation rather than 
impenetrable and discrete epochs of temporal distinction.    
      While most scholars see that ahistorical tendency on the wane by the late 
nineteenth century, an issue at the center of that historicizing process has received 
insufficient attention. Slavery, above all else, led Americans to rethink their relationship 
to their favored pasts and to the past as a whole. The most recognized forms of 
interpretation suggested that the Bible and the Constitution endorsed the institution. 
However, transatlantic engagements with European historical criticism and the focus on 
slavery at home raised the level of scrutiny directed at these founding texts and 
encouraged new interpretive approaches aimed at uncovering their meanings. The 
resulting historical explications highlighting the context of these texts and narrations 
tracing changes since their production compelled many Americans to confront the reality 
of historical difference and distance. When it proved exegetically impossible for 
antebellum abolitionists to deny that Jesus tolerated slavery in primitive Palestine, or that 
James Madison sanctioned it in the nascent United States, they faced two choices: 1) 
reject the Bible and the Constitution as worn out and obsolete (and some did just that) or 
2) insist that they were written in fundamentally different historical circumstances and 
that one must be hermeneutically attuned to that fact (more did this). Even conservative 
and moderate interpreters, who ignored historical distance and asserted the applicability 
of Jesus’s or Madison’s words, inadvertently drew attention to the vast differences 
dividing biblical and Revolutionary pasts from the present through their contextual 
                                                                                                                                            
Revolutionaries efforts to revise the Whig history to match their American experiment, 
see Trevor Colburn, The Lamp of Experience: Whig History and the Intellectual Origins 
of the American Revolution (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1965). 
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explications. In addressing slavery, then, American interpreters became aware of 
historical distance to a degree unmatched by their predecessors. 
This kind of examination of the biblical and constitutional debates over slavery 
reveals the rise and development of historical awareness in antebellum America and gives 
historical shape to an often broad and loose notion of historical consciousness. It 
demonstrates that some Americans in the national period did, in fact, think historically 
and shows that their historical thinking took the form of an awareness of the qualitative 
historical distance that results from a confrontation with distinct historical contexts and 
qualitative historical distances. This dissertation, then, corrects the assumption about the 
shallowness of antebellum historical thought by outlining the specific nature of that 
thought, which resulted from biblical and constitutional debates over slavery. 
The overlap traced in antebellum hermeneutical approaches to the Bible and the 
Constitution signals one of the most important insights of this analysis. Both interpretive 
traditions were preoccupied with uncovering the “original meanings” of sacred texts from 
hallowed historical eras. Jaroslav Pelikan, who has explored this relationship in general 
terms, notes that “both the New Testament and the Constitution are set within historical 
periods that are endowed with a special aura by their traditions and that carry a unique 
authority for their communities.”46 This examination adds historical specificity to 
Pelikan’s discussion, showing how slavery brought together distinctive interpretive 
practices at a certain moment and demonstrating how that process gradually revealed the 
time-bound nature of presumably timeless eras. Historians have yet to adequately 
demonstrate the centrality of slavery in the complicated but clear intellectual processes by 
                                                
46 Jaroslav Pelikan, Interpreting the Bible and the Constitution (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 2004), 85.  
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which the biblical and Revolutionary pasts were historicized in antebellum America. In 
outlining these processes my dissertation will shed light on the emergence in America of 
the kind of historical thinking that we take for granted in the twenty-first century. 
 
Context and Change: Realizing the Pastness of Antebellum America’s Favored Pasts  
While slavery, more than any other antebellum issue, inspired a growing 
awareness of, and demanded responses to, the challenges of historical distance, the 
eventual realization of that distance through biblical and constitutional interpretation first 
depended on the usefulness and importance of founding texts and pasts. The realization 
of historical distance occurs with the recognition that profound and irrevocable changes 
separate one period from another and that, as a result, people from different eras inhabit 
fundamentally different worlds, exhibit distinct cultural and societal characteristics, and 
hold unique mentalities and worldviews. Paradoxically, the potential for this development 
is greatest when pasts with assumed cultural and ideological affinities with the present 
receive sustained attention. In other words, awareness of a past’s pastness (i.e. its cultural 
distinctness in terms of human experiences, attitudes, and mentalities) depends first on its 
emergence as a useful past. A past becomes useful as individuals and groups appeal to a 
certain historical era to address present social, cultural, and political issues. To be sure, 
pasts are useful in terms of both affinities and contrasts, but in each case such use 
assumes correspondence in presupposing that lessons from a past apply in the present. 
Some useful pasts obtain shape as favored pasts through consistent and meaningful use. 
In such cases applicants make the chosen past more familiar than foreign. Thus, a past’s 
persistence as an object of attention, and thus as a potential object of historicization, rests 
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on its presentness (i.e. its apparent affinity with the present in terms of human 
experiences, attitudes, and mentalities). 
Discussion of neglected or unfamiliar pasts can also fuel historical awareness. To 
a certain extent, one assumes historical distance with pasts receiving little notice. For 
example, to the extent that they were aware of them at all, most antebellum Americans 
likely assumed historical distance from the ancient Asian and African pasts. But minimal 
engagement with those pasts, combined with the existence of more useful and familiar 
historical periods, would have made that a surface level realization only. An awareness of 
temporal distance is most complete when favored pasts are understood as past due to an 
increased historical recognition of the different historical contexts and circumstances of 
past eras and not only because other pasts have taken their place. Depicting a past in a 
negative light, as in the case of the so-called Dark Ages or the centuries of supposed 
corruption from Christianity’s origins, created a sense of temporal distance and change, 
but that realization was mitigated by simultaneously appealing to pure pasts or golden 
ages, like the classical period or Puritan New England. Even when erstwhile favored 
pasts, including the classical and colonial eras, lost some of their usefulness, other pasts, 
such as primitive Christianity and the American founding, replaced them and thus 
reduced the potential realization of historical alienation.47 Thus, the most profound form 
of historical distance results with the recognition that unbridgeable historical divisions 
and irreversible historical changes separate even the most favored pasts from the present. 
                                                
47 In the Christian West, the development of religious thought corresponded to a 
continuous rejection of immediate pasts for the purity of primitive pasts, which had the 
result of reversing the Western comprehension of historical time as “an image of 
syncretic unity” and “essential sameness” to “one of dynamic and supersessive change.” 
Kemp, Estrangement of the Past, quotation on vi.  
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It is the shock of realizing that those pasts that feel closest, those that seem most worthy 
and capable of recovery, are deeply different and perhaps best left behind that pushes the 
process of historicization most violently forward. And so, although the enduring textual 
basis of both the biblical and the Revolutionary pasts promised to make them most 
favored, it also set the stage for sustained historical investigation of their texts, which 
threatened to historicize them and expose a certain archaism. And when those pasts were 
characterized as archaic, it suggested that no historical era could claim to transcend time. 
Historical eras, including the classical and colonial periods, competed with the 
biblical and Revolutionary pasts for Americans’ favor in the antebellum era. Americans 
drew a number of political lessons from the classical past and while Revolutionary uses 
of that past tended to collapse time, antebellum uses highlighted historical differences as 
Americans increasingly found greater use in Greece as an antidote to, rather than Rome 
as a mirror of, their current situation. Historical criticism also contributed to the 
estrangement of the classical period. In the 1820s American classicists like Edward 
Everett used contextual explication to address issues raised about the authorship of the 
Iliad and the Odyssey. The realization of historical distance began to undermine direct 
appeals to, and challenge the prominent place of, the classical world in American culture 
and higher education.48 The potential anxiety associated with the realization of the 
classical period’s pastness was mitigated by the usefulness of another favored ancient 
period: the biblical past. The Bible’s religious significance to generations of Christians 
                                                
48 On the place of classicism in America during the nineteenth century and on the 
reasons for its decline, see Winterer, Culture of Classicism. In upholding the slave 
society, southerners continued to draw on the classical, and also the medieval, pasts 
during this period, see Eugene Genovese and Elizabeth-Fox Genovese, The Mind of the 
Master Class: History and Faith in the Southern Slaveholders’ Worldview (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 247-406. 
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placed it and its past on a higher plane than the classics and the classical period, seeming 
to offer a greater level of protection from historicization. To an extent, the time 
separating the sacred biblical past from the present ensured its persistence as perhaps the 
antebellum period’s most important historical point of reference. And yet, when scholars 
began to illuminate the biblical past with historical research, when they dug up the details 
of culture and geography and language, the vast temporal distance between biblical and 
modern times seemed to widen rather than contract.  
Antebellum Americans also found important uses for more recent historical 
periods, including colonial times. Colonial experience was vital to the new republic’s 
political instruction, though often refracted through the lens of an antislavery 
Revolutionary epoch. Puritans became proto-Revolutionaries and antislavery advocates 
in the era’s histories. Further historical research questioned such representations. For 
example, in response to the first volume of John Gorham Palfrey’s hagiographic History 
of New England (1859), fellow Harvard alumnus Francis Bowen informed the author that 
the Puritans “were mortal men; they made blunders, they shared the errors of their 
times.”49 Similarly, Moses Stuart responded to abolitionist claims by locating slavery in 
New England’s past, which he explained as understandable given their temporal setting. 
Such explanations could expose historical distance between the progressive present and 
the Puritan past, working against efforts, including Stuart’s, to draw lessons from an 
earlier era. Furthermore, in depictions stressing the gradual development of democratic 
principles toward epochal revolution, either as fulfillment of or departure from the period 
of Puritan settlement, the Revolution became the historical starting point in the national 
                                                
49 Francis Bowen to John G. Palfrey, 30 January 1858, Palfrey Family Papers, MS 
Am 1704, Houghton Library, Harvard University.  
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drama.50 At once, the founding era seemed to signal the culmination of colonial historical 
development and to promise permanent relevance. The establishment of an 
unprecedented point of historical departure placed intense scrutiny on a fixed point in 
time, a development that held great potential to draw attention to historical distance when 
later generations looked back for instruction. 
Similar to representations of the colonial period that traced progress toward the 
Revolution, the common law emphasis on the accumulation of legal wisdom stretching 
back into the British past stressed the value of historical development. Some antebellum 
Democrats dismissed common law as a product of the dark ages, while Whigs like 
Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story argued that because it was based in custom and 
grounded in a deep legal tradition, common law possessed the capacity to adapt to 
changing circumstances and specific cases even as precedent promised to check arbitrary 
judicial application. The emphasis on incremental advances accentuated continuity over 
change.51 In contrast, the Constitution, upheld as the nation’s supreme legal source, 
demanded that America’s legal minds focus their gaze on a static historical document 
from a fixed founding period when addressing the most pressing legal and political 
questions of the day. Though it did not replace common law, the Constitution illuminated 
precedential decisions. The post-founding canonization of that document, which 
applicants valued as the nation’s founding text above other possible choices, such as the 
Articles of Confederation, raised the favored founding era to rival the importance of the 
                                                
50 On antebellum historians’ portrayals of the Puritans in relation to slavery and 
the Revolution, see Cheng, Plain and Noble Garb, 153-207.   
51 On custom law and its relation to historical development in antebellum period, 
see Parker, Common Law, 117-218; and Streichler, Justice Curtis, 18-22.  
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biblical past, while also initiating a unique historical conversation.52 The development 
directed adherents to look to a set historical era—the period of Revolution and 
ratification—for the nation’s political and legal direction, a process that promised to raise 
far-reaching questions about how events, people, and documents from a specific era in 
the past spoke to the needs of the present, and thus carried a unique potential to instill 
awareness of historical distance.  
The nation’s preeminent religious and legal texts, the Bible and the Constitution, 
directed Americans’ attention to certain historical periods, particularly in their attempts to 
resolve issues of great moral and political importance. As this study demonstrates, 
slavery brought together two distinct interpretive practices in unprecedented ways, 
despite the unique nature of the sacred texts and favored pasts under examination. The 
number of years dividing the present from the Revolutionary era was, of course, very 
brief compared to that separating it from the biblical past, but the dominant Protestant 
hermeneutic, which stemmed from an ad fontes epistemic determined to lay aside 
traditions and focus on the Bible itself, was largely uninterested in the nearly two 
millennia that divided the present from the biblical past. Many Christians read the Bible 
as if the nineteenth century had followed the first. However, when scholars began to 
illuminate the biblical past with historical research, it signaled the presence of the 
intervening centuries that separated biblical from modern times. A deep study of the 
erstwhile familiar and favored biblical era illuminated the immediate historical contexts 
                                                
52 On the legal nature of the new republic and the sacralization of the Constitution 
in early America, see David Ray Papke, Heretics in the Temple: Americans Who Reject 
the Nation’s Legal Faith (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 1-23. On the 
sacralization of the Declaration of Independence in the antebellum era, see Pauline Maier, 
American Scripture: Making the Declaration of Independence (New York: Knopf, 1997), 
154-208. 
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of biblical passages, which drew attention to historical particularity and suggested that 
much had changed in the period between primitive Christian times and modern America.  
In comparison to the erstwhile familiar biblical times of Jesus and Paul, or of 
Moses and Abraham or Adam and Eve (not to mention the much less useful archaic 
periods), the nation’s founding era seemed more present than past, a fact that might 
protect it from historicization. History, for many, was ancient and classical, not modern 
and American. The new nation’s historians introduced some distance by draping the 
period in classical terms and lamenting the loss of classical virtue since that time, but that 
brought the classical past forward as much as it pushed the founding era backward. 
Further, that the Constitution was relatively untested actually fostered its sacralization as 
a timeless text. And yet, precisely because relatively little time had passed since the 
originating era, knowledge about the period was accessible and widespread, and thus 
historical differences and transformations could be easily demonstrated. As with 
historical distance from biblical times, an awareness of historical distance from the 
founding era depended on contextualizing constitutional clauses, but also on evidencing 
changes since their creation. The sense of historical change that resulted from a study of 
the nation’s short history loomed large. Perhaps the relatively short time between the two 
periods discouraged Americans from listening to abolitionist cries of the Constitution’s 
obsolescence, but even efforts to dismiss historical insight and change as irrelevant to 
constitutional construction raised questions about the founding document’s relationship 
to temporal evolution. Arguing that historical context and change should not affect 
interpretation only reified their reality. Denying the interpretive relevance of slavery’s 
presence in the founding era highlighted context and dismissing as inconsequential to 
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construction the rise of antislavery sentiment drew attention to change, both of which 
signaled the existence of an unbridgeable historical distance. Those who used historical 
distance or denied its interpretive importance spoke of its presence. The potential for a 
widespread realization of such distance resulting from a fixation on periods of religious 
and political founding remained suppressed until events pushed slavery to center stage 
during the nineteenth century’s middle decades. In antebellum era, this development 
above all others fostered a realization of historical distance and fueled conversations 
about the place of the Bible and the Constitution in the American present. 
 
Chapter Summaries 
The narrative that follows offers a chronological account of these developments. 
Rather than separate out antebellum thinkers into groups based on the rigor of their 
historical investigations or the depth of their historical consciousness, I trace the 
emergence of their historical awareness in relation to the their interpretive contestations. 
In other words, because these thinkers displayed historical awareness through biblical and 
constitutional debates about slavery rather than by providing abstract articulations of 
historical consciousness, I examine their historical thought by narrating their interpretive 
debates over slavery. Grouping thinkers according to the sophistication of their 
contextual readings, the depth of their historical awareness, and the degree to which they 
used historical distance in interpretation would have resulted in a neater narrative. At 
some points this account demands that the reader exhibit some patience with sections that 
detail important ideational distinctions between the thinkers discussed. However, this 
organizational choice allows me to give some flavor of the intellectual discussions and 
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debates among antebellum historical actors and, more importantly, it reveals the central 
argument of this dissertation: that the immediate context in antebellum America—and the 
issue of southern slavery in particular—created awareness of historical distance. 
The first two chapters focus on the transatlantic development toward viewing the 
Bible as a historically situated set of texts in need of historical explication. The first 
chapter begins by briefly tracing European biblical scholarship in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. It outlines the emerging view of the Bible as a historical text. This 
short discussion examines how that development influenced the thinking of American 
theologian Jonathan Edwards. The bulk of the chapter outlines the growing attention to 
biblical criticism in America in the early nineteenth century and explains the implications 
for how scholars viewed the Old and New Testament pasts. I demonstrate that thinkers 
across the antebellum religious spectrum, from Charles Hodge’s orthodox Calvinism to 
Andrews Norton’s liberal Unitarianism, variously appropriated the lessons of biblical 
criticism and accepted history as the discursive currency of choice in debates about the 
canon, religious truth, and pressing social issues. These approaches challenged the 
proclivity to collapse the temporal distinctions between ancient and modern times and to 
conflate the moral imperatives of different historical eras. Even as more conservative 
Protestants used biblical criticism to defend the biblical canon’s timelessness and to 
assert its relevance in addressing modern problems such as American slavery, their 
contextualized readings inadvertently contributed to the Bible’s historicization. 
The rise of biblical criticism in America led prominent religious thinkers to stake 
their claims on historical grounds and it also directed some of the nation’s more 
heterodox figures to abandon those transient grounds in favor of what they understood as 
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a transcendent moral sphere. The second chapter focuses on Transcendentalists Ralph 
Waldo Emerson’s and Theodore Parker’s engagement with biblical criticism, which 
nourished their sense that the fount of religious truth flowed directly to the human soul. It 
also highlights how such engagement inspired Parker’s distinction between permanent 
religious truths and their transient biblical bearings. Although he believed that the 
Gospels and their Jesus rested on a historical foundation, Parker severed the Unitarians’ 
evidentialist tie between Christian truth and what he perceived as the unstable basis of 
historical texts, persons, and events. The move to disconnect religious truth from 
historical facts informed his identification of certain biblical teachings as outdated. As 
slavery gained political prominence on the national stage, Parker dismissed proslavery 
biblical teachings as antiquated. A similar approach allowed him to interpret the nation’s 
sacred legal document—the Constitution—as a flawed text with temporary proslavery 
features. In this way, biblical discussions prepared the way for constitutional debates, and 
slavery brought together two distinct interpretive traditions. 
The third chapter highlights the rhetorical affinities in antislavery readings of the 
Bible and the Constitution and describes the role of historical reasoning in shifting the 
grounds of the debate from one ancient favored past—Old Testament times—to a more 
recent, but still ancient, favored past—New Testament times—and finally to the most 
proximal favored past—the Revolutionary era. This chapter explores the arguments of 
figures such as William Ellery Channing, Albert Barnes, William Lloyd Garrison, and 
William Goodell to demonstrate that historical argumentation began to dominate biblical 
and constitutional interpretation in the debates over slavery, and to show how the 
publication of Madison’s papers in 1840 led interpreters such as Lysander Spooner and 
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Wendell Phillips to either deny or affirm the use of historical sources in constitutional 
interpretation. Regardless of how one valued contextual readings, in both biblical and 
constitutional debates, antislavery interpretations emphasized that Christ and his apostles, 
in the case of the biblical past, and the founding fathers, in the case of the founding era, 
had planted the seeds of slavery’s abolition. They thus posited that Christian and national 
founders had thought historically in expecting time to cultivate the antislavery principles 
they had inculcated. Such readings blamed the rise of the Slave Power, which they 
characterized as an anachronistic development, for Christian Americans’ failure to realize 
those expectations. These interpreters highlighted historical distance in arguing that 
unique figures had carefully inculcated universal principles meant to flower in a future 
period and in suggesting that the time for fulfillment had arrived but had been thwarted 
by outdated thinking and archaic institutions.  
The fourth chapter traces how the above approaches commingled, developed and 
spread in the furor surrounding the Fugitive Slave Law (1850) and its enforcement. It 
explains how respondents, including Daniel Webster, Moses Stuart, and Theodore Parker 
debated the role of both the Bible and the Constitution in determining the justice of the 
new law. It also examines the writings of Frederick Douglass, Benjamin R. Curtis, and 
Abraham Lincoln to explain the ways in which, during the 1850s, a public and political 
constitutional debate took precedence over the relatively isolated biblical debate that it 
paralleled and drew strength from. This process suggested that the nation’s legal and 
political rather than its religious texts held more importance in determining slavery’s fate, 
while also subjecting the founding era to new levels of examination and scrutiny.   
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When political efforts failed to resolve the growing sectional problem, Americans 
turned to the Supreme Court. And in constitutionalizing slavery in a period wherein 
constitutional interpreters emphasized contextual readings, America’s political and legal 
thinkers made slavery primarily a historical issue. The fifth and final chapter examines 
the Dred Scott decision (1857), the apogee of slavery’s constitutionalization, which 
turned Americans’ attention to the most recent favored past and carried unprecedented 
potential to unveil historical change since and distance from that period. This chapter 
explains the historical implications of the both the decision and the dissenting opinions. 
Chief Justice Roger B. Taney formulated his argument in the wake of decades of 
interpretive emphasis on historical explication. He believed that a historical argument 
would settle the issue and thus rested his argument on historical grounds. He contended 
that because the framers had designated blacks as non-citizens at the founding, he could 
not now declare them citizens in 1857, despite the alternative construction that the spirit 
of abolitionism, which he found obscuring and deviating, might provide. In response, 
dissenting Justices John McLean and Benjamin Curtis echoed decades of antislavery 
articulation in their counter-narrative of founding and of post-founding-era developments. 
They argued that some blacks had voted as citizens during ratification and uncovered, 
behind the Slave Power’s cloak, the founders’ expectations of change in the form of 
developing egalitarian sentiment. This allowed the dissenters to call for constructions that 
valued historical change. These public readings incited further debate and brought 
increased attention to historical distance from the founding era.    
Such arguments also helped Abraham Lincoln articulate his political position. In 
the conclusion, I will suggest ways in which the antislavery reading of the founding era 
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informed his antislavery response to Dred Scott, further demonstrating that historical 
consciousness did not preclude the use of the past. The deepening of historical awareness 
resulting from biblical and constitutional hermeneutics led many Americans to reconsider 
both the biblical and Revolutionary pasts as distinct and distant periods of historical time, 
but it also led a substantial number of them to reinterpret both the Bible and the 
Constitution as malleable texts meant for use in various historical contexts. The Civil 
War, along with the assumption, planted by late nineteenth-century thinkers, that 
antebellum Americans failed to reason historically, obscured this development. I aim to 
get behind that occlusion by tracing how slavery led American interpreters of the Bible 
and the Constitution to recognize that historical distances divided them from even their 
most favored pasts. In short, this work explains the process by which antebellum 
Americans began to realize that, to invoke L. P. Hartley’s famous line, “the past [was] a 
foreign country.”53 
                                                
53 L. P. Hartley, The Go-Between (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1953; New York: 
The New York Review of Books, 2002), 17. Citation refers to the New York edition. 
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CHAPTER 1  
“RECOURSE MUST BE HAD TO THE HISTORY OF THOSE TIMES”: THE 
ARRIVAL OF BIBLICAL CRITICISM AND THE HISTORICAL LESSONS OF 
ACCOMMODATION 
In the first decade of the nineteenth century, Unitarian minister Joseph Stevens 
Buckminster encouraged his congregants to adopt a “historical explication” of the Bible. 
He warned against “looking into every text, separated from its context” and insisted that 
the biblical authors “were not, on every occasion, delivering a system of dogmas for the 
instruction of all succeeding time.”1 Biblical criticism led prominent American religious 
thinkers like Buckminster to stake their claims on historical grounds. I argue that while 
they incorporated the lessons of biblical criticism in different ways, thinkers across the 
antebellum religious spectrum, from Charles Hodge’s orthodox Calvinism to Andrews 
Norton’s liberal Unitarianism, accepted history as the favored discursive currency in 
debates about the canon and religious truth. They defended canonical choices with 
historical arguments, grounded their hermeneutics in historical analysis, and centered 
their epistemologies in historical knowledge. As a result, these scholars were confronted 
with evidence that profound contextual differences separated their world from the biblical 
world that they looked to for inspiration and guidance. Unlike their hermeneutical 
predecessors, they came to realize that the biblical authors did not always write “for the 
instruction of all succeeding time.” However, a priori assumptions about the nature and 
word of God informed their canonical choices and shielded them from historical 
criticism’s threat of textual and moral relativism. Ultimately, most antebellum religious 
                                                
1 Buckminster, “Philemon,” 83, 84. 
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scholars, including Buckminster, continued to rely on the Bible’s perceived atemporal 
features despite their exposure to historical distance. Nonetheless, their engagement with 
biblical criticism, which included both the rejection and incorporation of certain 
hermeneutic principles, left a new and indelible imprint on their understanding of the 
Bible as a historical text from an ancient past. 
 Most historians have left unexamined the engagement with biblical criticism 
among more orthodox thinkers such as Charles Hodge. In a recent publication, Michael 
Lee provides an important corrective to the narrative of biblical scholarship in America 
by explaining the ways in which theologically conservative thinkers accepted the 
empirical grounds of debate prepared by the Bible’s critics, including and especially 
deists. He demonstrates how figures like Joseph Buckminster, Moses Stuart, and 
Andrews Norton followed their eighteenth-century predecessors in using historical 
reasoning and argumentation to defend the Bible and to affirm their religious beliefs. Lee 
argues that in the process these biblical defenders inadvertently undermined the divine 
stature of the scriptures.2 The next two chapters trace a similar development among these 
and other antebellum religious thinkers while also highlighting the implications of that 
development for the potential realization of historical distance from biblical times. While 
it took a civil war to resolve a question that theologians could not—whether American 
slavery was indeed anachronistic—these pre-war rhetorical engagements along religious 
lines nourished, if in uneven and inadvertent ways, an emerging historical consciousness, 
while also setting the stage for a constitutional debate with similar implications. 
 
 
                                                
2 Lee, Erosion of Biblical Certainty.  
   47 
“Though They Are Histories”: The Revaluation of Historical Knowledge in Seventeenth- 
and Eighteenth-Century Hermeneutics 
 The rise of biblical criticism in early nineteenth-century America followed from 
prior developments in European hermeneutics. Christianity originated as a faith centered 
in historical texts and figures, but the shakiness of those foundations began to appear only 
in relation to seventeenth- and eighteenth-century epistemological and methodological 
evolutions that privileged historical knowledge and a historical explanation of the Bible. 
The major thinkers of the Reformation, including Martin Luther and John Calvin, had 
believed that the Bible’s content directly corresponded to actual historical realities and 
that substantive religious truths bound together its two Testaments, despite clear 
differences in the presentations of moral teachings and the forms of religious rituals 
between the Old and the New. In both literal and figurative interpretations, readers 
assumed that the words of the sacred texts bore a close relation to historical truths. The 
Bible could be received as the sole source of divine revelation and trusted as an authentic, 
accurate, and embracing historical account of God’s workings with humankind.3  
This reading persisted in the eras that followed, but a few seventeenth-century 
thinkers began to challenge some of these suppositions. For example, early modern 
English philosopher Thomas Hobbes questioned the authenticity of certain Old 
Testament texts. Hobbes used the Bible to promote the idea that to ensure the safe 
exercise of human liberty, that liberty had to be limited. Paul D. Cooke argues that he 
replaced the biblical law of God with the laws of nature, though, aware of his Christian 
                                                
3 See Hans W. Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth and 
Nineteenth Century Hermeneutics (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1974), 18-37. 
I rely on Frei’s study in tracing these and subsequent developments in biblical 
interpretation. 
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audience, he artfully aligned the latter with the former. In the process, Hobbes challenged 
the received authorship of the first five Old Testament books. In 1651, near the end of the 
chaotic and bloody English Civil War, he published Leviathan, wherein he emphasized 
the need for an absolute sovereign. In the text, he denied the Mosaic authorship of the 
Pentateuch, as would a number of his contemporaries. He also distinguished between the 
original writings of the apostles and the books of the New Testament as they were then 
constituted. Even Christ, in Hobbes’s work, became a promoter of natural rights rather 
than the singular savior of humankind. Despite such strictures, he accepted the biblical 
texts as accurate historical accounts of God’s word based on the determinative word of 
the civil sovereign. In raising issues with the biblical record, then, Hobbes demonstrated 
the potential dangers of using historical analysis to scrutinize the Bible without the 
supervision and direction of an autonomous ruler.4   
 Baruch Spinoza went further than Hobbes in historicizing the Bible. Samuel J. 
Preus argues that the Dutch philosopher also used the Bible to advance his political 
purposes. That process involved displacing the authority of the canon itself through a 
rigorous historical-critical approach, wherein Spinoza interpreted the Bible as historical 
in terms of its creation, transmission, and content. Like Hobbes, in his Theological-
Political Treatise (1670), Spinoza rejected the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch. And, 
as the English thinker had disassociated Israel’s theocratic government from both Puritan 
and Catholic rule in England, Spinoza dismissed affinities between Israelite wars and 
Dutch struggles for independence, positing rather that the former demonstrated the 
problems of theocratic rule. Rather than assume that past prophets had spoken to people 
                                                
4 Paul D. Cooke, Hobbes and Christianity: Reassessing the Bible in Leviathan 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996), esp. chaps. 6-7. 
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in all ages, an assumption that produced anachronistic readings, he contended that the 
biblical texts must be understood in terms of the historically conditioned intentions of 
their authors. In turn, while Hobbes placed the power of interpretation in the civil 
sovereign, Spinoza aimed to wrest authority from the public purveyors of biblical 
understanding and exalt individual readers to the status of interpreters. He did not mean 
to suggest that the Bible contained no truth or that all truth was relative. Rather, he used 
reason to measure the truth of all ideas, including biblical teachings. Preus contends that 
Spinoza’s efforts have been overlooked because, unlike later German thinkers who 
“domesticated” historical exegesis, he did not aim to derive religious value from them.5 
Regardless of how far Spinoza carried his historical approach, most biblical 
readers remained oblivious to these isolated discussions and, for the most part, continued 
to assume that the Bible faithfully recounted actual historical occurrences, conveyed a 
cumulative story, and stretched to include all of human existence. However, by the late 
seventeenth century, English philosopher John Locke challenged those assumptions when 
he began incorporating narrow biblical narratives into a much more expansive human 
story, rather than cramming world history into a presumably all-encompassing Bible. 
Locke did not question the Bible’s historicity and he continued to uphold it as an 
exceptional work, but he read it in terms of a much more embracive idea of human 
experience. In the eighteenth century, deism, empiricism, and historical criticism began 
to raise new questions about the nature of the Bible and the connection between biblical 
stories and historical realities. For instance, in addressing the relationship between the 
                                                
5 Samuel J. Preus, Spinoza and the Irrelevance of Biblical Authority (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), quotation on 33. See also, Frei, Eclipse of Biblical 
Narrative, 42-46.  
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Old and New Testaments, deist Anthony Collins dismissed scripture’s factuality when 
read literally and its meaningfulness when read typologically. Literal and figurative 
approaches began to clash once thinkers separated religious meanings from their 
erstwhile historical referents. In response to these interruptive arguments, inheritors of 
the figurative approach, who continued to interpret the Bible as a cumulative text, 
propagated providentialist readings to establish a bridge of religious meaning across the 
chasms of historical difference that divided biblical texts. Meanwhile, successors to the 
literalist approach strove to capture the original sense of specific passages and to 
determine their relationship to historical facts. While conservative interpreters accepted 
biblical narratives as factually reliable sources of revealed truth, their liberal counterparts 
began to doubt that reliability. In short, as Hans Frei notes, “Everything conspired to 
confine explicative hermeneutics to meaning as references—to equate meaning with 
knowledge of potential or actual reality—and to make the primary reference historical 
rather than ideal.” Historical reasoning began to control biblical interpretation.6   
 Historians often assume colonial America’s isolation from the more unsettling 
pulls of these intellectual currents, but recent scholarship has illustrated how Calvinist 
preacher and theologian Jonathan Edwards was drawn into them in a number of ways. In 
contrast to Hobbes and Spinoza, who, like deists and Quakers, had derived religious 
knowledge from a priori understandings rather than historical texts and traditions, 
Edwards assumed that the Bible’s historicity related to its moral function. He broadened 
Locke’s sensationalism to include divine intuition, which he believed the Bible 
cultivated, but after internalizing the critique of revelatory epistemology from deists such 
                                                
6 See Frei, Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, 66-104, quotation on 103.  
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as Collins and Matthew Tindale, Edwards came to believe, as Robert Brown states, “that 
historical religious knowledge was the only source of human ideas about religion.”7 It 
became paramount for Edwards to defend the Bible and the Christian religion on 
historical grounds.  
In one of his notebooks from the mid-1750s, which a later editor titled “Defense 
of the authenticity of the Pentateuch as a work of Moses and the historicity of the Old 
Testament narratives,” Edwards upheld Hebrew scripture with historical arguments. In 
general, he accepted the Bible’s historical authenticity simply because it presented itself 
as historical. For example, because “some of the STATUTES of the Law [of Moses] are 
delivered in the FORM OF HISTORY,” he accepted those statutes as an accurate account 
of past events. But Edwards also followed English apologists in using external and 
profane knowledge to confirm the Bible’s truth. He drew on the history of pagan 
religions to verify its historical accuracy and to favorably compare its contents. He wrote 
that “the history of Moses, though it be full of things more wonderful, yet are nothing 
akin to the fables of man’s inventing in old times about deities and invisible beings, and 
their intercourse with men, which were agreeable to the carnal dispositions and taste of 
mankind. … But these facts of Moses are extremely diverse and of a quite opposite 
                                                
7 Robert E. Brown, Jonathan Edwards and the Bible (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2002), 27-87, quotation on 55, emphasis mine. Much of my discussion 
of Edwards’s approach to the Bible relies on Brown’s analysis. Edwards’s expansion of 
sensationalism seems less radical in light of the argument that an intuitive strain of 
Enlightenment thought informed the subsequent epistemological emphasis on 
imagination among German historicists. See Reill, “Science and the Construction.” 
Recent scholars also contend that the Enlightenment was as much an Age of Sensibility 
as it was an Age of Reason. See, for example, Jessica Riskin, Science in the Age of 
Sensibility: The Sentimental Empiricists of the French Enlightenment (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2002); and Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights: A History 
(New York: Norton, 2007).  
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nature, all pure, holy and spiritual.”8 Similar statements and the same kind of reasoning 
abounds in Edwards’s “Notes on Scripture” and his “Miscellanies.” In the latter, for 
example, he included the entry, “History of the Old Testament from Moses’ time 
confirmed from heathen traditions and records.”9 In his “Catalogue” of books one finds 
lists of numerous historical sources, both ancient and modern, which further attest that 
although he remained apologetic in his reasoning, Edwards accepted the historical 
grounds of the biblical debate that had been prepared by figures such as Hobbes, Spinoza, 
and Locke.10  
Although his religious orthodoxy would not allow him to be as unflinching in his 
reading of the sacred canon, in a sense Edwards valued historical reasoning much more 
than the Bible’s critics for the very reason that he believed the Bible to be the primary 
repository of divine revelation and the measuring stick of religious truth. Edwards 
believed that tradition had brought ancient truths down to his time, and he also believed 
in the book of nature, but in terms of religious and moral instruction he used the Bible to 
gauge those truths and thus, once he accepted the historical approach to scripture, he 
focused on using historical arguments to back the Bible. So while his use of extra-biblical 
sources shows that he took very seriously the deists’ stricture of revelatory knowledge, he 
scoffed at their objection “against a book’s being divine merely because it is historical.”11 
                                                
8 Jonathan Edwards, “Defense of the Pentateuch as a Work of Moses,” in Works 
of Jonathan Edwards Online, Volume 28, Minor Controversial Writings (Jonathan 
Edwards Center at Yale University, 2008), n.p.  
9 Jonathan Edwards, Works of Jonathan Edwards Online, Volume 13, The 
“Miscellanies,” ed. Harry S. Stout, 136.  
10 See Brown, Edwards and the Bible, 88-163.  
11 Jonathan Edwards, Works of Jonathan Edwards, Volume 9, A History of the 
Work of Redemption, ed. John F. Wilson (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), 
284 (hereafter WJE).   
   53 
Edwards made this statement in A History of the Work of Redemption, a collection of 
sermons that he first delivered to his Northampton congregation in the spring and 
summer of 1739 and revised for publication throughout the remainder of his life, though 
it only reached the press in 1774, nearly a decade and a half after his death. In this 
expansive project—although in inchoate form, it represented the crystallization of his 
thought in many ways—Edwards contended that the historical nature of the Bible 
confirmed its revelatory status. 
The colonial theologian interpreted history through his conception of the “Work 
of Redemption.” This work focused on Christ’s salvific providences—revivals in 
particular—which, to Edwards’s understanding, functioned as the motor of historical 
change. Avihu Zakai argues that in outlining his “theological teleology of history” in 
Work of Redemption, Edwards rejected the Enlightenment’s mechanical philosophy of 
time and its anthropocentric concept of progress toward a millennium. Instead, argues 
Zakai, Edwards stressed God’s sovereign control over historical development through 
continual redemptive workings and contends that it was in this light that Edwards 
understood the revivals of the Great Awakening, which, he believed, effected change 
toward denouement within time, although redeemed souls only would enjoy the full fruits 
of those workings outside of and beyond time. This conception of history informed 
Edwards’s readings of the Bible.12 
Even while he used extra-biblical sources and acknowledged ancient human 
experience not recorded in the Bible, Edwards maintained that all human existence, past 
                                                
12 Avihu Zakai, Jonathan Edwards’s Philosophy of History: The Reenchantment 
of the World in the Age of Enlightenment (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2003), quotation on xiv. On The Work of Redemption, see also, Brown, Edwards and the 
Bible, 164-96.  
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and present, fit within the biblical framework. As he summarized in his first sermon in 
the series, the Work of Redemption “‘tis all but one work, one design. The various 
dispensations and works that belong to it are but the several parts of one scheme.”13 In his 
tenth sermon, he further explained that “there are two ways of the Scripture giving an 
account of the events by which the Work of Redemption is carried on: one is by history 
and another is by prophecy. And in one or the other of these ways,” he asserted, “we have 
contained in this holy book an account of how the Work of Redemption is carried on 
from the beginning to the end.” Cognizant of new historical information about extra-
biblical peoples and settings, Edwards had to admit that “the Scripture don’t [sic] contain 
a proper history of the whole, yet,” he maintained, “there is contained the whole chain of 
great events by which this affair has been carried on from the foundation soon after the 
fall of man to the finishing of it at the end of the world.”14 And even in those cases where 
the Bible did not offer a “proper history” of its own historical subjects, such as the period 
between the Babylonian captivity and the coming of Christ, “God in his providence took 
care that there should be authentic and full accounts of the events of this period preserved 
in profane history.”15 Edwards proposed that these accounts, which “wonderfully agree 
with the many prophecies that we have in Scripture of these times,” further attested to the 
accuracy of the biblical account.  
 Having confirmed the Bible’s factuality from extra-biblical historical sources, 
Edwards recognized the need both to account for the historical nature of the Bible and to 
distinguish it from other historical sources. This, he set out to do, in his thirteenth 
                                                
 13 WJE, 9:118.  
 14 Ibid., 9:242 
15 Ibid., 9:243. 
   55 
sermon. In response to the view that the historical nature of the biblical texts placed them 
alongside other histories and thus desacralized them, Edwards posited that “though they 
are histories, yet they are no less full of divine instruction … than other parts of the holy 
Scriptures that are not historical. To object against a book’s being divine merely because 
it is historical is a silly objection,” he supposed, “just as if that could not be the word of 
God that gives us an account of what is past.”16 Indeed, he went on to argue, “so far from 
being a weighty objection against the historical parts of Scripture being the word of God 
that ‘tis a strong argument” in its favor. If reason led “all civilized nations to keep records 
… how much more may we expect that God gives the world a record of the dispensations 
of his divine government.”17 Edwards held that this record offered unique insight into the 
ancient past, stating that “the times of the history of the Old Testament are times that no 
other history reaches up to.”18 But the Bible was not only unique because of what 
Edwards considered its historical depth, but also because it alone gave “an idea of the 
grand scheme of divine providence.”19 The “Work of Redemption” distinguished the 
Bible and it also ensured the present usefulness of all its parts. 
 “Some,” Edwards bemoaned, “are ready to look on the Old Testament as being, as 
it were, out of date and as if we in these days of the gospel had but little to do with it.”20 
Historical research had revealed an insurmountable historical distance to certain 
readers—that segment of readership would expand greatly in the nineteenth century—but 
they failed to recognize that “all parts of the Old Testament have their places in terms of 
                                                
 16 Ibid., 9:284.  
 17 Ibid., 9:285. 
 18 Ibid., 9:285-86.  
19 Ibid., 9:284.  
 20 Ibid., 9:290.  
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the scheme of redemption,” for “Christ and his redemption are the great subject of the 
whole Bible.”21 The difference in presentation between the testaments led to this failure 
to find Christ throughout the Bible. “The whole book,” Edwards declared, “both Old 
Testament and New, is filled up with gospel, only with this difference, that the Old 
Testament contains the gospel under a veil.”22 Based on this premise, Edwards continued 
to read the Bible typologically and maintained the relevance of even the Old Testament, 
despite the strictures of modern scholarship. Indeed, he had become convinced that extra-
biblical sources confirmed and the Bible’s historical nature confirmed the authenticity of 
the Christian canon. Over the course of a few generations, American exegetes would all 
but contend that far from being less divine because historical, the Bible’s divinity rested 
on its historicity. That move placed the Bible in a precarious position.  
As deism helped direct America’s preeminent Protestant theologian to prize 
historical knowledge, so it also contributed to the rise of biblical criticism as an 
autonomous academic discipline in eighteenth-century Germany. In the 1770s, Gotthold 
Ephraim Lessing, a lead figure in the German Enlightenment, published portions of a 
work by deist Hermann Samuel Reimarus that dismissed Jesus’s miracles and denied the 
historical accuracy of the New Testament texts. In response to such arguments, Johann 
Saloma Semler asserted the factuality of the events there recorded but posited that those 
events, including the miracles, were best explained in the light of historical context. It 
was in works such as Semler’s critical analyses of the received canon, Johann David 
Michaelis’s historical introductions to the New Testament, and Johann Gottfried 
Eichhorn’s historical introduction to the Old Testament that Spinoza’s, Hobbes’s, and 
                                                
 21 Ibid., 9:288-89.  
 22 Ibid., 9:290. 
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Locke’s anticipatory questions received their first thorough treatments. Using 
philological and historical tools to ascertain the origin, context, and factual veracity of the 
Bible’s narratives, these German critics maintained that the textual content was of a 
historical nature, and while they did not draw a straight line from historical content to 
religious meaning, these scholars sought to recover the cultural conditions in which 
biblical texts were produced so as to determine their religious value. To their way of 
thinking, applicable religious meaning was not indistinguishable from historical facts or 
wholly explainable through reference to historical contexts, but those facts provided a 
basis for belief and those contexts served an important function in weighing truth. Such 
efforts raised questions about the canon’s unitary meaning. Indeed, even before the 
publication of Reimarus’s strictures, Semler had separated out biblical books based on 
their religious value. Unlike Edwards, he did not think that each book preached of Christ 
equally. These arguments opened the door to Johann Phillip Gabler’s contention that 
religious meaning was derived from textual referents in the form of authenticated 
historical facts.23 
 Developments in America also leaned towards an emphasis on applying historical 
reasoning to biblical interpretation and even if that hermeneutic was in many ways less 
critical in approach than the German scholarship, it was often even more invested in the 
historical nature of the biblical texts. As the seeds of a bible-based historical theology 
                                                
23 See Frei, Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, 60-65, 105-64. See also Michael C. 
Carhart, The Science of Culture in Enlightenment Germany (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
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took root in Germany, Scottish Realism spread its branches across the Atlantic.24 
Glasgow native Thomas Reid, who revised Locke’s sensationalist epistemology to 
combat David Hume’s skepticism, asserted that ordinary experience revealed the 
universal presence of internal first principles, which attested to the existence of the self 
and the reality of objects perceived via the senses. When radical deists like Thomas Paine 
exalted reason and battered the Bible as irrational, proponents of evidential Christianity 
like College of New Jersey (later Princeton) President Samuel Stanhope Smith borrowed 
the empiricism of Francis Bacon and relied on the bolstered sensationalism of Scottish 
Realism to stress the limits of reason even as they marshaled internal and external 
evidences to defend the reasonableness of biblical revelation. While orthodox belief 
guarded most American biblical scholars from the kind of rigorous examination of the 
biblical texts found among their German contemporaries, the effort to evidence the truth 
of Christianity uniquely drew together historicity and religious meaning. Historical 
reasoning became a principal concern for American exegetes and evidential Christianity 
set the stage for the qualified introduction of biblical criticism in antebellum America.25 
Thus began the exegetical march in America toward reading the Bible as a historical text, 
followed soon after by a budding realization that could not assume historical transference 
between the biblical past and the American present. 
                                                
24 Sometimes the transatlantic migration of ideas was a literal one, as with 
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The Introduction of Biblical Criticism and Joseph S. Buckminster’s “Historical 
Explication” 
 The institutional arrival of biblical criticism in America and the corresponding 
appeal to contextual exegesis owed much to the same sources (i.e. “deistical 
publications”) that directed German developments.26 Convinced that older and newer 
deistic works obscured the truths of Christianity, Samuel Dexter set aside $5,000 in his 
will for Harvard to promote “that most useful branch of learning, the critical knowledge 
of the holy scriptures.” He proposed that the testators acquire relevant scholarly works, 
purchase and support the production of new translations of the Bible, and fund learned 
lectures “for the purposes of critically explaining either the history, doctrines, or 
precepts, of the gospel.” Even when not mentioned specifically, history figured 
prominently in Dexter’s discussion, as in his emphasis on the “usefulness of explaining 
idioms, phrases, and figures of speech, which abound in the scriptures; and the usages 
and customs therein referred to; and of clearing up the difficulties in sacred chronology 
and geography.”27 Biblical criticism was often a historical endeavor, as Dexter and the 
first Dexter Lecturer knew well.  
In 1811, the year after his death, Dexter’s trustees elected New Hampshire native 
Joseph Stevens Buckminster as Harvard’s inaugural Dexter Lecturer, the first American 
                                                
26 “Intelligence,” General Repository and Review 1 (January 1812): 203-9, 
quotation on 204 (APSO). The General Repository lasted less than two years, but a 
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academic appointment dedicated to biblical criticism.28 Upon receiving official notice of 
the election, Buckminster wrote to Harvard President John Thornton Kirkland of the 
“unexpected appointment to the office of first Lecturer on the Dexter foundation.” The 
young but capable minister expressed his conviction that perhaps the lectureship should 
be “entrusted to some one whose age and acknowledged merits in theology will gain for 
them more consideration than will probably be secured by the present appointment.” 
However, in the event that those in charge of making the appointment already had 
addressed that question, Buckminster stood ready “to execute as well as the time allows 
and my own health will permit.”29 Neither time nor his health complied. In 1812, before 
he could start lecturing, the promising twenty-eight-year old succumbed to epilepsy. 
However, as minister of the Brattle Street Church and as Boston’s foremost orator, 
Buckminster had already displayed a respectable understanding of German biblical 
scholarship and had attempted to encourage historical exegesis. He upheld the Bible as 
the final authority on religious truth, but used historical insight to explain its teachings. 
Buckminster developed an interest in both history and biblical criticism at an 
early age. He had learned Greek and Latin as a child and had graduated from Harvard 
with a bachelor’s and a master’s degree at sixteen. As a student in Cambridge, he wrote 
various pieces on history and the Bible, including an essay on “Biblical Criticism.” The 
essay showed very little of what Buckminster would soon learn from German scholars—
it contained copied passages from Herodotus and Thucydides and extracts from 
evidentialist Samuel Clarke’s notes on Homer, and also discussed Hebrew grammars—
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but, along with hinting at the close relationship that existed between classical works and 
the Bible in the period, the piece shows his early interest in biblical scholarship.30  
In a more illuminating and original, though preliminary and brief student essay 
entitled “Study of History,” Buckminster demonstrated a youthful fascination with the 
utility of the past. Granting that studies such as metaphysics provided delight and others, 
such as poetry and oratory, ornamentation, he wrote, “To History alone can we resort in 
circumstances the most intricate and situations the most hazardous. Here is collected in 
one vein the universal experience of human nature, ever employed on similar subjects of 
investigation, and successively exhibited in parallel situations. Here we survey a map of 
the human heart.” Buckminster’s emphasis on history as a guide to all human endeavors 
echoed the apparently classical idea, famously expressed by Lord Bolingbroke and 
repeated throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, that “history is philosophy 
teaching by examples.”31 History gave to the present the collective wisdom of 
generations past. Buckminster proposed that “the utility of the study of history results 
from the truth of this principle, viz. that human nature remains throughout all ages 
essentially unaltered.” The universality of human nature ensured history’s continued 
usefulness. Thus, while Buckminster acknowledged that “precisely the same 
circumstances can never twice occur, and consequently precisely the same line of 
conduct can never be wisely attempted,” he proposed that “where a strong analogy or 
resemblance can be traced we are justified in similar conduct of sentiment.” Without 
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reading too much into a short student essay, here we find a traditional belief in human 
nature as static, but also a more modern awareness of the differences in historical 
circumstances that resulted from contingencies; we find the coexistence of interest in the 
universal and recognition of the particular. The attention to historical particularity and the 
emphasis on recovering atemporal truths from past eras resurfaced in Buckminster’s later 
writings, specifically in those focused on biblical texts.32 
In 1805, Buckminster, who was in his early 20s, became minister of the Brattle 
Street Church. In 1806, he left his flock behind for a time to travel to Europe, as was 
common among Harvard graduates. He collected various works, including studies of the 
Bible. An 1810 letter to New Testament scholar Herbert Marsh, an English bishop who 
had studied with Michaelis in Germany and had translated his mentor’s introduction to 
the New Testament, Einleitung in die göttlichen Schriften des Neuen Bundes (1750), 
reveals that Buckminster obtained works such as Johann Jakob Griesbach’s manual 
edition of his two-volume work on the Greek New Testament, Novum Testamentum 
Græce (1774-1775), which, according to his letter, Buckminster persuaded Harvard to 
reprint and use as a textbook.33 Such works informed the sermons that he delivered to his 
Boston congregants, which again display Buckminster’s interest in the past and also 
demonstrate his emphasis on a historical approach to the Bible.  
The text of one undated sermon in particular, marked “On Studying the N.T. as a 
historical record,” encapsulates Buckminster’s approach to the Bible as a historical text, 
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while also suggesting its prevalence among at least some of his fellow ministers. Writing 
in shorthand, Buckminster noted,  
To many xtns [Christians] it appears superfluous and vain to insist so much as we 
do on the study of the books of the N.T. as historical records. We do this not only 
because the importance of the facts there recorded justifies and demands the 
closest attention, but because this is the only method by wih [which] we can 
arrive at the understanding of the primitive simplicity of xtnity [Christianity], and 
correct there mistakes into wih [which] we are continually led by the sound of 
words and phrases taken out of their connexion, and by the mis application of 
phrases appropriate to certain times and circumstances to the all ages, and all the 
world.  
 
Understanding the texts as historical and aware, at in least to some degree, of the 
contextual nature of biblical language, Buckminster aimed to avoid anachronistic 
readings and applications even as he strove to recover religious truth. He held that “the 
study of the N.T. is the first duty of a xtn [Christian] minister, the understanding of its 
primary meaning his most essential knowledge, and it is only so far as his hearers take an 
interest in the same inquiries and are furnished with similar information that his 
discourses can be truly profitable.” Buckminster hoped that his congregants would 
recognize the importance of historical exegesis and listen to his sermons with that mode 
of interpretation in mind. In particular, he believed that “the circumstances of the first 
chhs [churches] of xt [Christ], to wih [which] Pauls epistles are directed, make a very 
interesting and profitable subject of inquiry.” He thus made the epistles the subject of his 
historical explications.34 
Buckminster’s sermon “Philemon,” in particular, which he likely delivered 
sometime in the summer or fall of 1809 or the spring or summer of 1810, evinces his 
understanding of biblical criticism as a historical endeavor. Following Michaelis in 
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drawing distinctions between the two testaments, Buckminster received the Gospels as 
canonical based on apostolic authorship, which was confirmed by internal consistency 
and external evidences, such as miracles and fulfilled prophecies. Certain that inter-
textual analysis ensured historical accuracy, extra-textual historical evidence could 
confirm but not unsettle the canon. While allowing that criticism might alter his beliefs, 
Buckminster’s reliance on textual evidence alone as historically authenticating limited the 
extent to which extra-biblical evidence could shape his canonical and theological 
positions. He measured the authenticity of other New Testament texts against the 
Gospels, and Paul’s epistle to Philemon passed the test.   
After a verse-by-verse examination of the epistle, including a discussion of Paul’s 
direction that Onesimus, a slave, return to Philemon, his master, Buckminster proposed 
that “in an historical explication of the writings of the New Testament, such as we have 
now given of this short letter, would be found the most interesting and satisfactory mode 
of studying them.”35 What did “historical explication” signify? Buckminster explained 
that “instead of looking into every text, separated from its context, to find something 
which may bear upon a favourite system, we should be content to understand the 
apostles, as they meant to be understood by those to whom they wrote. … They were 
not,” he insisted “on every occasion, delivering a system of dogmas for the instruction of 
all succeeding time.”36 Historical context rather than present concerns should direct 
biblical interpretation. This emphasis marked a departure from traditional readings that 
assumed the timeless nature of the Bible’s words. Rather than interpret the text as if 
contemporaries of biblical peoples, readers should focus on the intentions of historical 
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authors and the reception of historical audiences to determine meaning. Buckminster 
noted that “Paul, in particular, consulted the circumstances of his correspondents, 
reasoned with them sometimes on their own assumptions, and sometimes upon prevailing 
hypotheses, now according to their peculiar habits of interpretation, and then upon 
suppositions and accommodations of his own.”37 The apostles’ writings must be read, 
first and foremost, as historically situated records, produced in “particular 
circumstances,” written “in a popular style,” and “influenced no doubt, by the prevailing 
notions of their own age and nation.”38 In some ways, the New Testament belonged to a 
peculiar, unfamiliar, and foreign past.  
Buckminster used works such as Michaelis’s studies on the New Testament as 
historical helps to assist in orienting the reader during his sojourn to this foreign country. 
Like Dexter and most of biblical criticism’s foremost proponents, Buckminster used new 
insights to illuminate and affirm rather than complicate and undermine the chosen canon. 
His mode of historical explication followed from rather than drove toward the 
establishment of historicity. Inter-textual examination helped to establish the canon, but 
once established, Buckminster turned his attention to how the texts illuminated the 
biblical past. The texts throw “light upon the early history of the gospel,” enable “us to 
enter into the character of the apostles and converts,” and assist “us in judging of the 
probability of the principle facts mentioned … in one word,” Buckminster summarized, 
“they are documents, which awaken an interest in, and add confirmation to the wonderful 
history of Jesus and his apostles.” While this approach could assist in authenticating the 
canon, it could also draw attention to historical distance by identifying the historically 
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conditioned nature of much of the text. The Brattle Street minister supposed that “it 
would … be a subject of curious inquiry to ascertain, if we could, what the apostles 
thought upon some subjects of modern speculation; but” he acknowledged that “it is 
likely that few, perhaps none of them, ever once entered their minds.” As with their ideas, 
so too the apostles’ style of writing is “by no means nicely accommodated to the 
metaphysics of our times.”39 Buckminster stressed to his congregants that in most 
instances temporally located concerns shaped the content and form of the apostles’ 
teachings and language.  
Buckminster’s reading raised the question: if the authors and their writings were 
subject to the same constraints as other humans and texts, how could one be sure of the 
historical accuracy of the canon or the truth of its teachings? Buckminster rejected the 
notion of plenary inspiration. Though the apostles’ writings constituted the word of God, 
he did not inspire their authors in every particular. Still, Buckminster thought that God 
“would not suffer them, in writing on any occasion in which his revelation was even 
remotely concerned, to give a false or mistaken statement of his truth.”40 While at pains 
to explain that the apostolic authors responded to specific circumstances in time-bound 
ways, Buckminster assured his congregation that an eternal God chose his temporal 
servants wisely and guarded them from factual errors. In fact, divine guidance made the 
Gospels the most accurate of ancient texts. To a degree, Buckminster privileged 
recovering historical understanding above uncovering clear instances of divine 
inspiration: the apostles’ “testimony to facts is all that is of indispensable importance.”41 
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Struggling against a firmly entrenched non-contextual approach to scripture, 
Buckminster’s emphasis on historical explication at this stage stood little chance to 
spread awareness of historical distance in ways that might raise serious concerns. He 
worried about winning over an audience that might be skeptical of his historical 
approach, rather than warning them about the skepticism that might follow historical 
exegesis. Even still, his efforts and those like them set the stage for when the increasingly 
incendiary slavery crisis would raise the stakes and fostered the Bible’s historicization. 
At this point, Buckminster drew on historical facts to confirm religious truths, but even 
his early efforts address the issue of slavery, which, in time, would make the challenges 
of historical distance difficult to ignore. 
Returning his attention to the content of Paul’s letter, Buckminster illustrated how 
comparing New Testament texts could confirm their histories and truths. He asked his 
listeners to imagine the executor of Philemon’s estate, having read Acts, perusing Paul’s 
letter to Philemon and then listening to a public reading of his letter to the Colossians. 
Such experiences, he suggested, would verify the “history of the apostle” and his 
relationship with Philemon, while also attesting to Paul’s greatness.42 In a move 
reminiscent of Edwards, Buckminster appealed to a contemporaneous non-biblical text to 
elevate Christianity above other belief systems and to confirm the plausibility of Paul’s 
decision to return the slave Onesimus to his master Philemon. He cited an extant letter 
written by Pliny, “who lived in the same age with the apostle,” which the Roman 
“addressed to one of his friends, upon an occasion precisely similar to this of Paul, 
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interceding for the pardon of a runaway slave.”43 Having used the letter to corroborate 
Paul’s account, Buckminster noted that Pliny’s epistle, though written by a man of 
literary learning, “is altogether inferiour, not merely in affection, in dignity, and the spirit 
of christianity, of which Pliny was ignorant, but also in the subordinate beauties of 
style.”44 The classical past attested to both the factuality and the superiority of the New 
Testament past. Given the text’s historical accuracy and superior literary value, the 
author’s magnanimity, and Christianity’s greatness, “what ideas would the reader of this 
letter form of the nature and spirit of christianity?”45 
Christian universalism was among the religious truths Buckminster extracted 
from Paul’s letter. Here the reader “would learn, that the soul, even of a fugitive slave, is 
not unworthy of being rescued from the tyranny and misery of sin; that the gift of eternal 
life, in the sight of Jesus and of Paul, is no less important to Onesimus, than to his 
master.” But freedom from sin did not signify freedom from slavery. Buckminster 
explained that the reader, “in remarkable coincidence with the doctrine of the apostle in 
other epistles … would find, that Christianity made no alterations in the civil or political 
relations of the converts, for Paul demands not the emancipation of the slave, but, on the 
contrary, returns him to the service of his master.”46 Buckminster highlighted 
congruencies between apostolic texts to authenticate Paul’s letter, marshaled extra-
biblical historical evidence to confirm its history, and then made Paul speak for “all 
succeeding time” on the present question of slavery and fugitive slaves.47 Using an epistle 
                                                
43 Ibid., 89, 89-90. 
44 Ibid., 90. 
45 Ibid., 91.  
 46 Ibid. 
 47 Ibid., 91-92. 
   69 
that dealt directly with slavery to illustrate the idea of historical explication was not an 
arbitrary decision on Buckminster’s part. Section 9 of Article 1 of the Constitution had 
protected the slave trade up until 1808, a year or two before his speech, when Congress 
passed an act that prohibited the importation of slaves. Between the start of the 
Revolution and 1804, every northern state had passed antislavery laws and by 1810 most 
slaves in the North had been manumitted. Although anticipated, illegalizing the 
transatlantic slave trade worried some southern slaveholders, whose dependence on the 
internal slave trade, the policing of slaves, and the return of fugitives increased. In light 
of these developments, Buckminster used his historical insight to chide overzealous 
antislavery northerners while easing the fears of anxious proslavery southerners. 
In his reading, Buckminster had repeatedly referenced the historical distance 
separating modern present from ancient past, but once he uncovered an apparently 
timeless teaching—“the attachment of a master and his domestics”—he critiqued his 
age’s failure to collapse that distance and live as Paul had, exclaiming, “how unlike the 
customs and the spirit of modern society!”48 Certain human relations, along with human 
nature, remained constant despite historical distinction and change. This interpretation 
and application of Paul’s epistle to Philemon, made consistent with the Constitution’s 
fugitive slave clause and the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, would echo loud and clear in 
subsequent decades, culminating in southern and northern defenses of the Fugitive Slave 
Act of 1850. Like those interpreters, present concerns constrained Buckminster’s view of 
Christian freedom and encouraged him to set aside historical difference.49 However, in 
drawing attention to the temporal and transient nature of the Bible’s content, his historical 
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explication, like the ones that followed, could also be used to insist that the ancient 
scriptures had little relevance in addressing contemporary issues like American slavery, 
or that their relevance depended on interpreting them in light of historical change.  
Buckminster’s biblical criticism was synonymous with his historical explication. 
He began with the contention that Christianity as presented in the New Testament “is 
conveyed to us in the historical form.”50 Internal and external evidences and inter-textual 
analysis confirmed an apostolic text’s historicity. The authenticated text, divinely 
protected from errors, functioned as a uniquely accurate historical account of the times. 
An attention to historical context, captured within the text itself and uncovered in extra-
biblical sources, illuminated an ancient era. On the basis of a text’s historicity and an 
understanding of the historical situation in which it was produced, timeless religious 
truths could be extracted from transient temporal facts. Buckminster’s emphasis on the 
need to recognize the historical situatedness of an apostolic author, his text, and his 
audience and the historical distance between said author, his text, and the present yielded 
to the idea that, on crucial issues such as the relationship between a master and his slave, 
the canon transcended time. But while Buckminster conceived of historical understanding 
and religious truth as allies, making that truth epistemologically dependent on “an 
historical explication” had the potential of arming historical understanding against 
religious truth. Armament for such a conflict depended on the spread of the principles 
that Buckminster espoused. Over the next few decades, as slavery maintained and then 
increased its hold on the national consciousness, it created the conditions for a much 
more consequential biblical debate over slavery and for a greater realization of historical 
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distance. Meanwhile, a greater number of biblical scholars began to emphasize the same 
kind of historical explication that Buckminster had promoted. 
 
 
“Rules of Interpretation Modified by the Special Circumstances”: Religious Liberals and 
Conservatives in the Battle for the Elevated Grounds of History 
As America’s foremost proponent of biblical criticism, Buckminster’s influence 
remained mostly limited to his Brattle Street congregation. His appointment as Dexter 
Lecturer promised the extension of his principles to a wider and more engaged audience. 
Death robbed him of the opportunity, but it also propelled the spread of biblical criticism 
in ways that a lifetime as Dexter Lecturer might not have. Indeed, it might be said that 
two deaths, Samuel Dexter’s and Joseph Buckminster’s, gave life to American biblical 
criticism. Other students of the Bible, who knew of Buckminster’s European travels and 
acquisitions, attended the public sale of his library that followed his death. The auction 
placed works of biblical scholarship known for “their rarity in our country” into the hands 
of those who became some of the period’s foremost advocates of biblical criticism, at 
least in a qualified form.51 We might expect that attendees included Unitarians such as 
William Ellery Channing, Edward Everett, and John Thornton Kirkland, but 
Congregationalists, including Jeremiah Evarts and Moses Stuart, also turned up for the 
event. When Stuart outbid his friend Everett for Eichhorn’s five-volume introduction to 
the Old Testament, Einleitung ins Alte Testament (1780-1783), he ensured that defenders 
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of orthodoxy would challenge promoters of liberal religion in debating canonical choices 
and doctrinal positions on biblical criticism’s elevated historical grounds.52 
Still, Unitarians figured most prominently among the antebellum religious groups 
that promoted historical explications of scripture. William Ellery Channing, whose 
relatively conciliatory approach to biblical criticism mirrored a rather cautious handling 
of the slavery question, briefly succeeded Buckminster as Dexter Lecturer from 1812-
1813. He most successfully publicized the Unitarian approach to scripture in the sermon 
he later gave at Jared Sparks’s ordination in 1819. In “Unitarian Christianity,” Channing 
stated his preference for apostolic texts and upheld reason as the indispensable 
interpretive tool in examining them. He asserted that because God conformed to human 
language, “every word and every sentence must be modified and explained according to 
the subject … the purposes, feelings, circumstances and principles of the writer, and … 
the genius and idioms of the language which he uses.”53 One hears Buckminster in 
Channing’s caution that “the different portions of this book, instead of being confined to 
general truths, refer perpetually to the times when they were written, to states of society, 
to modes of thinking, to controversies in the church, to feelings and usages which have 
passed away, and without the knowledge of which we are constantly in danger of 
extending to all times, and places, what was of temporary and local application.”54 Like 
the first Dexter Lecturer, Channing encouraged readers to avoid anachronistic 
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applications. His understanding of inspiration and interpretation also matched 
Buckminster’s. “That the Holy Spirit did not so guide the Apostles as to suspend the 
peculiarities of their minds,” Channing instructed, “and that a knowledge of their 
feelings, and of their influences under which they were placed, is one of the preparations 
for understanding their writings.”55 One must first recover the historical context in which 
the apostles operated and then use such knowledge to separate general truths from 
particular facts. Historical distance required, and historical knowledge informed, a 
reasonable reading of scripture. This approach allowed Channing later to posit that the 
apostles had taken expedient measures to start the process of slavery’s abolition. 
Channing’s sermon provoked responses from conservative religious scholars and 
Andrews Norton’s appointment to succeed Channing in 1813, which placed a much more 
militant defender of liberal Christianity in the position of Dexter Lecturer, had already 
ensured the continuance and deepening of canonical and interpretational debates. 
Whereas Channing had healthy interactions and exchanges with more conservative 
religious figures such as Moses Stuart and more liberal religious figures such as 
Theodore Parker, the contentious Norton often found himself embroiled in heated debate 
with those outside the fold as he battled to position Unitarianism against Calvinism on the 
right and Transcendentalism on the left. In 1812, he had opened the General Repository 
with an attack on orthodox interpreters of scripture, who, he argued, “do not expect to 
find the meaning much disguised by peculiarities of expression of the writer or of the age 
or country to which he belonged; they pay but little regard to the circumstances in which 
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[the writer] wrote, or to those of the persons, whom he addressed.”56 In contrast, Norton 
posited, liberals attend “to all these circumstances.”57 He believed the Bible, and the New 
Testament in particular, to be the source of Christian truth, but he stressed the importance 
of historical explication in attempts to grasp the meaning of sacred texts.  
In 1818, due to Norton’s pleadings and President Kirkland’s efforts, the Dexter 
Lectureship became the Dexter Professorship of Sacred Literature with Norton as its first 
occupant. This marked the beginning of a serious and prolonged engagement with 
biblical interpretation that culminated in his The Evidences of the Genuineness of the 
Gospels, published in three volumes between 1837-1844. These later publications 
displayed Norton’s attempt to use historical evidence to defend the authorship, general 
accuracy, and relevance of the Gospels from scholarship, purveyed by radicals such as 
Parker, which threatened to undermine their canonical status. Much of his prior work, 
however, aimed to distinguish liberal from orthodox interpretation along lines of 
historical explication. Indeed, Norton believed that the historical peculiarities of the New 
Testament texts reinforced their genuineness; their archaic components signaled their 
historicity. Only later, when Parker and others used historical insights to question the 
historical basis of Unitarian faith, did scholars began to recognize that highlighting 
historical particularities could threaten the Gospels’ relevance just as easily as it might 
evidence their authenticity.    
A number of Norton’s notebooks and the manuscripts of his Harvard lectures 
display his emphasis on reading the scriptures in relation to historical circumstances and 
                                                
56 Andrews Norton, “A Defence of Liberal Christianity,” General Repository and 
Review 1 (January 1812), 2 (APSO). On Norton’s role in propagating the principles of 
biblical criticism in America, see Brown, Rise of Biblical Criticism, 29-35, 69-93. 
57 Norton, “A Defence,” 3. 
   75 
contexts. One notebook contains a section labeled “Materials for Lectures on Biblical 
Criticism,” wherein Norton included references to scriptures to measure “the character of 
the Evangelists as historians,” to illustrate their “figurative language,” and to identify 
“precepts to be explained by a consideration of circumstances.”58 He fleshed out these 
ideas much more fully in his lecture notes. In one lecture in particular, numbered 
“Lecture 5,” Norton stressed the need to interpret the New Testament writings in relation 
to the circumstances in which their authors wrote them. He outlined three kinds of 
knowledge necessary to understanding the scriptures, beginning with “a knowledge of the 
circumstances under which the discourses of our Saviour were delivered, and the writings 
of the evangelists and apostles [were] composed.” The second and third forms of 
knowledge referred to an understanding of the style of their writings and the meanings of 
their words and phrases, which, as Norton made clear, were also questions of historical 
research. Throughout the manuscript, he emphasized the need to “acquire … a distinct 
conception of those more temporary and transient circumstances, of those particular 
incidents and situations, which gave occasion to many passages in the discourses of our 
Saviour or the writings of his apostles.”59 Norton contended that the reader could 
apprehend the truths of the sacred texts in no other way. 
Like Buckminster, Norton held that “the fundamental principles of religion and 
virtue are always the same,” but, like Buckminster, he also affirmed that “the particular 
rules derived from these vary with the varying circumstances of men.” Norton 
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emphasized that “we must know the situation and character of those to whom any 
particular rules are addressed, before we can judge of their reasonableness, of the 
extensiveness of their application to others.” Focusing on the particular would reveal the 
universal. Otherwise, Norton explained, “we shall interpret all these [scriptures] very 
erroneously if we neglect their original application, and suppose them to have a direct 
relation to ourselves.” Failing to take note of errors and controversies “which have 
become long since wholly obsolete,” and supposing that the apostles wrote “with the 
express design of affording instruction to all Christians in all ages,” blinded readers from 
comprehending original and universal Christian truths.60 Christ and his apostles, Norton 
believed, addressed the particular needs and problems of particular audiences.  
Norton proposed that “the whole preaching of our Saviour and his apostles must 
have been accommodated to the understandings, to the character, and to the situation of 
those whom they addressed.” “Accommodation” became a popular term among 
American interpreters in this period. While some of them damned the German born 
“theory of accommodation,” which was often used to dismiss certain biblical passages 
and teachings that conflicted with modern sensibilities, an expanding group of American 
biblical scholars accepted and advanced at least a variant on that theory. Norton 
spotlighted accommodation to the apostles’ audiences, and even he went so far as to 
suggest that “we have indeed no reason to believe that the minds of the apostles 
themselves were unaffected by the intellectual character and prevailing opinions of the 
age and nation.” Apparently, even Christ’s most intimate disciples could not help but be 
influenced by contemporary ideas and notions. Regardless, he continued, “they must still 
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have taught with reference to [the prevailing opinions of the age], and conformed 
themselves as far as possible to the apprehension of their disciples.” While noting that the 
“great truths of our religion … are of permanent and universal interest,” Norton 
reemphasized that “the manner of their exhibition was conformed to temporary and local 
circumstances.” The sacred writers “had in mind no readers but their contemporaries” 
and anticipated “none of those difficulties which would occur to other men than those in 
their own age.” As a result, Norton insisted, in a directive reminiscent of Johann 
Gottfried Herder’s historicism, the reader must “leave behind him and forget our modern 
doctrines, and prejudices, and associations. He must make himself familiar and 
contemporary with men” from New Testament times. Norton, in essence, challenged 
Christian Americans’ assumed affinities between biblical and modern times by 
emphasizing the historical situatedness of New Testament authors and audiences, and 
then posited that one could indeed become familiar with them, but only by recovering 
and participating in their ancient mentality through historical research.61 However, the 
attempt to familiarize readers with a foreign past exposed the historical distance from that 
most sacred historical era and threatened to undermine the very familiarizing project that 
Norton had outlined and advocated. This gradual turn in American exegesis from 
assumed contemporaneity with biblical figures to a stress on historical sympathy, 
contributing to a broader realization of historical particularity. 
Norton again stressed the particular and peculiar nature of the New Testament in 
discussing the style of Christ’s discourses and the evangelists’ and apostles’ writings. 
Citing the ancient Jews’ “oriental modes of expression” and noting their “comparatively 
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rude and uncivilized” state, Norton again argued that the reader must take note of 
“temporary, and local causes.” In analyzing specific words and phrases of the New 
Testament, Norton, more than Buckminster, displayed an awareness of the evolutionary 
nature of language. Noting the changing signification of words, he warned that readers 
“must be careful to understand” a text’s “words in their original sense, and not that which 
they have acquired in modern times.” Norton earnestly believed that as the “meaning [of 
a text] appears more distinctly” through this approach, “we shall see more reason to 
admire the simplicity, the purity, and the sublimity of it’s [sic] moral precepts and it’s 
[sic] religious doctrines.” Rigorous and sophisticated historical research revealed 
straightforward and simple eternal truths.  
Further, and of growing interest to Norton, he maintained that the peculiar 
historical nature of the New Testament offered a strong proof of the genuineness of its 
texts. Human wisdom might assume that the scriptural canon had been written for 
“Christians in all ages and countries; and of course should contain little or nothing of a 
merely local or temporary nature.” However, if such had been the case it would have 
raised questions about the authenticity of the New Testament texts. But God, in his 
providence, allowed the sacred writer to have “nothing in view, but to be understood by 
the person or persons whom he is addressing.” The presence of peculiar historical 
features also marked the authenticity of ancient texts such as Cicero’s letters. Norton’s 
comparison between biblical and classical texts, similar to Buckminster’s, served to 
confirm the authenticity of the New Testament, though it could also demote the Bible as 
one among a number of historical texts. Norton believed that the New Testament’s 
archaic features attested to its historicity, but that historicity might also indicate the 
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historical distinctions and distances that separated biblical from modern times, especially 
when antislavery writers contrasted ancient with American slavery.62 
Norton later advanced such arguments in defending the genuineness of the 
Gospels in print, but he also used these ideas to publically promote what he viewed as the 
liberal attention to circumstances against what he understood as orthodox interpretations 
that read the texts in isolation. In 1819, responding to an exchange occasioned by 
Channing’s ordination sermon between Channing and Congregationalist Moses Stuart, 
Norton reiterated that liberal Christians rightly explored the ways in which contexts and 
circumstances shaped the meaning of words and texts. He argued that an interpreter must 
account for a writer’s “habits of thinking and feeling, his common style of expression, his 
settled opinions and belief, the extent of his knowledge, the general state of things in 
which he lived, the particular local and temporary circumstances present to his mind 
while writing, the character and conditions of those for whom he wrote, [and] the 
opinions of others to which he had reference.” Norton’s instructions stressed the need to 
recognize the foreign nature of the biblical past. To understand biblical passages, he 
argued, the reader must learn the cultural languages of particular times and places. In a 
note, Norton drew attention to Stuart’s use of certain German scholars, but found them 
“defective in the most essential particular necessary to qualify them for the work. … It is 
necessary to have just notions of the intellectual and moral character of our Saviour and 
his apostles, and of the circumstances under which they spoke or wrote.”63 As with 
Buckminster and Channing, Norton championed a historical explication of the scriptures, 
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while deriding Stuart for his apparent neglect of context in emphasizing grammar. He 
failed to notice that Stuart, not to mention the German critics that Stuart had referred to in 
his pamphlet, also stressed the historical situatedness of biblical texts, which again 
signaled the historical distance that resulted from a realization of contextual difference.  
Perhaps Norton perceived similarities between his cherished Unitarian and 
condemned German modes of interpretation. In a vigorous disassociation effort he 
vociferously contested Stuart’s claim that Channing was traveling down the heretical path 
staked out by figures such as Semler, Eichhorn, and De Wette, and quickly rejected the 
invitation to imbibe German offerings if only for the purpose of casting aside their more 
unsavory opinions, as Stuart had done. Perhaps antebellum religious thinkers’ contempt 
for all things German can be attributed to what Sigmund Freud later described as the 
“narcissism of small differences,” which posits that “it is precisely the little 
dissimilarities in persons who are otherwise alike that arouse feelings of strangeness and 
enmity between them.”64 This also might help explain the darts that Norton directed at 
the increasingly heretical Theodore Parker, who seemed to confirm everything that 
conservatives feared liberal religion would lead to and everything Norton assured them it 
would not. Nonetheless, real doctrinal differences did exist both on the left and the right, 
and regardless of the reasons for his distrust of German scholarship, Norton’s reading of 
Stuart led him to the erroneous conclusion that in emphasizing grammar Andover’s 
principal biblical scholar had neglected context.  
Stuart was, in fact, the nation’s most competent Hebrew and Greek grammarian. 
But, as Norton well knew, grammatical issues were tied to historical questions. As 
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Professor of Sacred Literature at Andover Theological Seminary, Stuart taught grammar 
and a form of biblical criticism. In 1807, in partial response to Harvard’s appointment of 
the liberal Henry Ware to the Hollis Chair of Divinity at Harvard in 1805, a group of 
orthodox New England Congregationalists, including Eliphalet Pearson, Jedidiah Morse, 
and Leonard Woods, founded Andover, the second American academic institution 
promoting a brand of biblical criticism. Within three years they appointed Stuart to help 
stem the tide. In the letters he wrote in response to Channing’s ordination sermon, which 
he published in 1819, Andover’s eminent appointee demonstrated a keen awareness of 
German scholarship, to which he had applied his facility with the German language, and 
showed his interest in distilling biblical criticism’s more benign principles. He focused on 
doctrinal differences and noted canonical distinctions. He agreed that the New Testament 
more clearly delineated gospel truth, but worried that Channing had too easily dispatched 
the Old Testament, which, according to Stuart, the Gospels authenticated. Still, he found 
similarities between his and Channing’s rules of interpretation, embracing “with all [his] 
heart” the Unitarian’s directive to modify biblical language according to the specific 
subject, motivations, principles, and “special circumstances” of the author.65 Seeming to 
agree with Norton’s approach to the Bible as a historical text, in a later letter Stuart noted, 
“I read John, and interpret him just as I do any other author, ancient or modern, by the 
general rules of interpretation modified by the special circumstances and dialect in which 
he wrote.”66 Stuart placed emphasis on the rules of interpreting words in their historical 
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context, which included an investigation of their “relation to the context, and (of course,) 
of their local meaning,” but differentiated these rules from extra-biblical knowledge 
about peculiar circumstances, writing that “whatever aid I may get from other sources … 
must be that which is superadded to the explanation that these rules will afford.”67 Norton 
recognized this distinction and argued that Stuart, like other orthodox interpreters, 
ignored historical peculiarities and circumstances in his grammatically based 
interpretation. 
Perhaps in an attempt to satisfy Norton, or at least to defend himself from his 
attacks, Stuart added a few sentences in the third edition of his Letters to Channing, also 
published in 1819, which further exhibited his appreciation for historical knowledge. In 
place of the above statement on “other sources,” Stuart wrote, “I may obtain aid from 
many sources, to throw light upon the meaning of words and sentences. From a 
knowledge of the geography of any country … as well as of the manner, customs, laws, 
history, &c. of its inhabitants, I may obtain assistance to explain its language, and must 
obtain it, if I mean to make out a satisfactory interpretation.” Correct interpretation 
required the use of all available historical knowledge. “But,” and this was Stuart’s central 
point, “I can never dispense with the laws of grammatical analysis.” He granted primacy 
to grammatical rules in part because they could be universally applied to scriptural 
passages independent of extra-biblical findings, which were relatively scarce and often 
unverifiable. “Admitting these rules to be the best and surest guide to the meaning of 
language,” Stuart wrote, “we cannot supersede them, by supposing, or conjecturing 
peculiarities in a writer. It is only when these peculiarities are proved, or, at least, 
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rendered probable, that they can be admitted to influence our interpretation of any 
passage.”68 Although interpreters in the antebellum era began to stress contextual 
readings, some also pointed out the difficulties involved in accurately recreating 
historical contexts. Stuart’s caution here anticipated arguments in both the biblical and 
the constitutional debate over slavery, when some interpreters found it useful to point out 
the conjectural nature of a historically grounded reading. Despite his careful approach, 
Stuart did not value ahistorical grammatical rules over historical explication, but rather, 
as the period’s preeminent popularizer of the grammatical-historical method he prized a 
demonstrable inter-biblical and language-based historical explication above a dubious 
extra-biblical one. 
In fact, Stuart was defending this approach against a presentism that he associated 
with the German-born theory of accommodation advanced by Semler, who proposed that 
Jesus and the Gospel writers had accommodated their teachings to the ignorance of the 
Jews, which accounted for their obvious misapplication of the Old Testament. Stuart held 
that some German critics, including Semler, Eichhorn, and Bauer, relied on this approach 
to explain away stories like the Genesis account of the Creation and the Fall as poetical, 
naturalize miracles, including those ascribed to Christ, and dismiss doctrines that failed to 
align with their present philosophical and theological positions. But, as far as Stuart could 
tell, “Accommodation has been sifted, attacked, defended, explained, moderated, 
modified, itself accommodated; so that at last it is nearly driven from the ground.”69 
Now, rather than assigning unacceptable teachings and supposed miracles to Jewish 
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ignorance, some critics explained them according to “the idiom and ignorance of 
antiquity in general, and in particular of the sacred writers themselves.”70 New Testament 
audiences and authors held outdated and thus dismissible beliefs. Some abolitionists 
would soon make similar claims about the framers and their audience. These readings 
depicted the past as a whole, rather than in part, as bound up in time. Stuart believed that 
if one accepted the theory of accommodation, then this was the more historically sound 
approach. He differed from the German critics “in sentiment” and found their views 
“subversive of Christianity,” but was “under great obligations to them … for convincing 
me that we need nothing more than the simple rules of exegesis, and a candid, believing 
heart, to see in the Scriptures … all the substantial and important doctrines, which have 
commonly been denominated orthodox.”71 Stuart wrote that “if the sentiments that I 
espouse will not stand the test of investigation, then I will abandon them,” but, echoing 
Jonathan Edwards, he felt that “the real truth and importance of evangelical doctrines … 
are greatly strengthened” by this method.72 Stuart worried that Channing had 
incorporated the presumed historicist principle of accommodation to twist ancient and 
authoritative writings in support of newly propounded Unitarian teachings. In truth, 
Norton, at least in his lecture notes, had expressed the idea that the apostles could not 
escape their historical setting. Stuart held that the Unitarians neglected the Germans’ 
redeeming interpretive methods while seeming to embrace their damning liberal 
sentiments. Their efforts, it seemed, threatened to banish the canon as a whole to the past. 
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Stuart maintained that “we are agreed as to principles of interpretation, in most 
things that are of importance.”73 While real departures came in the application of 
interpretive principles, he and his Harvard counterparts shared an interest in the historical 
situatedness of the scriptural authors and, presumably, a consequent awareness of the 
historical distance separating biblical from modern times. Unwittingly echoing Norton’s 
lectures, Stuart instructed his Andover students to “let every writer be placed in his own 
age, and if possible, transfer yourself back there, with him.” He urged ascription “to 
every sacred writer, views on such subjects consonant with his character and his age—
and to reject the monstrous exegesis which explains him as though he spoke but 
yesterday and with all our feelings and prejudices.”74 Stuart’s orthodoxy limited his 
willingness to historicize the biblical past, even as he believed the Unitarian’s liberalism 
hampered their interpretations, but he held that “on all subjects, not pertaining directly to 
the development of moral or religious truth … the sacred writers [express] the common 
view of their age & time.”75 Stuart asserted the Bible’s primacy and unity, defended 
plenary inspiration, and assigned accommodation to God rather than his scribes. As with 
Buckminster, on issues of moral truth he spoke of Paul “as though he spoke but 
yesterday.” Indeed, Stuart would later echo Buckminster’s reading of Philemon to 
criticize those opposed to the Fugitive Slave Law. But, also like Buckminster and his 
successors, Stuart upheld historical explication as the premier exegetical mode. In doing 
so, together these American exegetes inadvertently backed into an awareness of the kind 
of qualitative historical distance from biblical times that emerged through contextual 
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readings. In turn, that distance became difficult to ignore in their applicative efforts, 
especially when it helped arm more radical readers, including abolitionists who were 
willing to question the contemporary value of an ancient text. 
Some colleagues grew suspicious of Stuart, in part due to his engagement with 
German scholarship, but he was not the only Congregationalist to value historical 
explication. Jeremiah Evarts, for example, was also present at the landmark auction, 
where he purchased works on the New Testament by Göttingen scholar Johann Friedrich 
Schleusner and Semler disciple Johann Griesbach. Best known for his later opposition to 
Andrew Jackson’s Indian Removal Act (1830), Evarts served on the American Board of 
Commissioners for Foreign Missions from 1812-1831 and edited the Panoplist from 
1805-1820. Compared to the Unitarian’s General Repository, the Congregationalist-run 
Panoplist gave little space to biblical criticism except to counter its potentially 
destabilizing efforts to historicize the canon’s creation and transmission.76 But in the 
same year that Buckminster became Dexter Lecturer, the missionary-minded magazine 
diverted attention from its evangelical emphasis to praise Englishman Thomas Scott’s A 
Commentary on the Whole Bible. “Scott’s Family Bible,” introduced to the American 
market in 1804, anticipated a bourgeoning book trade of bibles with commentaries, 
introductions, illustrations, and maps, new translations from first texts, and geographical 
studies like William Thomson’s The Land and the Book (1858). In an important way, the 
deepening of historical awareness in antebellum America depended on technological 
advances in the publication and dissemination of historical knowledge, including works 
                                                
76 The historical figures discussed in this study occasionally attended to this 
aspect of biblical criticism, but I am most interested in their emphasis on contextual 
explications of the texts rather than in their understanding of the creation and 
transmission of those texts.  
   87 
containing information about the most esteemed of ancient texts. Those who upheld the 
Bible as “the standard, and only standard, of truth,” might view such works with 
suspicion.77 And yet, even orthodox figures such as Evarts and the Panoplist’s publisher 
Jedidiah Morse, famous American geographer and father to painter and inventor Samuel 
F. B. Morse, recognized “that the Bible abounds with allusions to manners, customs and 
facts” the explication of which requires “some knowledge, drawn from other sources, of 
the general history of the ages and countries in which the Scriptures were written.”78 
Even religious stalwarts like Morse, a lifelong critic of liberalism, believed that the 
historical distance separating ancient and modern necessitated the use of scholarly guides 
and helps to illuminate the Bible’s past environments for present readers. While intended 
to expand the Bible’s reach and appeal, these works contributed to its historicization and, 
as historian Paul Gutjahr puts it, “While many still believed it to be ‘the book of books,’ 
it was equally true that the Bible was increasingly a book among books.”79  
Calvinists also contributed to this development. More leery of biblical criticism 
than the either the Unitarians or the Congregationalists, Charles Hodge’s Biblical 
Repertory nonetheless aimed to “excite a spirit for Biblical Studies.”80 Hodge, described 
as “the Pope of Presbyterianism” by his biographer, was a product of Princeton, which 
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was a more conservative institution than the Congregationalist institutions of Andover, 
and, especially Yale.81 In 1820, before Hodge began teaching at Princeton, he traveled to 
New England where he visited with figures such as Nathaniel Taylor, Edward Everett and 
Moses Stuart. Stuart encouraged his orthodox Presbyterian counterpart to learn German 
to combat the Unitarians. Hodge followed his direction and when he formed the Biblical 
Repertory in 1825, which he edited for nearly five decades, he did so to counter the 
writings coming out of Cambridge. He envisioned the quarterly “as a substitute, for the 
possession or perusal of works, which … it may neither be easy nor desirable to put into 
general circulation.”82 Although Unitarians such as Buckminster seemed more willing to 
encourage the spread of biblical criticism, more conservative religious figures like Stuart 
and Hodge also desired, at least selectively, to distill and then disseminate that 
knowledge by publishing “interesting articles on the manners, customs, institutions, and 
literature of the East—on various points in Biblical Antiquities—and on the Literary 
History of the Sacred Volume.”83 Stuart hoped to use biblical criticism’s more benign 
principles to counter its more lethal lessons, but he maintained the essential neutrality of 
critical study and the usefulness of historical knowledge to biblical interpretation.  
The Repertory’s opening issue included partial translations of German philologist 
Christian Daniel Beck’s work on the New Testament, Monogrammata Hermenuetices 
Novi Testamenti (1803), and German theologian Charles Christian Tittmann’s 
commentary on the Gospel of John, Meletemata Sacra (1816), works that grounded 
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biblical exposition in historical explication. Hodge wrote of the lengthy Beck selection 
that it “was to give an account of the character, age, origin, and history of each particular 
book, and the commentaries upon each.”84 Beck informed readers that “those passages 
which are inconsistent with the Christian religion or history … are to be regarded as 
spurious” and the teachings and style of the New Testament texts are to be judged 
“according to the opinions and manner of writing prevalent in the times of the sacred 
penmen.”85 As “much belongs to the means of determining the historical sense,” Beck 
encouraged the acquisition of “the knowledge of history and antiquities of the Jews, 
Greeks, and Romans, especially of the age in which the Sacred Writers lived.”86 All of 
these insights would allow one to better understand the language and content of the New 
Testament’s authors, who, Beck explained “were obliged to accommodate themselves, in 
some measure, to the character of their readers, and to the object which they wished to 
accomplish.”87 Although Beck seemed to reject the more radical accommodation theory 
that Stuart had deplored and that Norton seemed open to, which posited that then 
prevalent notions had even constrained the apostles’ attempts to proclaim gospel truths, 
he proposed that of necessity the “Sacred Writers” had to speak the language of their 
historically situated audiences.  
Tittmann, in his selection, sought to dismantle the theory of accommodation as he 
understood it, which, he wrote, aimed to discover “not what [the New Testament authors] 
taught, but what the measure of light then in the world, and their own talents, enabled 
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them to teach.”88 Similar to Stuart, Tittmann upheld the grammatical mode of 
interpretation as the best, though he also recognized that “grammatical interpretation is 
for the most part Historical.” The interpreter must attend to the usus loquendi, or the 
customary manner of speaking, which “is a matter of history” as it reveals “the import of 
every expression, at every different period … with each particular author and nation, and 
in each specific connexion or passage; all which are historical facts, which history only 
can teach us.”89 Tittmann asserted that in deciphering both doctrinal and historical 
passages, “recourse must be had to the history of those times … and in this way, and in 
no other, can the true meaning of the passages be evinced.” While renouncing the purely 
“historical mode of interpretation” as presentist and ahistorical, he conceded “that the 
Sacred Writers … so accommodated themselves to the genius of their age, as to use a 
style and language which they would not have used, had they written for different people, 
and at another time.”90 Tittmann granted accommodation in form rather than content, 
writing that “the peculiar mode of exhibiting these doctrines was adapted to the condition 
of those who had been Jews” and directing the interpreter to “discover in what instances 
Sacred Writers have accommodated themselves to the genius of their age, as to the mode 
of discussion, and the import of figurative language.”91 Regardless of how they 
accommodated, the New Testament authors lived in a different world, the historical 
comprehension of which was a prerequisite to understanding their words. Historical 
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knowledge proved useful in establishing authenticity and, coupled with an awareness of 
historical distance, in explicating meaning.  
Hodge’s own writings show that he incorporated the focus on contextual biblical 
readings that he found in the portions of the German works he made available for public 
consumption. While those incorporations appear in a number of his works beginning in 
the 1820s and 1830s, the clearest articulation of his emphasis on historical interpretation 
came in his magnum opus, Systematic Theology (1871-1873), which he published near 
the end of his life. There Hodge used words similar to those in the Beck translation, 
writing that “the fundamental principle of interpretation of all writings, sacred or profane, 
is that words are to be understood in their historical sense; that is,” he explained, “in the 
sense in which it can be historically proved that they were used by their authors and 
intended to be understood by those to whom they were addressed.” Again, historical 
readings of the Bible stressed the importance of original audiences. Hodge continued, 
“Unless words are taken in the sense in which those who employ them know they will be 
understood, they fail in their design. The sacred writings being the words of God to man, 
we are bound to take them in the sense in which those to whom they were originally 
addressed must inevitably have taken them.”92 Similar to Stuart, Hodge believed that 
proper interpretation demanded that readers recognize the ways in which God had 
accommodated to biblical audiences when inspiring his prophets. Such recognitions 
implied an awareness of distinct historical contexts. 
 Hodge’s statement, along with his reproductions of Beck and Tittmann showed 
much of the same historical awareness that Unitarians and Congregationalists exhibited, 
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while similarly ignoring historical distance when it came to core truths. Indeed, in the 
Tittmann piece, the German theologian urged that “we cannot too severely reprobate the 
sentiments hence deduced by some of our contemporaries, that what we find thus 
communicated is not to be considered as pertaining to all Christians, and that the 
doctrines thus revealed are by no means common, and necessary to every age, in such a 
manner as to be a perpetual rule of faith and practice.”93 On the contrary, he affirmed that 
religious truth “is equally applicable to all men, in every age.”94 While fully 
acknowledging the differences between biblical past and modern present in terms of 
language and modes of thought, these interpreters insisted that the Bible remained 
relevant and could not be dismissed simply as a product of the ancient past. These varied 
efforts to ward off attempts to completely historicize the Bible and its teachings were 
largely successful in the short term, but even in attempting to minimize the interpretive 
importance of the historical distance their research uncovered, these interpreters 
contributed to a new understanding that the text to which Christians looked had been 
produced in a very different time amongst a very different people.  
 
Conclusion 
Important doctrinal and canonical differences separated antebellum Unitarians, 
Congregationalists, and Presbyterians, and each of the above figures promoted unique 
modes of historical explication. The liberal Unitarians accepted as canonical certain New 
Testament texts, authenticated and illuminated through internal and external evidences 
and a reasonable use of inter-biblical and extra-biblical historical knowledge. They 
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emphasized the historical situatedness of authors, texts, and audiences to better 
understand the scriptures and to guard against ahistorical applications. Differences 
existed even among the Unitarians. They all denied plenary inspiration, but while 
Buckminster upheld the canon as a uniquely accurate historical text, Norton received it as 
an occasionally flawed historical text, owing in part to the Gospel writers’ 
accommodations, if not their failure to escape the characteristic ideas and notions of their 
times. The orthodox Congregationalists and Presbyterians affirmed, with some 
exceptions, the traditional canon, and often appealed to internal and external evidences to 
assert its unity, historicity, and historical accuracy. They emphasized the historical 
situatedness of authors to better comprehend the Bible’s universal meaning. While they 
rejected the theory of accommodation to protect against presentist readings, Stuart and 
Hodge allowed for God’s accommodation to human language. Stuart privileged inter-
biblical to extra-biblical historical knowledge, but both he and Hodge accepted historical 
insight from extra-biblical sources.  
 Many more nuances separated these thinkers’ ideas on how to best explain the 
scriptures through appeals to historical knowledge, but that each of them accepted history 
as the grounds of debate, and that all of their efforts drew attention to historical distance 
in one way or another, bears emphasizing. Both liberals and conservatives recognized the 
need for an historical exegesis of one kind or another. Edwards’s affirmative answer to 
the question of whether the Bible could be historical and divine had been replaced by the 
assumption that its divinity rested, in some sense at least, on its historicity. More than 
ever, America’s pious biblical scholars valued the canon as historical texts in need of 
historical illumination, even when they remained focused on grammatical interpretation. 
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The unprecedented focus on the historical nature of the biblical texts in canonical debates 
between liberals and conservatives drew new attention to the historical distance 
separating its ancient setting from its modern audience. As David F. Holland writes, “In 
making their case, both sides committed themselves to careful examinations of the 
Bible’s history—and in the course of their conflict, they drove the historical distance of 
the ancient scriptures deeper into the center of Americans’ religious thought.”95 
Questions about eternal truths inspired a greater interest in the historical facts that had 
come to serve as the foundation for knowledge about those truths, and the recognition of 
historical distance that resulted reinforced the value of and desire for historical 
knowledge. In turn, the historical research that followed made historical distance more 
apparent as the search for the universal exposed the vastness of transient. 
 Some of these figures used the historical lessons of biblical criticism to reject the 
historicity of certain biblical texts and, in the case of the more liberal minded, to dismiss 
certain teachings as antiquated instructions meant for ancient audiences. The process of 
separating out specific biblical books and principles expanded the sphere of the temporal 
and shrunk that of the timeless. The biblical debates over slavery would further 
encourage interpreters to make canonical distinctions and to differentiate transient from 
permanent principles. But even attempts to challenge certain texts and teachings most 
often prefaced the more urgent effort of establishing a canon and presenting its timeless 
truths. History was more often used to reveal rather than question a text’s meaning. Once 
the Unitarian, Congregationalist, and Presbyterian expositors had established their 
versions of the canon, historical knowledge became a crucial component to understanding 
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God’s eternal verities. Even the Unitarians, who accepted that most of the Bible’s content 
applied to a now irrelevant past, asserted that once the canon was established, its 
universal truths were just as applicable in the present as in the past. Rational 
supernaturalism was, in many ways, historical supernaturalism. The temporal revealed 
the eternal. But, as Transcendentalist Theodore Parker made clear, the transient could 
also undermine the textual source of the permanent.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
“THE GROUND WILL SHAKE”: TRANSCENDENTAL APPROACHES TO THE  
 
BIBLE AND THE BIBLICAL PAST 
 
In a February 1839 letter addressed to his mentor and fellow Transcendentalist 
Convers Francis, Theodore Parker freely expressed his views of the Bible. “Let any sober 
man read de Wette’s Biblical Dogmatics,” he wrote to his friend, “and he will be 
astonished to see how many doctrines are taught in the Bible which enlightened men 
cannot believe. I must think that by and by, centuries hence, the O.T. will be dropped out 
from the church, then the N.T. will follow, or only be used as we now use other helps. I 
cant [sic] but wish with you, that Jesus had written his own books, but even then, they 
must have contained some things local and temporary.” The passage of time and the 
development of religious views made sacred historical texts obsolete and not even Jesus 
could have ensured their timelessness. In this letter, Parker articulated the difference 
between traditionalist and Transcendentalist interpreters of scripture, writing that “the 
orthodox place the Bible above the Soul. We the Soul above the Bible.” Parker believed 
that the soul, unlike the Bible with its myriad mediations, enjoyed a direct connection 
with the divine. Thus, Transcendentalists answered the questions of whether “‘the canon 
was closed’” and “revelation is at an end” with a resounding no.1 While biblical criticism 
dictated that America’s biblical scholars rest their arguments on historical grounds, it also 
directed one of the nation’s most heterodox figures to abandon those transient grounds in 
favor of what he understood as a transcendent moral sphere.  
                                                
1 Theodore Parker to Convers Francis, 9 February 1839, Theodore Parker Papers, 
Massachusetts Historical Society (hereafter MHS).  
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Parker used historical knowledge to replace transitory biblical texts and figures 
with a divine intuitive sense as the source of unchanging religious truth. As with his 
contemporaries, theological understandings shaped his historical sensibilities. However, 
his rather abstract and minimalist belief—“no master but God, no creed but Truth, no 
service but Love”—along with his privileging of permanent truths and principles over 
mutable doctrines, ceremonies and structures, and his distinction between those truths 
and transient texts, meant that the undermining potential of historical criticism that 
Hodge, Stuart, and Norton avoided or attacked, posed no threat to Parker.2 Sure of his 
direct connection with a timeless God, he could afford to use historical arguments to 
unchain eternal truths from temporal facts. American proponents of evidential 
Christianity placed the Bible and its teachings on a presumably firm historical footing. 
Parker revealed the cracks and breaks in the footing and highlighted its susceptibility to 
wear and tear. Just as quickly as historical evidence might authenticate a sacred text it 
might also falsify that text and thus render it banal. Rather than rest his faith on those 
unstable grounds, Parker centered his belief in an atemporal and innate religious sense. 
Thus, when evidence established that a text rested on a faulty historical foundation, he 
painlessly dispatched it as inauthentic. And when historical distance demonstrated the 
temporariness of an authentic text’s teachings, he dismissed the teachings as antiquated. 
While orthodox and liberal religionists used historical texts to set aside historical change, 
Parker used historical change to disregard the teachings of historical texts. 
To be sure, Parker believed that portions of the Bible remained useful as the 
historical expression of true religion and often used it to evidence the universality of an 
                                                
2 Theodore Parker, A Discourse of Matters Pertaining to Religion (Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1842), 377. 
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innate religious sense, but his beliefs freed him from allegiance to literalist and static 
meanings and allowed him to posit the text’s malleability. The debates over slavery, in 
which Parker became embroiled in the 1840s and 1850s, cemented his position. He could 
accept as historically accurate Buckminster’s contextual reading of Paul’s epistle to 
Philemon, which affirmed that Paul had directed a slave to return to his master, and then 
replace that outdated original meaning, formulated in a world quite different from his 
own, with a universal meaning that had emerged due to what he understood as the 
development of religion and the progress of freedom. While Parker’s religious opponents 
used historical stasis, grounded in a founding religious text, to combat change, he used 
historical change, informed by an illuminated conscience, to combat stasis. In the 
process, both sides brought new attention to historical distance. One did so inadvertently 
in an attempt to dismiss the use of that distance in interpretation and the other explicitly 
in an attempt to use it. Historical distance made it easier for Parker to privilege what he 
identified as present imperatives over outdated past teachings. This approach, which 
extended to other favored pasts, including the Revolutionary era, became most clear in 
his contention that whatever the position of the prophets and apostles or the founders and 
framers on slavery, the present age, as an age of freedom, demanded slavery’s abolition. 
Historicity, it turned out, was a double-edged sword, and in this Transcendentalist’s hand, 
one edge seemed sharper than the other. 
Like most antebellum biblical scholars, Parker sought the eternal. Norton, Stuart, 
and Hodge asserted their canon’s transcendence and the timelessness of certain biblical 
truths, which trumped historical change. Parker, on the other hand, asserted the 
transcendence of conscience and the timelessness of intuited truths, which trumped the 
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historical canon and changed the meaning of biblical texts. Both sides used historical 
insight to reveal the eternal, but because those more orthodox than Parker rested their 
faith on the increasingly historical foundation of the Bible, discussions focused on that 
text especially threatened to expose apparently permanent truths as transient facts. To an 
extent, even Parker’s position was suspect. When contextual exegesis exposed the local 
and transient nature of sacred biblical teachings, it suggested the potential transiency of 
all truth. Even if Parker’s temporally transcendent position protected his truths from the 
same level of historicization for a time, the discussion contributed to the development 
toward the idea that all truth is temporally constructed. Distinct paths led to the same 
destination. Regardless of where these thinkers centered religious truth, each of their 
approaches to the Bible cultivated historical awareness. Their contextual interpretations 
exposed the historical differences and distances separating peculiar biblical pasts from 
the nineteenth-century American present, while creating the intellectual conditions for a 
similar process that indicated historical dislocation from the Revolutionary era.  
 Scholars of Transcendentalism have too often emphasized the movement’s 
ahistorical nature without identifying how historical arguments freed heterodox thinkers 
such as Ralph Waldo Emerson and Theodore Parker in their attempts to build atemporal 
worlds.3 As traced in the first chapter, historical argumentation became standard among 
thinkers across the antebellum religious spectrum. Most used it to ground universal truths 
in a biblical past, and a few, including some Transcendentalists, to unmoor such truths 
                                                
3 In one recent study, for example, Richard A. Grusin contends that an analysis of 
their engagement with higher criticism shows that rather than arriving at an anti-
institutionalist position, the Transcendentalists came to realize that the self was a 
historical product resulting from social institutions. Grusin, Transcendentalist 
Hermeneutics.  
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from that temporal setting. In the process, an awareness of historical distance emerged 
among these antebellum biblical scholars and religious thinkers, most using it to separate 
out historically grounded and biblically based eternal truths from temporal facts, and a 
few, including Parker and Emerson to detach less precarious and permanent atemporal 
truths from a mutable and transient biblical past. 
Transcendentalism’s break with New England orthodoxy was not a wholesale 
renunciation of the past and its lessons, but rather a deep historical critique of the ancient 
book and world on which Trinitarians and Unitarians grounded their beliefs. Emerson 
and Parker used historical reasoning to call into question the singular status of the Bible 
and biblical figures. While the level of their critique was unique, it followed a long 
tradition of rejecting the authority of one historical era for that of a purer past. During the 
Reformation, Protestants dismissed the traditional authority that Catholics placed in 
historical continuity, finding instead change and corruption, and replaced it with the Bible 
and the primitive church. New England Puritans, in turn, found corruption in Protestant 
England, and claimed for themselves the early Christian past. Later American restoration 
movements, such as the Disciples of Christ and the Latter-day Saints, repeated this 
narrative of corruption and renewal, repudiating the elongated immediate past and 
seeking union, or at least correspondence, with a distant biblical one.4 While the above 
displacements aimed to reclaim the primitive Christian and, in the case of the Mormons, 
even the ancient Old Testament pasts, Transcendentalists preferred, as Emerson put it, an 
                                                
4 See Leonard Allen and Richard T. Hughes, Discovering Our Roots: The 
Ancestry of Churches of Christ (Abilene, TX: ACU Press, 1988), 94-97; and Samuel 
Brown, “Mormonism as Restoration,” in Mormonism: A Historical Encyclopedia, ed. W. 
Paul Reeve and Ardis E. Parshall (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2010), 365-71. See 
also, Jordan T. Watkins, “Early Mormonism and the Re-Enchantment of Antebellum 
Historical Thought,” Journal of Mormon History 38 (Summer 2012): 195-201.  
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“original relation to the universe.”5 The primitive past the Transcendentalists sought 
seemed to extend backward and upward beyond a temporal timeframe. Although their 
appeal seemed to follow a long tradition interested in restoration and renewal, 
Transcendentalists broke from that tradition in their emphasis on the present moment. 
They were not claiming contemporaneity with a pure past or golden age, but rather 
positing that the present, the eternal now, was pregnant with promise. Still, they did not 
dismiss as fiction what their intellectual predecessors had upheld as fact; Emerson and 
Parker maintained that the New Testament and its Jesus corresponded to a historical 
reality.6 Though imperfect historical accounts, the Gospels rested on a foundation of 
some historical truth, making their passages and personages useful. Historicity, however, 
signified temporal limitation and attempts to evidence authenticity revealed historical 
distance. Thus, once America’s Christian theologians tied universal religious truth and 
authority to what was an increasingly historical text, it was left to thinkers such as 
Emerson and Parker to point out how temporal constraints made that foundation 
inevitably unstable. Drawing attention to the remoteness and the shiftiness of historical 
evidence and the limitations of historical time revealed the transience of the historical 
grounds on which Americans based their faith.  
 
                                                
5 Ralph Waldo Emerson, Nature, in The Collected Works of Ralph Waldo 
Emerson, ed. Robert E. Spiller and Alfred R. Ferguson, 5 vols., (Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971-94), 1:7 (hereafter Collected Works). 
On these developments, see Kemp, Estrangement of the Past. I contend that this 
development reached a new level in the antebellum period when some Americans found 
distance with even the most pure and useful pasts without recourse to other pasts.  
6 See Hurth, Between Faith and Unbelief, 31-76.  
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“Peculiar” Old Testament “Usages” and a Gospel for “All Countries and Times”: The 
Particular and the Universal in Emerson’s Vestry Lectures  
Transcendentalists confronted biblical criticism with a vigor unmatched by any 
other collection of individuals in the antebellum period. An examination of Ralph Waldo 
Emerson’s and Theodore Parker’s writings on the topic highlight the variety in 
Transcendentalist approaches to biblical scholarship and demonstrates the varying 
implications of those approaches for realizing historical distance. Their interest in biblical 
criticism’s historical critique emerged within a faithful tradition, as seen in their early 
uses of biblical scholarship, but the potential for disillusion with that tradition was 
present from the start. Emerson’s brother William, along with fellow Massachusetts men 
George Ticknor, George Bancroft, and Edward Everett, encountered Johann Eichhorn’s 
biblical criticism first-hand as students at Göttingen, a hub of German biblical 
scholarship. Although Eichhorn was constructive in his approach to the canon, many of 
his American students perceived the undermining potential of his criticism for a faith 
grounded in historical fact, which informed their decision to forego careers in the 
ministry and instead find occupations as literature professors, orators, statesman, and 
historical writers. Emerson also gave up the ministry after dismissing the necessity of the 
Lord’s Supper, but not before a short stint (1829-1832) as a pastor in Boston’s Second 
Church.7   
The sermons Emerson delivered as pastor included his Vestry Lectures, a series of 
nine discourses on the Gospels delivered in the spring of 1831. He presented the first 
lecture at the dedication of the Second Church Vestry on March 1, and the last he gave 
                                                
7 Ibid., 5-30, which includes a discussion of Emerson’s vestries.  
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two months later on May 3. The lectures focus on the authors of the first three Gospels 
(Matthew, Mark, and Luke), outline the transmission of their accounts, and provide 
background and analysis of the early chapters of Matthew. They demonstrate Emerson’s 
early apologetic use of figures such as Johann Michaelis and his students like Eichhorn 
and Marsh, while also showing the awareness of historical distance that was 
characteristic of scholars attentive to recent developments in biblical criticism. 
Emerson’s brief discussion of the synoptic authors shows his grasp of their 
historical situatedness. He noted, for example, that, “as St. Mark wrote for the immediate 
use of the Romans, he sometimes gives explanations which were necessary for foreigners 
though not for the inhabitants of Palestine.”8 Similar to his contemporaries, Emerson 
recognized that the biblical writers wrote to historically situated audiences. In turning to 
the transmission of the biblical texts, he traced a neat line from the creation of the King 
James Bible backward through the efforts of William Tyndale and Myles Coverdale to 
Saint Jerome and early Church Fathers Origen and Ireneaus. He supposed that “an 
unbroken chain of evidence” connected “the books from which we now draw our rule of 
faith and duty with the books first written by the four apostles 1800 years ago.” Criticism 
focused on the transmission of the biblical text soon problematized such streamlined 
accounts. At this stage, though, Emerson held that God protected the Christian canon, 
which “outlasted the barbarous institutions of the middle ages—and have now come 
down safe to our eyes and our ears and our hearts across the vast tract of so many ages of 
                                                
8 Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Emerson’s Six Vestry Lectures of 1831,” in 
Transcendental Epilogue: Primary Materials for Research in Emerson, Thoreau, 
Literary New England, the Influence of German Theology, and Higher Biblical Criticism, 
ed. Kenneth Walter Cameron, 3 vols., (Hartford, CT: Transcendental Books, 1982), 
2:722. 
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war and ignorance.”9 Emerson asserted the preservation and transmission of the sacred 
text in spite of decline, corruption, and the passage of so much time. His historical 
narration, wherein he posited that the canon retained its integrity, paralleled biblical 
scholars’ historical explications, wherein they asserted that its teachings retained their 
relevance. In both cases, though, either to insist on the salience of biblical ideas or assert 
canonical continuity, the use of historical scholarship brought new attention to historical 
context, change, and distance. Emerson attended to both the history of the text and 
historical distinction, mentioning, for example, that Ireneaus wrote “very much in the 
mystical style of the age.”10 The interest in contextual understanding, more than the 
review of textual transmission, had the potential to reveal historical distance in a nation 
where Christians trained their attention on the words of the Bible rather than its creation 
and life as a text.  
Turning to the synoptic Gospels, in particular, Emerson outlined various theories 
put forth to explain the similarities between the three accounts, citing arguments that the 
authors had the various texts in their possession or that they drew from a common written 
source. He preferred, though, the alternative explanation provided by Johann Karl 
Ludwig Gieseler, another Göttingen scholar, which drew attention to an important 
“difference of circumstances,” including the fact that “not books but oral instruction was 
the great mode of communication in that age.” Emerson held that an examination of this 
approach “will show satisfactorily why any darkness hangs over this history and why the 
microscopic criticism that has been directed towards it has served to confirm rather than 
                                                
9 Ibid., 2:727.  
10 Ibid., 2:726.  
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shake the faith of inquirers.”11 The prominence of an oral tradition in the period 
accounted for both the similarities and the differences between the accounts. The early 
Emerson, like his predecessor Edwards and his contemporary Stuart, believed that 
historical criticism confirmed the Bible’s authenticity. But, as with Norton, pointing out 
historical particularities to authenticate the text tended to historicize the biblical past. 
In turning his attention toward the background to Matthew’s Gospel, Emerson 
retained his apologetic tone, writing of the Jews that “the unbeliever in vain throws 
doubts on their miraculous history.” While noting “usages so peculiar” to that people, he 
found in their laws the foundation of modern legal codes. “Whence came those [laws],” 
he stated, “wonderful and connected with strains of religious poetry the most sublime, if 
the history is not true—[laws] which presuppose the truth of the history and connected 
too with historical actions and confirmed by [the] concurrent history of other nations, 
which were done in the belief of this history.” The endurance of Jewish law, the historical 
writings of Josephus, and accounts of modern travelers attested to the veracity of Hebrew 
scripture.12 Historical research authenticated biblical texts, but it also drew attention to 
the historical peculiarities of their ancient peoples. 
While using recent scholarship to authenticate the Bible, Emerson also showed an 
interest in identifying permanent religious truth, again highlighting how historical 
criticism directed America’s biblical scholars to acknowledge and account for historical 
difference through an appeal to accommodation. In his discussion of the first few 
chapters of Matthew, Emerson posited that “the human mind is the same when it opens 
itself to the light in Judea or in Greece [or in] Rome or in America.” This interest in a 
                                                
11 Ibid., 2:727-30, quotation on 729, emphasis in original.  
12 Ibid., 2:730-34, quotations on 730.  
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universal nature of religious sentiment fast became a central pillar of Transcendentalist 
thought and would soon support the idea that though historical and useful, the New 
Testament and its Christ were unessential in the search for salvation, and Philemon and 
its author Paul were irrelevant in addressing the slavery crisis. At this juncture, however, 
Emerson focused on the universal meaning of the words ascribed to Christ.13 
Although his message was universal in meaning, Emerson explained that “Jesus 
adopted [the Jews’] language to impart a new and a sounder sense,” and thus one should 
guard against a strict literal reading of the text, and, even further, one should allow that 
through such accommodations mistaken beliefs found their way into the text.14 As an 
example, he cited Matthew 4:24, which makes reference to demonic possession. 
Anticipating discussions surrounding the miracles controversy that would break apart 
American Unitarianism, Emerson attributed the presence of such an idea to then 
prevalent understandings. “It is maintained,” he wrote “that this was a popular 
superstition of the Jews which they received when they were in captivity … and that 
Jesus accommodated his words to the usual modes of speech.” Emerson noted that “the 
apostles and evangelists” also used “these expressions which in their time were in 
common use.” As with Unitarians like Channing and Norton, Emerson found 
accommodation in both language and meaning, and asserted the truth and relevance of 
those meanings perceived to be timeless, but he also seems to have anticipated his later 
stance on the other side of the debate over New Testament miracles, when he regarded 
                                                
13 Ibid., 2:730-38, quotation on 731.  
14 Ibid., 2:731.  
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the Unitarian investment in those miracles, which historical evidence might disprove, as 
misplaced.15 
Indeed, Emerson’s early transcendentalist leanings, as much as his Unitarian faith, 
informed his early search for permanent truths. In an addendum to the lectures, he 
referenced the love at the heart of Christ’s beatitudes and wrote that “it is this sense that 
fits the Gospel to all countries and times.” Perhaps speaking of the Mosaic Law in 
particular, rather than the later Jewish law that he had previously lauded, he stated that 
“the Jewish code is not only a burdensome ceremony but a local code fit for that 
particular region—fit only for a small country.” In contrast, he contended that, “With the 
law of love at the bottom, [the Sermon on the Mount] is as good at Rome as [at] 
Jerusalem—at Boston as at either. It is for all places where the human heart beats. … It is 
for the soul. If this whole system of worlds, this universe of matter, should pass away it 
would still be eternally true that purity and love and wisdom would be heaven or the right 
and happy state of the soul as it was nineteen centuries ago to the little company of poor 
Jewish peasants whom Jesus Christ addressed.”16 Again, Transcendentalists such as 
Emerson and Parker also sought the eternal, but reducing the permanent and universal 
component of the Bible to a basic element of Christian love signaled the surfacing of a 
minimalist position that designated the rest of the Bible’s content as local, transient, and 
forgettable. It cultivated greater cognizance of temporal distance and robbed the Gospels 
and Christ of their exceptional historical roles. 
Emerson publically articulated a more advanced formulation of these ideas in his 
Harvard Divinity School Address (1838), years after he had resigned from the pulpit and 
                                                
15 Ibid., 2:735.  
16 Ibid., 2:738.  
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left behind much of his interest in biblical scholarship. As with his brother and other 
Harvard graduates who had studied in Germany, biblical criticism informed Emerson’s 
choice of a career outside the ministry as an orator and his decision to turn from biblical 
topics. Emerson’s philosophical stance in the late 1830s and early 1840s assumed 
historical distance from the biblical past, but he was no longer concerned with providing 
close contextual analysis of biblical passages. While he chose to turn from the ministry, 
Theodore Parker struggled to preserve his place at the pulpit and retained a keen interest 
in biblical studies. In his writings and speeches, the potential to uncover and highlight 
historical distance from the biblical past was especially pronounced.  
 
“Not Common Historical Ground”: Theodore Parker and the Transience of the 
Testaments 
Similar to Emerson, Parker’s early writings on biblical topics show a rather 
orthodox understanding of scripture giving way to a more critical approach. Within the 
period of a decade, he moved far beyond the exegetical positions of the Unitarians. One 
way to trace this development is through his engagement with the biblical criticism of 
two German scholars: Wilhelm Martin Leberecht de Wette and David Friedrich Strauss. 
De Wette showed Parker historical problems with the Old Testament texts, while 
reinforcing his belief in an essential inner religious sense, and Strauss unveiled to him 
historical issues with the Gospels. The biblical debate over slavery, which tested 
canonical loyalties among a number of antislavery readers, would further cement this 
approach to the testaments. Parker held some reservations about German biblical 
scholarship, including Strauss’s reading of the Gospel accounts as myths representative 
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of the time in which they were written, but his religious convictions allowed him to 
uniquely engage some of the period’s most devastating biblical critiques without fear of 
losing his faith. In turn, he became less attached to more of the Bible, which allowed him 
to dismiss most of its texts and teachings as relics of a bygone era.17  
But in the early 1830s, even after Unitarians such Andrews Norton and William 
Ellery Channing had left behind the Old Testament and promoted contextual 
interpretations of the New, Parker viewed the Hebrew Bible as an accurate historical 
account. In 1832, he wrote a text for student use entitled, “A History of the Jews,” in 
which he presented a straightforward narrative that showed an orthodox approach to Old 
Testament miracles. Soon, though, Unitarian minister Convers Francis introduced Parker 
to biblical criticism and within two years he began a seven-year project of translating De 
Wette’s historical introduction to the Old Testament, Lehrbuch der historisch-kritischen 
Einleitung in die kanonischen und apokryphischen Bücher des Alten Testaments (1817), 
which demonstrated a shift in his thinking to a more critical approach.  
Informed by Immanuel Kant’s religion of reason, Friedrich Schelling’s view of 
the Bible as the expression of the Absolute, and Jakob Friedrich Fries’s distinction 
between understanding (reason) and revelation (Reason), De Wette aimed to unhinge the 
religious significance of the Bible from historical facts. He viewed Old Testament 
miracles as mythic expressions of ancient Hebrew faith. This protected the ancient 
scriptures from the unsettling historical criticism of scholars such as Eichhorn and Bauer, 
                                                
17 On Parker’s prolonged engagement with biblical criticism, including the 
writings of figures such as De Wette and Strauss, see Dean Grodzins, American Heretic: 
Theodore Parker and Transcendentalism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2002), a source that I rely on for general information about Parker’s thought and 
biblical scholarship. 
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who, in search for historical information brushed aside supernatural embellishment and 
discarded central narratives with deep symbolic meaning. In contrast, while De Wette 
dismissed the historical value of the Pentateuch, he accepted much of the Hebrew 
scriptures as religious poetry representative of ancient thought. Perhaps the Old 
Testament did not constitute an accurate account of past events but did capture ancient 
instantiations of divine revelation. De Wette approached the New Testament in a similar 
manner, preferring to measure the religious value of the ideas expressed therein 
according to the religious ideal—or Reason—rather than in terms of their relationship to 
historical events. Contending that faith resulted from Reason distinguished him from the 
supernaturalists and the naturalists, both of whom measured revelation according to 
reason. Still, he asserted that the Gospels rested on enough of a historical foundation and 
believed Christ to be the historical expression of the ideal. So, when Strauss’s Das Leben 
Jesu, Kritisch bearbeitet (Life of Jesus, Critically Examined) was published in 1835, De 
Wette granted that his compatriot had raised important questions about the historicity of 
the Gospels, but argued that the scarcity of extra-synoptic and extra-biblical 
contemporary accounts arrested Strauss’s critique. De Wette believed that a lack of 
historical evidence undermined the mythological approach and thus remained confident 
in Jesus’s role as Christianity’s founder. This time, historical skepticism undermined the 
work of the skeptic.18 
                                                
18 On De Wette’s thought and his biblical criticism, see John W. Rogerson, 
W.M.L. de Wette, Founder of Modern Biblical Criticism (Sheffield, UK: Sheffield 
Academic Press, 1992). On the relationship between De Wette’s biblical criticism and the 
emergence of historical consciousness in the West through the works of historian Jacob 
Burckhardt, see Howard, Religion and the Rise.  
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Parker’s “Report on Germany Theology,” which he read before the Philanthropic 
Society at Harvard in 1836, shows an early attachment to De Wette and an awareness of 
the German intellectual context. Parker had begun attending the Divinity School in the 
spring of 1834 and in the fall of 1835 he began editing the Scriptural Interpreter, which 
fed subscribers a steady diet of biblical criticism and further exposed Parker to German 
writings. In contrast to American attacks on German thinkers as infidels and atheists, 
which his countrymen would soon direct at him, Parker believed that history showed that 
the Germans possessed a natural inclination toward religiosity.19 He narrated the history 
of German theology and biblical scholarship from Luther up to the more recent writings 
of Reimarus, Michaelis, Semler, Kant, Herder, Eichhorn, Fichte, Schleiermacher, 
Schelling, De Wette, and Bauer. He separated strains of contemporary German religious 
thought into four categories: deists and freethinkers; naturalists; rationalists; and 
supernaturalists. Dedicating most of his space to those he labeled rationalists, which he 
divided between thinkers who argued that religion originated in understanding from those 
who posited that it originated in feeling, Parker showed his affinity with the second 
group, which included De Wette. He wrote, “the fact that religion does originate in the 
feelings is one of the grandest discoveries of modern times.” But in this report, Parker 
remained focused on the first group and their scriptural hermeneutic. He referenced 
Bauer on the Old Testament and Paulus on the New, and explained how both scholars 
accounted for biblical miracles by referring to the age of the world in which the texts 
                                                
19 Hurth’s Between Faith and Unbelief attends to the fears of German religious 
thought exhibited among a number of antebellum America’s religious thinkers. See also, 
Lee, Erosion of Biblical Certainty, 111-72. 
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were written, for “what are miracles to one age are not so to another.”20 The mythical 
nature of biblical passages attested to the antiquity of the biblical texts, but it also 
highlighted the historical distance between biblical pasts and the present.21  
Reading, translating, and editing De Wette likely informed Parker’s separation of 
the Old from the New Testament. Contemporaries like Channing and Norton had already 
made that canonical distinction without the German’s help. Parker outlined problems 
with the Hebrew scriptures in various writings from the period, including a pair of 
sermons he formulated on “The Contradictions in Scripture,” which he wrote in 1837, but 
did not deliver until 1839. In the first sermon, he challenged the Old Testament’s 
narration of the creation as a six-day event, its early depictions of God in physical form, 
and its moral contradictions, including its presentation of the Canaanite massacre as a 
divinely commanded and sanctioned act. He would soon fix his attention on the moral 
contradiction of ancient slavery, but in the second sermon, he described the Bible itself as 
a contradiction, privileging the New over the Old Testament, as was common among 
liberal Christians. He believed that historical evidence required him to distinguish the 
Greek from the Hebrew scriptures, but his emphasis on internal religion, which he found 
clearly articulated in the teachings and example of Jesus, directed that distinction. Soon, 
though, Parker began to wonder if the New Testament might be a collection of myths as 
well, and another German scholar guided him down that path.22 
                                                
20 Theodore Parker, “A Report on German Theology Read Before the 
Philanthropic Society in Divinity College, Harvard University,” in Transcendental 
Epilogue, 2:706-20, quotations on 709 and 712.  
 21 On Parker’s studies, writings, and thought from this period, see Grodzins, 
American Heretic, 41-74.  
22 On “The Contradictions of Scripture” and Parker’s other writings from this 
period, see Grodzins, American Heretic, 150-65.  
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 Parker first read Strauss’s Life of Christ in 1837 and the critiques that the German 
theologian raised soon began to weigh on the American theologian’s mind. As Dean 
Grodzins writes, “If some in New England saw Schleiermacher and De Wette as infidels 
thinly disguised, most thought that Strauss had torn off the mask.”23 The supernaturalists 
interpreted scriptures literally and the rationalists explained them naturally, but both 
believed in the historicity of the Gospels. Strauss, on the other hand, contended that the 
narratives emerged through an unconscious myth-making process and thus reflected the 
beliefs of the times in which they were produced. This reading suggested that the Gospels 
revealed more about the mindset of the writers than the actions and teachings of a figure 
named Jesus. The question Strauss raised was not how much Christ had accommodated to 
the traditions and customs of the Jews, but rather how much the authors of the Gospels 
had unintentionally used local beliefs and mentalities to create myths around a historical 
figure identified as Jesus. This kind of historicization undercut the historicity of the 
Gospels, leaving those who had dug in their heels on historical grounds sinking in 
quicksand. It also exposed the cultural differences separating New Testament and modern 
times by pointing out the peculiar historical nature of the biblical past. 
 By the time William Ellery Channing urged him not to translate, and William 
Ware, editor of the Christian Examiner and General Review, asked him to critique, 
Strauss’s controversial publication in 1839, Parker, who had demonstrated a keen interest 
in the historical accuracy of the Gospels, began doubting the reality of the miracles 
depicted within its pages. However, warned that Ware would not publish a controversial 
review, Parker repressed his private thoughts. Seeming to don the cap of an apologist, he 
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informed readers that Strauss’s publication would have been more adequately titled, “A 
Fundamental Criticism on the Four Gospels,” and labeled it a “conjectural history.”24  
Like Stuart and De Wette, Parker could play apologist in pointing out the conjectural 
nature of historical research.  
However, he would not hide the difficult problems the work raised. Indeed, in 
summarizing its introduction, Parker made a statement that represents one of the 
antebellum era’s clearest articulations of the idea that historical distance resulted from a 
historical explication of sacred texts from favored pasts. Neatly encapsulating the 
inevitable problem that temporal distinction created for Christianity, he wrote that “if a 
form of religion rest on written documents, sooner or later, there ensues a difference 
between the old documents and the modern discoveries and culture shown in works 
written to explain it.”25 This statement not only highlighted the problem of historical 
distance for Protestants, but it also anticipated a similar development among Americans 
who looked to a document from a set period in the past for legal guidance. Modern 
historical investigation of historical texts drew attention to the dissonance between past 
and present cultures. Parker wrote of the distance from the biblical past that the critic may 
acknowledge the dissonance or “blind himself to this inconsistency, and seek merely to 
unfold the original meaning of the text.”26 He would later highlight this dissonance to 
condemn proslavery readings of the Constitution, which, in his opinion, aimed to uncover 
original meaning without a proper understanding of the founding era or of developments 
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since then. In the review, he proceeded to trace developments in scriptural interpretation, 
noting instances in which readers had used non-literal readings to account for 
inconsistencies. He referenced the work of Eichhorn and Heinrich Paulus on the Old and 
New Testaments, respectively, and outlined the mythical response of De Wette and 
others. This brought Parker to Strauss, who applied the mythical interpretation to the 
Gospel accounts of Jesus’s last three years, which even De Wette assumed were authored 
by eyewitnesses. Strauss regarded them “as spurious productions of well-meaning men, 
who collected the traditions that were current.”27 He made the Gospels historical not by 
evidencing their historical accuracy, but by showing how the texts reflected the mentality 
of a specific time and place. 
Strauss defined myth as an unhistorical and fictive account. In his view, 
witnesses’ accounts are unhistorical if they counter the known laws of causality and 
contain circumstantial contradictions, and are fictive if they are poetical in form and 
agree in substance “remarkably with the preconceived opinions of the community where 
[they] originate.”28 Parker explained how Strauss applied this approach to the narrative of 
John the Baptist, Jesus’s birth, his public ministry, his miracles, his death and 
resurrection. Of the appearance of a “miraculous star,” for example, Parker summarized 
Strauss’s position that “the whole story is mythical, and is derived from ideas and 
opinions commonly held at the time. The ancients,” he summarized, “believed a heavenly 
body sometimes appeared on great occasions, for example, a comet, at the birth of 
Mithridates, and at the death of Julius Caesar. … In ancient times, it was supposed stars 
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guided men.”29 An understanding of the ancient mythic mindset explained the 
miraculous. The same was true with accounts of possession: “It was a common opinion 
of the Jews, that certain diseases were caused by demons; Jesus himself seems to have 
shared this opinion.”30 In his Vestry Lectures, Emerson proposed that Jesus had 
accommodated to the opinions of the times on this point but Parker seemed to agree with 
Strauss’s idea that even Jesus had held these outdated views. Parker would later advance 
this position more explicitly. This approach could authenticate teachings, as Bauer, and 
even Jonathan Edwards, had shown with the Old Testament, or as Norton had 
demonstrated with the New. Parker noted, for example, that “Strauss thinks the 
controversial discourses of Jesus are genuine, because they correspond so closely to the 
spirit and tone of rabbinical explanations of Scripture, at that time.”31 But referencing the 
“spirit and tone” of the time to authenticate certain teachings undermined their present 
relevance. In a sense, Parker finished what Edwards’ had started, but rather than use 
historical proofs to confirm the Bible’s divinity, he admitted historical evidence that 
demonstrated its temporality. Still, although Parker recognized that Strauss’s approach 
rested on an awareness of historical distance, a position he was sympathetic with, he 
remained invested in the permanent he found in the Gospels. 
Before offering a brief critique, Parker attended to Strauss’s concluding treatise, 
noting his Hegelian-informed philosophical position that the ideal rested in humanity 
rather than in the figure of Jesus. This immanent interpretation of Hegel’s concrete 
universal set the stage for Feuerbach to completely unhinge Hegelianism from its 
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Christian bearings.32 The anthropomorphizing move paved the way for another revolution 
in historical thinking—the understanding that “men make their own history,” even if 
“they do not make it as they please.”33 Parker, though, who rejected Hegel’s dialectic in 
favor of a Platonic idea of God, remained focused on the Gospels and their Christ.34 He 
viewed the idea that the Gospels were inauthentic as more presupposition than proof, 
noting Strauss’s reliance on internal evidence and his neglect of “the [external] evidence 
of Christian, Heretical, and even Heathen Antiquity.”35 As with De Wette, Parker found 
the German unconvincing in his historical argumentation and too liberal with his 
mythical approach, writing that “men do not make myths out of air, but out of historical 
materials.”36 Rather than accept the mythical interpretation or the opposed supernaturalist 
reading, which posited the historical validity of the Bible as a whole, Parker adopted a 
middle-way approach, which held that the New Testament, at least, “always rests on 
historical ground, though it is not common historical ground, nor is it so rigidly historical 
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that no legendary or mythical elements have entered it.”37 He thus held that “if there was 
not an historical Christ to idealize, there could be no ideal Christ to seek in history,” 
while still critiquing the modern desire to obtain a full rendering of Christ. Following De 
Wette, he suggested that not even the apostles, “though they were eye-witnesses, had 
such a complete, consistent, and thoroughly historical picture of the life of Christ, as we 
seek after.” As with some of his contemporaries, Parker showed an awareness of the 
limits of historical interpretation, even as he championed it as the best available 
approach. Parker was relieved to find that Strauss, in the third edition of the work, 
recognized the shortcomings of his historical critique and left room for Jesus in history.38 
Parker felt that enough historical material existed to confirm but not deny his life: “if we 
cannot prove all things, we can hold fast to enough that is good.”39 He conceded that 
Strauss’s text—“the production of the age”—had initiated an unprecedented crisis for 
Christian believers, compared him to Spinoza—“both struck at the most deeply cherished 
doctrines of their times”—and described his work as “colder than ice” and labeled it “the 
most melancholy book we ever read.”40 But, Parker professed that it did not remove “the 
Redeemer’s image” which “has been stamped ineffaceably on the hearts of men.”41 This 
affirmation did not signify a belief in the necessary authenticity of the Gospels, but rather 
that essential Christianity had found historical expression in Jesus.42 
                                                
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., 313. See Grodzins, American Heretic, 242-43. 
39 Ibid., 310, emphasis in original. 
40 Ibid., 314. 
41 Ibid., 316. 
42 On Parker’s reading and review of Strauss, and his other studies and writings in 
his period, see Grodzins, American Heretic, 129-90.   
   119 
 Through readings, translations, and reviews of De Wette and Strauss, Parker came 
to the conclusion that some biblical texts stood on a firmer footing than others, including 
the accounts of the life of Christ, but he also followed these scholars in unhinging his 
religious belief from biblical texts, including those deemed authentic, which rested on 
grounds that new evidence might unsettle. He followed De Wette, in particular, in 
locating the source of religious belief in an innate religious sense. Both this emphasis and 
historical evidence led Parker to appreciate the New more than the Old Testament. In the 
teachings of the New Testament Christ, Parker discovered truths that corresponded to the 
truths emanating from his soul, and it was on this basis, and not on that of Christ’s 
miracles, that he remained invested in the historicity of the Gospel accounts.    
 
 
“I See Not How a Miracle Proves a Doctrine”: Parker, the Miracles Controversy and the 
Permanence of the Religious Element  
Though his review, completed on 1 April 1839, fit comfortably in the Unitarian 
Examiner, Parker himself had grown uneasy with Unitarianism. Around the time of its 
completion and months before its publication in July, he contributed to the growing 
division between Unitarians and Transcendentalists. He entered the acrimonious miracles 
controversy, a New England polemic that erupted when Unitarians, including Andrews 
Norton and George Ripley, took opposing positions in a pamphlet war over the 
relationship between Christianity and Christ’s New Testament miracles. In an article on 
Schleiermacher, Ripley praised the German theologian’s emphasis on intuition-based 
religious experience, and in a review of James Martineau’s The Rationale of Religious 
Enquiry (1836), he agreed with the English theologian’s move to sever the evidentialist 
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tie between Jesus’s miracles and his gospel message.43 In his reply, Norton damned 
Ripley’s reasoning as heretical and forcefully asserted the necessity of a link between the 
authenticity of the Gospels and the reality of Christ’s miracles.44 Thus, while figures such 
as Norton argued that Christian faith depended on the historicity and literality of the 
accounts of Christ’s miracles, figures such as Ripley, who granted that such miracles 
might have occurred, saw no such necessary relationship.  
Another prominent Transcendentalist soon threw his weight behind those 
emphasizing a faith centered in an internal religious sense rather than grounded on 
external evidences. In his infamous address to the Harvard Divinity School’s graduating 
class of 1838, Emerson leveled a powerful blow in the battle over the relationship 
between Christ’s miracles and Protestant belief. There, he stated that Christ “spoke of 
miracles” but quickly qualified that statement in clarifying that Jesus “felt that man’s life 
was a miracle.” Christ “saw with open eye the mystery of the soul,” Emerson explained, 
he saw a direct pathway from God, the divine fount of religion, to the human soul.45 The 
Galilean’s salvific message rested not in an atoning sacrifice but rather in the teaching 
that each human possessed divine attributes and a revelatory prerogative. His exceptional 
status depended on the fact that he was, as Emerson stated, “the only soul in history who 
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has appreciated the worth of man.”46 Drawing attention to Protestant contemporaries’ 
sense that miracles stood in opposition to or apart from nature, Emerson also lamented 
that “miracle” “is not one with the blowing clover and the falling rain.” He believed that 
verbal misuse had turned “Miracle” into an epistemological and theological “Monster.”47 
Belief in Christianity had mistakenly come to rest on whether or not Gospel miracles 
reflected ancient realities. In shifting his evidentiary weight to the indwelling presence of 
the divine in nature and, above all else, in the soul, Emerson struck at Unitarianism’s 
shaky foundation of belief.  
Righteous indignation reigned down from America’s Christian watchtowers. As 
expected, Norton, who had turned his attention from schooling Congregationalists in 
biblical interpretation to raising the spectre of Transcendentalism, was at the forefront of 
those signaling the warning. A year after Emerson’s address, “the Unitarian Pope,” who 
had been in the audience, delivered an address of his own to the alumni of the Harvard 
Divinity School, which included others who also had been present at Emerson’s oration 
the previous summer. Norton sought to not only respond to Emerson but also aimed to 
address the larger disease of which he believed Emerson was a symptom. Citing recent 
political and intellectual attacks on traditional powers and modes of thought, Norton 
warned that a new form of infidelity, one that had been spawned “in Europe, and 
especially Germany, has made its way among a very large portion of nominally Christian 
theologians.”48 Like Spinoza, Norton explained, these theologians used orthodox terms to 
mask heretical and even atheistic notions. What was at the heart of the debate? “The 
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latest form of infidelity is distinguished by assuming the Christian name, while it strikes 
directly at the root of faith in Christianity, and indirectly of all religion, by denying the 
miracles attesting the divine mission of Christ.”49 In stressing the ultimate implications of 
that denial, Norton made clear the historical nature of those religious roots, stating that to 
“deny that a miracle is capable of proof … is, in effect … to deny the existence of 
God.”50 Miracles, external evidences, proved God’s reality. And New Testament 
miracles, as historical facts, proved Christianity’s truth.  
Outlining the recent German approaches to New Testament miracles, Norton 
explained that some scholars spoke of them as exaggerated natural events, others as 
“prodigies, adapted to rouse the attention of a rude people, like the Jews; but not required 
for the conviction of men of more enlightened minds,” and still others denied them 
outright.51 Norton argued that Christ’s “whole history, as recorded in the Gospels, is 
miraculous,” and thus, in explaining away the miracles one inevitably threw out the 
Gospels too. “If the accounts of Christ’s miracles are mere fictions,” as some claimed, 
“then no credit can be due to works so fabulous as the pretended histories of his life” and 
no one can regard Christ himself “as an object of veneration or to consider his teachings 
… as of any importance to himself.”52 This was an all-or-nothing equation: either the 
miracles were factual occurrences, and Jesus was the Christ, and, thus, Christianity was 
true, or they were fictions and Christianity was a farce. Norton conceded that “certainty, 
in the metaphysical sense of the word, has nothing to do with the concerns of men,” but 
he, similar to Edwards in the previous century, upheld historical evidence, understood 
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through the use of reason, as the surest foundation of human knowledge about religious 
truth.53 He thus protested against the “rejection of all that mass of evidence, which in 
view of a Christian, establishes the truth of his religion.” As he saw it, the Germans and 
their American followers “complain, that the solid earth is not solid enough for them to 
rest on. They have firm footing on the clouds.”54 Norton’s characterization was not far 
off. The Transcendentalists did find the historical grounds “not solid enough,” and surely 
they realized that their more abstract footings were less susceptible to the undermining 
potential of rigorous historical examination. Norton, though, contended that “there can be 
no intuition, no direct perception, of the truth of Christianity.”55 Intuition might not fall 
prey to historical criticism, but it provided no surer epistemology of truth, and indeed 
conscience seemed to lack any kind of foundation whatsoever.  
In the appendix of the published version of this address, Norton included “SOME 
FURTHER REMARKS ON THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MODERN GERMAN SCHOOL OF 
INFIDELITY,” and a second note “ON THE OBJECTION TO FAITH IN CHRISTIANITY, AS 
RESTING ON HISTORICAL FACTS AND CRITICAL LEARNING.” In both, he focused on the 
historical foundation of Christian faith. He pointed to De Wette and Schleiermacher as 
examples of German theologians who placed faith in “a pious apprehension of things” 
and who argued against faith “being founded on a historical acquaintance with 
Christianity.”56 He noted that Strauss went even further in arguing that the Gospels were 
“destitute of historical truth.”57 In Norton’s framework, that conclusion demolished 
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Christian faith. Such thinkers seemed to hold that “Christianity is no permanent thing, but 
must, with the advance of men, go on improving, and divesting itself more and more of 
its historical relations.”58 Holders of such a position stood little to lose in the face of 
historical distance. Indeed, the position depended, in some sense, on the recognition of 
that fact. Norton, despite his heavy-handed approach, could be quite perceptive in his 
critiques. In Parker’s case, while he actually believed with Norton that “true Christianity 
is always the same,” he had a more minimalist and atemporal understanding of 
Christianity and did, in fact, hold that the innate religious sense, used to perceive 
Christian truth, became less obstructed over time.59 In January of 1839, he had written to 
Convers Francis, asking whether he thought “the apostles understood Christianity as well 
as some in these times?”60 Parker certainly did. This sort of thinking and these sorts of 
questions proved influential when confronted with contextual explanations of the 
apostles’ and, later, the American founders’ approach to the moral issue of slavery. Yes, 
he would grant, perhaps they did sanction slavery, but, he would stress, their historical 
contexts had blinded them to the sin, and progress since then had removed the blinders.   
In his second note, Norton addressed the objections to the idea that Christian faith 
rested on historical grounds, asserting that “there is … no other mode of establishing 
religious belief, but by the exercise of reason, by investigation, by forming a probable 
judgment upon facts.”61 Such facts, though ascertained “by only a comparatively small 
portion of” learned men, could be distilled and enjoyed as “a common property and a 
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common blessing” by the mass of humanity, but the foundations of De Wette and his ilk 
seemed understandable only to an initiated few.62 Norton stressed that epistemological 
dependence on an elite group was characteristic of all fields of inquiry and contended that 
nothing “gives to Christianity a different character from what belongs to all the higher 
and more important branches of knowledge.”63 Norton did not notice that in 
characterizing knowledge of truth as of the same epistemic makeup as other subjects, he 
helped denude Christianity of its supernaturalism. And he did not realize that in resting 
his faith on historical grounds, he and others like him contributed to the growing 
awareness that historical peculiarities could be used to disprove the New Testament texts 
and historicize the New Testament past just as easily as they could be used to 
authenticate the Gospel accounts. He proposed that exegetes interpret the Bible as 
scholars read other ancient texts and suggested that adherents approach Christianity as 
they might approach other historical subjects. In fact, Norton had already done that very 
thing in the first of three volumes of his Evidences of the Genuineness of the Gospels 
(1837-1844). He marketed his works in drawing attention to their principal subject—“the 
genuineness of those books.” Norton was no longer preoccupied with whether orthodox 
readers like Moses Stuart attended to circumstances in their interpretations, he now 
fixated on defending the authenticity of the Gospels with historical reasoning. 
Indeed, in a surprising move, Norton now called on those more orthodox readers 
for help. A volley of exchanges between he and Ripley followed Norton’s Discourse.64 
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The level of Norton’s contempt became evident when he put to use an article written by 
Princeton Presbyterian Charles Hodge—which included a cutting review of his own 
Discourse—a portion of which he reprinted as a pamphlet along with a biting critique of 
Transcendentalism that Hodge’s co-religionists James Alexander and Albert Dod had 
written.65 Alexander and Dod exposed Emerson’s affinities with the Germans and Victor 
Cousin, their French counterpart, and excoriated his exaggerated opinion of man, which 
undercut the authority of God.66 For his part, Hodge rejected Norton’s reliance on 
miracles as the sole evidential grounds of Christian belief, holding up the Bible as a 
whole as proof of Christian truth. Hodge’s foundation, though, remained historical. He 
also exposed Emerson’s philosophy as Hegelian, aligning him with the heretical 
Strauss.67 When Norton used Hodge to combat Transcendentalism, Parker entered the 
fray, picking up where Emerson had left off. In response to Norton, he published a 
satirical announcement of the former’s pamphlet, an elucidating essay on 
Transcendentalist views, and a damning “Desultory Notice.” In the short notices, he 
briefly dismissed the arguments of Hodge for his reliance on Berlin biblical literalist 
E.W. Hengstenberg, and those of Alexander and Dod for their ignorance of German 
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philosophy.68 But it was in the more substantial essay, which Parker penned under the 
pseudonym of Levi Blodgett, that he aimed at the heart of the debate.69  
In addressing the question of whether miracles form the basis of belief in 
Christianity, Parker attempted to establish, through philosophical and historical 
demonstration, the universal presence of an innate religious element, which, he 
contended, led the human soul to believe in, and recognize one’s dependence on, God. 
Parker used historical evidence to buttress his claims rather than serve as their 
foundation, and thus he could use such evidence without contradicting his belief in a non-
historical source of religious truth. In accounting for perceived differences in awareness 
and evidence of the “higher faculties of the soul” among past peoples and prophets, he 
emphasized the “progress and development of religion in man.”70 Parker posited that “as 
the tribe of race improves, the manifestations of religion become more perfect. The form 
changes to suit the culture of the age.”71 He believed that while religious truth remained 
constant, its expressions became clearer as religious forms developed and accommodated 
to more enlightened circumstances. Although teleological and in some ways similar to 
enlightenment thinkers’ turn from tradition and their emphasis on progress, this idea 
fostered an awareness of historical difference and change, and of distinct historical 
periods.72 Stressing the progress of religion supported Parker’s belief that some in the 
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present understood Christian truth and moral issues better than the primitive Christians. 
Parker’s continued study of the past would only bolster that belief. 
He wrote that individuals who communicate with the divine through the religious 
sentiment “create new religions and make religious epochs,” and explained that though 
some “of these men are deemed gods,” they “are subject to the various peculiarities of 
their nation, place and age, and to their own idiosyncracies [sic].” Because the 
peculiarities “perpetually change, the old form of religion, unable to change with them, 
gradually becomes obsolete. A new teacher of religion arises; starts from a higher stand 
and separating the peculiarities of the old form which adapted it to its age … constructs a 
new form suitable to the altered condition of mankind, which shall, for its season, carry 
forward the good work, until ‘in the fulness of time,’ it gives place to somewhat higher 
and better.”73 Parker’s belief in the progress of religion related to his sense that true 
religion adapted to new circumstances. This broad understanding placed him at the far 
end of the spectrum of antebellum religious thinkers who accepted that the sacred writers 
had accommodated their messages to specific times and audiences. Stuart and Hodge 
granted that sacred writers accommodated in language, while asserting that the Bible 
remained the repository of divine revelation. Norton contended that those writers 
accommodated in content as well, but argued that New Testament, and the Gospels in 
particular, served as the fount and foundation of Christian faith. Parker agreed that 
religious truth found expression in the Bible, but only to the extent that circumstances 
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had allowed. True religion existed independent of time but, because it functioned in 
relation to individual enlightenment, it evolved in time according to the development of 
the soul. Parker held that truth itself accommodated. Although the Transcendentalists 
Emerson and Parker maintained the permanence of divine truth and of God as the 
originator of that truth, they placed the development of religion in human hands, which, 
to someone like Norton, was tantamount to the humanistic and atheistic positions that 
Hegel had spawned, Strauss had nurtured, and Feuerbach had perfected and unleashed. 
Applying his understanding to true Christianity, which he held “to be the highest 
form of religion,” Parker explained that though he could conceive of “no more perfect 
moral and religious incarnation of God than Jesus of Nazareth,” he could not designate 
Christianity “absolute religion” or label Christ “the ultimate incarnation of God.” Rather, 
in Christ he saw someone who “attempted to excite in man a more living consciousness 
of” God’s existence and of human dependence on him.74 Parker believed that “Jesus … 
wrought miracles.” But he saw “not how a miracle proves a doctrine,” which allowed him 
to sidestep “some historical difficulties in the way of establishing all the miracles which 
[Jesus] wrought.”75 Part of these historical difficulties included an awareness of historical 
context. Parker pointed to the “tendency to the marvellous in all ancient nations, 
especially among the Jews, before and after the time of Christ,” and of the evangelists in 
particular, he argued that “their inspiration did not free them from the notions of the age 
and nation.” He assured his readers that he believed in “the general accuracy of their 
history of Christ, at least during his ministry.”76 His insistence that Christian truth flowed 
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from an internal source rather than resting on external evidences did not necessarily 
imply a dismissal of New Testament miracles as the fictions of fabricated accounts. The 
issue was not whether or not Christ had existed or performed miracles, but whether or not 
the truth of Christianity rested on the miracles he had presumably performed. So, when 
someone like Norton, or even Hodge, accepted that historical circumstances shaped 
biblical language and content, but insisted that Christ’s miracles had occurred as related 
in the Gospels and resisted viewing the accounts of those miracles as productions of the 
age, Parker thought that they had rested their belief on “insecure” grounds. In his opinion, 
they were “at the mercy of scoffers, scholars and critics” who had dismantled the Old 
Testament miracles and discredited those of the New.77 Parker stressed the shakiness of 
their chosen historical foundation. “You make our religion depend entirely on something 
outside, on strange events which happened, it is said, two thousand years ago, of which 
we can never be certain, and on which yourselves often doubt, at least of the more and 
less.”78 Some, including Parker himself, had pointed out the limits of historical 
explication to protect the canon from the deepest critiques, but the historical skepticism 
that historical distance introduced could also be used to demonstrate the difficulties 
involved in upholding a faith based on historical facts. Parker preferred a more reliable 
basis of faith, or, rather, one that was less susceptible to deterioration and falsification.  
Parker believed that the endurance of the gospel message contained in the New 
Testament rested in its relationship to the universal religious sentiment, which found 
residence in the soul. He further outlined this conviction in an updated version of his 
sermon, “The Relation of the Bible to the Soul,” which he published in two articles in the 
                                                
77 Ibid., 277. 
78 Ibid., 278. 
   131 
winter of 1840-41.79 In the first, he began by stressing the Bible’s high status as “the 
Book of Books.”80 In an attempt to explain its elevated position, he first described what 
the Bible was not. It was “not the master of the Soul,” or “the foundation of Religion,” 
and was “not greater than Conscience and Reason.”81 In part, the ancient text was not 
ancient enough. “Religion is older than the Bible,” Parker posited, just as justice is older 
than legal tradition.82 The legal parallel he raised here held great promise in a nation 
preoccupied with law.  
Parker held that eternal sentiments formed the basis of legal and religious truths, 
while biblical and legal codes were “simply [their] historical form.” The essential truths 
of Christianity were “not simply ‘as old as the creation,’ but far older; ancient as the 
eternal ideas of Justice, Love, Holiness and Truth.”83 This was, of course, not a strictly 
historical claim; it was not an attempt to reclaim the teachings and principles of a pure 
past, but rather an appeal to truths above time and space. Anticipating his later statements 
about slavery, and adding a token of support to the Garrisonian critique of Constitution 
worship, Parker disconnected eternal juridical and religious truths from sacred historical 
texts. Indeed, it was during this period that he began to address, if haltingly, slavery as a 
subject of reform.84 Before long, it would become the subject of his reform efforts, efforts 
that became enveloped in constitutional debate. In this article, Parker wrote that that 
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“men sometimes think the statues of the land were providentially struck out, in some 
happy moment, which will never return—that if these should perish, so would Order and 
Justice decease from being.” Parker seemed to have in mind the favored founding era to 
which his generation habitually referred to and longed to recreate. This anticipated his 
critique of the fixation on a period in the American past, which, in terms of moral insight, 
he believed the American present far exceeded. In this article, though, Parker remained 
focused on religion. “They say the same of the Bible,” Parker continued, “and assert that 
Morality and Religion would have been quite lost from the world, if the Bible had 
chanced to perish.”85 Parker’s absolute religion was ahistorical: 
granting it were shewn, in opposition to the greatest amount of historical evidence 
ever brought to bear on one point,—that the facts related in the Gospels, were not 
facts, but fictions; that Jesus never rose from the dead; never died, as it is related; 
never wrought miracles, taught doctrines, or even lived—still Christianity would 
be as true, as lasting, as now it is, when environed by all these historical 
statements.86 
 
Parker’s formulation contradicted Norton’s equation. His separation between external 
evidences in the form of the truthfulness of the Gospels and the miracles recounted 
therein, paralleled De Wette’s distinction between historical facts and religious meaning. 
Parker’s proposition, as with Emerson’s salvo, shook the religious foundation of thinkers 
such as Norton, who rested their Gospel-centered faith on historical grounds. It 
undermined the exceptional status of the New Testament, of Christ’s miracles, and even 
of Christ himself. Parker did not cast Christ aside but he measured his teachings against 
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“Reason and Conscience.”87 After all, “The Bible was made for man, not man for the 
Bible.”88 
 In a slightly longer second installment, Parker set out to explain the Bible’s 
central role as instructor. Rather than “teach men by pouring certain abstract doctrines 
into all minds,” the Bible, a product of the soul, “teaches by arousing the soul. … It 
reveals the true idea of a man, the divine man … tells him of his noble nature—the image 
of God. It sets before him the noblest aim—‘Be perfect as God.’”89 Parker held that, 
unbounded and universal, the “spirit of God everywhere reveals itself,” as seen in the 
sacred books of India, Persia, Egypt, and Greece. While he granted that it is revealed 
“perhaps more clearly in the Old Testament than in any other witness of equal antiquity,” 
he held that “pupils outgrow their teachers.” Parker compared outdated Old Testament 
passages to “laws and political institutions. Like old garments which were fine in their 
day, they are laid aside when their end is answered.”90 He allowed that Moses “was a 
prophetic man” who saw “far onward into futurity,” and that his laws were “wonderful 
for his age,” but noted that “it is only the true, the universal, the divine part of them, that 
thus extends itself and still lives. All peculiar institutions of his system, which belong to 
the man Moses, not to the divine idea of justice, holiness and love, have long since fallen 
to decay.” Before long, Parker would train his focus on one peculiar institution in 
particular. A belief in the universal and unchangeable nature of the religious sentiment 
led him to dismiss as peculiar and passing much of Moses’s teachings and to posit that 
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“we too are men, and have seen what he and Solomon desired to see and saw not.”91 
Parker conceived of revelation as progressing rather than historical. Thus, he could 
highlight historical distance without repercussions. This understanding would allow him 
to shine a spotlight on the discrepancies he found between ancient and modern views on 
servitude, or even mid-nineteenth-century and late-eighteenth-century understandings on 
slavery.   
 Parker’s belief in the universal sentiment and the progress of religion supported 
his separation of the Hebrew and Greek scriptures, but it also directed him to question the 
relevance of the New Testament and its actors. “If the Old Testament,—which Paul 
considered imperfect and transitory … has been superseded,” he asked, “how do we 
know that the New Testament, the Gospel, nay, even Christianity itself, shall not one day 
be passed by and forgotten, having prepared the way for a more beautiful revelation of 
the divine image than Jesus himself?”92 Parker was almost willing to leave behind the 
whole Christian past, in part because he believed that “doubtless there are men at this day 
who understand Christianity far better than it was understood by its teachers in the first 
ages of our era.”93 Such clarity, however, did not obviate the importance of the original 
Christian truth, which “can never pass away. … No sign of decay is written on it; no 
mark of age appears.” Parker saw the passage of time as the sifter of religious truth. “The 
lights of old time, like lamps in the street, are passed by, diminished by the distance, and 
gradually lost sight of; while … Christianity still shines with mild and tranquil light, and 
appears clearer and more lovely to man as he awakes more broadly from his dream, and 
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is refined and elevated by the science and culture of successive ages.” Distance rendered 
much of the past and its teachings obsolete, burnt up in “the furnace of time,” as change, 
in the form of progress, made permanent Christian truth, “which knows nothing of time 
or space,” clearer. “Three thousand years, that are past” and “eighteen hundred years of 
change, downfall, progress, and retreat” could not dim the light of eternal truth.94 Clearly, 
Parker’s efforts to separate out the timeless from the time-bound truths more explicitly 
drew attention to historical distance than did those of his contemporary exegetes, but in 
stressing context and accommodation they also identified the transient nature of the 
Bible’s content and thus highlighted that distance as well. In essence, even if they used 
knowledge of historical distance differently in their interpretations, they all recognized 
the pastness of the Old and New Testament pasts.  
 In Parker’s case, held that because Jesus taught pre-existing Christian truths, and 
not because those truths resided in him alone, “Christ will always teach” and his gospel 
will “be an eternal text-book.”95 Parker’s accommodation theory prescribed that “the 
form of Christianity will change, to suit the character and wants of different nations and 
ages.” His historicism stood in tension with his assertion that “the essence of Christianity 
can never change.”96 He attended to both sides of the equation, the transient and the 
permanent, but toward the end of the article he focused on the former. He again noted the 
Old Testament’s imperfections. Specifically, he cited its “degrading views of God and 
man” and bemoaned his contemporaries’ use of Moses’s writing to justify “war, capital 
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punishment, [and] slavery.”97 Parker again brought together issues of both secular law 
and sacred scripture, a link made clearer in the next two decades. As the debate over 
slavery gained steam in the 1840s and 1850s, interpreters would appeal to both the Bible 
and the Constitution, and abolitionists like Parker would highlight historical distance to 
question those appeals. Even in this article, he decried readers’ adherence “to the 
[Bible’s] letter, while the spirit has long since gone.”98 Parker retained his distinction 
between the Old and New Testaments, writing that “the old dispensation has passed 
away. … But the Gospel will teach to the end of time.”99 But the limitations he found 
with ancient Israel and its prophets also applied to the New Testament and its apostles: 
“Paul, and Peter, and James, and John, saw not all things; nor were they placed above the 
reach of passion, human weakness, the dreams of that age, and that imperfection of 
wisdom incidental to this mortal state.” Although sometimes prophetic, the biblical 
writers had existed in time and space and were subject to human weakness and temporal 
limitation and, as a result, often failed to draw “a sharp line between the fabulous and the 
historical.”  Despite this, Christian ministers “will tell you the canon of revelation is 
closed—that you and I … must be poor imitators of two or three men, who have 
incarnated in past ages, all of God’s spirit that can be embodied in mortal flesh.”100 
Parker echoed Emerson’s shocking statements in his Divinity School Address, where he 
had observed that “the divine nature is attributed to one or two persons, and denied to all 
the rest, and denied with fury,” and had lamented that “men have come to speak of the 
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revelation as somewhat long ago given and done.”101 While encouraging the use of “the 
revelation made to others,” as did Emerson, Parker joined the Sage of Concord in 
directing believers to “seek new ones in himself.”102 An awareness of the transient in and 
transience of the Bible highlighted the need for permanent and ongoing revelation. 
 During the late 1830s and early 1840s, Parker’s religious position became 
detached from the historicity of the Bible. He had grown skeptical of the Old Testament 
narratives and dismissed much of the Hebrew scriptures as products of an outdated past 
with little meaning to offer the present. The miracles controversy allowed him to further 
articulate his position against that of Unitarians like Norton, who asserted that Christian 
faith rested on the historicity of New Testament miracles. In contrast to this position, 
Parker posited that Christian truth existed independent of historical facts and flowed from 
an innate and ubiquitous religious sense that time had cultivated. Parker continued to 
distinguish between the Old and New Testaments, but this distinction came to rest less on 
a belief that the Gospels were the first and final repository of religious truth and instead 
followed from his understanding that enough historical evidence existed to confirm that 
true religion found expression rather than embodiment in a person named Jesus. Now 
Parker was willing to suggest the transience of even that particular historical expression. 
 
 
“The Inward Christ, Which Alone Abideth Forever, Has Much to Say Which the 
Historical Jesus Never Knew”: The Transient Jesus and the Permanent Christ 
 The themes in these sermons and writings developed in relation to Parker’s 
continued attention to German literature and his ongoing translation of De Wette. Those 
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sermons and writings served as the intellectual backdrop to his two most important 
publications on the relationship between Christianity and history: A Discourse on the 
Transient and Permanent in Christianity and A Discourse of Matters Pertaining to 
Religion.103 The first, published in June of 1841, resulted from a sermon Parker wrote in 
January and preached in May. The second resulted from a series of lectures he delivered 
in the fall of 1841 and published in May of 1842. In these writings, as much as in any 
other source from antebellum America, one can see a thinker whose engagement with 
biblical criticism created an acute sense of the historical transience and pastness of the 
Bible and its central figure.  
The first discourse paid homage to Strauss’s “On Transiency and Permanency in 
Christianity,” wherein the somewhat repentant German critic had made room for the 
historical Jesus.104 Parker did too, but he located the permanent in Christ’s eternal words 
rather than his temporal person. Distinguishing between the eternal and true religion (the 
permanent) and the religion of the people (the transient), he explained that the latter “has 
never been the same thing in any two centuries or lands, except only in name.”105 
Parker’s studies led him to recognize temporal distinctions, a realization that created an 
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awareness of unbridgeable historical gaps. In contrast to restorationists and Christian 
primitivists, he found efforts to reclaim religious forms futile: “neither God nor the world 
goes back.”106 He found that the forms and rites of religion, like the outward facts of 
nature, pass away in time while true religion, like the law of nature, transcends 
temporality. Universal moral truths remained permanent, but the historical forms and 
expressions approaching those truths often obscured more than they revealed and thus 
possessed little purchase in the present. 
 “Nothing changes more from age to age than the doctrines … insisted on as 
essential to Christianity and personal salvation,” Parker stated.107 He used familiar 
examples—the authority of the Bible and the authority of Christ—to make his point. 
Tracing the tradition of belief in the infallibility and unmatched authority of the Bible 
from the first centuries after its creation to the present, he noted that such a belief “is now 
the general opinion of religious sects at this day.”108 With some relief, he observed that 
“modern Criticism is fast breaking to pieces this idol which men have made out of the 
Scriptures.” Historical criticism identified the biblical authors as “men who in some 
measure partook of the darkness and limited notions of their age.”109 Parker also 
addressed the proclivity to make “Christianity rest on the personal authority of Jesus.” He 
highlighted the changing opinions about Christ to evidence the “transitoriness” of this 
belief.110 He conceded that Christianity “depends on [the New Testament] for the 
historical statements of its facts,” but insisted that “we do not require infallible inspiration 
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on the part of the writers, more than in the record of other historical facts.”111 Historical 
evidence still convinced Parker that the Gospels rested on historical grounds, but he did 
not rest his faith on those grounds: “If it could be proved … that the gospels were the 
fabrication of designing and artful men, that Jesus of Nazareth had never lived, still 
Christianity would stand firm.” Christianity was “tried by the oracle God places in the 
breast” rather than the evidence offered by the critic.112 Parker agreed with contemporary 
interpreters such as Stuart and Norton that the Bible should be interpreted as a historical 
text, but he refused to base his belief in that text or the people and events it described. 
Freedom from transitory doctrines, Parker argued, allowed believers to 
understand the Bible and Christ as God intended. Read with “Reason, Conscience, and 
Faith fully active,” the Bible presented a “whole library of the deepest and most earnest 
thoughts and feelings and piety and love, ever recorded in human speech.”113 Viewed in 
such light, Christ’s words “solve the questions of this present age.”114 While rejecting the 
transient as outdated, Parker affirmed the continued relevance of the permanent. Indeed, 
he would later argue that the spirit of Christianity, which existed above time, if not a 
literal reading of the New Testament text, which was grounded in time, condemned 
slavery. Parker pointed out cultural differences between past ages and his own, but he 
upheld as ahistorical the permanent that essential Christian truth that taught the “method 
of attaining oneness with God.”115 Part of attaining oneness with God depended on 
cultivating the divinity within. Echoing Emerson, Parker believed that in making Christ 
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“the Son of God in a peculiar and exclusive sense—much of the significance of his 
character is gone.”116 Instead, his significance was based on the fact that he, as Emerson 
stated, was “the only soul in history who has appreciated the worth of man.”117 Parker 
explained that “in an age of corruption, as all ages are, Jesus stood and looked up to God. 
There was nothing between him and the Father of all. … He would have us do the same; 
worship with nothing between us and God.”118 Other biblical teachings fell prey to the 
past. Parker warned that “the ground will shake under” the feet of those who focused on 
“the surfaces of things.”119 Indeed, “the form Religion takes … can never be the same in 
any two centuries or two men,” but, he asserted, “the Christianity holy men feel in the 
heart—the Christ that is born within us, is always the same thing to each soul that feels 
it.”120 Bold statements such as these came at a cost.  
Even when the religious press damned Parker as a deist and fellow minister 
refused to share the pulpit with him, he persisted in promulgating his views. His 
Discourse of Matters Pertaining to Religion represented a kind of culmination of the 
ideas contained in his prior sermons and publications.121 Following from “The Transient 
and the Permanent,” he summarized his purpose in recalling “men from the transient 
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shows of time to the permanent substance of Religion.”122 He revisited and expanded the 
familiar themes of the innate religious element and its relationship to God (inspiration), to 
Jesus (Christianity), the greatest book (the Bible), and the greatest human institution (the 
Church). He announced the historical implications of this discussion at the outset, 
declaring that “our reverence for the Past, is just in proportion to our ignorance of it.”123 
Historical ignorance had led Christians to make idols out of a historical text and a 
historical figure, blinding them from the fact that religious truth rested within themselves. 
As in his previous writings, Parker first sought to establish the universal presence 
of the religious element. He contended that the ubiquity of this “religious element is 
confirmed by historical argument.”124 And historical circumstances and development, he 
posited, explained perceived differences in the presence and power of that religious 
element. Again, Parker persisted in his use of historical evidence to confirm his views 
rather than insist that they constituted the basis of them. Indeed, in the winter of 1841-
1842, as he prepared to publish his sermons as Discourse, his reading of Comte 
convinced him that human existence started in an uncivilized state and progressed from 
lower to higher levels of being. The historical evidences he found in Comte’s work 
supported his historical conclusions about the progress of religion. He soon associated 
golden age thinking with the Old Testament mythmaking, finding both characteristic of 
ancient times.125 By the early 1840s, then, the intellectual framework was in place for 
Parker to critique what he viewed as his contemporaries’ overreliance on the archaic if 
not barbaric teachings of historical sacred texts from favored pasts for insight into 
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nineteenth-century questions of religious truth and legal sanction. The issue of slavery 
would drive him to further historicize the biblical and founding eras. And once these 
golden ages became objects of historicization, it left all periods of time susceptible to 
historical critique and explanation. 
Turning to the issue of inspiration in the Discourse, Parker used his new 
understanding to condemn Protestants’ golden age mentality, which shut communication 
with God between the two lids of the Bible. At Harvard, Emerson had stated, “I look for 
the hour when that supreme Beauty, which ravished the souls of those eastern men, and 
chiefly the Hebrews, and through their lips spoke oracles to all time, shall speak in the 
West also.”126 Parker similarly contended that “now, as in the days of Adam, Moses, 
Jesus, he that is faithful to Reason, Conscience, and Religion, will, through them, receive 
inspiration.”127 In Christ, then, Parker found a historical expression, rather than the 
exclusive embodiment, of absolute religion.  
Unlike knowledge of absolute religion, which came directly via intuition, 
“knowledge of the doctrine taught by any teacher of ancient times,” a “historical 
question” that rested on secondary sources and testimonies, was “more difficult.”128 The 
problem, in part, as biblical criticism made clear, was the constraining historical context 
of the testators: “Their national, sectarian, personal prejudices must color their 
narrative.”129 Hence the problem with making the reality of the miracles of Christ—a 
“purely historical question”—the basis of Christianity.130 Consistent with his prior 
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position, Parker argued that “if we look after the facts of the case, we find the evidence 
for the Christian miracles is very scanty in extent, and very uncertain in character,” 
adding that “the current belief of the times” favored miracles created more problems.131 
Parker proposed that, if the evangelists were to be trusted, even Christ himself held 
erroneous opinions characteristic of the times. Allowing that baptism and the Last Supper 
seemed “to have been an accommodation,” on the part of Christ, “to the wants of the 
times,” and were not intended to “last forever,” Parker held that Jesus was “mistaken in 
some points, in the interpretation of the Old Testament, in the doctrine of demons, in the 
celebrated prediction of his second coming and the end of the world.”132 As with the Old 
Testament and its prophets and the New Testament and its apostles, the Christ of the 
Gospels could not escape the temporal limitations of his era. That fact left Parker 
unshaken. He averred: “Let it be shewn … that the Gospels are false, and Jesus mistaken, 
still Christianity is eternally true if it be the Absolute Religion.”133 
Parker still believed in the historical basis of the Gospels and of Jesus and in them 
he found the summarization of Christianity: “Love to Man—Love to God.”134 This 
practical method of living set Christianity apart as absolute religion and absolute 
morality. Parker rested his religion in universal precepts rather than particular peoples, 
encouraging his contemporaries to “worship with no master but God, no creed but Truth, 
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no service but Love.”135 To this, Parker added the universal privilege of inspiration, 
declaring that Jesus “never speaks of his connection with God as peculiar,” but rather 
“represents himself as but the type of that relation which all good men sustain to God.”136 
In short, Parker gloried that “the experience of the past lives in the present.” As Emerson 
listed Boston alongside Rome and Jerusalem, so Parker posited that “the light that shone 
at Nineveh, Egypt, Judea, Athens, Rome, shines no more from those points; it is 
everywhere.” Parker’s religion was not restricted to a place, a past, a book, or a man, but 
“the inward Christ, which alone abideth forever, has much to say which the Bible never 
told,” or, as he added in a later edition, “much which the historical Jesus never knew.”137 
 
Conclusion 
Parker clung to an idea of universal and unchanging religious truth as much as 
Channing, Norton, Stuart, Hodge, and other antebellum Christians, but he unbound those 
truths from historical facts, events, and figures. His rare willingness to travel down the 
various paths of historical criticism outlined by De Wette and Strauss informed his urgent 
rejection of the idea that the permanent relevance of religious truth rested in historical 
texts and actors. From the mid-1830s, at least, Parker affirmed that religion originated in 
feeling and his engagement with biblical criticism revealed the benefits of this belief. 
Liberal and conservative scholars recognized the need to attend to historical context in 
discerning the meaning of scriptural passages, including the Gospel accounts, and 
through that recognition exposed that real temporal distances separated even the pure 
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primitive Christian era from the American present. Rather than simply point out historical 
distance through contextual interpretation, and then mute its presence in scriptural 
application, Parker came to assume such distance in his writings. Instead of struggling to 
separate the transient from the permanent through historical explication, Parker measured 
the transient and the permanent according to conscience. In analyzing this sifting process 
among America’s biblical scholars, one finds a spectrum, from those retaining faith in the 
Bible as a whole, such as Stuart and Hodge, to those claiming the New Testament or the 
Gospels alone as canon, such as Channing and Norton, to those focused on the actions 
and teachings of Jesus himself. Regardless of those positions, however, each of these 
interpreters granted, and indeed, insisted that his chosen canon contained time-bound 
teachings meant for a particular ancient audience. Parker stood at the far end of the 
spectrum. He accepted a few specific messages he gleaned from Christ’s teachings as 
permanent religious truths, and all else he let drift away into the sea of the distant past. 
This position armed Parker, who had endured ecclesiastical controversies that his beliefs 
created, for engagement in the nation’s most wrenching moral, political and legal crisis.  
In 1850, the Congregationalist Stuart echoed the Unitarian Buckminster by using 
historical reasoning to interpret Paul’s decision to send a slave back to his owner and—
muting historical distance—asserting the correspondence between that decision and the 
Fugitive Slave Law.138 Parker’s engagement with biblical criticism and his deep-seated 
belief in an innate religious guide and the progress of religion led him to accept Stuart’s 
interpretation as historically accurate and then dismiss it as historically dated. Parker had 
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already cast as past what he perceived to be the historical Jesus’s false ideas. Damning 
Paul’s directive seemed a small thing in comparison. In the Discourse, Parker echoed his 
prior critique of his contemporaries’ use of the Old Testament to justify evil, lamenting 
that “men justify slavery out of the New Testament, because Paul had not his eye open to 
the evil, but sent back a fugitive. It is dangerous,” he warned, “to rely on a troubled 
fountain for the water of life.”139 In the early 1840s, Parker, as with the nation itself, 
began to direct his attention to slavery, a process that further raised questions about the 
relationship between the imperatives of the past—the biblical and Revolutionary past—
and the duties of the present. In the wake of what Parker perceived as proslavery 
consolidation in the late 1840s and early 1850s, which, in his view, paralleled the 
progress of antislavery sentiment, Parker’s reference to Paul’s error would pick up a new 
punctuation mark: “Paul had not his eye open to the evil, but sent back a fugitive!”140 
Slavery raised the historical stakes. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
“OF WHAT AVAIL ARE A FEW TEXTS, WHICH WERE DESIGNED FOR LOCAL 
AND TEMPORARY USE”: SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF 
HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN ANTEBLLUM BIBLICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 
Debates about slavery had been raising the historical stakes for some time, and 
not just in terms of the Bible and the biblical past. Discussions about the South’s peculiar 
institution also inspired questions about the historical nature of the nation’s legal guide—
the Constitution—and the place of the Revolutionary past in the nineteenth century. As 
noted above, in “The Relation of the Bible to the Soul,” Parker compared the Bible to 
legal codes, citing common law, in particular, and arguing that biblical texts and legal 
statutes are historical forms of “the indestructible religious sentiment” and “the sense of 
justice in the Soul.” Parker offered the latest instantiation of a Western intellectual 
tradition in which legal and scriptural interpretations had long been intertwined. Perhaps 
in reference to the ratification of the Constitution, he explained that “men sometimes 
think the statutes of the land were providentially struck out, in some happy moment, 
which will never return—that if these should perish, so would Order and Justice decease 
from being. They say the same of the Bible,” he observed, “and assert that Morality and 
Religion would have been quite lost from the world, if the Bible had chanced to perish.”1 
Parker, of course, believed that such people had confused mutable historical expressions 
of immutable truths with the truths themselves. In 1840, the year that he published this 
article, the publication of Madison’s papers directed unprecedented historical attention to 
                                                
1 Parker, “Relation of the Bible,” (December 1840): 338.  
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the Constitution and its moment of creation. Soon, the nation’s sacred legal text became 
the subject of deep historical inquiry alongside the nation’s sacred religious canon. 
The potential for overlap in antebellum biblical and constitutional hermeneutics 
was most pronounced in rhetorical clashes over southern slavery and this potential 
increased in the buildup to actual war. Slavery linked these distinct interpretive traditions 
along lines of historical argumentation, even if commentators seldom made the 
connection explicit. To be sure, critical conversations about the Bible reached a high 
level of intensity long before historical readings of the Constitution became relevant. The 
emphasis on original contexts and circumstances in explicating the Bible resulted from 
engagements with biblical criticism in the first four decades of the nineteenth century, but 
it was not until the 1840s that constitutional interpreters also began to stress the use of 
historical insight in their readings. The latter development did not simply follow from the 
former. Attempts to recover and use the framers’ writings in constitutional interpretation 
resulted, in part at least, from the passing of the founding generation, which was 
symbolized in the deaths of Thomas Jefferson and John Adams on July 4, 1826, and of 
the primary crafter and last living signer of the Constitution, James Madison, a decade 
later. As one Boston paper explained after the publication of Madison’s papers, “the 
further we recede from the birth of the constitution, the more precious do contemporary 
expositions of it become.”2 By midcentury both biblical and constitutional exegetes used 
historical research and reasoning to uncover original and timeless truths. The growing 
crisis over slavery increased the urgency to understand and put to use original meanings 
of the nation’s religious and legal texts, which created numerous possibilities for 
                                                
2 “Literary Intelligence—U. States,” Boston Recorder, 23 October 1840, 170 
(APSO).  
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interpretive overlap and opened up new possibilities for realizing and confronting 
historical distance. While presentism remained a powerful factor in religious and legal 
interpretation, interpreters’ contextual readings and their narrations of change further 
exposed historical distance and troubled attempts to see past and present temporal frames 
as fusible and the teachings and imperatives of even the most favored pasts as fixed.  
In biblical battles over slavery, the historicizing process began with the most 
distant period in question, the Old Testament era, and worked its way forward toward 
more recent New Testament times. A number of factors contributed to the historicization 
of the Old Testament, including, as discussed in the previous chapters, certain religious 
proclivities and the exposure to the principles of biblical criticism. Liberal Christian 
scholars who identified with the God of the New more than that of the Old Testament 
found biblical criticism useful in upholding the former as the premier canonical text. 
When the slavery debate further highlighted the peculiarities of Patriarchal and Mosaic 
times, American Protestants—orthodox and liberal, proslavery and antislavery—trained 
their focus on the Gospels and the Epistles.3 The results of this shift in interpretive 
attention suggested that historical distance could call into question the relevance of even 
the New Testament past. Although most biblical scholars accepted the reasonableness of 
the proslavery interpretation, a number of slavery’s opponents developed alternative 
arguments.4 Some differentiated ancient servitude from American slavery while others, in 
a more innovative approach, outlined a variant of the accommodation theory. They 
                                                
3 On the parallel emergence of biblical criticism in America and the beginnings of 
the antislavery movement, see David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of 
Revolution, 1770-1823 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1975), 527-28. 
 4 On the success of the proslavery argument and the failure to produce a viable 
antislavery response, see Noll, “Bible and Slavery”; and Noll, Civil War, 31-74. 
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suggested that Christianity’s founders had chosen not to condemn slavery openly and 
loudly, so as not to upset the established social order, but instead carefully sowed the 
seeds of its gradual destruction. These approaches, like Theodore Parker’s, posited the 
progress of moral sentiment since the time of Christ. And as with Parker, their appeal to 
almost hidden universal truths buried in the soil of the New Testament past indicated the 
general transience of that period and its teachings. Although antislavery truths had been 
planted in that era, the promises they contained could only flower in a distant and 
different future. Antebellum antislavery interpreters began to imply that they inhabited 
that future, while abolitionists said so outright. Such readings displayed awareness of 
historical distance, which might threaten to undermine the Bible’s relevance, but also 
could encourage more flexible readings of God’s word. 
The shift in focus to the New Testament, the set of scriptural texts that American 
Protestants increasingly valued most in their attempts to live Christian lives, raised the 
temperature of the debate and this particular strain of the rhetorical contest maintained its 
high and heated level through the Civil War. That temperature increased to a fever pitch 
when, in the 1840s and 1850s, politicians, judges, and citizens focused their attention on 
reading and using the nation’s founding documents to resolve the growing crisis over 
slavery. As the use of historical texts in this debate expanded from the Bible to the 
Constitution, so did the impulse to historicize. Moving the battleground from one favored 
past to another more recent chosen period raised the historical stakes once more. When 
the realization of historical distance from favored pasts drew closer to the present, the 
process of historicizing the past as a whole neared completion. Appeals to the past to 
answer current problems revealed that historical distance separated Americans from even 
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the most familiar historical eras, increasing an awareness that temporal distinctions and 
changes distinguished all past eras from the present and from each other a real possibility. 
Slavery shrunk the sphere of the timeless and expanded the realm of the temporal. 
As in biblical debates, most American commentators assented to the proslavery 
constitutional reading, including both radical abolitionists like William Lloyd Garrison 
and moderate antislavery advocates like Moses Stuart, but antislavery constitutionalists 
developed a range of alternative approaches, which paralleled antislavery biblical 
interpretations in a number of ways. Moderate antislavery constitutionalists, such as 
Gamaliel Bailey, reasoned that the framers had secured extant slavery in the Constitution 
only because they realized the futility of abolishing it at that time. Thus, the framers 
satisfied themselves with allowing the egalitarian principles incorporated in the founding 
texts to work a gradual abolition in the states. This process, the moderates opined, was 
interrupted by the unforeseen emergence of the Slave Power, which many antislavery 
proponents described as antithetical to the spirit of the age. At times, more radical 
antislavery constitutionalists, including Lysander Spooner, rejected historical evidence in 
advancing their arguments, but even denying slavery’s presence in the Constitution 
highlighted its place in the founding era. Further, in seeking political and constitutional 
means to bring about slavery’s immediate abolition, the radicals also uncovered 
founding-era antislavery sentiment. As some antislavery biblical readings highlighted 
differences between ancient and modern slavery, some antislavery constitutional readings 
highlighted slavery’s changed status in the nation since the founding. And, similar to 
“accomodationist” antislavery readings of the New Testament, these readings suggested 
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that though the founders had respected the limitations of their historical setting they had 
advanced ideas that would ultimately abolish slavery.  
In contrast to antislavery biblical readings, which often separated a presumably 
proslavery Old Testament from an antislavery New Testament, antislavery 
constitutionalists tied together the nation’s canonical texts, reading the Constitution in 
light of the Declaration of Independence, even as a growing number of southerners 
rejected that document as a unreasonable rag that put forth false and impractical 
propositions. While harnessing the Declaration’s revolutionary power, Garrisonians used 
historical research to reject antislavery interpretations of the Constitution as irresponsible 
failures to admit its proslavery nature. Each of these approaches, though, even those 
interpretive practices that upheld the founding era as pregnant with present relevance, 
highlighted qualitative historical distance from that period. Despite vast differences in the 
use of historical sources, both antislavery constitutionalists and anti-constitutionalists 
crafted historical narratives positing that the founders’ had expected slavery to die out. 
These positions drew attention to slavery’s presence at the founding, but posited an 
original expectation of change in the form of slavery’s abolition. This furthered a belief 
in the Constitution as a flexible set of guidelines rather than a strict set of legal rules. 
This chapter outlines biblical and constitutional antislavery interpretive practices 
during the 1830s and 1840s, tracing the rhetorical parallels between them and 
highlighting their implications for historical awareness. It examines the role of biblical 
criticism in both of these discussions. The use of words such as context, circumstance, 
and accommodation informed debates among biblical scholars but also seeped into the 
interpretations of those who demonstrated little interest in or awareness of biblical 
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criticism. This chapter suggests that even biblical interpretations that did not privilege 
historical explication could challenge the assumption of a close correspondence between 
biblical and modern times. It also demonstrates the growing attention to context and 
change in constitutional readings and highlights the role of Madison’s published papers in 
that development. Similar to the biblical debates, even those who denied the importance 
of historical resources in constitutional interpretation crafted historical narratives that 
exposed historical distance from the founding era, which created challenges for using the 
Constitution to solve the present crisis. Most Americans, including those studied here, did 
not set out to explore the historical differences of their favored pasts, nor did many of 
them consider their interpretations’ implications for realizing historical distance. Indeed, 
most desired to recover static original truths in hopes of using them to resolve the slavery 
crisis. Their efforts, though, had undeniable potential to evidence the reality of historical 
distance. 
 
“The Unreasonableness of Perpetual Unconditional Slavery”: Patriarchs, Prophets, 
Apostles and the Shifting Grounds of the Biblical Debate  
If the proslavery biblical argument triumphed in antebellum America, it came at a 
price for the Old Testament. As the debate over southern slavery reached a national scale 
in the 1830s and increased in the following decades, the reverberations of Joseph Stevens 
Buckminster’s reading of Philemon to sanction both slavery and the return of fugitive 
slaves grew louder. The proslavery appeal to Philemon came as a response to antislavery 
readings of the New Testament. Liberal Christians’ antislavery proclivities contributed to 
and affirmed the decision to privilege the New over the Old Testament. To be sure, some 
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of slavery’s opponents continued to call on the Old Testament, holding that slavery did 
not exist among the Israelites, or refocusing the argument by accepting its nominal 
existence while maintaining that it differed in crucial respects from southern chattel 
slavery. But when that discussion affirmed the foreignness of the Old Testament past and 
thus the inapplicability of Old Testament precedent, most antislavery interpreters 
designated the New Testament as the central biblical battleground. Their proslavery 
opponents eagerly met them there. This development in historical understanding carried 
significant canonical implications. It further undermined the privileged place that the 
Hebrew scriptures had enjoyed in the United States until, not coincidentally, about 1830.5 
It also threatened to unveil dissonance between the New Testament and the new republic 
to an extent that antebellum biblical criticism alone had not. Shifting the grounds of 
debate to the New Testament held threatening implications.6 Where would Americans 
look for religious guidance if the most recent biblical past also proved too far away and 
too foreign for use? 
Proslavery exegetes agreed to meet their counterparts on the chosen grounds but 
dictated that the issue was not whether slavery was wrong in certain circumstances (mala 
prohibita) as some contended, but whether slavery was wrong in all circumstances (mala 
en se). Moderate antislavery Protestants, including liberal Christians such as William 
                                                
5 On the prevalence of “Old Testamentism” in the political culture of the early 
republic and the antebellum period, and on the reasons for its eventual decline, which 
included the biblical argument over slavery, see Shalev, American Zion.  
 6 On this shift and its implications, see Harrill, “Use of the New Testament.” This 
portion of the chapter draws on Harrill’s article, but while he argues that radical 
abolitionists’ appeals to moral sense undermined biblicism and encouraged the 
incorporation of German higher criticism, I contend that this was a dialectical 
development. Experience with biblical criticism informed the development of liberal 
Christians’ later antislavery arguments, and those arguments reinforced the acceptance 
and use of biblical criticism. 
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Ellery Channing and more orthodox figures such as Moses Stuart and his student Francis 
Wayland, accepted the terms of the debate and, given their scriptural commitments, 
attempted to explain how slavery became a sin, formulating what historian Molly Oshatz 
describes as a theological innovation of moral progress. The North and the South 
believed in social progress but neither northern abolitionists nor proslavery southerners 
thought that the moral law itself, which they viewed as static and unchanging, progressed. 
In juxtaposing the moral law with the Bible’s teachings, abolitionists either accepted the 
proslavery reading and then damned the Bible, as would William Lloyd Garrison, or 
posited a fundamental difference between ancient and modern slavery, as did Theodore 
Weld. Moderate antislavery proponents, however, developed an argument that though 
slavery was mala en se, the revelation of that truth evolved in relation to the varied 
circumstances of human existence.7 The question of slavery’s morality, then, brought 
together thinkers such as Channing and Stuart on this point. Although his use of the New 
Testament to support the Fugitive Slave Law demonstrated that Stuart still encouraged 
strict applications of the biblical text in 1850, slavery led him to emphasize that historical 
conditions constrained even Christ and his apostles in some ways. He seemed to hold that 
even after nineteen centuries the time had not arrived to abolish slavery, but believed that 
the passage of time did show that Christian truth spotlighted the sin of slavery.  
Each of these antislavery positions had the potential to reveal historical distance. 
When Garrisonians contended that slavery was prevalent in biblical times and that, in 
fact, the Bible did support proslavery claims, it suggested that southerners used an 
                                                
7 See Oshatz, Slavery and Sin, 81-109. See also, Molly Oshatz, “The Problem of 
Moral Progress: The Slavery Debates and the Development of Liberal Protestantism in 
the United States,” Modern Intellectual History 5, no. 2 (2008): 225-50.  
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obsolete text to justify a barbaric practice. When some antislavery interpreters argued that 
ancient servitude was profoundly different than modern slavery, and thus that the Bible 
could not be used to justify the southern institution, it highlighted historical differences as 
well. When moderate antislavery proponents insisted on the progress of moral sentiment 
and posited that neither Old Testament precedent for nor the New Testament presence of 
slavery could be used to condone the peculiar institution in the enlightened present, it 
signaled qualitative historical change. And when some abolitionists proposed that enough 
historical change had occurred to implement the antislavery principles that Christ and his 
apostles had taught, it pushed the period to which they appealed further into the past. In 
most cases, slavery did not lead its critics to abandon the Bible, but it did inspire them to 
interpret the sacred canon in such as way as to indicate that the biblical past was a foreign 
country. 
These arguments received their clearest articulation during the 1830s, 40s, and 
50s, though one can find components of each much earlier. African American minister 
Daniel Coker, who had been ordained a deacon by Francis Asbury and was familiar with 
Absalom Jones, helped Richard Allen organize the African Methodist Episcopal Church 
in 1816. Six years before, in 1810, he had published a fictitious dialogue between an 
African minister and a Virginian slaveholder, wherein the minister convinced the 
slaveholder of the sin of slavery and the virtue of gradual emancipation.8 Coker granted 
that the Romans, other “ancient nations,” and modern “barbarous tribes” made slaves of 
war prisoners, but protested that “it is a cruelty that the present practice of all civilized 
                                                
8 Daniel Coker, A Dialogue between a Virginian and an African Minister 
(Baltimore: Benjamin Edes, 1810).  
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nations, bears testimony against.”9 His temporal distinctions made modern slavery 
anachronistic. Despite these distinctions, however, Coker believed that the Bible, an 
account about a favored ancient past, condemned the practice. Christians had long made 
an exception with biblical times when dividing ancient and modern, barbaric and 
civilized. Coker, then, voiced a conventional understanding that hallowed the biblical 
past as timeless. He argued that Abraham’s command to circumcise purchased servants 
had granted those servants “all the common privileges of citizens.”10 Ancient Abrahamic 
religion, according to Coker, offered freedom for all. Sharpening his gaze, he argued that 
the Atlantic slave trade, outlawed in the United States only two years before, lacked an 
Old Testament precedent, writing that “the Israelites were not sent by a divine mandate, 
to nations three hundred miles distant … in order to captivate them by fraud or force.”11 
On the one hand, progress from ancient to modern times had made slavery anachronistic. 
On the other hand, declension since the golden age of Old Testament times had 
introduced the slave trade. Coker’s discussion demonstrated the conflicted nature of the 
development of historical consciousness, as traditional historical understandings 
intermingled with new historical reasoning. 
Turning to the New Testament, Coker continued his proof-texting approach, but, 
seeming to take a cue from William Paley, he also emphasized context in dealing with 
Paul’s teachings, writing that “to understand rightly the matter, we should recollect the 
situation of the Christians at that time.”12 Noting Roman rule, “a heathen” polity that he 
                                                
9 Ibid., 9. 
10 Ibid., 20.  
11 Ibid., 22.  
12 Ibid., 23. Among other Old and New Testament verses, Coker cited Gen. 17:13, 
Lev. 25:42, 54, Col. 3:22, 1 Cor. 7:21, and Matt. 7:12. See William Paley, Principles of 
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contrasted with the new republic’s “Christian government,” Coker explained that “in such 
circumstances … had the apostle proclaimed liberty to the slaves, it would probably have 
… injured the cause he loved so well, and that without the prospect of freeing one single 
individual. … Therefore it was wisdom in him, not to say a single word about freedom, 
more than he did.”13 Circumstances dictated that Paul use prudence, but Christian 
teachings clearly opposed servitude. “Though the apostle acted with this prudent 
reserve,” Coker continued, “the unreasonableness of perpetual unconditional slavery, 
may be easily inferred from the righteous and benevolent doctrines and duties, taught in 
the New Testament. It is very evident,” he explained, “that slavery is contrary to the spirit 
and nature of the Christian religion.”14 The Golden Rule stood in contrast to the South’s 
slave codes, even if it had been taught in a time where those codes would have fit the less 
civilized state of the ancient world. Though less developed than later antislavery 
readings, some of which drew on the German biblical scholarship being introduced by 
ministers and scholars such as Buckminster, Coker’s pamphlet contained many of the 
contentions that became the focus of later writers. Even in his early antislavery biblical 
reading, one finds assertions of temporal distinction and a recognition of historical 
difference, which expanded as the debate over slavery gained momentum. 
Shifting the grounds of debate from the Old to the New Testament was a gradual 
process. Coker’s antislavery arguments from the Old Testament found expression 
throughout the antebellum period, perhaps most famously in Theodore Dwight Weld’s 
                                                                                                                                            
Moral and Political Philosophy, 2 vols., 4th ed. (London: Faulder, 1787), 1:238-40. First 
published in London in 1785, by 1810 Paley’s publication had been reprinted extensively 
in the United States, and had been published in six American editions.  
 13 Coker, Dialogue between a Virginian, 23.  
14 Ibid., 25.  
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The Bible Against Slavery (1837).15 Weld received training and direction from some of 
the period’s most well-known religious and reform personalities, including Charles 
Finney, Lewis and Arthur Tappan, James G. Birney, and Sarah and Angelina Grimké. He 
married Angelina in 1838. While a student at Lane Theological Seminary in 1834, Weld 
had led debates on a range of issues, including slavery, that inspired his antislavery 
efforts. Leaving Cincinnati for New York, he became involved in the newly formed 
American Anti-Slavery Society (1833). His subsequent publications on slavery, which 
ranged from biblical and legal interpretation to exposés on the nature of slavery and the 
slave trade, show his interest in both biblical and constitutional interpretation.16 A 
growing number of national commentators would demonstrate this dual interest in the 
1840s and 1850s, as the slavery debate became more intense.  
In his 1837 publication, Weld brought his powers to bear on the biblical debate. 
Anticipating national commentators’ increasing focus on constitutional issues in the 
succeeding decades, he referenced legal differences between Abrahamic bondage and 
southern slavery, noting that “Abraham had neither ‘Constitution,’ nor ‘compact,’ nor 
statutes, nor judicial officers to send back his fugitives.”17 Like Coker, Weld found 
declension when measuring American slavery against Old Testament servitude, a 
position that once again called attention to temporal incongruities by upholding the 
                                                
15 [Theodore Dwight Weld], The Bible Against Slavery: An Inquiry into the 
Patriarchal and Mosaic Systems on the Subject of Human Rights (New York: American 
Anti-Slavery Society, 1837).  
16 [Theodore Dwight Weld], The Power of Congress over the District of 
Columbia (New-York: John F. Trow, 1838); [Theodore Dwight Weld], [Angelina 
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Slavery and the Internal Slave Trade in the United States of North America (London: 
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17 Weld, Bible Against Slavery, 28. 
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ancient past as a kind of golden age. While highlighting differences between Abrahamic 
and American circumstances, Weld contrasted the Mosaic system of “Divine authority” 
with that of his patriarchal predecessors, of whom Weld wrote, “God has not made them 
our examplars [sic].”18 Slavery encouraged some interpreters to make canonical choices 
among Old Testament texts and to value the newer Mosaic over the older Patriarchal 
dispensation. While still using the Hebrew scriptures to condemn the practice, Weld 
suggested that the oldest portion of the Old Testament past had no claim on the present. 
Slavery encouraged the move from appealing to more distant to more recent favored 
historical periods. In this case, Weld aimed to undermine the proslavery position by 
arguing that slavery did not exist among the Israelites. He made a semantic distinction 
between the words servant and slave to argue that they did not reduce men to “articles of 
property,” to “things,” as was the case with “American slavery.”19 Again, part of his 
argument displayed a conventional belief that the biblical past, or at least a portion of that 
past, exhibited timeless appeal. However, when further examination highlighted the 
peculiar nature even of Mosaic practices, favorably comparing the ancient past to the 
American present served to identify slavery as the great contradiction of modern 
civilization more than to uphold the Old Testament past as a golden age. Later antislavery 
writers who were more attentive to biblical scholarship and more open to biblical 
criticism conceded that historical evidence demonstrated slavery’s existence in 
Abrahamic, and Mosaic, and Christian dispensations. Some would refocus the argument 
in expanding the contention that the southern system differed in significant respects from 
                                                
 18 Ibid., 15. 
 19 Ibid., 6, 7.  
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what existed in biblical times, or contend that progress in moral understanding had 
revealed the sinfulness of slaveholding. 
 
“Principles Which, However Slowly, Could Not but Work Its Destruction”: The Christian 
Founders and the Antislavery Argument from Expediency 
In closing his discussion, Weld noted that he had intended to include “an Inquiry 
into the teachings of the New Testament.”20 Perhaps he felt that ground had been 
adequately covered. The turn to a focus on the Greek scriptures was already well under 
way. In 1819, William Ellery Channing had demonstrated his preference for contextual 
interpretation and had made clear his canonical preference for the New Testament. His 
openness to new research led him to argue in an 1835 publication that polygamy, like 
slavery, “was allowed to the Israelites, was the practice of the holiest men, and was 
common and licensed in the age of the Apostles.”21 Channing assumed that southerners 
agreed that polygamy belonged in the past. In highlighting its biblical sanction he called 
into question southern reasoning, quipping, “Why may not Scripture be used to stock our 
houses with wives as well as with slaves?” Approach the issue with another line of 
reasoning, Channing asked what “was slavery in the age of Paul?” and, with some 
embellishment, he explained that it included the enslavement of white men, of Greeks, of 
“the virtuous, educated, and refined.”22 To drive his point home, he made a modern 
comparison. Had Napoleon, through his military victories, enslaved “the delicate, refined, 
beautiful young woman,” or “the minister of religion, the man of science, the man of 
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 21 William E. Channing, Slavery (Boston: James Munroe, 1835), 108.  
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genius … we should then have a picture in the present age of slavery as it existed in the 
time of Paul.” More than Coker or Weld, Channing stressed the differences between 
ancient, in this case New Testament, and modern slavery to emphasize that “such 
slavery” could not have been “sanctioned by the Apostles!”23 Others more fully drew 
attention to these temporal distinctions to undermine the authorizing potential of biblical 
precedent. Although Channing favorably compared ancient to modern slavery in this 
passage, his purpose was to draw attention to the irony of slavery’s existence in America. 
He was not denying that slavery existed in the biblical past, indeed, he stressed that it 
held a firm grip on society in New Testament times. Focusing on the relationship 
between primitive Christianity and slavery, Channing echoed Coker’s argument in 
emphasizing context, writing that “slavery … had so penetrated society, was so 
intimately interwoven with it … that a religion, preaching freedom to its victims, would 
have shaken the social fabric to its foundations, and would have armed against itself the 
whole power of the State. Of consequence,” he explained, “Paul did not assail it. He 
satisfied himself with spreading principles which, however slowly, could not but work its 
destruction.”24  
Channing’s reading might be read as a critique of radical abolitionists who called 
for immediate rather than a gradual abolition. Indeed, Channing only later adopted an 
immediatist position. Even still, here he offered an alternative interpretation to the one 
Buckminster had provided of the oft-cited New Testament passage, proposing that Paul 
had instructed Philemon to receive Onesimus as a brother, “thus asserting for the slave 
the rights of a Christian and a Man.” Channing was unwilling to concede the historical 
                                                
 23 Ibid., 110.  
 24 Ibid., 111. 
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grounds to the proslavery interpreters, emphasizing the differences between ancient and 
modern slavery and preferring to interpret the New Testament according to “the general 
tenor and spirit of Christianity.” But the thrust of his argument rested in the idea that 
Christ and his apostles had planted seeds of progress because their environment would 
not allow them to abolish the system outright. In an approach that aligned with Theodore 
Parker’s distinction between the transient and the permanent, Channing asked an 
incendiary question with unsettling implications: “Of what avail are a few texts, which 
were designed for local and temporary use, when urged against the vital essential spirit, 
and the plainest precepts of our religion?”25 Channing remained invested in the historical 
Jesus and the historicity of his Gospel miracles, but he concluded that certain portions of 
the New Testament, including those that seemed to sanction slavery, had short shelf lives. 
Further, he believed that despite their temporal teachings, Christianity’s founders had 
inculcated universal antislavery principles. In outlining distinctions between ancient and 
modern slavery or in positing the apostolic expectation of slavery’s demise, Channing’s 
arguments drew attention to the temporal chasm separating the nineteenth from the first 
century.26 
In a book also published in 1835, New York Baptist Francis Wayland made a 
similar argument. He acknowledged that, while a deviation from God’s original law, 
slavery was allowed to exist in Old and New Testament times. As a student of Moses 
Stuart’s at Andover Theological Seminary, Wayland had been trained in the new methods 
of biblical exegesis and was probably aware that historical evidence attested to slavery’s 
                                                
25 Ibid., 113.  
 26 On these and similar antislavery arguments, see Harrill, “Use of the New 
Testament,” 150-60. On Channing’s commitment to the Unitarian position, see Grodzins, 
American Heretic, 123-27.  
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existence in biblical times. Wayland’s publication demonstrates that although Stuart and 
Channing emphasized different practices in their discussions of biblical hermeneutics, 
their approaches overlapped in important respects, and the issue of slavery could 
accentuate those similarities. Like Channing, Wayland compared the practice to 
polygamy, another clear corruption of God’s original law and of “the gospel law of 
marriage,” which was also allowed anciently.27 This tie between slavery and polygamy 
only grew stronger, placing southerners on the defensive and later undermining the 
position of polygamous Mormons.28 More immediately, when proslavery exegetes 
contended that the gospel abolished polygamy but not slavery, the debate about the 
relationship between the two practices ensured the Old Testament’s dethronement. 
Wayland asserted that in the gospel, a system “designed … for all races, and for all 
times,” as opposed to the law of Moses, which was designed for the Israelites alone, God 
revealed truths meant “not to abolish this form of evil for that age alone, but for its 
universal abolition.” He placed emphasis on historical context and “circumstances,” 
suggesting that the gospel worked to “quietly and peacefully modify and subdue the evil 
passions of men, and thus, without violence, work a revolution in the whole mass of 
mankind.” If the gospel “had forbidden the evil, instead of subverting the principle;” he 
posited, “if it had proclaimed the unlawfulness of slavery, and taught slaves to resist 
oppression of their masters; it would have arrayed the two parties in deadly hostility … 
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and the very name of the Christian religion would have been forgotten.”29 According to 
Wayland, Christ intended to rid the world of slavery by teaching universal principles that 
would flower, in the appropriate circumstances, to overcome particular corruptions. 
Anticipating arguments about the framers of the Constitution, Channing and Wayland 
held that the founders of Christianity planted the seeds of slavery’s destruction, which 
time would nourish.30  
 To retain a claim on the New Testament, proslavery exegetes asserted continuity 
with the Old Testament. This argument supported the contention that slavery “was an 
early arrangement of the Almighty, to be perpetuated through all time.”31 In the wake of 
the split between Baptists along sectional lines in 1845, which followed the 1844 
Methodist break, South Carolinian minister Richard Fuller answered his coreligionist’s 
arguments in a letter that represented the tenor of the southern position. Recognizing that 
“compared with slavery, all other topics which now shake and inflame men’s passions in 
these United States, are really trifling,” Fuller argued that “the Old Testament did 
sanction slavery,” citing a favorite proslavery passage from Leviticus.32 He then 
attempted to show that “in the Gospels and Epistles, the institution is, to say the least, 
tolerated.”33 Fuller responded with contempt to the idea that Christ and his apostles 
refrained from a straightforward denunciation of slavery for the sake of expediency, 
mocking the notion that “they who proclaimed and prosecuted a war of extermination 
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against all the most cherished passions of this guilty earth … shrank from breathing even 
a whisper against slavery, through fear of consequences!”34 Turning to Channing’s 
reading, in particular, Fuller wondered, if “nothing but this unyielding, uncompromising, 
condemnation of every sin could content him,” then why Paul had “declined uttering a 
word” on slavery, preferring to allow “millions on all sides” to sink “into hell through 
this crime” while “spreading principles which would slowly work a cure!”35 Fuller’s Paul 
did not lack for temerity and was not limited by temporal constraints. Having established 
continuity between the Testaments, Fuller sought to untie the noxious knot between 
polygamy and slavery by applying to the former practice the argument that many 
antislavery readers applied to the latter, arguing that “the gospel does forbid, and did at 
once abolish polygamy.”36 Fuller viewed polygamy as a corruption from the divinely 
instituted original practice of monogamy. To the extent that proslavery advocates 
displayed a distinction between polygamy and slavery under the gospel, it undercut the 
authority of the Old Testament, which, in turn, troubled the argument from continuity. 
And to the extent that the argument from continuity retained force, the New Testament 
stood to suffer from its association with the Old and its outdated practices.  
In response to Fuller’s letter, Wayland broadened his argument from expediency 
to a claim about the progressive nature of revelation. Maintaining that slavery “is always 
and everywhere … a moral wrong,” he conceded its existence in both the Patriarchal and 
Mosaic eras.37 To explain this seeming inconsistency, he proposed that “God did not see 
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fit to reveal his will on this subject, nor indeed on many others, to the ancient 
Hebrews.”38 Thus, Old Testament permissions were “peculiar” and “anomalous” 
allowances and so, instances like the command to destroy the Canaanites did not 
“authorize American citizens … to destroy, or to enslave, or to hold in slavery, the people 
of another continent.”39 Wayland reasoned that Fuller’s assumption that “whatever God 
sanctioned among the Hebrews, he sanctions for all men and at all times” was “at 
variance with the whole theory of divine dispensation.”40 God “has seen fit to enlighten 
our race progressively,” he explained, and thus “we cannot plead … that what was 
permitted without rebuke in a darker age is permitted to us to whom greater light has 
been given.”41 Wayland used the idea that biblical peoples lived in different time periods, 
described as dispensations, to advance an understanding of revelation quite similar to 
Theodore Parker’s idea of the progress of religion. In both cases, their positions led them 
to reject slavery as an antiquated practice. Like Channing, Wayland also stressed 
historical distinctions. Even if “whatever was sanctioned to the Hebrews is sanctioned to 
all men at all times,” he did “not see what manner it could justify slavery in the United 
States,” given the differences between the two systems.42 Believing that “the Jewish law 
was made exclusively for that people,” he argued that it “can be pleaded in justification 
by no other people whatever.”43 Emphasizing the progress of God’s revelation and 
spotlighting differences between ancient servitude and modern slavery allowed Wayland 
to dismiss Old Testament precepts as peculiar to a bygone past. 
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Presuming that southerners would not want to mirror the peculiar Mosaic system, 
Wayland assumed that “the Scriptural argument in defence of slavery is narrowed down 
to the limits of the New Testament,” a text given not “to one people, but to the whole 
race; nor for one period, but for all time.”44 Stressing “a consideration of the 
circumstances,” he wrote that “at the time of our Saviour and his apostles, slavery was 
universal,” which stemmed from “the moral darkness of the age.”45 Thus, rather than 
teaching precise precepts, Christ and his followers inculcated broad principles, such as 
the brotherhood of man and their equal relationship to God, timeless truths which, once 
“instilled into the public mind, must of necessity abolish slavery.”46 Wayland’s 
developmental argument took historical limitations into account. Citing the “long-
mindedness of the Deity,” he argued that “God treats his intelligent creatures according to 
the nature which he has given them. … He promulgates truth of universal efficacy, but 
frequently allows long time [sic] to elapse before the effect of it appears, in order that that 
effect may be the more radical and comprehensive.”47 While it was a moral advancement 
over Patriarchal and Mosaic dispensations the gospel era emerged in a dark time, and “it 
was necessary that this darkness should be dispelled, before the moral light could shine 
upon slavery.”48 Wayland found that moral light in a more recent favored past. 
In a clear instance of overlap in biblical and legal interpretation, which also 
suggested a turn to the founding era as the most useful favored past, he argued that the 
gospel truths, which had evolved since the New Testament times, received “their fullest 
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development in the principles of the Declaration of Independence.”49 Wayland went so 
far as to posit that “the gospel of Christ, on the subject of human rights, falls infinitely 
below the Declaration,” though he believed that the flowering of the principles in that 
document relied on the cultivation of original gospel truths.50 This kind of reasoning 
brought together the biblical and Revolutionary pasts, but it also marked the beginnings 
of an emphasis on Revolutionary era texts as authoritative in the slavery debate. In 
answering the question as to how to implement antislavery principles found therein, he 
granted that “we are at liberty to use the same manner, in just so far as our circumstances 
and those of the early Christians correspond,” before arguing that “the cause with us is 
different. … We, in our Declaration of Independence, have already acknowledged the 
very principles now in question.” For primitive Christians, “laws were nothing but the 
published will of a despot. … It is by no means the same with us. We make our own 
laws.”51 Rather than suggest that the US legal system granted greater protection for 
slaveholders than that of ancient Israel, as had Daniel Coker, or that slavery in New 
Testament times paled in comparison to modern slavery, as had Channing, Wayland 
stressed the democratic nature of the American republic and the amendatory potential of 
its laws. Change was now in the hands of the people. The time was ripe to pick the fruit 
born of gospel seeds. All this indicated historical distance from the New Testament era. 
Before letting the subject rest, Fuller responded in a series of letters, which, in 
1845, were published together with Wayland’s. Fuller reasserted that “WHAT GOD 
SANCTIONED IN THE OLD TESTAMENT, AND PERMITTED IN THE NEW, CANNOT BE SIN.” 
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Having posited that “both Testaments constitute one entire canon” and “furnish a 
complete rule of faith and practice”—a position undermined by his statements on 
polygamy—he attacked the abolitionists’ scriptural elasticity.52 “The Bible operates too 
slowly for our reformers,” he sneered, dismissing “the germinal principle, which, in 
subsequent ages, and under the genial influence of the reformers, should expand and 
ripen.”53 Believing that Wayland wrongly had conflated southern slavery with the 
South’s slave laws, and thus mistakenly compared slavery as an institution to the peculiar 
Old Testament laws, he posited that “the moral character of [ancient] actions is 
immutable.”54 Fuller granted that the Mosaic laws and the slave codes differed, and even 
allowed that reform of the latter might be right, but argued that the example of biblical 
prophets demonstrated that slaveholding, in and of itself, was not sinful. Attention to 
historical distinction could be used to justify, as well as condemn, modern slavery. 
Though emphatic in his argument for canonical continuity, Fuller realized that temporal 
differences separated the biblical past from the American present. He, then, also 
recognized transient aspects of the biblical record in his attempt to rescue permanent and 
immutable truths. Rather than conflate Abrahamic servitude with American slavery, 
Fuller called on the biblical past simply to show that “slavery is not necessarily, and 
always, and amidst all circumstances, a sin.”55 Like his opponents, Fuller recognized 
historical differences, but he believed that exemplary actions could be recovered to 
demonstrate that slavery was similar to a “large number of actions whose moral character 
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depends on the peculiar circumstances of each case.”56 While some antislavery readers 
argued that progress in moral understanding made slavery’s immorality clearer in the 
present, Fuller contended that present circumstances made slaveholding itself moral in 
the American South. Fuller’s argument, which resurfaced in other proslavery defenses, 
downplayed historical distance, but in positing the contingent nature of some sins, his 
reading also stressed the importance of historical context and particularity. 
Fuller, though, stood firm in his belief that God had revealed all moral truth in the 
gospel and that the first Christians understood that truth perfectly well. “Nothing can be 
more utterly sophistical,” he wrote, “than the idea that we have any light, as to matters of 
pure revelation, which the first Christians had not.” He acknowledged “that the world has 
made prodigious progress in all the arts and sciences, during the last three or four 
centuries,” but, in contrast to figures such as Wayland, Channing, Stuart, and especially 
Parker, believed that progress shed no new light on the original scriptural truths.57 Fuller 
seemed to believe that while historical circumstances determined whether or not slavery 
was moral, changes in those circumstances did not alter the original Christian revelation. 
In short, he held that both primitive Christians and American nineteenth-century 
Protestants had access to the same gospel light needed to determine slavery’s morality, 
and when illuminated, understood that the similarities between past and present 
circumstances, made slavery moral then and now. Other southerners agreed, allowing for 
progress in “physical science,” but maintaining that “in religion and morals, we doubt all 
improvements, not known to certain fishermen who lived some eighteen hundred years 
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ago.”58 Fuller not only dismissed that humans had grown in their grasp of God’s moral 
laws since Christianity’s founding, but he believed that recent biblical scholarship 
darkened rather than illuminated static gospel truths. He aimed to remove the occlusion 
introduced by modern movements, such as abolitionism, and recover pure primitive 
teachings. He cited scriptural passages to provide inferences, proofs, and demonstrations 
that “in the days of the Saviour and the apostles, this institution existed everywhere,” and 
they “did not declare it to be a sin, but by precept and example permitted it to 
continue.”59 Given his assumptions about the universal moral nature of New Testament 
actions and the similarities between ancient and modern slavery, Fuller could collapse 
vast historical distances and conflate real historical distinctions in positing that “should 
they appear now, they would find the same institution. … And they would act just as they 
acted then; or rather, they are here in the gospel, and are now doing what they then did.”60 
This sense of contemporaneity with the biblical past, its people, its institutions, and its 
sentiments, carried forward traditional understandings. The historical turn was not 
without its holdouts. Some interpreters continued to insist on reading the Bible as if its 
past retained a clear temporal correspondence with the present. Despite his emphasis on 
historical contingencies and circumstances, in Fuller’s mind, biblical figures sanctioned 
American slavery.   
Wayland and Fuller’s 1845 publication became a useful text in the slavery 
debates, finding reference among prominent individuals such as Albert Barnes. A 
graduate of Princeton Theological Seminary, Barnes soon gained notoriety as head of 
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Philadelphia’s First Presbyterian Church, where he championed New School 
Presbyterianism, and through his publications on the New Testament, which drew the ire 
of his coreligionist, the orthodox Charles Hodge. Trained in biblical criticism, Barnes 
added his abilities to the task of discerning Bible’s meaning and relevance on slavery. In 
an 1846 publication, he brought his expertise to bear on the issue, while advocating 
widespread engagement, noting that “the subject of slavery is one in which all men have 
an interest, and which all have a right to discuss.”61 This appeal corresponded to the 
prevailing opinion that all could read and understand the Bible, but elevated that belief in 
opining that all could learn the principles of biblical interpretation. The growing 
emphasis on historical reasoning in both biblical and constitutional hermeneutics 
suggested that all could participate as interpreters, and not just biblical and legal scholars. 
In laying out his approach, Barnes responded to Fuller but also to Hodge’s Biblical 
Repertory, both of which distinguished between slaveholding and slave laws to contend 
that “‘the condemnation of the latter does not necessarily involve the condemnation of the 
former.’” Shifting attention from whether slavery was wrong in all circumstances, Barnes 
responded that the only question “fairly before the American people” was “whether 
slavery as it exists in the United States is, or is not, in accordance with the principles and 
the spirit of Christianity.”62 In dealing with the various biblical dispensations, Barnes 
kept this question at the forefront of his discussion, though he also drew on the idea of the 
progress of God’s revelation. 
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With the help of cementing canonical divisions among more liberal Christians 
that pulled apart the Old and New Testaments and separated their texts from each other, 
Barnes examined patriarchal and Mosaic servitude. He narrowed his first consideration to 
“whether one who is a slaveholder in the United States, in the manner in which slavery 
exists here, is justified in it by the examples of the patriarchs.”63 In determining whether 
“the slavery which existed then was essentially the same as that which it is proposed to 
vindicate,” Barnes examined terms denoting servitude in the Hebrew scriptures and 
concluded that “the mere use of the word in the time of the patriarchs, determines nothing 
in the issue before us.”64 As with other antebellum scholars who were attuned to biblical 
criticism, Barnes employed his learning to muddy rather than to purify the waters of the 
biblical past. Some antislavery constitutionalists would do the same with the founding 
era. Even if slavery had existed among the Patriarchs, Barnes explained, existence was no 
sign of divine approval. “It is perfectly clear,” he wrote, calling on a now familiar 
equation, “that, so far as the conduct of the patriarchs goes, it would be just as easy to 
construct an argument in favour of polygamy as in favour of slavery.”65 Regardless of the 
status of servitude among the ancients, “the patriarchs were good men in their generation, 
and, considering their circumstances, were men eminent for piety. But they were 
imperfect men; they lived in the infancy of the world; they had comparatively little light 
on the subjects of morals and religion; and it is a very feeble argument which maintains 
that a thing is right, because any one or all of the patriarchs practiced it.”66 Barnes held 
that even the holy Patriarchs, who were exceptional figures despite their historical 
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context, did not transcend that context. Recognizing that most drew on the Mosaic system 
to defend southern slavery, Barnes stressed the failure “to compare it with that which 
exists in our land.”67 His investigation of the practice turned the application around: “All 
the arrangements of law which are made in the slave states, are designed to perpetuate 
slavery, not to bring it to an end; all those in the Mosaic statutes were intended to modify 
the system, and ultimately abolish it.”68 Barnes, on the one hand, asserted that the 
historical differences resulting from moral progress undermined the relevance of outdated 
Patriarchal precedents, and, on the other hand, he suggested that present southern laws, 
perhaps owing to decline, fell short in relation to enlightened Mosaic laws. Barnes, then, 
understood the Mosaic law as interpreters such as Channing and Wayland understood the 
apostles’ New Testament teachings. These sorts of antislavery biblical readings, which 
called on a past that looked forward to slavery’s abolition, anticipated antislavery 
constitutional readings, which also would appeal to a historical period—the founding 
era—that expected slavery’s demise. 
 Before turning to the New Testament, Barnes strove to minimize slavery’s 
existence in Judea between the times of Moses and of Christ, which allowed him to posit 
the antislavery tendency of Mosaic law and also to counter the claim that Christ, though 
familiar with slavery, never denounced it.69 He conceded slavery’s existence in the 
apostolic era and followed Channing and Wayland in arguing that “God has in fact 
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removed most of the evils of the world by a gradual development of principles which 
strike on great wrongs existing in society.”70 Stressing historical “circumstances,” he 
explained that  
the apostles were strangers in the lands where they published the gospel; they had 
no civil power. ... Slavery had existed for ages … it was defended by lawgivers 
and moralists; it was interwoven with every custom and habit of social life … and 
it was supposed to have the sanction of religion. What would have been the effect 
of denouncing it. … [The apostles] would have been regarded as disturbers of the 
public peace … and they would have been banished at once from every 
slaveholding community—just as abolition agents are now at the South.71  
 
Again unable to resist historical comparison, Barnes cited the gradualist gospel views 
found in the Biblical Repertory and aligned them with those of Christ’s apostles in order 
to confront the paper’s contention that an argument from expediency made the apostles 
duplicitous.72 Barnes made both historical comparisons and distinctions to serve his 
purposes. Turning to the case of Onesimus, he again complicated the conflation of 
servant and slave, proposing, as had Channing, that Paul had sent him back as a fellow 
Christian. He stretched the argument to the brink, positing that “the principles laid down 
in the epistle to Philemon … would lead to the universal abolition of slavery.”73 Barnes 
concluded that the “fair application,” of both the Mosaic laws and the Christian religion 
“would ultimately bring the institution to an end.”74 Such an application, though, 
depended on the right circumstances. Barnes believed that these views were “destined 
most certainly to increase and prevail.”75 This, according to the reformer, was because of 
history’s direction: “The progress towards universal freedom is onward. The spirit of the 
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age; the settled principles of liberty; the advances in intelligence and in benevolent 
feeling, all are against the system, and it cannot survive the shock when all these are fully 
arrayed against it.”76 Like Parker, Barnes posited progress, which highlighted historical 
distance from the past to which he appealed. The antislavery seeds had been planted 
centuries ago and soon would flower in the fertile grounds of the new age. 
This kind of back and forth about what kinds of slavery prevailed in biblical times 
and about what portions of the Christian canon justified or condemned the institution held 
important implications for how Americans thought about the biblical past. The assertion 
that the institution did not exist in Old Testament times gave way to a debate about 
whether or not Patriarchal or Mosaic slavery paralleled southern slavery and thus could 
be used to uphold or condemn the American institution. This historicized the Old 
Testament past.77 Some persisted in appeals to the Hebrew scriptures but the actions and 
words of Abraham and even of Moses seemed to lose relevance as polemicists on both 
sides agreed that the actions and words of less distant figures like Jesus and Paul mattered 
more. The new Gospel trumped the old Law. Southerners such as Fuller strove to fuse the 
Testaments, which, if successful, would support the claim that Providence ensured 
slavery’s endurance as a universal institution. That effort could prove counterproductive 
in a Christian nation, but as slavery’s sanction was clear among the Patriarchs and 
Israelites, drawing the Testaments together helped overcome the limitations of a 
proslavery reading of Greek scriptures. Some antislavery readers conceded the 
persistence of slavery from the times of one Testament to the other, but capitalized on 
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those limitations, taking the Gospels’ universal teachings as a condemnation of the 
practice and using historical arguments to separate New Testament from southern 
slavery. This approach paralleled that of antislavery constitutionalists, who would read 
the Constitution in light of the Declaration’s egalitarian statements and use historical 
arguments to contrast founding-era expectations about slavery with the protected position 
of the peculiar institution in the nineteenth century. 
Despite Barnes’ best efforts to refocus the discussion on whether or not the Bible 
sanctioned southern slavery, southern proslavery interpreters continued to insist that the 
question of consequence was whether or not slavery was always and everywhere 
wrong.78 This approach did not make southerners less prone to assert that biblical figures 
justified American slavery, but it suggests their awareness of temporal differences. 
Contextual readings of the Bible allowed proslavery readers like Richard Fuller to argue 
that because God sanctioned different forms of slavery at different times, he sanctioned it 
now. But, such readings also helped antislavery readers attack southern slavery as 
archaic. Those who accepted slavery’s existence in Old and New Testament times, such 
as Wayland and Channing, countered with interpretations focused on the intentions of 
Christianity’s founders. This progressive historical view held that the seeds of universal 
antislavery principles would outlast and overcome particular sentiments and institutions 
peculiar to the times, reaching full fruition in the more democratic and progressive 
American present. While also an appeal to a past, this was not an argument to return to or 
reclaim the past. The emphasis on submerged universal principles under a surface of 
outdated teachings highlighted the foreign nature of the biblical past. As the number of 
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the Bible’s useful and permanent teachings shrunk to a few universal principles from a 
handful of texts, the remaining instructions and passages were relegated to the status of 
passing and particular peculiarities from a distant past. The argument that those universal 
principles would find fulfillment in the future drew attention to the distance between the 
biblical past and the present. This contention, which retained faith in the sacred texts and 
thus stood a better chance of winning adherents than antislavery attempts to dismiss the 
Bible as obsolete, held great potential to spread awareness of that distance.  
 
The Sacred Founding Texts and the Shifting Grounds of the Constitutional Debate 
The emphasis on using certain portions from a favored past and on uncovering 
universal principles expected to flower in time found a clear parallel in constitutional 
debates. As demonstrated in Wayland’s argument, appeals to the biblical past could 
overlap with appeals to the Revolutionary past, and, as his discussion showed, the recent 
American past could be valued as more enlightened than even the sacred Jewish and 
Christian pasts. According to Wayland, the universal truths inculcated in the New 
Testament received their clearest articulation in the Declaration of Independence. Around 
midcentury, the American past became more relevant in determining the fate of 
American slavery debates than the biblical past. This is not to say that the biblical debates 
subsided, but as politicians began to focus on finding a resolution to the crisis in their 
political rather than their religious tradition, even biblical scholars turned their attention 
to deciding the constitutional side of the debate. If the distance separating the favored 
biblical past from their American present proved too great to bridge in addressing 
contemporary problems, perhaps the more recent favored past could offer solutions. As 
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Americans appealed to the Revolutionary era for answers, it became clear that historical 
change separated even that recent founding moment from the present.  
 The debates over national religious texts traced in the preceding sections and 
chapters did not exactly parallel the debates over national legal texts outlined in the 
following sections and chapters, but, as the remainder of this chapter demonstrates, both 
came under the scrutiny of historical reasoning, which informed canonical distinctions. In 
the biblical argument the New Testament achieved a higher status than the antiquated Old 
Testament, despite some southerners’ best efforts to hold them together. In the 
constitutional argument, the Constitution achieved a higher status than the Declaration of 
Independence, despite some antislavery proponents’ best efforts to hold these founding 
documents together. In part, of course, this was because the Constitution was accepted as 
that nation’s supreme legal document. But if the New Testament suffered in the eyes of 
some abolitionists from its connection with the Old Testament, to the same audience the 
Constitution achieved greater stature through its tie to the Declaration. Indeed, despite 
Garrisonian and proslavery efforts to sever the connection between these documents, the 
former to claim the Declaration and damn the Constitution, and the latter to damn the 
Declaration and claim the Constitution, the texts remained tied in the antislavery 
imagination. Though the Declaration predated the Constitution, interpreters did not 
consider it the product of a separate and peculiar past, as they did the Old in relation to 
the New Testament. Millennia separated Moses from John the Revelator, while some of 
the same figures that signed the Declaration helped craft the Constitution. To the extent 
that the later diverged from the former, then, antislavery advocates could consider it a 
retrogressive creation. But, regardless of how one positioned the Declaration in relation 
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to the Constitution, the growing emphasis on reading those texts in light of historical 
research exposed temporal distance from the founding era.  
 
 
“We Plant Ourselves upon the Declaration of Our Independence, and the Truths of 
Divine Revelation”: The Declaration, the Bible and the Beginnings of Garrisonian Anti-
Constitutionalism  
 One can read the constitutional debates as a bout between lightweight antislavery 
and heavyweight proslavery forces. Southern slaveholders’ successful efforts to shore up 
their institution in the Constitution might be interpreted as a preemptive strike against the 
potential threat posed by the Somerset case (1772), wherein Lord Mansfield determined 
that only positive law protected slavery.79 Perhaps in response to that decision, which 
some interpreted as a natural-law condemnation of slavery, southerners ensured that the 
Constitution affirmed the federal consensus that slavery’s regulation should be left to the 
states.80 After a time of relative quiet, events such as the War of 1812, the crisis of 1820, 
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and Denmark Vesey’s slave rebellion of 1822, brought slavery again to the surface. In the 
wake of the Missouri Compromise, which aggravated rather than alleviated the issue, 
proslavery and antislavery advocates more fully developed and articulated their views.81 
Up until this period, most Americans accepted the federal consensus position, which 
forbade federal involvement in determining slavery’s fate. Thus, in the first decades of 
the nation’s existence abolition societies worked in loose coalitions for gradual 
emancipation through the states. In the 1830s, however, new abolitionist societies began 
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calling for immediate emancipation, which challenged the consensus and led Americans 
to look to the founding era for answers.82 
William Lloyd Garrison, America’s most determined abolitionist, raised the level 
of both the biblical and constitutional debates. He did not offer rigorous historical 
readings of the Bible or the Constitution, but his early uses and abuses of the nation’s 
sacred and legal texts encouraged interpreters to either offer contextual explications to 
support their position or to dismiss such explication as unnecessary. Regardless of 
whether or not one decided to decipher these texts through historical exegesis, one had to 
at least recognize the contextual approach as the prevailing hermeneutic. As outlined 
below, Garrison’s early efforts to be heard on the public stage spurred along the move to 
interpret the Constitution as a historical text in need of historical explication. 
Garrison approached the American past in a conflicted way. He called on the 
Revolutionary legacy early and often, though his interest in that period, and in the 
Declaration in particular, rested less on past achievements than on the Revolution’s 
potential power to revolutionize social relations in the present.83 In 1829, while finding 
his voice in the expanding newspaper culture, the twenty-three-year-old Garrison 
answered the invitation of the American Colonization Society to speak on the Fourth of 
July at the Park Street Church in Boston. Addressing his audience on the existence of 
slavery in a presumably free nation, he excoriated American politics as “rotten to the 
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core” and designated the Fourth “a day of great lamentation, not of congratulatory joy.”84 
Referring to “a very large proportion of our colored population,” he contended that “this 
is their country by birth, not by adoption. Their children possess the same inherent and 
unalienable rights as ours.”85 Conceding that the free states “are constitutionally involved 
in the guilt of slavery,” he called on northerners to unshackle themselves from “unjust 
Constitutional provisions,” and urged that “moral influence, when in vigorous exercise, is 
irresistible.”86 Here Garrison essentially rewrote “the Declaration of Independence to 
include African-Americans.”87 In the course of the next few decades, he and other 
abolitionists made it hard to think about slavery without thinking about the enslaved. 
In this speech and throughout his career, one finds an overlap between biblical 
and Revolutionary appeals.88 Like his Quaker mentor Benjamin Lundy, who Garrison 
assisted in editing the Genius of Universal Emancipation from September 1829 until 
March 1830, Garrison rooted his antislavery ideas in the Declaration and the Bible.89 In 
the inaugural issue of the Liberator, published on January 1, 1831, he referenced his 
efforts to “lift up the standard of emancipation in the eyes of the nation, within sight of 
Bunker Hill and in the birth place of liberty” and, after recanting his prior “unreflecting” 
assent to gradual emancipation, ascribed to the self-evident truths of the Declaration. 
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Based on this foundation, he committed to “strenuously contend for the immediate 
enfranchisement of our slave population.”90 Garrison grounded his immediatist position 
in the Revolutionary past. In the second issue of the Liberator, he held out hope for the 
nation’s redemption. “We do not give up our country as sealed over to destruction,” he 
wrote, “As long as there remains a single copy of the Declaration of American 
Independence, or of the bible, in our land, we will not despair.”91 He left the Constitution 
out of his list of redeeming texts as a response to proslavery constitutional arguments, 
which exhibited an early lack of faith in the Constitution as an antislavery text, but his 
allegiance to the Bible and, especially, the Declaration remained firm.   
In the early 1830s, awakened by the southern intransigence resulting from events 
such as Nat Turner’s slave rebellion and the nullification crisis, the immediatist 
movement confronted and gained numerous converts from the colonization effort, 
leading to the establishment of the American Anti-Slavery Society (AASS) in 
Philadelphia in December of 1833. Garrison’s continued valuation of the Bible and the 
Declaration was evident in the new organization’s “Declaration of Sentiments” and its 
constitution. The constitution opened the call for immediate emancipation by asserting 
humanity’s common creation under God, stressing the New Testament command to “love 
their neighbours as themselves,” and referencing the guiding egalitarian principles 
contained in the Declaration of ‘76.92 The “Declaration of Sentiments” began with a 
reference to the egalitarian ideas espoused by the “band of patriots,” but it proceeded to 
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contend that the mission of the AASS exceeded that of their Revolutionary forebears, 
holding that “we have met together for the achievement of an enterprise, without which, 
that of our fathers is incomplete; and which, for its magnitude, solemnity, and probable 
results upon the destiny of the world, as far transcends theirs, as moral truth does physical 
force.”93 Harnessing the power of the Revolutionary past, Garrison asserted the 
unprecedented significance of the revolutionary present. Whereas Francis Wayland 
would find the full articulation of the New Testament’s universal truths in the 
Declaration, Garrison hoped to realize those truths through the AASS. Noting differences 
in cause and approach, he opined that the Revolutionaries’ “grievances, great as they 
were, were trifling in comparison with the wrongs and sufferings of those for whom we 
plead.”94 Even his presentist reading of the Revolution posited historical distinctions in 
asserting the moral superiority of the present battle against slavery over the past struggle 
against tyranny. Garrison concluded with an affirmation of the twin pillars of his faith, 
Revelation and the Declaration, though, at the suggestion of Lucretia Mott, one of the 
prominent women in attendance, he changed the order: “We plant ourselves upon the 
Declaration of our Independence, and the truths of Divine Revelation, as upon the 
EVERLASTING ROCK.”95 As with Francis Wayland’s appeal to the Declaration as a 
more complete articulation of inchoate New Testament truths, Mott’s suggestion and 
Garrison’s agreement hints at the gradual reordering of favored pasts among some 
antislavery thinkers. This reordering placed the Revolutionary era under the same kind of 
scrutiny that scholars had subjected the biblical past to. It also suggests that these 
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abolitionists granted the Declaration a status similar to that of the New Testament, while, 
increasingly, they cast the Constitution as the Old Testament of the Revolutionary canon.   
Rather than provide contextual interpretations of these texts, Garrison extracted 
abstract ideas and cited ready-made passages. But these efforts to use the Bible, the 
Declaration, and the Constitution in a debate of increasing significance led to more 
rigorous examinations of those texts as rooted in, instead of outside, of time. Attempts to 
use favored pasts in this period inspired critical calls for historical accuracy.96 Americans 
were deeply invested in both the American and biblical pasts, and thus depictions of 
those pasts garnered special attention. Garrison’s radical application of Christian and 
American texts also coincided with the emergence of historical criticism and the growing 
emphasis on contextual interpretation in biblical and constitutional hermeneutics. In short 
order, constitutional debates, as with biblical debates, became historical contestations, 
which led some, including Garrison, to reaffirm their faith in one founding document, the 
Declaration, while abandoning to the past other founding texts, including the Constitution 
and, later, the Bible.  
The constitution and declaration of the AASS affirmed the federal consensus, 
admitting that “each State, in which Slavery exists, has, by the Constitution of the United 
States, the exclusive right to legislate in regard to its abolition in said State,” and 
conceding “that Congress, under the present national compact, has no right to interfere 
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with any of the slave States, in relation to this momentous subject.”97 Garrison’s 
reference to the “present” national compact signaled his sense of its impermanence and 
anticipated his later call for its abrogation. Even at this early stage he believed that “all 
those laws which are now in force, admitting the right of slavery, are therefore before 
God utterly null and void,” specifically arguing that the representation, fugitive slave, and 
insurrection clauses “MUST BE BROKEN UP.”98 Still, in issuing this call for 
constitutional emendation, he referenced “the highest obligations resting upon the people 
of the free States, to remove slavery by moral and political action, as prescribed in the 
Constitution of the United States.”99 The AASS held that the Constitution empowered 
Congress to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia and to forbid its presence in the 
territories, and its members used the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause to develop 
equal protection arguments. These ideas set the parameters for later antislavery 
constitutionalism, but during the 1830s, Garrison’s tepid constitutionalism was replaced 
by a fiery anti-constitutionalism.100   
In the early to mid 1830s, Garrison started casting aspersions on the Constitution 
in the pages of the Liberator, even while he retained faith in the Bible and the 
Declaration.101 But even as the newspaper assumed a radical edge, there is reason to 
believe that he showed some restraint when addressing an American audience. In a letter 
to the London Patriot, which was published there in full and republished in the Liberator 
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only in part, Garrison hoped to unmask the American Colonization Society and 
desacralize the Constitution. In a section excised from the Liberator, he wrote, “I know 
that there is much declamation about the sacredness of the compact which was formed 
between the free and the slave States. … A sacred compact, forsooth! I pronounce it the 
most bloody and heaven-daring arrangement ever made by men for the continuance and 
protection of a system of the most atrocious villainy ever exhibited on earth.” The failure 
of the document was the failure of its framers, who “were men, like ourselves – as 
fallible, as sinful, as weak, as ourselves.” Abolitionists such as Theodore Parker and 
Garrison found venerated prophets, apostles, politicians, and statesmen susceptible to the 
failures and foibles of human nature. In crafting the time-bound Constitution, such 
imperfect men undercut the timeless Declaration, trampling “beneath their feet their own 
solemn and heaven-attested declaration, that all men are created equal, and endowed by 
their Creator with certain inalienable rights.” The flawed and sinful nature of the compact 
removed its power to demand present or future adherence. “They had no lawful power to 
bind themselves, or their posterity, for one hour – for one moment – by such an unholy 
alliance. It was not valid then – it is not valid now.”102 Though “dripping … with human 
blood,” Garrison still argued that the Constitution gave Congress power to restrict slavery 
in the territories and guaranteed blacks “their liberty and rights of citizenship,” but when 
this antislavery potential of the nation’s supreme legal text failed to bear fruit, his public 
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condemnation of the Constitution gained traction.103 As outlined below, this depended, in 
part at least, on the publication of Revolutionary era sources that uncovered slavery’s 
dark presence at the nation’s founding.  
 
 
“The Principle of the Declaration Was Embodied in the Constitution”: Madison’s 
Papers and the Articulation of Moderate Antislavery Constitutionalism 
Following the founding of the AASS, antislavery constitutionalism evolved, 
expanded, and diverged in the 1830s and 1840s, finding voice in two broad groups, the 
radical and the moderate constitutionalists, whose ideas overlapped at times. Opposed to 
Garrisonian nonresistance and disunionism, both of these groups found political 
embodiment in the form of the Liberty Party in 1840. Differences among its members led 
to the party’s dissolution in 1845, and some of the dislocated moderates soon found a 
place in the more prominent Free Soil Party (1848) and, later, in the more influential 
Republican Party (1854). This group had powerful proponents in politicians such as 
Salmon P. Chase and William Seward. Moderates held that freedom was national and 
slavery local, conceding that abolition was up to the states, but holding that the federal 
government could not protect slavery or expand its reach.104 The more radical members 
of the defunct Liberty Party formed the Liberty League in 1847, the first of a number of 
short-lived political parties that served as a platform for radical constitutionalists. Figures 
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such as Alvan Stewart, William Goodell, Lysander Spooner, and Gerrit Smith articulated 
the radical position, advancing the idea that the Constitution itself opposed slavery.105 Far 
from dismissing the Constitution as an outdated legal creed, antislavery constitutionalists 
continued to pay allegiance to the nation’s supreme legal text, but their constitutional 
approaches still drew attention to historical change and distance. 
The radical and moderate constitutional positions obtained their most public 
hearing at different points, but each of them received clear articulation in the early 1840s, 
following the publication of The Papers of James Madison (1840).106 The publication 
might be interpreted as a nation’s attempt to recover the words and deeds of a founding 
generation now gone. The passing of time, and of generations, created a desire for 
primary sources like Madison’s papers, the publication of which contributed to the 
growing emphasis on the need for, or, in some cases, a stress on the irrelevance of, 
circumstantial and contextual interpretations of the Constitution. Regardless of how one 
valued such readings, debates about their merits spoke to the reality and fear of the fact 
that historical change and difference divided the founding past from the present. 
Madison’s published papers complicated efforts to read the Constitution as an 
antislavery text. As some antislavery biblical interpreters conceded slavery’s existence in 
the Bible, even in the New Testament, some moderate antislavery constitutionalists 
acknowledged its presence in the Constitution. But, as with the antislavery biblical 
interpreters, they also located antislavery sentiment in the chosen founding era. They also 
observed that, due to unforeseen economic developments, slavery’s hold on the nation 
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increased in spite of the framers’ egalitarian expectations. Even when antislavery 
constitutionalists like Goodell and Spooner rejected historical sources as superfluous to 
constitutional interpretation—which only highlighted slavery’s place in the founding era 
context—they also found antislavery expectations among the framers, which they 
believed the corrupting influence of slavery had betrayed. In other words, as in the 
biblical debate, antislavery interpreters asserted that the issue was not whether or not 
slavery existed in the favored past, many conceded that it did, but whether or not the 
favored past’s prominent figures intended that the institution endure into the future. Even 
antislavery narratives that professed allegiance to the Constitution, then, could 
demonstrate how different the Revolutionary past was from the present in asserting that 
the time had arrived to fulfill the expectations of the framers, despite the anachronistic 
presence of the Slave Power. 
In the wake of Madison’s death on June 28, 1836, President Andrew Jackson 
asked Congress to demonstrate their respect to the nation’s illustrious founder, to which 
its members responded with a number of resolutions, including one to accept Dolly 
Madison’s request to assist in the publication of her husband’s writings about the 
Congress of the Confederation and the Constitutional Convention. On November 15, 
1836, the prominent widow wrote to Jackson, informing him of the provision in her 
husband’s will, wherein he had written, in reference to the Convention, “it is not an 
unreasonable inference that a careful and extended report of the proceedings and 
discussions of that body, which were with closed doors, by a member who was constant 
in his attendance, will be particularly gratifying to the people of the United States.”107 In 
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light of such statements, Dolly proposed that “however prevailing the restraint which 
veiled … this record of the creation of our Constitution, the grave which has closed over 
all those who participated in its formation, has separated their acts from all that is 
personal to him or to them.”108 Madison and his fellow founders might have been 
uncomfortable with the level of scrutiny that would accompany the publication of such 
works, but Madison recognized that, as Jackson put it, such writings “cannot fail … to 
confer … accurate knowledge of the principles of their Government, and the 
circumstances under which they were recommended and embodied in the constitution, for 
adoption.”109 In the congressional discussions relative to the publication of Madison’s 
papers, Senator Ashur Robbins of Rhode Island declared that “those who think (if any 
think) that the result itself, namely the Constitution … will be enough for the instruction 
of mankind on this subject are much mistaken.”110 The Boston Recorder agreed. 
Celebrating the publication, the paper asserted that “the exact and authentic information 
which they furnish of the feelings, the motives and the words of the illustrious men of 
those times, is becoming, if possible, more and more valuable with the lapse of each 
successive year. The further we recede from the birth of the constitution,” the paper 
stated, “the more precious do contemporary expositions of it become.”111  
Most used the occasion to champion the founders and cherish their works. After 
hearing Jackson’s letter informing Congress of Madison’s death, Senator William Rives 
of Virginia praised the departed as “the founder and author of that glorious Constitution 
which is the bond of our union and the charter of our liberties; and it was graciously 
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vouchsafed to him,” Rives continued, “in the order of Providence, to witness for a longer 
period than any of his illustrious colleagues, the rich blessings which have resulted from 
its establishment. He was the last surviving signer of that sacred instrument.” The deaths 
of prominent figures often inspire their sacralization, but the passing of a generation can 
also induce anxious attempts to reclaim their past deeds and words through historical 
research and reasoning. This was especially true of the founding generation. Such 
scrutiny, however, could undermine filiopietistic veneration. If Madison’s death served to 
“canonize the works of his hands, and surround, with a new veneration, that precious 
relic of the wisdom of our departed patriots and sages,” the crisis over slavery 
demonstrated that no founders and no founding texts remained beyond reproach.112 
The Madison papers spurred criticism of the founders even among moderate 
constitutionalists. In 1836, James Birney, who ran for president twice on the Liberty 
Party ticket, once in 1840 and again in 1844, established Cincinnati’s Philanthropist. He 
served as its editor before turning those duties over to Gamaliel Bailey in 1837. Like 
Theodore Weld, Bailey had become an ardent abolitionist through the Lane Seminary 
debates in February of 1834. Seven years later, in February of 1841, the Philanthropist, 
while under Bailey’s editorship, ran an article that drew on Madison’s papers. It cited the 
slave trade and fugitive slave clauses, among others, as “designed to secure Southern 
interests.” Casting the Constitution as a “shameful bargain between the Northern and 
Southern states,” the author noted that “in the Madison papers, the details of this dark 
transaction are given at length.” While noting that “we have been taught to venerate the 
character of the framers of the federal constitution,” the writer admonished readers “to 
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discriminate in bestowing our respect.” The article pointed out that Virginians Madison, 
George Mason and Edmund Randolph had opposed the slave trade and emphasized that 
Madison “thought it WRONG TO ADMIT IN THE CONSTITUTION THE IDEA 
THAT THERE COULD BE PROPERTY IN MEN.” However, the author concluded that 
the accursed compromising spirit dominated then just as it did now—“Like parents, like 
children.”113 Historical evidence in the form of Madison’s papers qualified this reader’s 
view of the framers and threatened to bolster the ranks of those attacking the 
compromised Constitution. 
In January of 1843, the Philanthropist published an article that better represented 
moderate constitutionalism. In outlining the Liberty Party’s central tenets, this article 
offered a radically different perspective of the founding. In a call for Liberty Party 
support, the author outlined the party position, “in favor of free-labor, impartial liberty, 
and a right construction of the Constitution.” In a moment of political passion and a surge 
of patriotic fervor, the author collapsed historical distance and conflated temporal 
distinction in fusing the Liberty Party with the Revolutionary party: “We proclaim no 
new doctrine—we desire to form no new party. We reiterate the doctrines of our fathers. 
We wish to revive the old Liberty party of the times that tried men’s souls. We stand 
where Hancock, Jefferson and other old patriots stood in 1776, when … they proclaimed 
to all nations the great truths of humanity and freedom.” Without missing a beat, the 
writer vindicated the founders even while slighting the Slave Power:  
They did not attempt, by subtle argumentation, to prove that slavery is the 
foundation of civil liberty.—They did not torture the pages of Inspiration itself 
into seeming sanction of that stupendous and criminal solecism, that man can hold 
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property in man; they did not stultify, by any miserable limitation or exception, 
their grand and comprehensive declaration that ‘all men are created equal,’—that 
liberty is the inalienable, God-given right of every human being. They inscribed 
this declaration on their banners when they went into conflict for Independence. 
To maintain it, they poured out their generous blood like water. To establish it, 
they endured all the trials of that protracted and doubtful struggle, until God gave 
victory to the right.   
 
Rather than provide a close contextual reading—though mentioning Madison, the author 
did not cite his published papers—the article called attention to a lack of specific words 
and emphasized the presence of egalitarian ideas and martial deeds. The paper’s 
antislavery portrayal of the founding era came, in part at least, as a reaction to the 
proslavery interpretation of the Bible and the Constitution. In this response, the author 
made a case for historical declension from both the biblical and Revolutionary eras, 
faulting the Slave Power for slavery’s and unexpectedly secure presence in the 
nineteenth-century republic.114 
 In characteristic fashion, the moderate author used the Declaration as a lens to rad 
the Constitution, asserting that “when our National Independence was achieved, the 
principle of the declaration was embodied in the Constitution.” The article conceded that 
“the framers of the Constitution did not attempt to put an end to slavery in the states 
where it existed” and “incorporated into the Constitution, some provisions, such as the 
fugitive slave clause and the three-fifths rule, which experience has shewn to be 
subversive of justice and liberty. But,” the writer emphasized, “they did not nationalize 
slavery.” Rather than grant Congress “power to establish or continue slavery anywhere. 
… the Constitution expressly denies any such power.” Instead, the author continued, the 
states maintained “this system, in opposition to the principles of the Declaration and of 
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the Constitution and in violation of the plain precepts of Revelation.” The moderates did 
not allow the Garrisonians to lay sole claim to either the Bible or the Declaration, and 
faulted the states for failing to realize their egalitarian promises. Indeed, the author 
posited that the founders—citing Washington, Jefferson, and Madison—had anticipated 
that fulfillment. “It was confidently expected that the states … would speedily and 
voluntarily abandon [slavery], when the clause in the Constitution, having reference to it 
as existing under state authority, would become inoperative, while the sacred instrument 
itself would still remain a perfect and consistent expression of the National Will, 
breathing only the spirit of justice and human liberty.” The author believed that the 
farmers had thought historically in believed that the fruition of their founding prospects 
would cleanse the Constitution of its sinful features. Defiantly, the writer asserted that 
these “sayings of Revolutionary Fathers” proved “beyond all controversy,” that “the 
understanding of our ancestors, at the time of the formation of the Constitution” was “that 
slavery should be gradually and, speedily abolished by state authority.” Without ceding 
the proslavery reading, the author granted that the Constitution contained proslavery 
provisions, before positing an original expectation that time would wash them away.115 
The article asserted continuity between the Revolutionaries’ and the Liberty Party’s 
ideals, but in referencing an expectation of slavery’s abolition, it also asserted the 
importance of change. The change the author found, though, contradicted the antislavery 
expectations.  
 Had those expectations been realized? “Let History answer!” the author boomed, 
recalling the previous mention of “experience.” Citing concessions, including slavery’s 
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presence in the District of Columbia and the lands obtained through the Louisiana 
Purchase and the Adams-Onís Treaty, the writer issued a challenge: “Let any man 
examine the history of our government, especially since the overthrow of the friends of 
Liberty in the Missouri struggle, and he will be astonished to find how exactly the 
national policy has conformed to the interests of the slave-holder.” Though failing to 
provide a contextual antislavery interpretation of the Constitution, the author offered a 
historical narration of proslavery consolidation. In this article, rather than illuminate the 
founding period, history showed declension since that time. Consistent retrogression was 
made clear by the fact that “of the Presidents, the slaveholding States, have furnished SIX 
occupying the Presidential Chair FOR FORTY YEARS” and “a majority of the Judges of the 
Supreme Court are slave-holders.” Indeed, the author argued, “All the Departments of the 
Government are in the hands of the slave power, and are all opposed to the progress of 
Liberty principles.” The Liberty Party faced an uphill battle, but, in contrast to Garrison, 
believed that the present struggle was “not greater than our Fathers surmounted.”116  
Finding corrosive change in the rise of the Slave Power, which redirected the 
founders’ intended trajectory of historical development by exploiting the Constitution’s 
proslavery provisions rather than allowing the organic growth of the antislavery spirit, the 
author closed with another appeal to the Revolutionary heritage: “We shall prove 
ourselves degenerate sons of the patriots of 1776, if we were not readily to enter into a 
second contest for the same great principles with courage and determination like theirs.” 
Aiming to “vindicate the reputation of our fathers by delivering the government … from 
the corruptions fashioned upon it by slavery” and “make it what our fathers designed it to 
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be, a free government,” the article concluded with a broad national appeal. “We wish to 
rally an American party upon American principles—the principles of 1776 and 1787. We 
desire to vindicate the true construction of the Constitution, and to make the government 
conform to the Constitution.”117 While some proslavery biblical interpreters who found 
corruption in abolitionism imposed a proslavery stance on Paul and even posited the 
apostles’ continued support, some antislavery constitutional interpreters who located 
corruption in the Slave Power saw themselves as the rightful legates of founders like 
Madison and believed in their continued support—“we have the example and spirits of 
our fathers on our side.” Both narratives cultivated awareness of historical change, in the 
form of rising abolitionism and an emerging Slave Power, respectively.  
To be sure, when antislavery constitutionalists posited continuity between their 
ideas and those of the founding generation, it tended to conflate historical difference and 
collapse temporal distance. But their historical appeals did not always represent a naïve 
desire to recreate a pure past. Granting slavery’s presence at the founding and expressing 
a belief in the framers’ original expectations that time would make slavery obsolete 
exposed the foreignness of that past. And while proslavery consolidation might 
complicate that characterization, antislavery interpreters simply observed that the rise of 
the Slave Power was a lamentable anachronistic development. The belief in the framers’ 
original expectations, and the stark contrast antislavery observers found between those 
expectations and the prominence of the Slave Power in the present, further signaled the 
historical distance separating Americans from their founding.118  
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“Rules the Historian … Out of the Witness Box”: Madison’s Papers and William 
Goodell’s Articulation of Radical Antislavery Constitutionalism 
A similar belief emerged among the more radical constitutionalists. While Bailey 
and politicians like Chase remained moderate in their antislavery constitutionalism, in the 
mid to late 1840s, Birney, and abolitionists such as Stewart and Goodell, adopted more 
radical positions. Radical constitutionalism found its clearest expression in two 
publications—Goodell’s Views of American Constitutional Law (1844) and Spooner’s 
The Unconstitutionality of Slavery (1845). Drawing on previous arguments, including 
Stewart’s, the authors of these works variously appealed to the due process, privileges 
and immunities, habeas corpus, and the guarantee clauses—which they read in light of 
the Declaration—while contending that the broad wording of the central clauses often 
portrayed as proslavery—including the three-fifths, importation, labor, insurrection and 
domestic violence clauses—demanded alternative readings.119 While Garrison used the 
Declaration to justify a moral revolution aimed at convincing hearts and minds of the 
need to immediately abolish slavery, these interpreters joined with their moderate 
counterparts in using its egalitarian principles as a lens through which to read the 
Constitution as an antislavery text. And even if they dismissed historical evidence as 
extraneous, preferring instead to focus on the Constitution’s words alone, Goodell and 
Spooner also made historical arguments to uncover antislavery sentiment in the founding 
era and to posit that the perversion of constitutional interpretation hid the framers’ 
expectations that the Constitution would eventually bring about slavery’s demise. Their 
wariness of contextual interpretation, along with their historical narrations of pre- and 
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post-founding era developments, contributed to a greater realization that one could not, 
nor would one want to, make the traditional assumption of an easy transference of ideas 
and beliefs from the Revolutionary past to the present. 
Also a newspaper man, William Goodell had served as a leading temperance 
reformer and had been involved in the founding of the New-York Anti-Slavery Society 
and the AASS. He had helped form the Liberty Party in 1840 and in 1842 he turned his 
attention to church reform along abolitionist lines. He opened his 1844 publication with 
an appeal not to the “Blackstones and the Manfields of America,” but to “the public 
voice,” to “the people … the divinely appointed arbiters of their own destinies … not the 
framers, nor yet the arbiters of those original laws, immutable and eternal.”120 As Albert 
Barnes had asserted the right of the public to interpret the Bible, Goodell placed his faith 
in the public to sanction or condemn constitutional interpretation. This position paralleled 
the conventional belief in common sense readings of the Bible. Though such approaches 
were at times dismissive of using extra-textual sources in interpretation, historical 
argumentation, once reserved for experts, found its way into non-expert settings. The 
popular constitutionalisms that emerged during this period accepted and engaged the 
historical nature of debates about slavery’s constitutionality. The very appeal to the 
public, however hopeful, was symptomatic of the belief that slavery could not keep pace 
with the spirit of the times.  
From the outset, Goodell made clear his interest in a historical examination of the 
issue, valuing appeals to the spirit of the Constitution over strict construction, and writing 
of proslavery interpreters that, “beyond the Constitution of 1787-9 and the attendant 
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circumstances of its formation and adoption, the claimants are not accustomed to 
adventure.” He observed neglect of the Articles of Confederation, the Declaration of 
Independence, the principles of common law, and what he called the “unwritten 
Constitution.”121 Still, Goodell preferred a strict construction. Referring to Article II, 
Section 4, which states that “no Person held to Service or Labour in One State, under the 
Laws thereof, escaping into another … shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to 
whom such Service or Labour may be due,” Goodell asked, “Who, unacquainted with the 
facts that have taken place, with the past and daily passing history of this country, would 
ever have conceived that these words described the case of a fugitive slave, and required 
his delivery to the slaveholder?” “No one!” he protested. Proper construction “rules the 
Historian … out of the witness box.”122 Goodell argued that a focus on the words of the 
three-fifths, importation, insurrection, and domestic violence clauses purged them of their 
assumed proslavery protections, while a similar focus upheld antislavery interpretations 
of the clauses on congressional power and due process. Here, he also cited Madison to 
posit the incongruence between slavery and the guarantee clause, writing that, “The 
meaning of ‘a republican form of government’ in this country, in 1789, is sufficiently 
ascertained.”123 
In turning to an approach focused on the spirit of the Constitution, Goodell upheld 
words as important, but stressed that they should be read in light of the spirit of the 
Constitution, revealed in “external evidences,” which included the “spirit, design or 
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intentions” of the framers and the ratifiers.124 Goodell valued the intentions of the latter 
over those of the former, writing that “what the Convention of 1787, or a portion of it, 
intended to effect by the Constitution, is not to be confounded with the designs, especially 
the paramount object of THE PEOPLE who adopted it. The objects of the Convention, or 
members of it, may deserve our attention, and their testimony to the spirit of their times, 
may command respect. But their intentions are not to be substituted for the intentions of 
THE PEOPLE.”125 This valuation, which supported Goodell’s call for a popular 
constitutionalism, followed Madison’s singular direction in 1796 to discover the “voice 
of the people” in examining the ratification debates even as it downplayed the importance 
of Madison’s papers, which did not show up in Goodell’s bibliography.126 He positioned 
the sacred legal text itself against slavery, in large part through an assertion that “the 
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‘spirit of the Constitution’ is identical with the spirit of the Common Law.” Binding 
American common law to a narrow reading of British common law, and to a broad 
reading of the Somerset decision in particular, he argued that “to say that there can be 
constitutional slavery in the United States … is the same thing as to say, that there is 
Common Law slavery, in the United States; an absurdity that, in its own proper form, no 
sane man, perhaps, has ever yet been found to utter.”127 Goodell’s legal contention rested 
on a historical argument positing continuity between the Constitution and common law.  
In turning from the Constitution itself to an exploration of “its earlier days, in its 
origins, its birth-place, its parentage, its nursing and swaddling,” Goodell called on what 
he later labeled “incontrovertible historical facts” to recover the “‘SPIRIT OF SEVENTY-
SIX!”128 Similar to moderate readings, some radicals stitched the nation’s two founding 
documents together, but Goodell also bound the Declaration to what he referred to as the 
“ANTI-SLAVERY ‘SPIRIT OF THE AGE’ in which the Federal Constitution was 
framed and adopted.”129 He wrote that the Declaration used “not only the language of the 
Common Law, but the language, likewise—almost to plagiarism—of the popular and 
widely current anti-slavery literature of those times.”130 Again citing proslavery neglect 
of the Declaration, Goodell used it to write of “the claims of LIBERTY and 
EMANCIPATION,” that “they are of older date, and gain in freshness and vigor the farther 
they are traced.”131 Unlike in the biblical debate, antislavery interpreters often focused on 
the older of the two canonical documents, a less problematic choice given the short time 
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frame that separated them. Furthermore, the Declaration, like the New Testament, was a 
relatively succinct statement of principles while the Constitution, like the Old Testament, 
set forth in greater details specific legal provisions. Antislavery interpreters found the 
former texts less limiting and more supportive of their arguments for freedom. Making a 
case for continuity, Goodell imposed constitutional status on the Declaration, writing that 
“the fundamental basis and groundwork of AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, remains 
unchanged, and in full force” since the Declaration’s signing.132 The Constitution, then, 
served as “the more outward form, the minutely detailed provisions … the instruments, of 
which [the Declaration’s] principles are the living spirit and substance.”133 Because the 
Constitution came soon after the Declaration, Goodell could posit congruence between 
spirit and principles. Consequently, he concluded that there had been “no legal slavery in 
the United States, since the 4th of July, 1776.”134 As proslavery interpreters bound the 
Testaments together to argue for southern slavery’s divine justification, so antislavery 
interpreters tied the Declaration and the Constitution together to argue against southern 
slavery’s legality. Goodell wrote that “our Declaration of Independence and the 
Constitution of 1787-9 taken as members of each other, considered as a whole, and 
construed by its spirit, constitute a creditable statement of Constitutional Law, and even 
without the amendments of which they are susceptible, are amply sufficient in their 
provisions, for either the legislative or judicial abolition of slavery.”135 Making mention 
of the amendment process, Goodell maintained that historical facts attested to the 
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antislavery nature of the Constitution and to its inherent power to cleanse the national 
stain. 
Goodell’s argument centered on reading the Constitution in light of what he 
perceived as antislavery common law and an antislavery Declaration, but like the 
moderates, he also made mention of the framers’ expectations. In the midst of his 
discussion about the antislavery sentiment of the founding era, he compiled “a list 
including the most prominent statesmen of the South as well as the North, proclaiming 
before the sun, that SLAVERY was a fast waning system, that must speedily fall.”136 
Goodell cited a host of founders, including Madison, Jefferson, Rush, Hamilton, 
Franklin, and Jay, to posit an original expectation that slavery was on the road to 
extinction. Both moderate and radical antislavery constitutionalists read the founding 
American past as a number of antislavery biblical interpreters read the primitive Christian 
past: the founders worked to secure slavery’s demise and believed that the cultivation and 
spread of egalitarian principles would realize that expectation. In both scenarios, the 
emphasis on original expectations of abolition highlighted the reality of slavery’s 
presence in the biblical and Revolutionary pasts, which, for its opponents, signaled that 
the favored pasts were not golden ages to reclaim but troubled eras with universal 
promises to fulfill. And, in their view, the failure of fulfillment was attributable to the 
unexpected and anachronistic rise of the Slave Power. The founding era remained a 
usable past, but not in terms of recreation but of realizing its hopes and expectations. 
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“No Extraneous or Historical Evidence Shall Be Admitted”: Madison’s Papers and the 
Lysander Spooner’s Articulation of Radical Antislavery Constitutionalism 
Massachusetts man Lysander Spooner had left his career as a lawyer, which he 
began in defiance of the state regulation that required non-graduates to study with 
attorneys for a period of five years before setting up a practice, and had begun a new 
career in mail delivery in violation of federal statutes against private mail delivery 
services. In his 1845 publication, the radical provided a similar argument to Goodell’s, 
though where Goodell had read the Constitution in the light of the Declaration and 
common law, Spooner read the Constitution in the light of the Declaration and natural 
law. Insisting that there was “no law but natural law,” he proclaimed American slavery’s 
illegality, writing that slavery “has always been a mere abuse, sustained, in the first 
instance, merely by the common consent of the strongest party, without any law on the 
subject.”137 Though he later dismissed historical evidence as inadmissible in 
constitutional interpretation, Spooner’s reading depended on a historical narrative tracing 
slavery’s unconstitutionality from the colonial period through the Revolutionary era to 
the present. As some antislavery biblical interpreters argued that slavery’s existence in 
the Bible did not signify divine sanction, so Spooner stated that “the fact, that slavery was 
tolerated in the colonies, is no evidence of its legality.”138 Appealing to Somerset, he 
argued, “That decision … settled the law both for England and the colonies. And if so, 
there was no constitutional slavery in the colonies up to the time of the revolution.”139 
Bringing his narrative up to 1776, Spooner, as with Goodell, proposed that “the 
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Declaration,” which established self-evident egalitarian truths, “was certainly the 
constitutional law of this country for certain purposes.”140 Continuing his account, he 
contended that neither the Articles of Confederation nor the state constitutions of 1789 
“established, or recognized slavery,” and proposed that state constitutional 
endorsements—“inserted, by amendment, since the adoption of the constitution of the 
United States”—resulted from corrupt deviations.141 Spooner valued what he understood 
as the continuous unconstitutionality of slavery, and discountenanced what he viewed as 
post-founding era constitutional corruptions.   
While resting his argument on a broad historical narrative, Spooner’s discussion 
of the Constitution itself, much more than Goodell’s, challenged the use of historical 
information in interpretation. While Goodell saw some value in intent, Spooner dismissed 
as “of no consequence what recognition or sanction the constitution of the United States 
may have intended to extend to [slavery].”142 The appeal to intent, in Spooner’s opinion, 
made it clear that proslavery interpreters felt insecure in their use of the Constitution 
alone, which did not include such terms as slave or slavery. Unlike Barnes, who signaled 
that the mere appearance of certain words in the Old Testament did not signify the 
presence, much less the sanction, of a particular practice, Spooner stressed that the lack 
of certain words in the Constitution attested to its absence. He introduced a distinction 
between the intent of the framers and the Constitution itself, writing of proslavery 
interpreters who, “by the aid of exterior, circumstantial and historical evidence … attempt 
to enforce upon the mind the conclusion that, as matter of fact, such was the intention of 
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those who drafted the constitution; and thence they finally infer that such was the 
intention of the constitution itself.”143 Critiquing what he viewed as the manipulation of 
historical evidence, Spooner argued that one could only gauge intent via “the legal 
meaning of the words of an instrument.”144 In seeming alignment with the prevailing 
common sense biblical hermeneutic, he narrowed the discussion to the “words alone of 
the constitution.”145 Instead of following the conventional rules of interpretation, wherein 
a contextual reading overruled a straightforward one when a word or phrase held more 
than one meaning, Spooner measured possible meanings against natural law, writing that 
“no extraneous or historical evidence shall be admitted to fix upon a statute an unjust or 
immoral meaning, when the words themselves of the act are susceptible of an innocent 
one.”146 Similar to Theodore Parker’s sense that historical facts taught but did not 
embody eternal truths, Spooner held that historical evidence could uphold but not 
contradict natural law. Under these rules, he wrote of the labor, three-fifths, importation, 
and domestic violence clauses as Goodell had of the labor clause alone: “no one would 
have ever dreamed that either of these clauses alone, or that all of them together, 
contained so much as an allusion to slavery, had it not been for circumstances extraneous 
to the constitution itself.”147 Again, Spooner believed that proslavery interpreters had 
used historical evidence to twist the Constitution’s straightforward antislavery meanings. 
Turning to provisions for freedom, he argued that states could not withhold federal 
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citizenship from those capable of becoming citizens, including blacks, and cited habeas 
corpus and the guarantee clause in favor of freedom.148  
 To drive home his point about the nuisance of historical evidence, Spooner 
distinguished between “the intentions of the framers” which “have nothing to do with 
fixing the legal meaning of the constitution” and “the intentions of the people at large” 
which “are the only ones, that are of any importance to be regarded in determining the 
legal meaning of that instrument.”149 Like Goodell, he believed that while the original 
understandings of the ratifiers trumped the original intent of the framers, the original 
meanings of the document were most important. In dealing with uses of Madison’s 
papers, in particular, Spooner asked, “why do the partizans of slavery resort to the 
debates of the convention for evidence that the constitution sanctions slavery? Plainly,” 
he answered, “for no other reason than because the words of the instrument do not 
sanction it.” In opposition to what was quickly becoming the officially endorsed position 
that the original intent of the framers mattered most in constitutional interpretation, he 
proposed that “no evidence of their intentions, at that time, is applicable to the case.”150 
Depicting the framers as “the mere scriveners of the constitution,” he wrote that “their 
individual purposes, opinions or expressions, then uttered in secret cabal, though now 
revealed, can no more be evidence of the intentions of the people who adopted the 
constitution, than the secret opinions or expressions of the scriveners of any other 
contract can be offered to prove the intentions of the true parties to such contract.”151 The 
value of the framers’ intent depended on their alignment with the people’s intent, and “if 
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the instrument had contained any tangible sanction of slavery, the people would sooner 
have had it burned by the hands of the common hangman, than they would have adopted 
it.”152 Despite this equation, Spooner thought that it amounted to little in terms of 
determinative legal principles: “whether such were really the intention of the convention, 
or the people, is, at least a matter of conjecture and history, and not of law.”153 As in 
biblical debates, interpreters highlighted the conjectural nature of historical research to 
advance their positions. After all, Spooner argued, “No two of the members of the 
convention would probably have agreed in their representations of what the constitution 
really was. No two of the people would have agreed in their understanding of the 
constitution when they adopted it.”154 Spooner undermined the assumption of consensus 
among the founding generation to prize the words of the Constitution alone in 
interpretation. In his opinion, historical discussions about the founding era unnecessarily 
complicated otherwise straightforward legal issues. This contention drew attention to 
historical distance as it brought to mind the distinct context within which the framers’ 
crafted the Constitution. 
 Despite his contention that attention to historical context obfuscated rather than 
illuminated constitutional meaning, Spooner crafted a historical argument in labeling 
developments since the founding era as distractions. Dismissing governmental practice as 
irrelevant in unearthing original meaning, he wrote that “it is of no consequence … what 
meaning the government have placed upon the instrument; but only what meaning they 
were bound to place upon it from the beginning.” Spooner covered all his bases. 
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Discounting contextual interpretation meant to reveal the framers’ intentions and 
historical narratives aimed at illuminating governmental use, he sought to recover 
original antislavery meanings: “Such was the character of the constitution when it was 
offered to the people, and before it was adopted. And if such was its character then, such 
is its character still. It cannot have been changed by all the errors and perversions, 
intentional or unintentional, of which the government may have since been guilty.”155 
Spooner valued continuity if it corresponded with his sense of natural law, which, for 
him, was intrinsically antislavery, and condemned continuous practice that deviated from 
that sense. He thus proposed that despite developments which suggested the contrary, the 
Constitution was “designed to destroy slavery,” an “arbitrary institution,” “whenever its 
principles should be carried into full effect.”156 While dismissing contextual readings, 
Spooner used historical argumentation to posit the Constitution’s original antislavery 
nature, which inherently worked to bring about slavery’s abolition. 
 Both moderate and radical constitutionalists contended that unfortunate 
developments since the founding had derailed the nation from the course toward abolition 
that the founders had traced in the Constitution. Some moderates, like Gamaliel Bailey, 
proposed that although it contained proslavery provisions, the Constitution’s creators 
expected that its general ideas would bring about slavery’s end, an expectation that the 
slave states had aborted. Radicals Goodell and Spooner argued that Constitution 
articulated the antislavery principles of common law or natural law, respectively, and 
implemented the antislavery sentiments of the Declaration and the spirit of the 
Revolutionary age. Although they differed in their approach to historical evidence, most 
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antislavery readers offered historical accounts that made the historical link between the 
Declaration and the Constitution. They insisted that the founding canon contained 
universal egalitarian principles and staked their claim to the Revolutionary heritage. Such 
efforts seemed to partake of a traditional proclivity to collapse the time separating a 
virtuous past from a corrupted present. However, their tales of declension did not demand 
a return to a Revolutionary pure period. When moderates acknowledged the 
Constitution’s proslavery provisions and when radicals criticized the interpretive use of 
historical sources, it suggested that the founding era was a time to learn from rather than 
live in. And in positing the original expectation of slavery’s demise, while also tracing 
the unexpected rise of a Slave Power out of step with the current era, these readings 
honored a past that anticipated change, and thus highlighted historical distance.  
 
“These Pages Prove the Melancholy Fact”: Madison’s Papers and the Constitution as a 
Proslavery Compact 
In the mid-1840s, Garrisonian Wendell Phillips dismissed these antislavery 
readings of the Constitution and used Madison’s papers to do it. William Lloyd 
Garrison’s anti-constitutionalism had developed in relation to his perfectionism, 
nonresistance, and disunionism, positions adopted and advanced in the late 1830s and 
early 1840s.157 The publication of Madison’s papers in 1840 buttressed his anti-
constitutional position. The writings of the principal author of the Constitution facilitated 
the Garrisonian emphasis on contextual interpretation, an approach that lent credence to 
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their proslavery readings of the Constitution and undermined the claims of their 
antislavery constitutionalist counterparts.158 In short, Madison’s papers assisted Wendell 
Phillips in his attempt to damn the Constitution as a proslavery compact conceived in a 
time since past and by men now dead.159  
Phillips was also from Massachusetts and also had a career as a lawyer. 
Awakened by one mob’s unsuccessful attempt to lynch Garrison and another’s murder of 
Elijah Lovejoy, Phillips had left aside his lawyering to sound the call for abolition and 
disunion. In 1845, he published The Constitution a Proslavery Compact: Or, Selections 
from the Madison Papers, which provided extracts from “the [the ratification] Debates on 
those clauses of the Constitution which relate to slavery,” along with other related 
documents.160 These sources demonstrated, according to Phillips, that the Constitution 
granted “the slaveholder distinct privileges and protection for his slave property, in return 
for certain commercial concessions on his part toward the North,” and that “the Nation at 
large were fully aware of this bargain at the time, and entered into it willingly and with 
open eyes.”161 He drew attention to the three-fifths, militia, slave trade, fugitive slave, 
and the guarantee clauses, and, in clear contrast to Spooner, wrote that “if indeed they 
were ambiguous in their terms, a resort to the history of those times would set the matter 
at rest forever.”162 While Spooner thought that the use of historical information in 
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constitutional interpretation led to inconclusive findings, Phillips believed that a 
historical explication proved determinative.  
Phillips aimed to correct those “few persons … of late years,” who, “to serve the 
purposes of a party, have tried to prove that the Constitution makes no compromise with 
slavery.”163 Believing that such individuals, which undoubtedly included Goodell and 
Spooner, had shut their eyes to the “clear light of history,” Phillips asked, “if the 
unanimous, concurrent, unbroken practice of every department of the Government, 
judicial, legislative, and executive, and the acquiescence of the whole people for fifty 
years do not prove which is the true construction, then how and where can such a 
question ever be settled?”164 Rather than dismiss the government’s proslavery 
interpretations and uses as deviations from antislavery original meanings, Phillips 
spotlighted them to demonstrate the intrinsic proslavery nature of the Constitution. 
Believing that such an approach yielded the right interpretation, “It follows,” he resolved, 
“that at this time and for the last half century, the Constitution of the United States has 
been, and still is, a pro-slavery instrument.” Continuity since the founding, in 
interpretation and usage, demonstrated the legitimacy of the proslavery reading. Still, 
some “assert that that the known anti-slavery spirit of revolutionary times never could 
have consented to so infamous a bargain as the Constitution is represented to be, and has 
in its present hands become.” However, the present publication provided historical proof 
of the framers’ proslavery intentions. In Phillips’s narration, contextual explication 
buttressed the historical narration of proslavery continuity. “Now these pages prove the 
melancholy fact, that willingly, with deliberate purpose, our fathers bartered honesty for 
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gain, and became partners with tyrants, that they might share in the profits of their 
tyranny.”165 One might locate the appearance of antislavery sentiment in the founders’ 
writings, but in the context of “all that these Debates have to say on the subject,” one 
discovers “the fact, that the Constitution was meant to be, what it has always been 
esteemed, a compromise between slavery and freedom.”166 And regardless of “what the 
Constitution may become a century hence,” the fact of what “it is” required immediate 
annulment and necessitated the stance, “NO UNION WITH SLAVEHOLDERS!”167 
Phillips seemed to allow that the Constitution might become antislavery in time, but the 
current climate of affairs made that untenable at present. The times called for a complete 
legal revolution rather than constitutional evolution.168 
In 1847, Phillips followed up the publication of these selections with a lengthy 
review of Spooner’s work. Again noting prospects of a modified Constitution, he stressed 
its current status as a proslavery compact: “the Constitution will never be amended by 
persuading men that it does not need amendment.”169 Regardless of its potential, or even 
its original meaning or intent, “no one has ever denied that the Supreme Court now 
construes the Constitution in a pro-slavery sense. This, then, is the law of the land until 
altered.”170 The reliance on the Supreme Court to settle the constitutional debate 
increased among politicians during the next decade. Phillips referenced legal opinions to 
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counter appeals to natural and common law, including Somerset, arguing that “positive 
law … can,” in fact, “so establish even Slavery, that courts must treat it as legal.”171 
Based on this position, he addressed the three-fifths, fugitive slave, insurrection, and 
domestic violence clauses and grounded his interpretation in “extraneous and historical 
evidence”—the very kind of information that Spooner had railed against.172  
Despite his stated willingness to consider the Constitution without “aid from 
collateral history or national circumstances,” Phillips proceeded to contextualize.173 In 
contradistinction to Spooner, he advocated the conventional rules of interpretation, 
proposing that “words, when doubtful and ambiguous, are to be interpreted by the 
context, by the object sought, and by contemporaneous usage.”174 Citing the Federalist 
Papers and Madison’s notes, and following the examples of Justices John Marshall and 
Joseph Story, Phillips found it “evident that the understanding of the nation at the time” 
and the “history and customs of the country” helped determine “with irresistible clearness 
the meaning of the Constitution.”175 Willing to set aside the intentions of the framers and 
focus on the people in discussing the three-fifths clause, Phillips made use of the 1792 
census to evidence the clause’s relationship to slavery. He thus used historical 
information to propose that both the framers and the ratifiers understood the proslavery 
nature of the Constitution. 
In one surprising instance, Phillips’s reading of the founding era matched those of 
his interpretive opponents. He granted that the prevailing opinion of the times was that 
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the abolition of the slave trade “would ultimately put an end to Slavery,” but found “no 
evidence of any general expectation that the constitution would have any influence 
otherwise in producing such a result.”176 Rather than use such prospects to read the 
Constitution as an antislavery document, Phillips stated that “time has shown they were 
mistaken. But that mistake does not free their children from the agreements made under 
it. … The only way their sons can free themselves, is to disown their fathers’ act, the 
Constitution itself.”177 Albert Barnes had attempted to trace the gradual decline of slavery 
between the time of Moses and Christ and Spooner had aimed to outline its quick 
undoing from Mansfield to Madison. Phillips provided an alternative account, using 
historical evidence to argue that slavery was so engrained in English and colonial 
common law that it was taken for granted in the Articles of Confederation and the state 
constitutions. In a move reminiscent of liberal Christians’ antislavery biblical readings, 
which unhinged the Old from the New Testament, Phillips severed the tie between the 
corrupt Constitution and the divine Declaration, writing that “the Declaration had nothing 
to do with Slavery.”178 In constitutional as opposed to biblical debates, where separating 
the New from the Old Testament seemed to support antislavery readings, the breaking up 
of canonical texts stood to hurt rather than help the antislavery interpretation of the 
Constitution. Garrisonians seemed to suggest that historical differences made the gap 
between past and present too wide to bridge. They strove to relinquish rather than recover 
the founding era. Let the dead bury the dead. 
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In some ways, Phillips’s approach paralleled that of the antislavery 
constitutionalists even if most of his findings did not. Like them, he provided a historical 
account, but he traced slavery’s continual and overriding presence before, in, and after 
the founding era. The only change he detected was in the newfangled antislavery readings 
of the Constitution. Despite important differences between the arguments of the 
antislavery constitutionalists and those of Phillips, like them he also identified an original 
expectation of slavery’s ultimate abolition, an identification that gained prominence as an 
important piece to the antislavery constitutionalists’ puzzle. However, in contrast to 
Goodell and Spooner, Phillips privileged contextual interpretation throughout his review. 
Of the Constitution, he wrote, “It is not so much a statute as a great national event, and is 
to be interpreted not by technical rules, but by liberal reference to the history of the times, 
the circumstances which produced it, the great parties and interests represented in it, and 
the national objects it has in view.”179 At this juncture in American constitutional 
interpretation, most interpreters, with a few antislavery holdouts, agreed with Phillips’s 
premise that one needed to attend to context to rightly interpret the Constitution. Even in 
combatting Phillips’s interpretation, radical constitutionalists like Joel Tiffany strung 
together “historical fact[s]” to “rebut the historical presumption that the founders … 
would desire or even consent legally to recognize sanction, or in any manner gauranty 
[sic] slavery.”180 This development toward reading the Constitution as a historical 
production had a good chance of spreading a sense that one could not assume cultural and 
societal sameness across time. That sense further inspired either creative readings or clear 
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dismissals of the Constitution. For a time, the later approached seemed like it was on the 
ascendant among abolitionists.  
 
Conclusion 
 As in the emergence of an awareness of historical distance through antebellum 
biblical exegesis, the spread of awareness of that distance through antebellum 
constitutional interpretation was far from straightforward. However, as in the biblical 
debates, while important ideational differences separated these antislavery proponents 
from each other, all of their arguments tended to draw attention to historical distance 
from the founding era. The publication of Madison’s papers led each group to further 
articulate their constitutional understandings. Moderate constitutionalists recognized 
slavery’s presence in the Constitution, but emphasized that it existed only as a state 
institution. Radical constitutionalists denied its presence, positing that a strict reading of 
the text yielded an antislavery construction. Garrisonians responded with historical facts 
and appealed to historical figures to argue that the Constitution was a proslavery 
compact. Despite their different and at times contrasting approaches to the use of 
historical sources, each of these responses highlighted historical distance. In using or 
dismissing historical evidence, these groups historicized the Revolutionary past. 
Affirming, through historical sources, or denying, through a strict reading, slavery’s 
presence in the Constitution highlighted its place in the founding era. One can imagine 
someone like Phillips suggesting that the care that framers like Madison took to ensure 
that the words slave and slavery did not show up in the Constitution only belied the fact 
that the institution loomed large at the founding. The text’s silences spoke volumes. 
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Each of these positions also proposed, to one degree or another, that the founding 
generation had expected slavery to die out and thus implied that the founders had 
anticipated historical change. That implication, too, was complicated by the differences 
among the various arguments. Moderates and radicals read the Constitution as consistent 
with the Declaration, which allowed them to assert that the framers expected that the 
spread of egalitarian ideas would arrest and abolish unjust acts. Even Phillips cited the 
importation clause as evidence of a similar prospect. However, while the 
constitutionalists posited that the corrupting influence of the rising Slave Power had 
perverted the framers’ egalitarian expectations, Phillips found continuity in showing 
slavery’s power over the nation. Proslavery interpreters went further in arguing that the 
rise of abolitionism as a whole was the era’s most dangerous innovation, but Phillips 
attributed change to the antislavery constitutionalists, who had concocted new 
interpretations. Each of these positions conceded slavery’s presence at the founding, 
posited an expectation of change in the form of slavery’s abolition, and then identified 
corrupt change in the form of the Slave Power or irresponsible innovation in the form of 
antislavery constitutionalism. These opposing arguments about what constituted expected 
and unexpected changes spurred along an awareness of historical contingency. These 
varying interpretations also carried profound implications for the realization of historical 
distance. The constitutionalists’ attention to original expectations implied that the crucial 
issue was not determining slavery’s place in the founding era, but deciphering what the 
favored past’s founding figures expected of the institution’s future existence. They held 
that the framers had expected slavery’s demise and characterized the rise of the Slave 
Power, which had squelched those expectations, as an anachronistic development. Even 
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narratives professing allegiance to the Constitution could demonstrate how different the 
Revolutionary past was from the present. 
In 1845, the same year that Phillips published The Constitution A Proslavery 
Compact, Garrison wrote an article that demonstrated a willingness to transfer his 
constitutional approach to the Bible. He had once accepted the predominant hermeneutic 
in refusing to see the historical distance between his generation and the Bible. In 1831, 
his paper wrote of that sacred text—which he identified as God’s “Statute Book”—“It is 
immutable; the vicissitudes of time, the waves of revolution, the explosions of empires, 
cannot abrogate or change one of its acts. … It is of universal application.”181 However, 
Garrison eventually read and heard enough to know that the text he had once cherished as 
essential to the redemption of a fallen nation contained fabulous stories and outdated 
creeds. The Bible continued to inspire Garrison, but by 1845 he appreciated Thomas 
Paine’s use of reason in interpretation. The Bible was “to be examined with the same 
freedom as any other book.” Garrison rejected plenary inspiration—“To say that every 
thing contained within the lids of the Bible is divinely inspired … is to give utterance to a 
bold fiction, and to require the suspension of the reasoning faculties”—and instead 
argued that it “must stand or fall by the test of just criticism, by its reasonableness and 
utility, by the probabilities of the case, by historical confirmation, by human experience 
and observation, by the facts of science, by the intuition of the spirit.” After all, Garrison 
wrote, echoing Theodore Parker, “Truth is older than any parchment, and would still 
exist, though a universal conflagration should consume all the books in the world.” 
Dismissing the idea that the Bible was to be the people’s “master, not their servant,” 
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Garrison referenced its sanction of a host of sins, including the right “to enslave human 
beings!”182 Slavery, much more than biblical criticism or even a late reading of Paine’s 
Age of Reason, shaped Garrison’s contention that the Bible must be measured according 
to reason, historical research, and intuition. Slavery brought together constitutional and 
biblical interpretation, and rhetorical became real overlap in the responses to the Fugitive 
Slave Law.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
“THE CULTURE OF COTTON HAS HEALED ITS DEADLY WOUND”: THE 
FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW, PROSLAVERY CORRUPTION, AND THE SPREAD OF 
ANTISLAVERY READINGS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 
Moses Stuart upheld the Compromise of 1850 and its attendant Fugitive Slave 
Law through a historical explication of both the Bible and the Constitution. By this point 
in the nineteenth century, most national commentators agreed about the authoritative 
nature of appeals to the Bible and the Constitution, and most interpreters accepted the 
historical grounds of interpretation. Stuart claimed status as both authorized interpreter 
and national commentator. According to him, the founders of the Christian religion and 
the American republic, two disparate groups from distinct pasts, sanctioned the present 
law. He recovered the views of past prophets and politicians through historical 
interpretation and then collapsed temporal distinction and distance to posit their current 
relevance. Most commentators and interpreters accepted Stuart’s reasoning, but his 
studied discussion left Theodore Parker unmoved. Historical criticism had nourished his 
understanding of historical progress, allowing him to accept Stuart’s interpretation as 
historically sound before dismissing the recovered biblical teachings and constitutional 
imperatives as dated. He found errant proslavery provisions of past centuries at odds with 
the antislavery spirit he described as characteristic of the nineteenth-century present.  
This chapter describes how the Fugitive Slave Law incited responses in which 
commentators brought together decades of biblical and constitutional argumentation and 
demonstrates how the fugitive slave cases that followed turned erstwhile isolated 
theological and legal uses of favored pasts into important markers of political posture. It 
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also uses the writings and speeches of Frederick Douglass and Abraham Lincoln to trace 
the constitutionalization of the slavery issue in the 1850s, which reached its apogee in 
Dred Scott (1857). An examination of their writings shows that the new focus on slavery 
as a constitutional issue made the Revolutionary era more present than ever, but it also 
demonstrates how it carried unique potential to historicize that era. And the process of 
historicizing the most recent favored past seemed to suggest that all pasts, and indeed all 
existence, bore the marks of time. In the Compromise of 1850 and, later, in Dred Scott, 
the proslavery reading of the Constitution, as with the proslavery reading of the Bible, 
carried the day. But the argument about the founders’ expediency and original 
expectations, which gained powerful adherents, overcame that reading in the Civil War 
era. Regardless of which uses of the founding era more influential, those on both sides of 
the debates cultivated awareness of historical distance from that period. 
The use of the historical distance resulting from linked biblical and constitutional 
arguments about slavery, along with a shift of focus to the Constitution, found expression 
before the passage of the Fugitive Slave Law. In early January 1848, the New York 
Christian Inquirer demonstrated an almost Garrisonian willingness to slough off the 
nation’s supposed supreme source of legal instruction. The article in question came on 
the heels of the final major battles of the Mexican-American War in late 1847, a conflict 
that further divided antislavery and proslavery forces and focused the debate on slavery’s 
extension. It also came shortly after an unsuccessful motion to again table abolitionist 
petitions. In 1836, Congress had invoked a gag rule against such petitions as part of the 
Pinckney Resolutions. This ignited a drawn out battle against the rule, lead by the 
indefatigable John Quincy Adams, who ultimately succeeded when Congress rescinded 
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the resolution in late 1844.1 In the 1848 article, the Unitarian paper applauded Senator 
Thomas Lanier Clingman of North Carolina who, though a “thorough going pro-slavery 
man,” had cast the deciding vote “against the rule excluding abolition petitions” in a 
session of the Thirtieth Congress in late 1847.2 As in 1843, the Whig senator had been the 
only southerner who followed his hero Henry Clay in voting against tabling the 
antislavery memorials.3 The Inquirer praised Clingman as a “calm, cool, sagacious, and 
even candid reasoner,” but his vote was a function of electioneering and was rooted in a 
belief that the petitions posed no threat to slavery. While noting the “care, distinctness, 
frankness, and courtesy with which [Clingman] has treated the subject in a recent 
speech,” the Inquirer disagreed about the power of the petitions. The author wrote that 
“those who are the intelligent and conscientious foes of the institution, know that its 
consideration is its condemnation; its trial, its doom.”4 Further along in the discussion, 
the article seemed to suggest that the same might be said of the Bible and the 
Constitution. When weighed in the balance, these documents might be found wanting. 
Historical distance seemed to place them beyond the pale of present relevance.   
From the outset, the paper distanced itself from antislavery disunionists, writing 
that “we are not among those who think that the Union may not be preserved and slavery 
abolished.” It further expressed “little sympathy with those who cannot conscientiously 
employ every constitutional means to obtain the great end of emancipation, or who will 
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not patiently wait so long as they see that any progress is making towards this result.” 
While finding evidence of such progress, the author proceeded to use most of the space to 
argue that “if it be proved that slavery is constitutional, and that we have no remedy 
against it, whatsoever … and that nothing can be constitutionally done by us to arrest its 
growth, or to provide means for its diminution and utter extinction, then … is the moment 
to determine that we will cut ourselves loose from that abomination, and take the 
consequences of dissolution.” While advocating moderation, like Theodore Parker the 
paper, rather than dismiss as untenable the proslavery interpretation, proved willing to 
accept it and then leave the Constitution and the South behind.5 
A realization of the temporal distance from the founding informed this position, 
which broadened to include even the Declaration. The writer stated, “we are almost ready 
to believe with Mr. Clingman, that the framers of the Constitution did not provide, or 
intend to provide, against the spread of slavery.” If further examination demonstrated that 
the founding texts, including “the Declaration of Independence itself recognized the 
lawfulness of negro-slavery, (which of course it does not,) even then would it follow that, 
fifty years afterwards, we had no right to see our duty any more clearly than at the time 
we adopted it? If a gross inconsistency were wrought in our Constitution, have we no 
right to attempt to work it out?” The author expanded such reasoning further back in 
time. “Do we attempt to defend polygamy because it was practiced by the Patriarchs, or 
to adopt a monarchical form of government because the Gospel instructs us to honor the 
king, or to burn witches because we read, ‘though shalt not suffer a witch to live?’ Are all 
the errors and mistakes of good men to be forever maintained by those who see them to 
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be such?” In most cases, the overlap in biblical and constitutional debate was rhetorical 
rather than real and inadvertent rather than intended. Here, though, the link was clear. 
And as in antislavery readings of the New Testament, a belief in the progress of human 
insight into moral issues—“Does increased light bring with it no obligation to act up to 
its illumination?”—warranted the move to disregard the ideas of the nation’s founding 
texts.6 
Although the article referenced the ancient biblical past, it remained firmly 
focused on the recent Revolutionary era. Commentators’ increasing fixation on that 
favored past was in part a function of politics, but it also illustrated the growing belief 
that a resolution to the slavery debates rested in wrestling with the nation’s founding legal 
text. At the brink of relegating a benighted Constitution to a past fast losing its favor 
among radical abolitionists, the Inquirer proposed another solution. “We tell the South—
in our judgment, ‘Slavery is a crime.’ She returns us for answer—‘It is Constitutional.’ 
‘Very well,’ we reply, ‘suppose it is constitutional, we did not make the Constitution and 
… we have not sworn not to see its defects, not to awaken to its immoral concessions and 
compromises, not to labor to have it changed and improved!” The paper accepted that the 
Constitution was deeply compromised and seriously flawed, but instead of calling for its 
eternal abrogation, it proposed human emendation: “‘Do not tell us it is unchangeable, 
and that we shall not be permitted to remonstrate against the continuance of its sinful 
provisions. We seek to amend the Constitution. … Should we not be traitors to God did 
we allow ourselves for a moment to hesitate whether we would continue the Union 
forever upon your understanding of it—an interpretation which makes it unconstitutional 
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for us to be anything but self-convicted oppressors and man-stealers?’” The paper did not 
discuss the framers’ expectations of slavery’s eventual end or appeal to their conceptions 
that the Constitution should be amenable to change, ideas that achieved greater relevance 
over the next decade. Instead, it asserted that historical distance itself justified 
amendment. The article concluded with a demand: “It is time for Webster, and Davis, and 
Winthrop, to do something more than give sidewise blows for truth, and justice, and 
humanity.” Daniel Webster soon gave yet another sidewise blow, but, to antislavery 
proponents, it felt like it came from the enemy.7 
 
 
“It Is My Judgment That the South Is Right, and the North Is Wrong”: The Fugitive Slave 
Law and Daniel Webster on Post-Founding Era Change 
By the time Congress passed the Fugitive Slave Law as part of the Compromise 
of 1850 in September, Webster had long since pledged his support. The law gave federal 
teeth to the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, which was meant to enforce the fugitive slave 
clause by encouraging free-state authorities to assist in returning fugitive slaves to their 
slave-state masters. In opposition to a number of personal liberty laws that northern states 
had enacted in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Prigg v. Pennsylvania (1842), 
the new law strengthened the old one significantly. Whereas Prigg had opened the door 
to state legislation prohibiting the involvement of state officials, the new law imposed a 
fine system for federal marshals and local officers who failed to arrest and return fugitive 
slaves, while offering bonuses for their assistance. It also stipulated fines and 
imprisonment for those caught supporting fugitive slaves, who had no legal recourse. 
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Some northerners interpreted the new law, along with the fugitive slave cases that 
followed, as a move to nationalize slavery. The law and the subsequent cases fanned the 
flames of antislavery discontent.   
 At times, as displayed in Christian Inquirer article of January 1848, interpreters 
attended to the founding texts of Christianity and of the new republic at once, and no 
more so than in the debate over fugitive slaves at midcentury. On March 7, 1850, while 
proclaiming allegiance to union over section, Senator Daniel Webster of Massachusetts 
delivered a speech in support of the Compromise of 1850 and its attendant Fugitive Slave 
Law. On a number of occasions, including at the groundbreaking of the Bunker Hill 
Monument in 1825, the constitutional lawyer, statesman, and celebrated orator had 
advanced what scholars describe as a sectional nationalism by imposing a New England 
historical account and New England interests on the nation writ large.8 For example, in 
his Second Reply to Hayne, part of a debate resulting from the Nullification Crisis, he had 
cloaked his sectional stance in national attire, famously closing by issuing the motto: 
“Liberty and Union, now and forever, one and inseparable!”9 The opening of his Seventh 
of March speech, then, seemed typical. Expressing a desire to speak “not as a 
Massachusetts man, nor as a Northern man, but as an American,” he set out to make a 
case “for the preservation of the Union” in addressing slavery, which, given recent 
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events, required a “fresh discussion.”10 Webster, an unsuccessful Whig presidential 
candidate, proceeded to outline a position that accorded well with the reading of the 
moderate antislavery constitutionalists, who conceded slavery’s legality as a state 
institution, but stressed what they understood as federal restrictions against its spread. 
 Before entering into a constitutional discussion, Webster highlighted slavery’s 
existence during familiar historical eras, beginning with biblical times. He stated that 
“slavery has existed in the world from time immemorial” and “in the earliest periods of 
history,” specifically locating the institution “among the Jews,” the Greeks, and the 
Romans.11 Slavery and civilization were not antithetical, Webster insisted, and neither 
were slavery and Christianity. He informed his listeners that “at the introduction of 
Christianity, the Roman world was full of slaves, and I suppose there is to be found no 
injunction against that relation between man and man, in the teachings of the Gospel of 
Jesus Christ, or of any of his apostles.” Webster was cognizant of the belief among some 
northerners that “slavery … whatever may be said of it in the modifications which have 
taken place, is not in fact according to the meek spirit of the Gospel.”12 He also 
mentioned the stance of many slaveholders, noting that they “take things as they are.”13 
Webster likely had in mind the circumstantial argument that slavery’s very existence 
manifested its propriety as an institution in the American South. In contrast to antislavery 
readers of the Bible who contended that ancient allowance did not imply divine sanction, 
many slaveholders equated the institution’s endurance with providential approval. The 
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difference between these positions hinged on whether circumstances shaped and in some 
ways obscured God’s revelation and providence, or whether circumstances simply 
reflected God’s will. Believing the former, some antislavery proponents held that while 
long-term historical changes had removed obstructions to the spread of inspired 
antislavery sentiment, more recent historical changes had solidified slavery as a 
prominent southern institution.  This understanding placed great emphasis on the role of 
human actors in realizing God’s will. Webster thought that abolitionists went too far in 
this regard. Although he did not mention the antislavery New Testament argument, he 
used its logic against some of its purveyors. Citing Paul, he warned “‘that we are not to 
do evil that good may come.’”14 He found abolitionists’ “too impatient to wait for the 
slow progress of moral causes in the improvement of mankind.”15 Perhaps Christ and his 
apostles had planted the seeds of slavery’s destruction, but the harvest season had not 
arrived. One could not force fruition. 
 Proceeding to the constitutional debate, Webster considered “the state of 
sentiment, North and South, in regard to slavery, at the time this Constitution was 
adopted.”16 He called forth the “historical research back to that day” and the “authentic 
records still existing among us.”17 While he found that “slavery did exist in the States 
before the adoption of this Constitution, and at that time,” he also discovered “from all 
the eminent men of the time the clearest expression of their opinion that slavery was an 
evil.”18 Like Wendell Phillips, Webster proposed that the founders, and “Mr. Madison” in 
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particular, “thought that slavery could not be continued in the country, if the importation 
of slaves were made to cease, and therefore,” he stated, “they provided that after a certain 
period the importation might be prevented, by the act of the new government.” According 
to Webster, this idea did not originate in a desire to spread egalitarian principles, but 
rather stemmed from a belief that “the white race would multiply faster than the black 
race, and that slavery would therefore gradually wear out and expire.”19 Apparently, a 
racist notion of white superiority rather than a humanistic belief in human equality 
undergirded the founders’ expectations of slavery’s demise. However, seeming to 
contradict his overall argument defending the new law as constitutional, Webster went on 
to propose that Madison’s contempt for the idea of property in man accounted for why 
the word “slave, or slavery, is not used in the Constitution,” noting that “the Constitution 
does not require that ‘fugitive slaves’ shall be delivered up.”20 Appearing to support these 
points, Webster made reference to the “concurrent and contemporaneous” transaction of 
Congress in passing the Northwest Ordinance. Historical evidence confirmed “historical 
truths,” including the “expectation that … slavery would begin to run out”; that 
congressional power to prevent slavery’s spread “was executed in the most absolute 
manner, and to the fullest extent”; and that “the Convention meant to leave slavery, in the 
States, as they found it.”21 Webster’s historical account contained the basic elements of 
moderate antislavery constitutionalism. 
 Once he had outlined the founders’ assumptions about slavery’s fate, he went on 
to trace developments since that time, finding that “opinions … have changed, greatly 
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changed, changed North, and changed South.”22 While the North grew “much more warm 
and strong against slavery,” the South grew “much more warm and strong in its 
support.”23 Webster cited proslavery gains in Louisiana, Florida, and Texas and seemed 
unsettled by the fact that “the general lead in the politics of the country for three-fourths 
of the period that has elapsed since the adoption of the Constitution, has been a Southern 
lead.”24 Still, he described the change in the South’s stance as a natural progression.  
 If developments in the South were regrettable, yet reasonable, changes in the 
North’s views of slavery were dangerous. “There has been found at the North,” Webster 
observed, “among individuals and among legislators, a disinclination to perform, fully, 
their constitutional duties in regard to the return of persons bound to service who have 
escaped into the free States. In that respect,” he interjected, “it is my judgment that the 
South is right, and the North is wrong.” Although critical of slavery’s spread, Webster 
believed that allegiance to the Constitution required northerners to “deliver up fugitives 
from service.”25 He had provided a strict reading of the importation clause in his previous 
mention of Madison’s careful word choice, but here he left no doubt that the clause 
referred to fugitive slaves. He believed that the Constitution originally placed 
enforcement in the hands of the state, but, believing that Prigg v. Pennsylvania had 
nationalized the issue, now he deferred to “the power of Congress and the national 
judicature.” That deferral informed his decision to support the proposed Fugitive Slave 
Law “with all its provisions, to the fullest extent.”26 The wayward abolitionists lacked 
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justification in rejecting it, both “in the forum of conscience … [and] before the face of 
the Constitution,” and might have been at fault for its passage.27 According to Webster, 
the Virginia slavery debates of 1831-1832 showed that southerners had considered 
abolition, but then came the reckless abolitionists and “every thing that this agitating 
people have done has been, not to enlarge, but to restrain, not to set free, but to bind 
faster the slave population of the South.”28 He agreed that present circumstances placed 
the North in a situation that “it never did expect to find itself when they agreed to the 
compact of the Constitution,” but faulted northern agitation instead of southern 
intransigence for the current crisis.29 And believing disunion to be “a moral 
impossibility,” Webster thus championed “Liberty and Union.”30 He illuminated the 
founding through historical investigation and although he discovered an expectation of 
slavery’s dissolution, he argued that the North had to recognize the proslavery provisions 
that post-founding era events bolstered rather than banished. After all, northern 
abolitionists were the cause of this unfortunate effect. 
 
“Men Will Be Astonished in the Next Century to Learn That the ‘Model Republic,’ Had 
Such an Affection for Slaveholders”: Theodore Parker’s Double Helix of American 
Progress and Corruption 
To those attentive to Theodore Parker’s observations on the slavery crisis in the 
late 1840s, his condemnation of Webster’s speech came as no surprise. Like Webster, 
Parker narrated the rise of the Slave Power and of abolitionism, but with other antislavery 
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readers he damned proslavery gains as deviations from founding era ideas and glorified 
the spread of the antislavery spirit as evidence of history’s progress toward freedom; as a 
clear sign that the harvest season had arrived. By 1850, Parker’s reading of the 
Constitution in many ways mirrored the approach to the Bible he had developed in the 
preceding decades. He had learned to divide transient teachings from permanent truths in 
constitutional as well as biblical interpretation, particularly when dealing with slavery.  
Like William Garrison, Parker held a somewhat conflicted view of the 
Revolutionary era. Recent developments shaped that view. In early February of 1848, 
American and Mexican representatives signed the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, ending 
conflict between two nations while fomenting discord between two sections. The 
territorial gains stirred northern fears of slavery’s spread. Over a month after the war’s 
completion, in late March, Parker delivered a discourse praising the recently deceased 
John Quincy Adams. He acknowledged that “at the making of the Constitution, the South 
out-talked the North,” but, like Garrison, argued that in doing so the South was “violating 
the ideas of the Revolution,” or, the “American idea,” as he called it, “the idea that each 
man has unalienable rights.31 That idea found clearest expression in the Declaration. 
Parker praised Adams for going “back of the Constitution, to the Declaration of 
Independence, for the ideas of the Constitution; yes, back to the Declaration to Human 
Nature and the Laws of God, to legitimate these ideas.” Parker noted that Adams also 
found the idea of liberty in common law. By reading the Constitution in this light, Parker 
diverged from Garrison and found resonance with Goodell and Spooner. But he did not 
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attempt to explain away the Constitution’s proslavery provisions. He noted that, in 
Adams’ view, “the Constitution was not an idol; it was a means, not an end.” As “a 
compromise between those ideas and institutions and prejudices existing when it was 
made,” Adams “saw that the Constitution is ‘not the work of eternal justice, ruling 
through the people,’ but the work ‘of man; frail, fallen, imperfect man, following the 
dictates of his nature, and aspiring to be perfect.’”32 As in his biblical criticism, Parker 
drew attention to the imperfections of the authors and their textual creation. Even though 
he recognized what he viewed as transient proslavery clauses, with Adams he could read 
the Constitution “as an instrument for the defence of the Rights of man.”33 
Parker thus described slavery as “a lion who rent the Constitution, trampled under 
foot the Declaration of Independence, and tore the Bible to pieces.”34 Slavery stood in 
opposition to the American ideas that “shine out in all our history—I should say, our 
early history.”35 Parker’s qualification implied that something had changed since the 
founding era. In a December 1848 discourse on the Free Soil Party, Parker described the 
change as an unexpected divergence from founding-era ideas. He linked the Free Soil 
attack on slavery’s extension to the founding era, insisting that “it does not appear that 
the men who framed the Constitution, or the people who accepted it, ever contemplated 
the extension of slavery beyond the limits of the United States at that time. … The 
principle of the Wilmot Proviso boasts the same origin as the Declaration of 
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Independence.”36 Webster echoed some of these sentiments in his subsequent Seventh of 
March speech. Indeed, he would use words similar to Parker, who stated that “in 1787, 
the best and the most celebrated statesmen were publicly active on the side of freedom. 
Some thought slavery a sin, others a mistake, but nearly all in the Convention thought it 
an error.” Parker traced out a familiar antislavery declension narrative, noting that while 
“the North granted the southern demands” and “the anti-slavery spirit cooled down. … 
The Missouri Compromise again disturbed the public mind. But that was soon 
forgotten.”37 Since that time, pecuniary interests sapped Americans’ moral stamina and 
muffled antislavery voices. These changes, along with more recent developments, led to 
the devolution of the original federalist and anti-federalist parties into new parties, “in 
which guise some of their fathers would scarcely recognize the family type.”38 Slavery’s 
growing presence in American politics made it clear that theirs was not the republic of 
their ancestors. 
This kind of narration of declension alone did not signal a new awareness of 
historical distance. The jeremiad had long been part of the human and the American 
experience. But this was not a simple narration of decline or a nostalgic call to recover 
the past. Rather than despair, Parker posited the parallel progress of antislavery 
sentiment. “Where sin abounded,” he stated, “grace doth much more abound. There rose 
up one man,” meaning Garrison, “who would not compromise, nor be silent,—who 
would be heard.”39 Parker, who expected new Christs to appear, compared conscientious 
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abolitionists to the Galilean in his intended understatement that “a Man who had not 
where to lay his head ... has had some influence on the history of the world.”40 
Christianity’s humble beginnings matched those of American abolitionism. The 
antislavery idea was the American idea—the Declaration’s assertion that all are created 
equal—and it was “bottomed on Christianity.”41 Similar to Francis Wayland, Parker 
linked Christianity with the Declaration, but he located fulfillment not in Revolutionary 
era legal texts, but rather in present ideas and actions. He described abolitionism as the 
“idea of the time” and as consistent with “the spirit of the age.”42 This idea “went on, 
spite of the most entire, the most bitter, the most heartless and unrelenting opposition 
ever known in America.”43 Parker agreed with Garrison that the current crisis outmatched 
that of the Revolution. The antislavery idea had not found a home among a political party 
yet—the Free Soil Party fell short—“the time has not come for that.”44 Thus, “the 
revolution in ideas is not over till” the “motto ‘No more slave territory’” gives way to 
“‘No slavery in America,’ nor the corresponding revolution in deeds while a single slave 
remains in America. A man who studies the great movements of mankind feels sure that 
that day is not far off.”45 This historical narration of the post-founding era paralleled 
Webster’s later account in many ways, but Parker described the oft-submerged 
development of antislavery sentiment as natural, and proposed that it would overcome 
what he understood to be the unnatural growth of the Slave Power. The scalpel of 
antislavery sentiment would cut out the cancerous tumor of proslavery power. 
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Although he had shown a willingness to follow antislavery constitutionalists in 
making the Constitution cohere to the Declaration, Parker’s loyalties lay with the idea of 
freedom rather than with the nation’s written legal creed. He stated that if the Free Soil 
Party embraced “the idea of freedom, no constitutional scruple will long hold them from 
destroying the ‘peculiar institution.’” Parker felt sure that the long-awaited day was near. 
He observed, “What slavery is in the middle of the nineteenth century is quite plain; what 
it will be at the beginning of the twentieth it is not difficult to foresee.” Plainly, slavery 
belonged in a ruder time and place, and the further spread of antislavery ideas would 
ensure it erasure from America. In his Seventh of March speech, Webster placed the 
blame for slavery’s continuance at the feet of the abolitionists. Here, Parker conceded 
that that “the slave power has gained a great victory” in election of Zachary Taylor, but 
then declared that “one more such will cost its life.”46 Proslavery forces won a few more 
victories—including the Fugitive Slave Law (1850), the Kansas-Nebraska Act (1854), 
and Dred Scott (1857)—but Parker was not far off as such victories bolstered the 
antislavery ranks. While he was confident that antislavery ideas would triumph over 
proslavery politics, slavery qualified his view of America as exceptional. “Men will be 
astonished in the next century to learn that the ‘model republic,’ had such an affection for 
slaveholders.”47 America could seem ancient rather than modern. Citing a deed of sale in 
which a slave had been sold to President Zachary Taylor, Parker demonstrated a 
remarkable sense of historical distance, “If this document had been discovered among 
some Egyptian papyri, with the date 1848 before Christ, it would have been remarkable 
as a sign of the times. In a republic, nearly four thousand years later, it has a meaning 
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which some future historian will appreciate.”48 The meaning, one might surmise, was that 
the peculiar institution was anachronistic.  
Parker’s account highlighted historical contingency and distance. More than other 
antislavery interpreters, he demonstrated an ambivalence about change since the founding 
era. He believed that the lamentable rise of the Slave Power was only matched by the 
glorious spread of antislavery sentiment. This kind of narration, coupled with the idea 
that slavery challenged exalted understandings about the American republic, created a 
sense of the contingent nature of historical change. It also spread awareness of historical 
distance. On the one hand, Parker depicted the sale of slaves as a barbaric practice 
characteristic of ancient times. One the other hand, he described the spread of antislavery 
sentiment as representative of the “spirit of the [present] age.” In turn, that portrayal 
made sharper the claim that the Slave Power flowed against the nineteenth-century 
current. In allowing that slavery fit comfortably in the biblical past, and even in the 
Revolutionary past, and then arguing that it had an awkward existence in the present, 
Parker drew attention to and used historical distance to damn the peculiar institution.  
Expressing concern that “another compromise is to be feared,” Parker remained 
certain of the ultimate triumph of the American idea.49 But when that compromise came 
in 1850 and it received Webster’s stamp of approval, Parker’s optimism seemed to 
waver. In a 25 March speech at Boston’s Faneuil Hall, Parker noted the solemnity of the 
present century, stating that “this age is full of great questions, but this of Freedom is the 
chief.” That seminal question meant political conflict between “the party of Slavery” and 
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“the party of Freedom,” one of which “is to swallow up all the other parties.”50 In that 
battle, the Massachusetts Senator had struck a blow in favor of the former through his 
Seventh of March speech, which Parker considered the “most cowardly” of all Webster’s 
wrongs.51 He drove home his point with a historical comparison: “I know no deed in 
American history, done by a son of New England, to which I can compare this, but the 
act of Benedict Arnold!”52 Even abolitionists who drew attention to historical distance, 
like Parker, continued to find the Revolution useful, at least to highlight current 
cowardice. Adding to his prior historical narration, he located antislavery victories in 
1774 (a resolution against slave importation), 1776 (the Declaration), 1778 (a 
Confederacy without a fugitive slave provision), and 1787 (the Northwest Ordinance). In 
this strained account, the Constitution was neutral. Parker noted an antislavery blow in 
the 1808 abolition of the slave trade, but then traced proslavery advances in 1803 (the 
Louisiana Purchase), 1819 (the acquisition of Florida), 1820 (the western expansion of 
slavery), 1845 (the Texas annexation), and 1848 (Mexican cession).53 The narration 
placed emphasis not on the Constitution, but on pre and post-founding-era developments 
and on Webster’s politically motivated approval of the “Bill of abominations,” which 
soon passed as the Fugitive Slave Law. The new law stood in line with a string of 
proslavery successes since 1808.54 Projecting retrogression into the future, Parker 
lamented, “In 1750, in all the United States, but two hundred thousand” slaves labored 
beneath the republic’s false banner, “now, three millions. In 1950, let Mr. Webster’s 
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counsels be followed, there will be thirty millions.”55 Parker showed that he could create 
a useful future just as well as he could create a useful past, and that future looked bleak. 
Perhaps the proslavery compromise would not translate into antislavery success after all.  
Though he passed over it earlier in the speech, close to his conclusion Parker 
trained his focus on the Constitution and its framers. If, at times, he read that document as 
antislavery in spirit, he did not overlook its errors, nor forgive the failures of the framers, 
but he attributed those failures to the limitations of that age. He explained that in framing 
the Constitution, “Our fathers made a political, and a commercial, and a moral error—
shall we repeat it?” he asked. “They did a wrong shall we extend and multiply the wrong? 
Was it an error in our fathers; not barely a wrong—was it a sin? No, not in them; they 
knew it not. But what in them to establish was only an error, in us to extend or to fester is 
a sin!”56 Parker’s sense of historical progress—by which errors became sins—could 
encourage a rather sympathetic approach to the actions and teachings of past figures, 
although that corresponded with a move to place the past on a lower moral standing 
relative to the present rather than an effort to understand the past on its own terms. Parker 
believed that, like Paul, the framers’ eyes were not open to evil. However, time and 
progress made contemporary Christian Americans culpable. Developments since the 
founding had made the sin of slavery even more apparent, and thus to overlook its 
continued existence implicated the entire nation. In 1850, Webster had more light than 
Paul or Madison and thus merited greater condemnation. It was left to see how his 
contemporaries would respond.  
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“Even a Bad Bargain Must Be Kept”: Moses Stuart and the Valuing of Original 
Meanings over Original Expectations  
When religious radicals such as Parker damned Webster’s placating stance, a 
number of New England’s prominent citizens rose to defend him, including the venerable 
Congregationalist Moses Stuart, who had resigned from his post at Andover in 1848. In 
Conscience and the Constitution (1850), Stuart, America’s most eminent biblical scholar, 
applied his learning to the nation’s religious and legal texts. The significance of the 
moment did not escape him. He wrote that “never, since the Declaration of Independence, 
and the formation of the United States Constitution, has there been so much deep feeling 
excited, or so much effort called forth.”57 Early on, Stuart, who prided himself for staying 
out of politics in the past but who wanted to avoid violence at all costs, made clear his 
position, declaring, “I am ready to support every shade of sentiment, on every topic upon 
which Mr. Webster’s speech touches.”58 Although he provided a constitutional as well as 
a biblical defense of Webster, Stuart was particularly worried that respondents might 
dishonor Paul, writing, “that the great apostle himself may be brought into some 
disrepute, among a certain class of readers, by my exposure of his sentiments on the 
present occasions, is what I fear.”59 Some of slavery’s opponents believed that an open 
consideration of the issue would bring about its demise. Stuart worried that a similar fate 
might await Paul’s standing through a discussion of his teachings on slavery. In the early 
1840s, Parker had already written that “Paul had not his eye open to the evil, but sent 
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back a fugitive.”60 Stuart’s argument allowed Parker to further articulate his disapproval 
of the ancient apostle’s teaching. 
 Following Webster’s lead, Stuart began with the Bible. Before addressing the 
New Testament debate, he aimed to settle the argument from the Old Testament. He first 
established “the great antiquity of slavery.” In the antebellum era, Americans often 
authorized an idea or an institution by appealing to its antiquity, but that justification 
became increasingly precarious when new light seemed to show that the ancients’ words 
and deeds were immoral rather than immortal. Historical research, though, could also 
place them in a positive light relative to modern practices. While showing that Abraham 
had a vast cadre of slaves, Stuart acknowledged that the patriarch’s “relation to these 
slaves was somewhat different from that of master to slave among us.”61 Too much of a 
scholar not to notice historical differences, Stuart granted that in Abrahamic slavery, 
which he compared to Eastern servitude, slaves were “generally treated with less rigor, 
and more as human beings should be treated, than they are in most countries called 
Christian.”62 Patriarchal slavery still possessed features that were distasteful to modern 
sensibilities. For example, bondwomen often acted as concubines. Slavery, in this 
instance, suffered from its Old Testament association with polygamy, though Stuart, as 
with other proslavery interpreters, believed the gospel had replaced the latter vice with 
the original institution of monogamous marriage. Though Stuart held that the Patriarchs 
did not intend to do wrong in this regard, he wrote that “this will not justify us in 
imitating them. … They do not concern us; for the blessed God, by his gospel, having 
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scattered the darkness of early ages, has made us to walk in the clear light of the Sun of 
Righteousness. … Every man’s conduct is to be judged of in most cases, at least in some 
good measure, by the light he has, and by the age and circumstances in which he lived.”63 
Stuart, in essence, agreed with Parker and other antislavery interpreters in emphasizing 
the progress of human understanding relative to God’s revelation. In gaining a more 
complete and accurate picture of biblical times, all of these interpreters recognized that 
historical distance separated the past, especially the patriarchal past, from the present. 
Becoming more familiar with a past period, and thus with its peculiarities, drew attention 
to its estrangement from current era.  
 Similar to Theodore Weld’s analysis, Stuart dismissed the idea that the Patriarchs 
were worthy of imitation and also distinguished between the Patriarchal and the “Mosaic 
Constitution and Laws.”64 Using Exodus 21 as his text, he outlined “the picture of the 
slavery of Hebrews among Hebrews.” He noted that at Sinai Moses “declared that 
Hebrew man-servants should be free after six years,” but only forty years later did he 
make that law applicable to female servants. To account for this inconsistency, Stuart 
applied the argument from expediency, often used to explain the apostles’ actions also 
applied to the framers of the Constitution, to Moses. He wrote that the ancient lawgiver 
“had common sense and judgment enough to see, that legislation could not change the 
established internal structure of a nation or common wealth in a day.”65 Here appealing to 
historical particularity to explain Moses’s actions, Stuart proceeded to assume temporal 
sameness by contrasting such actions with those of the abolitionists, who “think that his 
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eyes were but half opened.”66 Although historical distance made the ancient Patriarchs’ 
actions irrelevant, for some reason the laws of the less ancient Moses remained pertinent. 
Citing Deuteronomy 23, Stuart explained that if a slave had escaped from a heathen 
master he might find asylum among the Hebrews, but not so for a slave who had escaped 
from a Hebrew master, for “reclamation of him could be lawfully made.”67 With this 
understanding, Stuart wondered “how can we appeal to the passage in question, to justify, 
yea even to urge, the retention of fugitive bond-men in our own country?”68 While 
highlighting historical difference to undermine antislavery uses of the Old Testament, 
Stuart all but conflated Mosaic religion with modern American Christianity in suggesting 
that Moses sanctioned the Fugitive Slave Law. He granted that “the Mosaic dispensation 
was a preparatory one,” writing that “none can now crave liberty to purchase slaves of 
the Gentiles or Jews, on the ground of Mosaic permission.”69 As Molly Oshatz argues, 
slavery alone directed Stuart to recognize the archaic nature of some biblical texts. He did 
not believe that the Old Testament sanctioned American slavery.70 However, he still 
appealed to the Old Testament to defend the Fugitive Slave Law. Indeed, he proposed 
that “if Abolitionists are right in their position, then Moses is greatly in the wrong.”71 
Similar to Richard Fuller, Stuart simply wanted to demonstrate that slavery was not 
malum in se (sinful in itself), but in doing so he suggested that despite significant 
historical differences and vast historical distances, the Old Testament stood on the side of 
fugitive-seeking slaveholders.  
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 He granted that the Mosaic Law “was confined to one nation, and was never 
designed to be a permanent and universal religion,” but proceeded to argue that “the 
moral and spiritual part of it … has its basis in the relations of God to man, and of men to 
God and to each other,” and thus concluded that “they are unrepealed and irrepealable.”72 
Finding continuity between Moses and Christ on this matter, Stuart again used the 
argument from expediency, this time applying it to the New Testament. He believed that 
“the Saviour uttered sentiments, which, in their ultimate effects, must abolish—totally 
and forever abolish—all slavery. … But where did he intermeddle with the then existing 
relations between master and slave? Not a word is to be found in the Gospels indicative 
of such an interposition.”73 In essence, this argument paralleled that of Stuart’s student 
Francis Wayland and Stuart’s Unitarian correspondent William Channing, both of whom 
only later adopted immediate emancipationist views. It even matched that of the more 
radical Albert Barnes. But while these figures had come to believe that enough time had 
passed to cultivate the antislavery seeds sowed in New Testament times, Stuart seemed to 
forget the historical distance he had referenced in stating that Christ’s “policy differed … 
from that of the immediate Emancipationists.” After inculcating principles that “would 
banish slavery from the face of the earth,” Christ left “the completion of the work to time, 
and to the slow but sure operation of the principles which he inculcated. … He, it would 
seem, believed that the sudden breaking up of the then existing frame-work of society, 
would have occasioned evils greater than slavery.”74 Stuart, as with Wayland, Channing, 
and Barnes, believed that Jesus had planted antislavery seeds, but apparently thought that 
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time had not yet nourished them. 1800 years later, Christ still counseled patience and 
perseverance. Despite his keen awareness of historical difference, Stuart seemed to 
suggest that little, with regard to slavery, had changed since Jesus introduced the gospel. 
 Turning to Paul, who had encouraged obedience amongst slaves, Stuart feared 
that some “do not think that any serious regard be paid to his teachings or his example, in 
respect to the matter before us.” Chiding his American contemporaries, he wrote that “an 
honest deist … might consistently ignore Paul. But this will not do for Christians.”75 If 
Moses’s morals still applied, then certainly Paul’s injunctions still mattered. Stuart called 
on biblical criticism to assist in his interpretation. He read a passage from 1 Corinthians 7 
as evidence that Paul did not believe that conversion changed the convert’s status. 
Building a contextual case, he noted that “even De Wette, (who for his high liberty-
notions was banished from Germany), in his Commentary on the passage, seems plainly 
to accede to the force of this reasoning.”76 Servants and slaves “are not to be anxious and 
uneasy and discontented. … It should suffice, that they are the Lord’s freemen.” It was 
De Wette, of course, who was largely responsible for Parker’s response to Stuart. Stuart 
affirmed that the gospel was for slaves as well, but like Joseph Buckminster, he held that 
eternal salvation had no bearing on temporal servitude. Again comparing the abolitionists 
to the first Christians, Stuart worried that “if the great apostle himself were to reappear on 
earth, and come now into the midst of us … he would unquestionably incur the danger of 
being mobbed.”77 Despite this conflation of temporal distinction, Stuart referenced the 
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difference between Mosaic theocracy and the American democracy and even of the civil 
conditions of the early Christians he declared, “How entirely different were those from 
our own!”78 While Wayland had contrasted ancient and American governance to assert 
the present possibility of popular legislation—“we make our own laws”—Stuart 
contrasted the Mosaic and Christian dispensations with nineteenth-century America to 
explain the biblical figures’ inability to change legislation. “Paul, Peter, and other 
disciples, thought it best to wait with patience for the greater prevalence of Christianity, 
and its more matured state, before they urged obligations on masters to free their 
slaves.”79 Stuart failed to notice that the changes in governance he referenced might allow 
Americans to do what the apostles could not: create laws to abolish slavery. As with most 
American commentators, Stuart did not consider the implications of his argument. He did 
not recognize that in pointing out the historical distinctions between the biblical pasts and 
the American present, he undermined his historical comparisons. The new realization of 
historical distance and difference resulting from biblical and constitutional interpretation 
emerged in relation to the persistence of traditional interpretive assumptions.  
 Stuart concluded his treatment with a discussion of how Christian principles 
should inform Americans’ behavior in regards to slavery. In doing so, he coupled his 
biblical interpretation with a constitutional reading of the fugitive slave clause. He 
brought the Declaration and the Constitution together, as he had the Old and New 
Testaments, but rather than read the latter in the light of the former, he reversed the 
relationship, denying that the Declaration was meant to condemn slavery before strongly 
dismissing the idea of a “palpable disagreement between the Declaration of 
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Independence, and the Constitution of the United States!”80 Though he had joined 
biblical and constitutional arguments in defense of the Fugitive Slave Law, he left little 
question as to which canonical text mattered most in this discussion. In what might have 
been a surprising concession, earlier in the text he had argued that “even if the Bible had 
neither said nor implied anything in relation to this whole matter, the solemn compact 
which we have made, before heaven and earth, to deliver up fugitives … is enough to 
settle the question of legal right on the part of the master, whatever we may think of his 
claim when viewed in the light of Christianity.”81 Stuart understood that in terms of 
legality, constitutional law trumped Christian sentiment, and grasped that the debate 
increasingly revolved around question of legality rather than those of morality. The 
qualitative nature of Stuart’s statement—“the question of legal right”—guarded readers 
from the conclusion that he, like some radical abolitionists, had also privileged the 
Revolutionary over the biblical past, but even this orthodox biblical scholar understood 
that constitutional interpretation carried unmatched consequences in the political 
environment of 1850. Stuart still held up the Bible as the central moral guide, and 
believed that both it and the Constitution trumped conscience. 
Turning to the oft-debated New Testament passage wherein Paul sends Onesimus, 
an escaped slave and recent Christian convert, back to his master Philemon, Stuart used 
historical reasoning to dismantle claims, put forth by antislavery writers, including 
Channing and Barnes, that Onesimus was something other than a slave. His orthodoxy 
demanded a literal reading of the text and a unilateral application of its moral lessons. 
“Paul’s Christian conscience,” in contrast to the abolitionists’ rejection of slaveholders’ 
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rights, “would not permit him to injure the vested rights of Philemon.”82 Returning his 
attention to the nation’s more recent sacred text, he argued that the Constitution protected 
the sovereignty of southern states and their property laws, and then dismissed claims that 
valued conscience over Constitution. Stuart called on the nation’s founding generation as 
he castigated abolitionists like Parker, asking his contemporaries, “can we respect a 
conscience, which puts the broad seal of disgrace and infamy on those immortal men and 
patriots, who formed our Constitution, and who in all our States accepted and approved 
of it?”83 Stuart appealed to past figures of originating moments, biblical and 
Revolutionary, and illuminated their views through historical explication, only to again 
collapse temporal distance. If the apostle Paul “were now among us” his life would be in 
danger; if the founder John Jay could see his son William Jay, an active member of the 
AASS, this “immortal ancestor” would look on “with a mixture of sorrow and of 
frowning.”84 Stuart accepted history as the common discursive currency, but other 
factors, including religious beliefs and political motivations, constrained his historical 
sensibilities. He reached into the past and used historical explication to recover and apply 
the original meanings of founding documents of church and state. 
In this somewhat erratic discussion, Stuart went on to argue that slavery “is a 
glaring contradiction of the first and fundamental principle, not only of the Bible which 
declares that all are of one blood, but of our Declaration of Independence, which avers, 
that all men are born with an inherent and inalienable right to life, liberty, and 
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property.”85 His mention of property must have drawn wry smiles from proslavery 
readers and dim frowns from their antislavery counterparts. Stuart further tied together 
the New Testament and the Declaration, and bound both to the spirit of the Revolutionary 
age, writing that the latter reiterated the Golden Rule, “a truly Christian and gospel 
principle. It is the unquestionable index of all but universal American feeling in 1776.” 
Stuart seemed to agree with the antislavery constitutionalists that at the ratification of the 
Constitution “it was then universally understood among all the States who formed it, that 
slavery was to be got rid of,” though he added, “just as soon as it could be done 
peaceably and with safety.”86 With Webster, Stuart argued that the time for abolition had 
not arrived, in large part due to abolitionism. He opined that “the liberation of the slaves 
is put back at least half a century, by this ill-timed, violent, and most injudicious 
movement.”87 Far from representing the spirit of the age, abolitionism kept America 
behind the times. Like Parker, Stuart did believe that “the spirit of freedom is waking the 
world to new life.”88 However, he maintained that the North remained bound “so long as 
the Article in the Constitution remains,” for “even a bad bargain must be kept.”89 
 
Parker’s “‘Short and Easy Method’”: An Archaic Bible and an Outdated Constitution  
Stuart’s lengthy and studied defense of Webster’s position had no impact on 
Parker, who had arrived at his heterodox view of the New Testament in the early 1840s 
and since then had adopted a similar view of the Constitution. According to him, both 
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texts had been written by good men, who nonetheless could not escape the influence of 
the erroneous notions of their times. In a speech delivered at the New England Anti-
Slavery Convention in late May, two months after he gave his response to Webster at 
Faneuil Hall, Parker somberly retraced the advances of the dominant Slave Power in the 
irreconcilable conflict between the “idea of Freedom” and the “idea of Slavery.”90 
Finding “much to discourage a man who believes in the progress of his race,” he outlined 
developments since 1789, lamenting that “since the adoption of the Constitution, 
protected by that shield, mastering the energies of the nation, and fighting with that 
weapon, slavery has been continually aggressive.”91 In this narrative the Constitution was 
no longer neutral, but signaled rather a fatal first step in the proslavery rise to its present 
political prominence in 1850. Parker’s depiction of proslavery advances as aggressive 
matched his belief that slavery itself was out of step with the general sentiment of the 
nineteenth century. The state of affairs in 1850 reminded him of “the spirit which 
prevailed in the Roman Senate, A. D. 62, when about four hundred slaves were crucified.” 
He found Tacitus’s account of the event “instructive, too, at these times.”92 In contrast to 
some of Stuart’s historical comparisons, Parker’s was meant to evidence the regressed 
state of the American nation rather than condemn the actions of the abolitionists or 
confirm the current relevance of ancient deeds.  
In their speeches, Webster and Stuart specifically supported the Fugitive Slave 
Law, but in 1850 such support was tantamount to a defense of slavery itself. Viewing 
Webster’s speech as the latest in a long line of proslavery consolidations, Parker still held 
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out hope. He expected that the people of Massachusetts would not countenance 
Webster’s act, which he again compared to “the treachery of Benedict Arnold.”93 He did 
not believe that the Bay State would “efface Lexington and Bunker Hill from her 
memory.”94 Although the Constitution marked the beginning of the current crisis, Parker 
still knew how to use the Revolutionary past for his purposes. Referencing the “orthodox 
minister” from Andover, he proposed “a ‘short and easy method’ with Professor Stuart, 
and all other men who defend slavery out of the Bible. If the Bible defends slavery, it is 
not so much better for slavery, but so much the worse for the Bible.”95 Parker did not 
discriminate among biblical texts or between patriarchs, prophets, and apostles. “If 
Christianity supports American slavery, so much the worse for Christianity,” he declared, 
“We all know it does not, never did, and never can. But if Paul was an apologist for 
slavery, so much the worse for Paul.”96 Parker’s wry comment carried awful weight; if 
and when the traditional canon contradicts conscience, conscience trumps canon. Rather 
than argue, as Barnes had, that Paul had instructed Philemon to receive Onesimus as a 
brother and a freeman in Christ, or, as Channing and Wayland had, that Paul, aware of his 
circumstances, had inculcated principles meant to abolish slavery, Parker granted the 
accuracy of Stuart’s understanding of the passage’s original meaning only to then devalue 
its relevance as a moral guide in the present. What, though, of Stuart’s enlistment of the 
Constitution? Parker made it clear that he was no respecter of founding documents. 
Earlier in the speech, he referenced the Free Soil Party’s effort to oppose “slavery so far 
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as it is possible to do, and yet comply with the Constitution.”97 He honored Salmon 
Chase and William Seward, who offered up “very noble words against slavery; heroic 
words in behalf of freedom,” but he called on them to go further in putting an end to the 
institution, warning that “if the Constitution of the United States will not allow it, there is 
another Constitution that will.”98 Rather than struggle to salvage the nation’s founding 
religious and legal texts through creative interpretations, Parker stood ready to admit that 
those documents had worn out their welcome in the antislavery nineteenth-century.  
Webster, Stuart, and Parker each provided interpretations of the Bible and the 
Constitution and offered historical accounts that drew attention to real temporal 
distinctions dividing biblical from modern times and that highlighted real historical 
changes separating the founding era from the present. Webster and Stuart agreed that 
Christ and his apostles had inculcated principles meant to extinguish slavery’s searing 
flames and that the framers had expected the clinging of chains to eventually cease, but 
both attributed the republic’s failure to realize the egalitarian promises found in the 
Revolutionary and, presumably, the biblical pasts to the counterproductive efforts of the 
American abolitionists. In their attempts to quench the flames, the abolitionists had only 
added fuel to the fire. Stuart, in particular, denied the importance of historical distinctions 
when he used biblical precedent to condemn the actions of the abolitionists. However, in 
defending the actions of Moses and the apostles as expedient, his argument highlighted 
those historical distinctions. Slavery forced Stuart to recognize, a greater extent than 
before, that the sacred writers and actors had accommodated to their times. Such 
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recognition drew attention to historical distance, even when Stuart still made cross-
temporal applications in his biblical interpretations. 
Parker offered an alternative account that made more direct use of historical 
distance. He placed the blame for unfulfilled promises at the feet of the Slave Power and 
its conspirators in the North. He explained the failures of both Christian and national 
founders through a historical explanation that stressed the progress of moral 
understanding. The sin of slavery was not in the unenlightened mothers and fathers 
whose eyes were shut to evil but in the illuminated sons and daughters who knew better. 
The emphasis on corruptions in the form of the rise of abolitionism or, in Parker’s case, 
of the Slave Power suggested that historical development was a contingent process and 
that historical distance left a chasm between present and past. In conjunction with his 
sense of the progress of moral understanding, Parker’s depiction of proslavery actions as 
anachronistic stressed that substantial historical changes had created a gulf between 
Americans and their favored biblical and Revolutionary pasts. It also checked a sense of 
America’s status on the world stage, but Parker remained convinced that the nineteenth 
century was an age of freedom, an age to fulfill the promises of the fathers. So did 
Frederick Douglass. 
 
 
“The Original Intent and Meaning of the Constitution … Makes It a Pro-Slavery 
Instrument”: Frederick Douglass’s Early Garrisonian Approach to the Constitution 
 Each of these interpreters recognized the importance of the Bible in the slavery 
debates and spent some time explicating its meaning. However, even theologians and 
ministers such as Stuart and Parker recognized that constitutional interpretation had taken 
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on a determinative role in the debates. Most parties involved came to believe that the fate 
of four million slaves did not rest in biblical exegesis but rather in constitutional 
construction. Even the Declaration of Independence, a sacralized text, retained relevance 
only to the extent that it could be used as the key to unlocking the Constitution’s 
meaning. The constitutionalization of slavery during the 1850s directed an unprecedented 
level of scrutiny toward the Constitution and the founding era, fulfilling a potential 
inadvertently created by the founding generation.99   
 In the controversy surrounding the Fugitive Slave Law and the subsequent 
fugitive slave cases, Frederick Douglass, once America’s most famous fugitive slave—
his English supporters had purchased his freedom in 1846—changed his opinion of the 
Constitution. In the spring of 1851, the onetime anti-constitutional Garrisonian converted 
to Gerrit Smith’s radical constitutionalism. Most of the prominent antebellum antislavery 
approaches to the Constitution found a voice in Douglass at one time or another. The 
evolution of his constitutional views demonstrates the lure of radical constitutionalism 
but also the lingering influence of the Garrisonian interpretation, with its emphasis on 
contextual and historical reasoning. Even as Douglass, convinced by the arguments of 
antislavery constitutionalists such as Alvan Stewart, William Goodell, and Lysander 
Spooner, adopted Smith’s position, he retained an interest in understanding the intentions 
and expectations of the framers. Before these interpretive approaches to the Constitution 
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found their most public hearing in Dred Scott, they clashed among various groups of 
antislavery advocates and within the mind of Douglass.100  
 Illuminated through the dark aftermath of the Fugitive Slave Law, Douglass’s 
path to antislavery constitutionalism was a gradual climb. In the same year that Spooner 
published The Unconstitutionality of Slavery and Phillips published The Constitution a 
Pro-Slavery Compact, the famous fugitive published his autobiography, Narrative of the 
Life of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave (1845), and immediately set sail for a 
speaking tour to Ireland and Britain. It was clear that, at this point, Douglass was a 
Garrisonian. Free to speak his mind about his country before a foreign audience, 
including the foreign newspaper reporters who recorded his words, Douglass often 
highlighted the hypocrisy of the supposed democracy, which “proclaimed to the world 
that all mankind were created freeborn; and for the maintenance of that principle she 
solemnly swore before high Heaven that she would vindicate and uphold it by force, at 
expense, at the sacrifice of life. … But alas! how had she carried out her pledge: what 
was the condition of slavery there?”101 Douglass believed in the egalitarian principles he 
located in the Declaration of Independence, principles for which black Revolutionaries 
had died—“for it was a negro who shed the first blood”—but, like Garrison, he found 
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treachery in the states’ union “under one constitution,” a Constitution that “protected and 
supported slavery.”102 
 In Douglass, too, one finds a deep interest in the Bible as well as the Constitution. 
Unlike Parker, his critique of the latter text did not follow from or transfer to his view of 
the former. He often criticized the so-called Christian nation, where “Bibles and slave-
holders go hand in hand,” for corrupting scripture, and during his tour he frequently 
discouraged the Irish Free Church from accepting funds from their false brethren in the 
American South.103 The corroding power of slavery and the resulting proslavery 
interpretation of the Bible, rather than the Bible itself, was the problem. Indeed, whereas 
proslavery biblical interpreters fused the Testaments together to defend slavery, Douglass 
united them to condemn the institution. In one 1845 speech, he cited a letter from Moses 
Stuart, whom he described as “an advocate for slavery,” wherein the Andover divine 
instructed his correspondent that Paul had sent back Onesimus “into slavery for life.” 
Douglass referenced a passage from Deuteronomy, the very one Stuart wrestled from 
antislavery interpreters in Conscience and the Constitution, to argue that because “there 
was no such thing known among the Jews as slavery for life,” Paul must have sent back 
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Onesimus “not as a slave who could be sold in the market, but as a beloved brother.”104 
According to the record of a May 1846 speech, he again made the same argument. “I do 
not agree with the opinion that the apostle Paul recognised Onesimus as the property of 
Philemon. The Jewish law says: ‘Thou shalt not deliver a man back to his master; he shall 
dwell with thee in the land.’ I do not think, that if, under Moses and the prophets, it 
would have been wrong to return me back to bondage, that in the nineteenth century of 
the Christian era it would be right to send me back. I think, however, it would be right to 
send back the money.” Douglass’s demand on the Free Church drew laughter and cheers 
from his audience.105 Even as he selectively called on both the Old and New Testaments, 
and collapsed time in his application of the scriptures, his reference to the current century 
exposed the vast temporal gap from the times in which the sacred writers had penned 
them. The slavery debates cultivated a sense of historical distance even among those who 
still assumed contemporaneity with the past. Although he was unfamiliar with biblical 
criticism, Douglass believed in progress and implied historical distance from the biblical 
past, which could make appeals to the Bible problematic.  
 Similar to Parker, Douglass believed that although “there never was so great a 
determination among large numbers to get rid of [slavery] as at the present time,” the 
southern institution had a stranglehold on the American nation, which he described as 
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“the sheet-anchor of slavery throughout the world.”106 In Douglass’s mind, the United 
States was the last great defender of slavery and slavery was the last great barrier to 
human progress. American slavery stood in strange juxtaposition to the spread of 
antislavery sentiment. The endurance of the former depended on “slave-holding religion 
in the south and a pro-slavery religion in the north,” and its secure status rested on 
proslavery constitutional provisions and a proslavery government. In an August 1846 
speech in England, Douglass set out to “give the meeting a history of the American 
government.” According to contemporary reports, he explained that “there was a clause 
in the general Constitution to the effect that the general government should not interfere 
with institutions in the states. Thus whilst the general government could not put down 
slavery, it had been prostituted to uphold it, and thereby slavery was made a national 
institution.” Douglass referenced “one clause in the American Constitution” in particular, 
“which made it the duty of the several states to return the slave to his master when he 
escaped from bondage.”107 This particular clause soon received a major renovation, and 
that renovation turned up the heat in constitutional debates.  
 In 1847, Douglass returned from his speaking tour a free and independent man, 
set on establishing a newspaper through which an independent African American voice 
could enter the public sphere. With assistance from the same friends who had purchased 
his freedom, Douglass soon established the North Star. Scholar T. Gregory Garvey 
describes the paper’s creation as a strategic move to claim structural equality on the 
public stage and to shift the center of attention from Douglass himself to the Constitution. 
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Douglass aimed to become a participant in, rather than just an object of, debate. Garrison, 
his mentor, had successfully applied the revivalistic methods of the Second Great 
Awakening to secular debates, which assisted him in efforts to reject conventional 
discourse and “come out” from traditional religious and political institutions. In order to 
embrace come-outerism like Garrison one had to be firmly situated within American 
society and thus Douglass was in no such position to imitate his friend. Instead, he 
struggled for recognition in the political culture of the time. His move to reposition 
himself away from the stance of his erstwhile guide was emblematic of a greater 
defection from come-outerism and disunionism to political abolitionism around 1850, 
when many abolitionists determined that Garrison’s approach was unrealistic and 
ineffective. Douglass’s evolving view of the Constitution accompanied his own move 
away from Garrisonian disunionism.108 
 The question of constitutional interpretation started to weigh heavily on his mind 
in the late 1840s. When pressed on the issue in early 1849, he agreed that, if strictly 
construed, the Constitution was “not a pro-slavery instrument.” However, retaining a 
Garrisonian approach at this point, he wrote in the North Star that “I now hold, as I have 
ever done, that the original intent and meaning of the Constitution (the one given to it by 
the men who framed it, those who adopted, and the one given to it by the Supreme Court 
of the United States) makes it a pro-slavery instrument.”109 Douglass’s statement, which 
echoed Wendell Phillips’s argument of continuity between the intent of the Constitution’s 
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framers and ratifiers and its subsequent interpretations, generated a response from New 
York abolitionist Gerrit Smith. The recent Liberty Party candidate’s reply led Douglass to 
offer clarification, which demonstrated how closely he followed along the path that 
Garrison and Phillips had paved during the last decade. He wrote that “the Constitution of 
the United States, standing alone, and construed only in the light of its letter, without 
reference to the opinions of the men who framed and adopted it, or to the uniform, 
universal and undeviating practice of the nation under it, from the time of its adoption 
until now, is not a pro-slavery instrument.”110 Again, he granted that if one read the 
words of the text and determined its meaning without an appeal to context or history, the 
Constitution was neutral on the issue. But Douglass did interpret that text in light of its 
framers’ original intent and its subsequent use and thus he continued to reject antislavery 
readings.  
Laying stress on the Constitution’s temporal nature, Douglass emphasized that “it 
is human, and must be explained in the light of those maxims and principles which 
human beings have laid down as guides to the understanding of all written instruments, 
covenants, contracts and agreements, emanating from human beings. … In this light,” he 
explained, “we hold it to be a most cunningly-devised and wicked compact.”111 This 
approach, claiming to use “facts, rather than theory,” allowed Douglass to damn the 
document as the creation of imperfect and time-bound beings. The Constitution, like the 
Bible, was becoming a text among texts and as such, it could be read without legal 
expertise. “Having a terrestrial, and not a celestial origin,” he wrote, “we find no 
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difficulty in ascertaining its meaning in all the parts which we allege to relate to slavery. 
Slavery existed before the Constitution, in the very States by whom it was made and 
adopted.—Slaveholders took a large share in making it. It was made in view of the 
existence of slavery, and in a manner well calculated to aid and strengthen that heaven-
daring crime.”112 Slavery, it seemed, was not only part of the framers’ original intent, but 
its continued existence seemed to be part of their original expectation. Dismissing the 
arguments of Spooner and others, just as Phillips had, Douglass interpreted the three-
fifths, insurrection, slave trade, fugitive slave, and domestic violence clauses in light of 
statements made by members of the Convention. Satisfied that he had made manifest the 
document’s temporal and corrupt nature, he proposed that “it is truly a compact 
demanding immediate disannulment.”113 Douglass’s reading implied that because the 
Constitution was a human document, created in time and subject to temporal vicissitude, 
it was not immutable and could be and should be replaced with a more suitable guide.  
 He retained this position for about two more years, but even here he expressed an 
openness to considering Smith’s contentions and invited his interpretive opponent to use 
the North Star to further explain them. Douglass wrote, “If the Constitution can be so 
turned, and [Smith] can satisfy us of the fact, we shall readily, gladly and zealously turn 
our feeble energies in that direction.”114 Douglass backed up his claim in accepting 
proposals to further debate the issue, as in New York City in May 1849, when he engaged 
Samuel Ringgold Ward, an African American Congregationalist minister and orator. 
While Ward believed that if the Constitution had acknowledged the “right to hold 
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property in person … it would be a direct violation of the principles for which the fathers 
of the Republic struggled,” the gist of his argument rested in a familiar focus on words 
alone and a disregard for the “intentions and sentiments of the framers of the 
Constitution.”115 In response to Ward, Douglass read “from the Madison Papers” to show 
that “the North bowed to the mandates of Slavery.”116 He believed that historical 
evidence unlocked the Constitution’s true meaning, and he found it supportive of a 
proslavery interpretation.  
 Douglass, though, remained open to debate. At a multi-day antislavery conference 
in Syracuse in early 1850, he found himself again discussing the issue with Ward, Smith, 
Parker Pillsbury—a Congregationalist minister and a lecturing agent for antislavery 
societies—and other abolitionists. Douglass, in the absence of Garrison, outlined the anti-
constitutional position. “We want to say to slaveholders,” he said to his fellow 
abolitionists, “we admit your views of the Constitution, but we war on that and on 
you.”117 Douglass emphasized the hypocrisy of the framers, who “laid down the doctrines 
of equality, consent, and [taught] that resistance to tyrants is obedience to God” but, 
“after they had achieved independence,” who then “attempted to unite Liberty in holy 
wedlock with the dead body of Slavery, and the whole was tainted.”118 To counter the 
prevalent filiopietism, Douglass declared, “I know they were slaveholders. This one fact 
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is enough for me.” He was just getting started. “Talk to me of the love of liberty of your 
Washingtons, Jeffersons, Henrys. … He who does not love Justice and Liberty for all, 
does not love Liberty and justice. They wrote of Liberty in the Declaration of 
Independence with one hand, and with the other clutched their brother by the throat! 
These are the men who formed the union. … Give me NO UNION WITH 
SLAVEHOLDERS!”119 In essence, the abolitionists all agreed that the framers, based on 
extra-constitutional historical evidence, intended to sanction slavery, but while the radical 
constitutionalists wanted to turn attention from those intentions to the language of the 
Constitution itself, the anti-constitutionalists focused on those intentions. While many 
Americans, including those in the slavery debates, claimed affinity with the founders, the 
anti-constitutionalists strove to distance themselves from them and their proslavery 
compact.  
 Ward responded with the familiar appeal to “plain language,” and went so far as 
to suggest that “almost the words of the Declaration are enacted in the Constitution—to 
be found in the fifth amendment. Truth in the Declaration, and Good in the Constitution, 
are one.”120 Once again, an interpreter brought together these founding documents, just as 
Douglass had brought together the Old and New Testaments, to attack the proslavery 
position. The discussion was soon sidetracked when attendees began debating the status 
of the Liberty Party. Douglass set them straight. The tangential deliberation “hinders the 
discussion of the constitutional questions,” he stated, “which is THE QUESTION OF 
THE DAY, as far as Anti-Slavery in this country is concerned.”121 The question of the 
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day would soon become the question of the decade. The constitutionalization of the issue 
began in earnest during this period. Returning his fellow abolitionists to the question at 
hand, Douglass restated a willingness to be persuaded. “He wished to address himself to 
the ‘bridge’ to be passed over, till we reach the spot where we are to have an Anti-
Slavery interpretation of the Constitution.” Douglass, however, still could not accept that 
interpretation. Like Phillips, he believed that because politicians “all concede to the 
Supreme Court, the right to determine the meaning of that instrument,” their 
interpretation “is LAW to all intents and purposes.” The observed deference shown to the 
Supreme Court increased leading up to Dred Scott, but that development coincided with 
the emergence of popular constitutionalisms, which placed interpretation in the hands of 
the people rather than the Court. Douglass, like Parker, would promote such an approach. 
Smith, showing him the way, asked him to “suppose Justice in this city bring in a false or 
corrupt judgment; would you overturn the government? No! turn out the Justice. … You 
may have the wisest and purest Constitution, and have it perverted. Your only security is 
in the sentiment of the country.” At this point, Douglass remained unmoved. The 
“overwhelming array of testimony” created too large a chasm to traverse.122 
 
 
“We Are in the Presence of No Ordinary Assembly”: Benjamin Robbins Curtis’s Time 
Travel and the Founders on Fugitive Slaves 
The Fugitive Slave Law and the cases that followed provided the impetus that 
Douglass needed to bridge that chasm. The controversies that erupted through attempts to 
reclaim fugitive slaves led some abolitionists, like Douglass, to reconsider, and other 
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abolitionists, like Theodore Parker, to further articulate, their positions. Indeed, as the 
human element became undeniable and as conflict seemed more inevitable, people in 
prominent positions felt compelled to verbalize and defend their constitutional 
interpretations. More than the Fugitive Slave Law itself, the fugitive slave cases that 
followed incited northerners to stake their grounds. Even before 1850, fugitive slave 
cases had deepened existing divisions. For example, the arrest of fugitive slave George 
Latimer in 1842 cemented the Garrisonian view of the Constitution as a proslavery 
compact.123 The cases that succeeded the Compromise of 1850 brought the constitutional 
issue further to the fore, leading some to dig in their heels in defense of slaveholders’ 
constitutional rights, while also radicalized much of New England against slavery. 
During this time, decades of seemingly isolated constitutional debating provided judges 
and policy-makers with national talking points. 
Parker dramatically depicted the volatile situation in a September 1850 speech on 
“The Function and Place of Conscience, in Relation to the Laws of Men.” Finding a 
loophole in the contractual obligation to uphold the land’s supreme source of legal 
authority, he contrasted the constant laws of God—“they never change”—with the 
changing laws of man—they “depend … on the finite will of man.”124 Parker explained 
that though the static laws of God reside within man as conscience, conscience was 
“relatively perfect. … It is often immature in the young, who have not had time for the 
growth … and in the old, who have checked and hindered its development.”125 This 
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description matched Parker’s sympathetic approach to eminent historical figures, who 
sanctioned slavery in their ignorance, and his damning attack on present proslavery 
supporters, who sanctioned slavery in spite of their illumination because they had 
allowed it to canker their souls. Sin, Parker believed, resulted when individuals knew evil 
but did not cast it out. Those who listened to conscience would acknowledge the sin of 
slavery and would be obligated to cast aside the Constitution to cleanse the nation. 
“Suppose,” Parker directed, that “a man has sworn to keep the Constitution of the United 
States, and the Constitution is found to be wrong in certain particulars: then his oath is 
not morally binding, for … he is morally bound to keep the law of God as fast as he 
learns it.”126 Parker identified the fugitive slave clause, especially in its most recent 
iteration, as wrong. Indeed, God’s law told him that “the man who attacks me to reduce 
me to slavery, in that moment of attack alienates his right to life, and if I were the 
fugitive, and could escape in no other way, I would kill him with as little compunction as 
I would drive a mosquito from my face.”127 A particular kind of historical understanding 
underlay Parker’s violent rhetoric. Believing in the progress of conscience, he found 
moral blindness but no sin in Paul, nor even in framers like Madison, though they had 
done wrong, but he could not hold nineteenth-century Americans guiltless, including the 
“eminent theologian of New England,” who bound himself to compact.128 As for himself, 
Parker preferred “conscience to cotton,” to the Bible, and to the Constitution.129  
Parker outlined the path of conscience for citizens. “It is plain to me,” he stated, 
“that it is the natural duty of citizens to rescue every fugitive slave from the hands of the 
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marshal who essays to return him to bondage.”130 A number of Boston’s residents 
followed that path when the Fugitive Slave Law placed William and Ellen Craft in 
imminent danger, while others valued Constitution over conscience. Successfully 
escaping from Georgia to Boston in late 1848, the Crafts had publicly recounted their 
harrowing and clever getaway to great effect on numerous occasions. But in October of 
1850 their popularity almost cost them their freedom when bounty hunters nearly 
captured them. In this tense setting, Harvard graduate and Massachusetts lawyer 
Benjamin Robbins Curtis prepared a legal opinion defending the constitutionality of the 
Act for US Marshal Charles Devens, who was charged to apprehend the Crafts. Within a 
week Benjamin Curtis further outlined his defense in a “Constitutional Meeting,” which 
his younger brother George Ticknor Curtis, also a Harvard graduate and a Massachusetts 
lawyer, had helped organize.131 
On November 26, 1850, “the Citizens of Boston and its vicinity, who reverence 
the Constitution of the United States; who wish to discountenance a spirit of disobedience 
to the laws of the land,” met in the famed Faneuil Hall, a virtual battleground for groups 
claiming the Revolutionary legacy.132 Indeed, John C. Warren, a Boston surgeon and a 
nephew of famous Revolutionary martyr Joseph Warren, who had been memorialized in 
various forms, including John Trumbull’s painting The Death of Warren (1786), presided 
over the meeting. In his brief speech, Warren described the Constitution not as a legal 
text but as an epochal divider between dark and light, stagnancy and progress, savagery 
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and civilization. Speaking with the authority of honor and experience, he outlined the 
desperate state of the colonies “during a period when there was no Constitution and no 
Union; when there was no commerce, no manufactures, little of agriculture, or of any of 
the arts calculated to make a powerful and happy people. … It was a period when men’s 
hands were turned against their neighbors,” he explained, “when the courts were beset 
with armed men, when law and justice were trampled under foot, when our best towns 
and villages were threatened with pillage, fire, and the sword; when the soil was polluted 
with the blood of its own citizens. … What a dark moment was this!”133 Warren painted a 
sad scene, but it was not without its happy features.  
“In the midst of this gloom,” he recounted to his listeners, “a ray of light showed 
itself. A Constitution was proposed, and … adopted as a bond of everlasting union. 
Under this Constitution,” he observed, “a new order of things has arisen. Commerce and 
agriculture have revived. Manufactures have everywhere grown up. Education, literature, 
and science, have been diffused in all our cities and towns. The highest prosperity has 
pervaded the nation, and presented to the wondering eyes of Europe the spectacle of a 
federal republic, free without licentiousness, and rich without luxury.” The Constitution 
had ushered in a new and unmatched era; an unprecedented period of peace and 
prosperity. Having provided this triumphalist narrative, Warren wondered, “is there any 
one desirous of returning to the disunion of 1786?”134 The implication was that anti-
constitutionalism and disunion would undo over a half-century of progress, leaving 
Americans in a dark and dilapidated past state. Warren did not mention the Declaration. 
The Revolution was not meant to be lived in but to be learned from. Like the opposite 
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narrative of decline since the founding era, this sort of historical narration of progress 
alone stood little chance of spreading a sense of the historical change that would induce 
Americans to reconsider their relationship to favored pasts and their readings of sacred 
texts. Indeed, these sorts of narratives differed little from Puritan calls for renewal or 
enlightenment pronouncements of progress. Warren’s narration demonstrates that 
traditional narratives of historical change and development persisted alongside those 
more capable of raising historical awareness. But in focusing on a specific moment in 
time and on a specific historical text, Curtis’s tale of temporal division did draw further 
attention to that moment and that text, encouraging further exploration. 
 Speaking next, Benjamin Curtis, who had helped organized Boston’s reception 
for Webster following his Seventh of March speech, echoed Warren’s pledge to “the 
whole CONSTITUTION and the whole UNION.”135 He made explicit what Warren had 
implied about disunionism. Making reference to a number of recent dangerous 
declarations, including the blasphemous higher-law proposition, made by abolitionists in 
Faneuil Hall, “that an article of the Constitution of the United States shall not be 
executed, law or no law,” and Parker’s violent statements in his September sermon, he 
damned anti-constitutional ideas as radical and deserving of “the rebuke of every good 
citizen.”136 Curtis compared the minority position he attacked, which aimed at revolution, 
with that of the more prominent if less defined Free Soilers, who recognized the 
constitutional presence of the fugitive slave clause and, in general, saw the need to keep 
the contract, but could not consent “to its being done in a particular way, or by any 
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particular means, or in any modern instance.” Aware of the antislavery emphasis on 
temporal distinction in their efforts to dismiss the Constitution’s proslavery injunctions, 
Curtis sought to close the gap between the time of ratification and the present. 
To determine the lawfulness of the anti-Fugitive Slave Law propositions, Curtis 
turned to history. He found that all legal theorists, from the early modern Dutch jurist 
Hugo Grotius to the contemporary German-American jurist Francis Lieber, had held as 
binding and enforceable interstate contracts dealing with the legal status of persons 
traveling among states. Locating this legal maxim in the Constitution itself, Curtis carried 
his listeners back to the Massachusetts ratification debates. “The question is,” he 
explained, “whether this Commonwealth, acted within the bounds of right, in 1788, when 
it entered into the compact in question.”137 Curtis’s speech was not simply a history 
lesson, but an experiment in time travel. “We are in the presence of no ordinary 
assembly,” he wrote, awakening the imagination of his audience. “In the chair is John 
Hancock. … There is Theophulis Parsons. … There is Samuel Adams.”138 Curtis 
wondered if such illustrious men as these had made “a compact so grossly immoral, that 
their children may not fairly execute it, but must now overthrow and destroy the work of 
their hands.” Figures like Parker and Douglass might have responded that the founders 
had expected that time would save their children the trouble. Curtis, though, conflated 
time. “It is but the other day,” he noted, “we were shedding our blood to obtain the 
Constitutions under which we live—Constitutions of our own choice and making—and 
now we are unsheathing the sword to overturn them.”139 While Parker stressed the 
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historical distance between the founding generation and his own to implicate the latter 
group, Curtis drew those generations together, which made the abolitionists’ position 
seem violently schizophrenic. “May the State make a promise to-day,” he railed on, “and 
to-morrow say, ‘On the whole, our interest did not require that promise, and it is not to be 
kept?”140 Curtis’s argument represented a striking example of the ways in which 
conventional conceptions of the close relationship between the present and a favored past 
maintained their hold on the antebellum American imagination. Indeed, it suggests that in 
some respects, slavery, encouraged and deepened the proclivity to conflate distinct 
historical contexts.  
And yet, while his speech tended to collapse time in ways that might leave 
modern hearers dizzy, Curtis recognized time’s passage in positing his own version of 
original expectation. He stated that “men of forecast must then have foreseen, and 
subsequent events have demonstrated … that without an obligation to restore fugitives 
from service, Constitution or no Constitution, Union or no Union, we could not expect to 
live in peace with the Slaveholding States.”141 As in the biblical debates, wherein 
interpreters stressed the prophets and apostles’ expedient approach to ancient servitude, 
Curtis highlighted the framers’ reasoned approach to American slavery. As historian 
Stuart Streichler notes, “Curtis suggested that the framers recognized the issue as 
potentially divisive and, for that reasons, establish guiding principles.”142 However, this 
version of original expectation emphasized continuity in slavery’s protection rather than 
change in its eventual abolition. “History proves” Curtis wrote, that the nation cannot 
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endure without a compact. As evidence, he referenced George Washington’s efforts in 
1789 to stop Georgia fugitives from escaping to Spanish Florida.143 Stating that the 
Constitution “comes as near to perfection as the lot of humanity permits,” Curtis 
concluded his argument in warning that breaking the “promise which our wise and good 
fathers made” would produce fatal results.144 Like Douglass, Curtis recognized that laws 
were man-made, but it was for that very reason he thought it unreasonable to measure 
them according to a standard of natural or divine justice. And although he believed that 
common law and even the Constitution must be flexible and adapt to changing 
circumstances to a certain extent, he believed that clear provisions, such as the fugitive 
slave clause, did not allow for change. He believed that the founding generation had 
thought historically, but did not seem to think that fact justified historical thinking among 
their sons and daughters. Indeed, because he did not believe in the progress of moral 
sentiment as did Parker and assumed temporal contemporaneity with the founding era, he 
could reject the idea that the time since then had created new imperatives with respect to 
fugitive slaves. 
In an 1850 Thanksgiving Day sermon, Parker responded to both Stuart and Curtis. 
He never embraced the Garrisonian contention that the Constitution must be scrapped for 
slavery to be abolished, but he proved willing to cast it aside, along with the Bible, if 
other means fell short. He wondered if “the professor,” meaning Stuart, “was mistaken 
more than the apostle,” but repeated his position that if the Old and New Testaments 
justify slavery, “so much the worse for them both.”145 Parker continued to believe that the 
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people of 1787 expected slavery “would die ‘of a rapid consumption,’” and mourned that 
“the culture of cotton has healed its deadly wound.”146 Given the direction of the nation, 
soon the only resolution might rest in replacing the Constitution. Speaking of Curtis and 
his ilk, Parker noted, “Men say there is danger of disunion, of our losing fealty for the 
Constitution. I do not believe it yet!” he announced. “Suppose it be so,” he continued, 
“The Constitution is the machinery of the national mill; and suppose we agree to take it 
out and put in new; we might get worse, very true, but we might get better. There have 
been some modern improvements; we might introduce them to the State as well as the 
mill.”147 Once again, Parker narrated both the corrupt rise of the Slave Power and the 
progress and spread of antislavery sentiment—“the spirit of the age, which is the public 
opinion of the nations, is against slavery.”148 He believed that the latter sentiment, one 
characteristic of the nineteenth century, might require a new Constitution to overcome the 
former power, one characteristic of former centuries. 
 
 
“The Statesmen of That Early Period Held Slavery to Be an Expiring Institution”: 
Frederick Douglass’s Smithian Approach to the Constitution 
While the controversy over fugitive slaves prompted some abolitionists to show at 
least a willingness to adopt Garrisonian measures, it helped others in their conversion 
from anti-constitutionalism to antislavery constitutionalism. In April of 1850, Frederick 
Douglass still maintained, “for the present, that the Constitution, being at war with itself, 
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cannot be lived up to.”149 John Stauffer places Douglass’s conversion to Gerrit Smith’s 
reading of the Constitution at the anti-fugitive slave bill convention held a few months 
later, in August, in Cazenovia, New York.150 It was six months after that, in January of 
1851, that Douglass wrote to Smith, explaining that although he could “not yet see that 
instrument in the same light in which you view it, I am so much impressed by your 
reasoning that I have about decided to let Slaveholders and their Northern abettors have 
the Laboring oar in putting a proslavery interpretation upon the Constitution.”151 
Douglass still believed that the slaveholders “are doubtless right so far as the intentions of 
the framers of the Constitution are concerned” and wondered, “may we avail ourselves of 
legal rules which enable us to defeat even the wicked intentions of our Constitution 
makers?” Soon enough, he joined Smith in flinging those intentions, to the extent that 
they could be proven authentic, “to the winds.”152 Meanwhile, the furor over fugitive 
slaves soon escalated.  
In April of 1851, George Curtis, Benjamin Curtis’s brother and Boston’s US 
Commissioner, issued a certificate of removal for Thomas Sims, another Georgia fugitive 
living in Boston. George Curtis had also been in charge of issuing arrest warrants for the 
Crafts and for Virginia native Shadrach Minkins, also known as Frederick Jenkins. 
However, the Boston Vigilance Committee, one of a number of such committees 
organized to assist fugitive slaves threatened with capture and re-enslavement, had hid 
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the Crafts in various dwellings, including Parker’s home, and had helped them escape to 
England in late 1850. To the chagrin of Benjamin Curtis, they also successfully saved 
Shadrach from his would-be captors in February of 1851. In his journal, Parker placed 
Shadrach’s rescue on par with famous Revolutionary acts, estimating the event to be “the 
most noble deed done in Boston since the destruction of the tea in 1773.”153 Sims was not 
as fortunate. Beginning on April 4, 1851, his lawyers, including prominent local attorneys 
Richard Henry Dana Jr. and Charles Sumner, made arguments to free him in a courtroom 
that doubled as a federal prison. A week later, George Curtis, through his certificate of 
removal, placed 300 policemen in position to march Sims back to bondage. 
Such developments corresponded with Douglass’s decision to make his 
transformation public. On May 21, he informed Gerrit Smith that he had adopted 
antislavery constitutionalism months before and asked his correspondent to give “a little 
attention to any controversy which may arise between my old friends and me, in regard to 
my present position on the Constitution questions.”154 Then, on May 23, feeling pressure 
from the AASS to state his position, Douglass announced in the North Star that “we have 
arrived at the firm conviction that the Constitution, construed in the light of well 
established rules of legal interpretation, might be made consistent in its details with the 
noble purposes avowed in its preamble; and that hereafter we should insist upon the 
application of such rules to that instrument, and demand that it be wielded in behalf of 
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emancipation.”155 Douglass had been blinded in seeking “its meaning in the history and 
practice of the nation under it,” but a “careful study of the writings of Lysander Spooner, 
of Gerrit Smith, and of William Goodell” had given him sight.156 As the rise of 
abolitionism had incited southerners’ to craft proslavery defenses, proslavery incursions 
encouraged more and more antislavery northerners to adopt antislavery readings of the 
founding and the Constitution. As Parker proved willing to move toward Garrison’s 
reading of the Constitution, Douglass gave up the Garrisonian interpretation for a 
Smithian one, while also maintaining his distance from the views of figures like Curtis.   
 Douglass was not prepared to fully leave behind the Garrisonian approach, 
however. He now believed that he was “only in reason and in conscience bound to learn 
the intentions of those who framed the Constitution in the Constitution itself,” but the 
extra-constitutional intentions continued to bother him, in part because of certain 
abolitionists’ “resolute determination to see slavery in the Constitution.”157 Douglass 
soon discovered a way to read those intentions differently. In a July 1851 editorial in his 
newly formed eponymous paper, which resulted from the merger of the North Star and 
Smith’s Liberty Party Paper, Douglass referenced the Pennsylvania Freeman, an 
abolitionist newspaper that claimed Quaker poet John Greenleaf Whittier as a past editor. 
The Freeman had taken umbrage with Douglass’s new constitutional stance and 
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countered it with an interpretation based on the framers’ intentions and the practice of the 
government since the founding era, an approach that Douglass had once defended. Rather 
than dismiss their findings as irrelevant, he proceeded along a new line of inquiry. Citing 
the Freeman’s statement that they could “‘hardly conceive of a fact in law or history 
being proved more conclusively, than is the fact that the Constitution was intended to 
protect slavery,’” Douglass then asked “who the persons were who intended that the 
Constitution should protect slavery?” and who was “the name of the author of that history 
who has so conclusively proved that the Constitution was intended to protect slavery.”158 
The paper might have supplied names like Madison and Phillips, but Douglass’s playful 
point had a serious edge. In terms of “traditional history … we shall find many 
conflicting versions about the very point which is so conclusively proved.”159 Similar to a 
number of biblical interpreters, Douglass introduced historical pyrrhonism into the 
debate, which called into question all historical accounts. The move, though, also opened 
the door to alternative narratives.  
 Douglass outlined a range of prominent readings. He first described a version he 
identified with the late leading southern political theorist, John C. Calhoun. This 
Calhounian version found slavery “co-extensive with the Constitution” and understood 
the right to property in men as holding the same constitutional status as the right to other 
forms of property. Douglass then explained what amounted to the federal consensus 
position, which designated slavery as a state institution. He then expounded a third view, 
prominent among antislavery interpreters, which held, “that contributing to the extension 
and perpetuity of slavery was never dreamed of by the men of the Revolution, and their 
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immediate descendants; but that, on the contrary, the fathers of the Revolution sought to 
limit, circumscribe, and to hasten the extinction of slavery.”160 Douglass’s own version of 
the founding era followed from the third. 
Earlier in the article he had written of the founders, “It does seem to us highly 
commendable to take the most favorable possible view of the motives and intentions of 
men, and especially of those men who lived in the stormy and trying time in which the 
Constitution was orginated [sic] and adopted.”161 Similar to Parker’s reading, this 
sympathetic approach to the Revolutionary generation valued context and circumstance. 
But where Parker’s reading allowed him to dismiss their views, Douglass’s supported his 
antislavery interpretation. He offered a reading that most northern interpreters seemed to 
agree with, including figures like Webster and Stuart. He wrote that, “In reading the 
sentiments of the most influential men of the period, and to which the Constitution was 
framed and adopted, it is evident that slavery was looked upon as a great evil. … The 
writings of Washington, Franklin, Jefferson, Adams, Madison, Monroe, Hamilton, Luther 
Martin, Patrick Henry, John Jay, and a host of other great men, fathers of the Republic, 
all go to establish this conviction.” To this, Douglass added another frequently expressed 
belief about the founders. “We take to be true—that the statesmen of that early period 
held slavery to be an expiring institution. We doubt if there were more than a dozen men 
in the Convention … who did not expect that slavery in this country would cease forever 
long before the year 1851.” Combined with the precise language of the Constitution, 
Douglass believed that these historical facts are “no slight testimony in proof of the 
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intention to make the Constitution a permanent liberty document.”162 Historical evidence 
could be used to develop a range of narratives, even one countering the version Wendell 
Phillips presented in The Constitution A Proslavery Compact, a version that Douglass 
himself had promoted. Ultimately, Douglass argued that the real question rested with the 
language of the Constitution and if it was discovered that the slaveholding founders 
sought to protect slavery as an institution, then “their intention was wicked, and contrary 
to the spirit and letter of the Constitution.”163 Douglass’s emphasis on spirit, which 
echoed antislavery readings of the Bible, as well as William Goodell’s antislavery 
constitutional interpretation, supported his move to stress the interpretive role of the 
people. He remained concerned with the framers’ intentions, but if those fell short other 
means existed to read the Constitution as “a permanent liberty document.” 
In closing his discussion, Douglass again drew attention to the difficulty of 
discovering the true intentions of the framers, a problem that he believed would only 
increase over time. “How are we to know now, or a century hence, what were the motives 
and intentions of the various parties to the Constitution of the U.S.A.” he asked. In 
emphasizing the messiness of the past, Douglass echoed Lysander Spooner and 
contradicted Wendell Phillips. The problem was further complicated by proslavery 
incursions since the founding era. “Nothing is more evident,” he wrote, “than that as 
slavery becomes strong, the pretensions of slaveholders range higher and broader, and 
their claims to be protected under the Constitution become more and more unreasonable 
and audacious.”164 Proslavery gains obscured the Constitution’s original intent and 
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meaning. And if one was going to appeal to intent outside of the Constitution, “there 
must be no ambiguity about it.”165 Ambiguity about the framers’ intentions authorized 
Douglass to introduce his own historical narrative, one that located antislavery sentiments 
and expectations at the writing and ratification of the Constitution and then traced 
slavery’s corrupting and obscuring influence since that time.  
Even though Douglass now read and would continue to read the founding era 
through an antislavery lens, he still had occasion to refer to the framers’ failures. The idea 
that they held divergent and conflicting opinions on slavery permitted him to suggest that 
the evolving views of the people mattered most in constitutional interpretation. One 
might expect him to appeal to the intentions of the people who ratified the Constitution, 
but the ratifiers’ views were even more ambiguous than the intentions of the framers. The 
voice of the people in the present matter most.166 Of course, Douglass had like-minded 
contemporaries in mind. In a speech on the Fugitive Slave Law, given at the National 
Free Soil Convention in August of 1852, Douglass, now “proud to be one of the disciples 
of Gerrit Smith,” separated his enlightened listeners from their shortsighted forefathers. 
“It has been said that our fathers entered into a covenant for this slave-catching,” he told 
his audience. “Who were your daddies?” he asked, drawing their laughter. “I take it they 
were men, and so are you. You are the sons of your fathers; and if you find your fathers 
exercising any rights that you don’t find among your rights, you may be sure that they 
have transcended their limits. If they have made a covenant that you should do that which 
they have no right to do themselves, they transcended their own authority, and surely it is 
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not binding on you.” The transient laws of the illustrious ancestors held no claim on their 
illuminated descendants. “The binding quality of law,” Douglass explained, “is its 
reasonableness,” and the reasonableness of the fugitive slave clause had long since 
expired, if it every existed at all.167 Like Parker, Douglass believed that “he who has God 
and conscience on his side, has a majority against the universe. Though he does not 
represent the present state, he represents the future state.”168 The abolitionists anticipated 
a glorious millennium even while hell extended its borders.  
Despite his future projections rooted in present fears, like Parker, Douglass 
believed that the nineteenth-century was an age of freedom, and as he had made clear in 
his cutting 1852 speech, “What to the Slave is the Fourth of July,” he believed that this 
should be especially applicable in the American republic. By describing slavery as the 
great contradiction of a supposed free land and by highlighting the hypocrisy of 
slaveholding in a presumably Christian nation, Douglass was not simply pointing out 
America’s most glaring flaw; he was also claiming a right to its most glowing promises. 
During the 1850s, his antislavery reading of the founding period, which he had briefly 
outlined in the July 1851 article, evolved to a point where he revalued the intentions of 
the framers in constitutional interpretation. In contrast to his use of intentions in the 
1840s, which he used to highlight the Constitution’s proslavery provisions, in the 1850s 
Douglass stressed the framers’ egalitarian expectations. He again privileged contextual 
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interpretation, but unlike Parker he had come to believe that the Garrisonian contention 
was without merit.169 
Tracing Douglass’s changing approach to the Constitution displays the central 
features of the period’s most prominent antislavery approaches to the Constitution and 
also shows how the Fugitive Slave Law and the fugitive slave cases initiated a move 
among some northerners to adopt an antislavery view of the Constitution and the 
founding era. It also demonstrates that constitutional interpretation, even more than 
biblical interpretation, was “THE QUESTION OF THE DAY.” In Douglass’s case, this 
shift in focus may have allowed him to hold onto his rather blunt antislavery reading of 
the Bible, which increasingly escaped the public penetrating readings of Stuart and 
others. But even with the Bible, Douglass grasped the temporal barrier between ancient 
and modern times. Perhaps the very distance separating biblical times from the nineteenth 
century, which was much greater than the gap dividing Revolutionary times from the 
present, allowed readers of the Bible, in contrast to readers of the Constitution, to more 
easily ignore troubling historical evidence. On the other hand, as was the case with 
Douglass, the greater availability of historical knowledge about the more recent founding 
era revealed certain discrepancies, allowing readers to introduce alternative accounts.  
Regardless of the exact nature of the relationship between an awareness of 
historical discrepancies and approaches to historical texts, in constitutional interpretation 
both the Garrisonian and Smithian approaches carried implications for how one thought 
about the relationship between the founding era and the present. Like Parker, sometimes 
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Douglass drew attention to the nation’s failure to realize the founders’ expectations, and 
sometimes he exposed the failures of the founders themselves. That dual emphasis 
indicated historical distance in highlighting original context, but also in sounding the 
discordance between original expectations and actual circumstances. And when these 
figures went on to contrast slavery’s corrupting presence with the current era’s call for 
freedom, it further signaled that historical distance. 
 The figure of Frederick Douglass, a fugitive turned freeman, served as a constant 
reminder that behind the high-level debates in which he participated stood suffering men, 
women, and children. At times, as with Theodore Weld’s American Slavery As It Is 
(1839), which he had authored with Angelina and Sarah Grimké, abolitionists strove to 
highlight the sad situation of the blacks in bondage in hopes of stirring northern 
sympathies.170 But antislavery readings of the Constitution and the founding era often 
remained at the level of abstraction. A number of realities, including the presence of free 
African Americans in the North, could bring their enslaved brothers and sisters in the 
South to the minds of white northerners. In a strange irony, attempts to enforce the 
Fugitive Slave Law in the 1850s placed other African Americans on the national stage, 
making it harder for northerners to forget the human lives at stake. These developments 
anticipated Dred Scott, when the focus on another African American turned attention to 
black Revolutionary forebears. The place of former slaves such as Frederick Douglass 
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and slaves such as Dred Scott in the national consciousness made it rather difficult to 
discuss slavery without discussing southern slaves, or, rather, without discussing blacks 
and their status in America as slaves but also as freemen.   
 
 
“Giving up the OLD for the NEW Faith”: Anthony Burns, a Burning Constitution, and 
Abraham Lincoln’s Juxtaposition of Founding-Era Expectations and Slavery’s Extension 
Between Douglass’s shift in constitutional views and Scott’s trial before the 
Supreme Court, another black figure captured the nation’s, or at least New England’s, 
attention. Back in November of 1851, after receiving an appointment to the US Supreme 
Court at the recommendation of Daniel Webster, Benjamin Curtis presided over a grand 
jury charge against African American lawyer Robert Morris for his alleged participation 
in the rescue of Shadrach. Almost three years later, in the summer of 1854, Morris and 
Richard Henry Dana Jr. acted as attorneys for Anthony Burns in perhaps the most 
important fugitive slave case in American history. Having escaped from Richmond in 
early 1854, Burns was arrested and jailed in a Boston courthouse in late May. When 
abolitionists drummed up resistance during the proceedings, as they had successfully 
done during previous cases, President Franklin Pierce sent federal troops to maintain 
order. And when US Commissioner Edward G. Loring remanded Burns to his Virginia 
owner and directed federal troops to escort him to a ship bound for slavery, New England 
burst into a panic. The already animated Garrison declared that Loring had pronounced 
Burns “no man, but a thing … the Declaration of Independence to be a lie, George 
Washington and his associates traitors and cutthroats, the Golden Rule an absurdity, and 
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Jesus of Nazareth an impostor.”171 Notably, he left out the Constitution. Amos Adams 
Lawrence of Groton, Massachusetts wrote of the marked results of the federal show of 
force, “We went to bed one night old-fashioned, conservative, compromise Union Whigs 
& waked up stark mad Abolitionists.”172 Most conservatives remained conservative, but 
many of those on the fence joined the emboldened radicals on the ground. 
In the aftermath of this trial, Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Curtis issued an 
indictment against Phillips and Parker. The indictment did not lead to convictions, though 
it did provide more fodder for Parker’s attack on Curtis as a pawn of proslavery 
powers.173  Burns’s forced return to servitude heightened the exchange in this tug-a-war 
between conciliatory government action and antagonistic abolitionist response. 
Abolitionists’ fury had already been sparked with the passage of Illinois Senator Stephen 
A. Douglas’s Kansas-Nebraska Act, which Pierce had signed into law on May 30. The 
new law repealed the Missouri Compromise and instituted popular sovereignty, which 
permitted settlers to decide whether or not to introduce slavery into territories previously 
closed to that institution. In the wake of these seeming proslavery advancements, the 
Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society declared the Fourth of July a day of public 
mourning. If the society needed a death for the occasion, Garrison would provide them 
one in his immolation of a prominent document.  
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During the society’s meeting in Framingham, Massachusetts, Henry David 
Thoreau, the Transcendentalist who had refused to pay taxes in opposition to the 
Mexican-American War and had written Resistance to Civil Government (1849), urged 
that “the law will never make men free; it is men who have got to make the law free.”174 
Similar to the idea expressed in Francis Wayland’s biblical argument, Thoreau suggested 
that Americans had the power to legally abolish slavery. This might involve an 
amendment process, but Garrison had a more radical resolution in mind. Once again, he 
praised the Declaration of Independence, but, in his view, this was the nation’s only 
fireproof document. First, Garrison burnt a copy of the Fugitive Slave Law. Next came 
Loring’s decision in the Burns case and the grand jury’s indictment that followed. 
Finally, the unrelenting abolitionist put the nation’s sacred legal document, the US 
Constitution, to the torch. The visible act symbolized what Garrison had been preaching 
for over a decade. It represented the culmination of his contempt. When prominent judges 
and politicians, including Justice Curtis and President Pierce, commanded Americans to 
recognize and obey the proslavery provisions, some abolitionists had no other choice but 
to raze a corrupt Constitution and break with an unsalvageable South. The outmoded 
document and the old-fashioned region deserved each other.175 
Other options, though, were available. Although the fugitive slave cases boosted 
the ranks of the abolitionists and raised their temperatures, to many more antislavery 
advocates, including both newcomers like Amos Lawrence and veterans like Frederick 
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Douglass, it signaled the need to use political, constitutional, and even violent means. 
These trends further undermined Garrison’s come-outerism and his non-violence. 
Especially in the wake of the late European revolutions, slavery’s enemies in America 
began to call on the martial legacy of their own Revolution, which raised questions about 
Garrison’s particular claim on the Declaration and his push for a revolution in 
sentiments.176 His anti-constitutionalism also found few adherents during this period. 
Douglass’s own appeal to the Constitution grew stronger in the creation of the Radical 
Abolition Party that he helped organize with William Goodell, Gerrit Smith, and James 
McCune Smith, a black physician and one of the era’s most avid abolitionists. These 
figures cherished the Constitution, along with the Bible, as sacred creeds. Millenarian in 
their mindset, this interracial alliance launched a holy crusade against the last great 
obstacle to the establishment of heaven on earth: slavery. Such ideas informed John 
Brown’s religiously motivated violent foray into the belly of the beast, but they also 
influenced those more interested in political measures.177 
More specifically, the kind of constitutional reading that Douglass had adopted 
and advanced began to show up in the speeches of a certain Illinois lawyer in the mid-
1850s. Abraham Lincoln had served a two-year term in the US House of Representatives 
between 1847 and 1849 before returning to practice law in Springfield, Illinois. The 
Kansas-Nebraska Act led him back to politics. He ran for but did not fill a seat in the US 
Senate in late 1854. Two years later, he placed second in the bid for the vice presidential 
candidate of the newly formed Republican Party. In 1858, Stephen A. Douglas defeated 
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him in a race for the US Senate. Then, in 1860, six years after his reentry into politics, 
Lincoln, the Republican Party’s presidential candidate, won election over his rival 
Douglas. Lincoln’s position on slavery was key to his politics in the 1850s, and that 
position rested on an antislavery reading of the Constitution and the founding era.  
Lincoln voiced that reading in his “Peoria Speech,” given on October 16, 1854, 
which marked his return to politics and signaled the rise of slavery as the central issue in 
his political thought. After the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act in late May, Lincoln 
holed himself up in the Illinois state library in Springfield and, as historian James Oakes 
writes, dedicated his time to “researching the history of slavery in the United States.”178 
Armed with historical evidence, Lincoln took to the political battlefield in August. 
Eventually, he convinced Douglas, his political foe, to engage in a fight of words. In their 
16 October debate, Lincoln neatly summarized his position.  
Following Douglas’s evening speech, Lincoln adjourned the meeting until seven 
o’clock in the evening, when he arose to discuss the recent repeal of the Missouri 
Compromise. He made clear the distinction between slavery as an “EXISTING 
institution” and its unfortunate “EXTENSION,” showing allegiance to the federal 
consensus.179 Informing his listeners of his historical findings, Lincoln began with pre-
ratification legislation. Of the Northwest Ordinance, he stated that Jefferson “conceived 
of the idea of taking that occasion, to prevent slavery ever going into the north-western 
territory.” Lincoln’s historical narration posited continuity on this point. 
“Thenceforward,” he explained, “for sixty-one years, all parties acted in quiet obedience 
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to this ordinance. It is now what Jefferson foresaw and intended—the happy home of 
teeming millions of free, white prosperous people, and no slave amongst them.” Training 
his focus on slavery’s extension allowed Lincoln to posit continuous assent to Jefferson’s 
founding expectations. Further, in highlighting extra-constitutional documents and 
developments, Lincoln avoided the criticism that figures like Lysander Spooner faced 
when they appealed to the Constitution’s words alone to interpret it as an antislavery 
document. In using pre-ratification enactments, Lincoln also diverted attention from the 
Garrisonian emphasis on the ratification debates. Or, rather, as with Frederick Douglass 
and other antislavery readers, Lincoln used the Declaration and the Revolution to 
illuminate those debates. In contrast to John C. Warren’s fear of returning to the period 
before ratification, he hoped to rediscover the time “away back of the constitution, in the 
pure fresh, free breath of the revolution.”180  
Returning to post-founding era developments, Lincoln proceeded to trace 
continuity from the Northwest Ordinance to the Missouri Compromise and from the 
Missouri Compromise to the Compromise of 1850. In contrast to Garrisonians, who 
posited consistency between a proslavery Constitution and the Fugitive Slave Law, or 
antislavery constitutionalists, who outlined decline from an antislavery Constitution to 
the Fugitive Slave Law, Lincoln traced efforts to contain slavery from the period before 
the founding to the present. His narrow focus on slavery’s extension permitted that 
reading. In his account, the aberrant Kansas-Nebraska Act interrupted the sequence. 
“Now new light breaks upon us,” he scoffed, “Now congress declares this ought never to 
have been.” Of slaveholders’ desire to take slaves into Nebraska he stated, “That perfect 
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liberty they sigh for—the liberty of making slaves of other people—Jefferson never 
thought of.”181 Over the next decade plus, Lincoln’s position came to rest on what he 
believed founders like Jefferson did and did not intend. In his political speeches of the 
late 1850s, Lincoln began to emphasize the various ways in which the founders’ 
expectations had failed to reach fruition. With the dissemination of these high profile 
speeches, the potential awareness of historical change and thus distance from the 
founding era became more pronounced.  
Lincoln contrasted the principles underlying the repeal of the Missouri 
Compromise—which he described as “covert real zeal for the spread of slavery”—with 
those of the founding era. He could “not but hate” the former, especially because “it 
forces so many really good men amongst ourselves into an open war with the very 
fundamental principles of civil liberty—criticising the Declaration of Independence, and 
insisting that there is not right principle of action but self-interest.” Although southerners 
had voiced such criticism from the time of the Missouri crisis, Lincoln described it as a 
new development, which gave his narrative bite. He stressed that he was not after social 
or political equality for blacks. He did not go so far as to agree with southerners who 
argued that their institution ensured progress, but he acknowledged that “they are just 
what we would be in their situation.”182 He confessed that he knew not how to best 
resolve the situation and acknowledged slaveholders’ “constitutional rights,” expressing, 
in particular, his willingness to uphold the Fugitive Slave Law and stating firmly that 
despite a number of degrading provisions, he did not “propose to destroy, or alter, or 
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disregard the constitution.”183 Lincoln even stated that, as much as he hated slavery, he 
“would consent to the extension of it rather than see the Union dissolved.”184 This 
preservationist position guided Lincoln’s politics throughout the remainder of his life. 
However, even as he eased southerners’ fears of abolition, he indicted them for their 
immoral institution. He believed that the consciousness of the southern people told them 
that “there is humanity in the negro.”185 He held up as “the sheet anchor of American 
republicanism” the principle he found in the Declaration’s Preamble that “no man is good 
enough to govern another man, without that other’s consent.”186 This appeal to what he 
understood as founding-era axioms guided his attack on slavery’s extension, “the great 
Behemoth of danger.”187 
Glad that Douglas had referenced the examples of the “revolutionary fathers,” 
Lincoln expressed a love for “the sentiments of those old-time men; and” noted that he 
“shall be most happy to abide by their opinions.” He granted the Constitution’s emphasis 
on state sovereignty, but wondered if it had “any reference to the carrying of slavery into 
NEW COUNTRIES?” The answer depended on a historical examination. “We will let the 
fathers themselves answer it,” Lincoln stated, before pointing out that it was the men of 
the Revolution and the Constitution who had passed the Ordinance of 1787. Of their 
views and Douglas’s on this issue, he held that “it is a question of discrimination between 
them and him.”188 Lincoln’s historical examination again broadened to back his anti-
extension position. He objected to the idea of a moral right to enslave fellow humans 
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“because the fathers of the republic eschewed, and rejected it. The argument of 
‘Necessity’ was the only argument they ever admitted in favor of slavery. … They cast 
blame upon the British King for having permitted its introduction. BEFORE the 
constitution, they prohibited its introduction into the north-western Territory…AT the 
framing and adoption of the constitution, they forbore to so much as mention the word 
‘slave’ or ‘slavery’ in the whole instrument.” Lincoln’s “argument of necessity” 
supported his own expedient approach to slavery and placed geographical and 
chronological limits on the Constitution’s proslavery provisions. The founders “hid 
away” those provisions “just as an afflicted man hides away a wen or a cancer, which he 
dares not cut out at once, lest he bleed to death; with the promise, nevertheless, that the 
cutting may begin at the end of a given time.”189 Rather than focus on the spread of 
antislavery sentiment, as did Theodore Parker, after referencing an original expectation of 
slavery’s removal, Lincoln traced post-founding era acts aimed at realizing those 
expectations, including laws limiting and prohibiting the non-domestic slave trade and 
plans for gradual emancipation in slave states. It seemed that the new nation was on track 
to fulfill the founders’ promises. 
“The institution was rapidly becoming extinct within these limits,” Lincoln 
proposed, “but NOW it is to be transformed into a ‘sacred right.’” The innovation was a 
deviation from founding era ideals, a “giving up [of] the OLD for the NEW faith. Near 
eighty years ago we began by declaring that all men are created equal; but now from that 
beginning we have run down to the other declaration, that for SOME men to enslave 
OTHERS is a ‘sacred right of self-government.’ These principles can not stand together.” 
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Much distinguished Parker’s and Douglass’s positions from Lincoln’s, but the aspirant 
for an Illinois senatorial seat agreed that slavery in the present and founding era ideals of 
self-government stood in stark opposition. Indeed, he proposed that if the Declaration had 
been called “‘a self-evident lie’” in “old Independence Hall” as it had been in a recent 
statement supporting the Kansas-Nebraska bill, “the very door-keeper would have 
throttled the man, and thrust him into the street.” Lincoln did not assert that the founders, 
if present, would support or attack the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, as Moses Stuart had in 
reference to the Fugitive Slave Law, but he argued that “the spirit of seventy-six and the 
spirit of Nebraska, are utter antagonisms,” lamenting that “the former is being rapidly 
displaced by the latter.”190 This development had temporal implications. Quoting a recent 
article from the Daily News (London), Lincoln noted the apprehension of “the liberal 
party throughout the world … ‘that the one retrograde institution in America, [was] 
undermining the principles of progress, and fatally violating the noblest political system 
the world ever saw.’” The work echoed Frederick Douglass’s prior claim that America 
was behind the times in its protection of a anachronistic institution. Lincoln agreed with 
Stephen Douglas that, “in point of mere fact,” the “government was made for the white 
people and not for the negroes,” but he feared that turning from the “earliest practice, and 
first precept of our ancient faith” would threaten “even the white man’s charter of 
freedom.”191 Unlike the abolitionists, Lincoln cherished the memory of Henry Clay and 
Daniel Webster and his focus on extension led him to describe only the most recent 
developments as evidence of the deterioration of founding-era ideals, but like the 
abolitionists, his narration tended to expose temporal distance since that time. 
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Conclusion 
 Lincoln never went as far as Douglass in reading the Constitution as an 
antislavery document. He certainly never proposed the position of Parker, much less 
Garrison or Phillips, in showing a willingness to abandon the nation’s legal creed. Indeed, 
in many respects, Lincoln’s position was closer to the unionism of Webster, Stuart, and 
Curtis than that of the abolitionists. In stating his intention to uphold the Constitution and 
its proslavery clauses, including the fugitive slave clause, and to respect slavery where it 
already existed, Lincoln swore allegiance to the federal consensus. The contextual 
reading he presented in his Peoria speech granted the presence of slavery at the founding 
and stressed the efforts to limit its spread as a state institution. Indeed, Lincoln found 
continuity in this containment policy from before ratification until 1850. He believed his 
expedient approach to slavery matched his own. However, his narrative echoed that of 
certain abolitionists in important respects. His focus on the Declaration, which only 
increased over the next decade, and his reading of the Constitution as consistent with that 
document paralleled the speeches and writings of figures such as Parker and Douglass. 
While Parker saw a gradual growth of the Slave Power since the founding era, Lincoln 
discovered radical proslavery intrusions only in 1854, but both identified southern 
betrayal from founding era principles meant to eventually stamp out slavery. While 
Douglass sought racial equality, Lincoln focused on containing slavery, but both insisted 
on the contradiction between the peculiar institution and the principles found in the 
Declaration’s Preamble. And both began to use historical insights to highlight what they 
heralded as the founders’ original antislavery expectations.  
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 Although important differences distinguished these historical narratives from each 
other, the similarities among them drew attention to historical distance. In identifying the 
founding fathers’ original expectations of slavery’s ultimate abolition, the narratives of 
Parker, Douglass, and Lincoln granted the legal presence of slavery in the founding era. 
Indeed, their emphasis on original expectations rested on the fact that proslavery forces 
had exerted a prominent role in the founding era. That emphasis, coupled with their 
assertions that enough time had passed—as a result of the spread of antislavery sentiment 
or of federal acts that hemmed in slavery—to fulfill the framers’ expectations exposed 
that times now were quite different than at ratification. In tracing deviations from the 
framers’ original expectations, either since ratification or since the passing of the Kansas-
Nebraska Act, these accounts identified unexpected change resulting in the solidification 
of an anachronistic institution. In doing so, they did not signal their authors’ desire to 
return to the favored past, as did most previous narratives of decline and corruption. 
Rather, they represented the hope that Americans could finally complete the struggle that 
the nation’s founders had started in 1776. Even in 1854, Lincoln condemned slavery 
itself, though he focused on its extension. His more moderate approach served his 
political cause, but his prominent position on the public stage also exposed the 
antislavery historical narrative, and its implications, to a broad American public. 
Paradoxically, that narrative received perhaps its most public forum in Dred Scott (1857). 
Indeed, Dred Scott gave a national platform for both the proslavery and the 
antislavery readings of the Constitution. In a strange twist of irony, the radical 
Garrisonian reading received the imprimatur of the US Supreme Court through Chief 
Justice Roger Taney’s decision. The irony worked both ways, however. In focusing 
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attention on Dred Scott and his ancestors, the Court’s decision placed an unprecedented 
amount of attention on blacks and their Revolutionary era ancestors. Turning attention to 
the historical question of whether or not blacks had been citizens at the nation’s founding 
shifted focus away from the Constitution’s proslavery clauses, including the fugitive 
slave clause. The change in historical focus inspired a change in political stance. 
Benjamin Curtis, who abolitionists had often attacked as a proslavery man, stood 
opposite the Court in arguing that in some states blacks had, in fact, voted as citizens 
during the ratification process. Even though the debate following the decision revolved 
around the second major question involved, that of whether the Constitution authorized 
or prohibited slavery in the territories, it was Curtis’s argument about blacks in the 
founding era that reverberated in antislavery publications. Similar to the narratives 
advanced by his erstwhile abolitionist opponents, that argument posited the presence of 
antislavery sentiments at the founding and highlighted the unfortunate deviation from the 
framers’ antislavery expectations. Here, Curtis’s understanding of the Constitution as a 
flexible document served him well. He advanced his argument through a careful 
explication, and then returned it in more articulate form for politicians like Lincoln to 
use. This synergistic process spread the potential to realize the extent of historical 
distance since the founding era.      
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CHAPTER 5  
 
“TIMES NOW ARE NOT AS THEY WERE”: THE DRED SCOTT DECISION AND 
SLAVERY’S INTRODUCTION OF HISTORICAL DISTANCE  
One respondent to Dred Scott contended that Chief Justice Roger B. Taney’s 
deciding opinion “does not rest so much upon any interpretation of the law as it does 
upon a construction of the facts of history.”1 Though perhaps mistaken in assuming a 
clear distinction between legal and historical interpretation, especially given the then-
recent trend toward using historical argumentation in constitutional debates, the 
respondent had a point. The decision did rest on a historical argument, which 
demonstrated that the Chief Justice accepted the historical grounds of debate that had 
been prepared through decades of interpretive emphasis on the historical explication of 
sacred religious and legal texts. Taney believed that a historically grounded decision 
would settle the constitutional debate over slavery. He insisted that slavery’s 
constitutional viability in the nineteenth-century present depended on an understanding of 
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its place in the Revolutionary past. In the syllabus of the decision, written by Taney 
himself, he asserted that “when the Constitution was adopted, they [blacks] were not 
regarded in any of the States as members of the community which constituted the State, 
and were not numbered among its ‘people or citizens.’” Based on this observation he 
concluded that “the special rights and immunities guarantied to citizens do not apply to 
them,” and, consequently, “they are not entitled to sue … in a court of the United States.” 
Taney conflated blacks at the founding with blacks in the present through his fluid use of 
pronouns—from “they” to “them” and back to “they.” His historical narration designated 
blacks as non-citizens in 1787 and thus, given his assumption of the Constitution’s 
timelessness, he rendered “African American” a misnomer in 1857.2 
The static nature of the Constitution seemed to place blacks, once and for all, 
beyond the pale of American citizenry, but what about the contingent and fluid nature of 
the republic’s history? Perhaps the Revolutionary generation had denied their black 
contemporaries citizenship, but some radical abolitionists had raised the question: what if 
their sons and daughters wanted to grant their descendants that status? Figures such as 
Parker and Douglass had contended that regardless of what the framers had intended, the 
current generation was duty bound to embrace the spirit of the present age by abolishing 
slavery and extending the blessings of liberty. Even in declaring that the words of the 
fathers held sway, Taney himself demonstrated an awareness of a cultural shift: “The 
change in public opinion and feeling in relation to the African race which has taken place 
since the adoption of the Constitution cannot change its construction and meaning, and it 
must be construed and administered now according to its true meaning and intention 
                                                
2 Scott v. Sandford, 60 US, 393. 
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when it was formed and adopted.”3 As much as Daniel Webster and Benjamin Curtis, 
Taney observed changes in northern sentiment and, more clearly than they, he asserted 
that those changes had no place in constitutional interpretation. Though created and 
ratified in time, the Constitution’s significance transcended temporality, preventing 
subsequent departures. Times had changed, Taney allowed, but the meaning of the 
nation’s sacred text had not.4 Because the founders had designated blacks non-citizens at 
the founding, Taney insisted, he could not now declare them citizens, despite a shift in 
public opinion. A focus on perceived static original meanings rather than an emphasis on 
                                                
3 Ibid., 393. The published version of the decision, which I use here, includes 
additions that Taney incorporated after the ruling to buttress his argument.  
4 As Chief Justice, Taney was not wholly against appeals to change. In fact, in 
Charles River Bridge (1837), he famously ruled in favor of commercial progress by 
arguing that a contract with the Warren Bridge Company did not violate the contract 
originally issued to the Charles River Bridge Company. Strictly construing the original 
charter allowed him to rule in favor of the former company without violating the 
Constitution’s contract clause. If the opposite ruling prevailed, Taney argued, “We shall 
be thrown back to the improvements of the last century, and be obliged to stand still until 
the claims of the old turnpike corporations shall be satisfied and they shall consent to 
permit these States to avail themselves of the lights of modern science and to partake of 
the benefit of those improvements which are now adding to the wealth and prosperity and 
the convenience and comfort of every other part of the civilized world.” Justice John 
McLean made a similar argument in his concurring opinion, noting that “the settlement of 
our country is comparatively recent, and its rapid growth in population and advance in 
improvements have prevented, in a great degree, interests from being acquired by 
immemorial usage. Such evidence of right is found in countries where society has 
become more fixed and improvements are in a great degree stationary.” McLean also 
contextualized the contract clause, drawing attention to “the history of our revolution” 
and “the time the Constitution was adopted,” to contend that the present case does not 
“come within the scope of that provision.” Justice Joseph Story dissented, in part, 
because he believed the decision would hinder commerce by discouraging companies 
from entering into contracts. Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren 
Bridge, 36 US 420, 553, 563, 572-73, 573 (1837). In this decision, then, Taney claimed 
continuity with the founding even as he prescribed progress. Though a good candidate to 
evidence change and distance since the Revolutionary era, the issue of commerce did not 
draw as much attention to that period nor introduce as much division and disagreement as 
the slavery issue. On the historical components of this decision, see Kunal Parker, 
Common Law, 128-58.  
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original expectations, directed Taney’s interpretation. Taney seemed set on recreating the 
founding era, or at least, on recovering what he perceived to be the legal principles that 
governed social relations between slave and master in that period. But, as in many of the 
debates that preceded his decision, the explicit attempt to disregard the interpretive 
importance of change highlighted its presence and, at least to antislavery respondents, 
drew further attention to the reality of the historical distance that separated the 1850s 
from the Revolutionary moment. 
The strict adherence to the Constitution’s original meaning and, increasingly, the 
framers’ original intent began to dominate constitutionalism in the antebellum period, 
largely foreclosing the possibility of decisions informed by the notion that historical 
distance and change demanded an adaptable constitution.5 Among the framers 
themselves, originalist appeals often focused on the document’s language rather than the 
subjective views of either its creators or ratifiers.6 In the debate over the Bank of the 
United States in the 1790s, James Madison had placed emphasis on the understanding of 
the people, through ratification, rather than the intent of the framers, through inscription, 
                                                
5 Perhaps Brian Dirck overreaches in asserting that “nearly all of [Lincoln’s] 
fellow Americans in that time period were what modern constitutional scholars call 
‘originalists’; that is, they believed the language of the Constitution was what its authors 
said it was, no more and no less,” but this description might apply to most Americans 
who set out to interpret the Constitution in that period. Brian R. Dirck, Lincoln and the 
Constitution (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2012), 29. 
6 On this kind of originalism in the early republic, see H. Jefferson Powell, “The 
Original Understanding of Original Intent,” Harvard Law Review 98 (March 1985): 885-
948. In response to Powell’s article on original intent, Charles A. Lofgren pointed out the 
distinction between framers and ratifiers in contending that some looked to the later for 
insight into original intent. Charles A. Lofgren, “The Original Understanding of Original 
Intent?” Constitutional Commentary 5 (1988): 77-113. Jack Rakove also attends the issue 
of originalism in his discussion of the creation of the Constitution and contextualizes 
Madison’s politically informed implication that one should examine the ratification 
debates in expounding the Constitution. Rakove, Original Meanings, 2-22, 339-65. 
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though he usually appealed to the text itself.7 Attention to the ratifiers later emerged in 
the writings of the radical antislavery constitutionalists, but William Goodell’s and 
Lysander Spooner’s strict focus on the original meanings of the words alone overrode 
their interest in the ratifiers’ original understandings. Their arguments came in response 
to the shift in interpretive focus toward determining and using the framers’ intent, which 
followed from the publication of Madison’s papers in 1840. Such appeals often attended 
to the opinions of the ratifiers and the broader Western audience as crucial contextual 
pieces to the framers’ textual puzzle. In either case, whether the emphasis was on the 
framers or the ratifiers, or even on the words of the document alone, most constitutional 
thinkers consistently sought to uncover and put to use static and consensus original ideas, 
which often required ignoring contradictions, differing opinions, and the Anti-Federalist 
tradition as a whole.8 Frederick Douglass highlighted discrepancies among the framers’ 
intentions, which allowed him to insert the people as rightful interpreters, but most of the 
era’s constitutionalists had words and people from the Revolutionary past determine the 
meaning and relevance of the Constitution in the nineteenth-century present.9 The 
Constitution was either a static proslavery or antislavery document. Antebellum 
constitutional construction most often dictated that Americans either accept the original 
ideas or reject them and, to a large extent, the document containing the words from which 
they emerged. This dissertation demonstrates that room existed to debate slavery’s 
                                                
7 See James Madison, The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United 
States (1825-1837), 4th Congress, 1st Session, v. 5, p. 776. See note 126 of chapter 3.  
8 On the persistence of the Anti-Federalist tradition, see Saul Cornell, The Other 
Founders: Anti-Federalism and the Dissenting Tradition in America, 1788-1828 (Chapel 
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999).  
9 Rakove rightly explains that “all appeals to original meaning, intention, and 
understanding of the Constitution are inherently historical in nature.” Rakove, Original 
Meanings, 9. 
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constitutionality, but it also shows that the timeless components of the canon could also 
trump historical change.  
And yet, if the passage of time did not demand a new construction, what if the 
framers themselves had aimed to bequeath an interpretive approach that demanded 
openness to historical change? If they intended to convey that the Constitution should 
adapt over time and in relation to new contingencies, then interpreters might argue that 
shifts in public opinion demanded a new construction. Perhaps the founders had denied 
most of their black contemporaries citizenship, but what if those same founders had 
anticipated that their sons and daughters would grant all black Americans that status in 
the future? Antislavery reading hinted at these questions. Most came up short, in part due 
to their focus on slavery itself, but a wide range of antislavery thinkers had argued that 
the founding generation had expected slavery’s eventual abolition. These ideas informed 
parts of the arguments of those who dissented from Taney’s opinion, including John 
McLean and Benjamin Curtis, each of whom reasoned that the founders had foreseen the 
institution’s eventual demise and had written with that vision in mind. Such thinkers 
began to sense that the framers had created the Constitution as a legal text meant to 
answer both present and future concerns—that the framers’ original intent was 
adaptability. In this period, one can detect the buds of a kind of originalist living 
constitutionalism, arising from seeds laid by some of the framers themselves, who 
conceived their creation with the expectation that it would adapt to new circumstances.10  
                                                
10 A well-known example of the framers’ effort to create an adaptable constitution 
is found in the Committee of Detail’s draft of the Constitution. In the preamble, John 
Randolph’s first of two related principles of constitution-making stressed inserting 
“essential principles only; lest the operations of government should be clogged by 
rendering those provisions permanent and unalterable, which ought to be accommodated 
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The Garrisonian reading of the Constitution as a static proslavery document received the 
Chief Justice’s stamp of approval in Dred Scott, but the antislavery interpretation of 
original expectation also achieved a prominent status in McLean’s and Curtis’s dissenting 
opinions, opinions which fostered an emerging view of the Constitution as a document 
which endured because it could adapt to the needs of different people in different times. 
The Dred Scott decision focused on what Taney viewed as negative change, or, in 
his words, unfortunate deviations “in public opinion or feeling.” He provided the ultimate 
counter-narrative to the antislavery account of the lamentable rise of the Slave Power. 
Antislavery proponents often balanced their narratives with observations of the spread of 
antislavery sentiment. That combination unveiled historical distance, which they used to 
argue that time had come realize the framers’ expectations. In contrast, Taney’s emphasis 
on negative change, in the form of the spread of abolitionist ideology, justified his 
attempt to collapse the historical distance that his reading revealed.11 If temporal distance 
resulted from unwanted change, then few could protest restorative appeals to a pure past. 
Similar to the arguments that Daniel Webster, Moses Stuart, and even Benjamin Curtis 
had made in 1850, Taney used the static and synchronic historical components of the 
Revolutionary golden age (i.e. late eighteenth-century ideas of black inferiority) to 
combat the changing and diachronic historical components of, in his view, corrupted 
                                                                                                                                            
to times and events.” John Randolph, “Draft Sketch of the Constitution,” in Supplement 
to Max Farrand’s Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, ed. James H. Hutson (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987), 183. The first full articulation of a living US 
Constitution emerged much later among legal realists, including Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Jr., and Louis D. Brandeis, in the early twentieth century. See H. L. Pohlman, Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes: Free Speech and Living Constitutionalism (New York: New 
York University Press, 1991); and Philippa Strum, “Brandeis and the Living 
Constitution,” in Brandeis in America, ed. Nelson L. Dawson (Lexington: The University 
of Kentucky Press, 1989), 118-32. 
11 Scott v. Sandford, 60 US, 426.  
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American history (i.e. the rise of abolitionist-informed egalitarian sentiment). In response 
to unwanted change, he emphatically asserted that the Constitution “must be construed 
now as it was understood at the time of its adoption.” The founding document, he urged, 
continued to speak “not only in the same words, but with the same meaning and intent 
with which it spoke when it came from the hands of its framers and was voted on and 
adopted by the people of the United States.”12 Taney collapsed time just as Stuart had 
when he asserted that Paul supported the Fugitive Slave Law, or as Curtis had when he 
insisted that the anti-constitutionalists were betraying the legacy of those who had died to 
obtain a constitution “but the other day.” The Chief Justice held that changes in public 
sentiment did not allow him to ignore what he believed to be the framers’ intentions and 
extend the rights of citizenship to those of the African race.  
There was an irony built into this debate. As with America’s biblical interpreters, 
Taney made the following hermeneutical assertion: times change, but the meaning and 
authority of sacred texts do not. In emphasizing the latter point, he brought new attention 
to the former. The allowance that times change, even when cast as irrelevant to 
interpretation and construction, highlighted that fact. Taney’s efforts to brush aside the 
new ideas imposed by change to recover and apply the original ideas that they masked 
necessarily designated those original ideas as old. Indeed, in some ways the tendency to 
depict change as corruption, more than as progress, highlighted historical distance. 
Change cast as continuous with the founding muted the dissonance resulting from 
distance, while change deemed to be discontinuous with the founding amplified it. 
Interpretations such as Taney’s, which aimed to expose historical change as distractive 
                                                
12 Ibid. 
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regression and to reject its constructional value, drew attention to the reality of historical 
distance. To be sure, in a setting where a consensus position about the negative value of 
change goes unchallenged, that reality is obscured by anxious attempts to overcome 
historical distance and reclaim a pure past. But in the 1850s, where antislavery readers 
called the negative change Taney identified “progress,” and associated that progress with 
the promises that figures in the past expected their predecessors to fulfill in the future, it 
raised awareness of historical distance in an unprecedented manner.    
In the antebellum period, slavery, more than any other issue, had the potential to 
deepen Americans’ awareness of historical distance from the founding era and to force 
them to reinterpret the Constitution in light of such awareness. Dred Scott embodied that 
potentiality. The historical arguments in the deciding and the dissenting opinions 
exhibited the fact that more than just chronological difference stood between nineteenth-
century Americans and their Revolutionary predecessors. That realization threatened to 
undermine the continued usefulness of the Revolutionary era and its texts. The process of 
historicizing the sacred biblical past had suggested that no historical period remained safe 
from historical criticism, but the sacralized founding era might have seemed too close and 
too useful to be historically distant. Thus, when constitutional argumentation over slavery 
indicated that historical distance separated Americans from even their most recent 
favored past, it sent the signal to some that no historical era could be relied on to 
transcend time. In a time and place that measured historical progress in terms of a 
nation’s promised destiny toward a millennial existence, historical awareness of the 
Revolutionary era and slavery’s vicissitudes in the mid-nineteenth century could lead 
some to conceive of even the present as bound by temporal constraints.  
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A “Dark and Fell Spirit”: Slavery’s Unwelcome Introduction of Historical Distance 
As with the fugitive slave cases that followed the Fugitive Slave Law, Dred Scott 
brought a great deal of attention to an African American. Dred Scott’s case induced 
debate about, the exploits and status of his Revolutionary forebears, which, in turn, 
incited contemporaries, black and white, to further action on behalf of enslaved African 
Americans. As the federal government’s efforts to return fugitives to enslavement 
brought increased clamoring for their freedom, the Supreme Court’s attempt to withhold 
citizenship from Dred Scott and his contemporaries encouraged the fervent articulation of 
historical arguments aimed at demonstrating their fitness for citizenship. Rather than 
settle the debate with a historically grounded decision, Taney gave it new life on an ever-
expanding public stage. And it became clear that on that stage, even in terms of 
constitutional interpretation, the Supreme Court was only one of a number of actors.  
Dred Scott was born into slavery in Southampton County, Virginia, near the turn 
of the century. He grew and toiled under the ownership of Peter Blow. In 1830, Blow 
relocated to St. Louis and, after his death in 1832, his heirs sold Scott to John Emerson, a 
doctor in the US Army. In 1834, Emerson was assigned to Fort Armstrong at Rock Island 
in the free state of Illinois, where he remained with Scott until May of 1836, when he was 
transferred to Fort Snelling, Wisconsin Territory, where the Northwest Ordinance and the 
Missouri Compromise were understood to prohibit slavery. While at Fort Snelling, Scott 
married Harriet Robinson, who became Emerson’s slave. In 1837, Emerson rented out 
Dred and Harriet at Fort Snelling, while he responded to the Army’s call to Missouri, and 
later Louisiana. In early 1838, Emerson married Eliza Irene Sanford, and soon called on 
the Scotts to join him in Louisiana. Before the year’s end, Emerson traveled back to Fort 
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Snelling with his wife and the Scotts. En route, Harriet gave birth to a baby girl, named 
Eliza. In 1840, while John Emerson served in the Seminole War, Eliza Emerson and the 
Scotts returned to St. Louis, where she hired them out. John was discharged from the 
Army in 1842 and died the following year, leaving his estate to Eliza. Perhaps the 
realization that his slave status transcended the mortality of his owner stirred in Scott a 
desire to break from servitude before his own demise.13  
In 1846, Scott attempted to purchase his family’s freedom, but Eliza refused. 
Scott then took legal action, suing for his release from enslavement in the St. Louis 
County Circuit Court, where his lawyers argued that his residence in free regions granted 
him emancipation. The court ruled against Scott and his family, which now included 
another girl, Lizzie, before the judge ordered a retrial due to hearsay. After numerous 
delays, Scott v. Emerson began in January of 1850. The Missouri jury found that 
Emerson had illegally held Dred and Harriet in Illinois and Wisconsin and awarded the 
Scotts their freedom. Eliza, though, won an appeal before the Supreme Court of Missouri, 
which, in November of 1852, reversed the decision. Judge William Scott echoed Webster 
and anticipated Taney in his reference to the unfortunate evolution of northerners’ views 
on slavery, but rather than dismissing it as blinding and irrelevant, he based his argument 
on this development.14  
                                                
13 This chapter provides only a partial discussion of the biographical and legal 
aspects of Dred Scott’s pursuit of freedom. Along with Fehrenbacher’s The Dred Scott 
Case, see, for example, Ethan Greenberg’s narrative in Dred Scott and the Dangers of a 
Political Court (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009), for an outline and analysis of the 
legal story. For biographical information on the Scott family, see Lea VanderVelde, Mrs. 
Dred Scott: A Life on Slavery’s Frontier (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
14 Scott v. Emerson, 15 Mo. 576, 582-87 (1852). 
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Far from dismissing them as unfortunate deviations, as had Webster and Stuart, or 
mere distractions, as would Taney, Judge Scott cited changes in public opinion as the 
basis for his departure from precedent. Recognizing relevant state rulings, he noted that 
“cases of this kind are not strangers in our courts,” and acknowledged that “persons have 
been frequently here adjudged to be entitled to their freedom, on the ground that their 
master held them in slavery in territories or States in which that institution was 
prohibited.”15 Scott then turned to Taney’s recent ruling in Strader v. Graham (1851), a 
Supreme Court case dealing with the status of slaves who had been taken from Kentucky 
to Ohio and had then fled to Canada. Taney had dismissed the case for lack of 
jurisdiction, placing the fate of the escaped slaves in the hands of Kentucky judges. Scott 
cited Taney’s ruling “to show, that the comity extended to the laws of other States, is a 
matter of discretion, to be determined by the courts of that State in which the laws are 
proposed to be enforced. If it is a matter of discretion,” he continued, “that discretion 
must be controlled by circumstances.”16 Circumstance, rather than precedent, Scott 
contended, must dictate. He designated the spread of unsavory antislavery sentiment as 
the case’s controlling circumstance: “Times now are not as they were when the former 
decisions on this subject were made. Since then not only individuals but States have been 
possessed with a dark and fell spirit in relation to slavery, whose gratification is sought in 
the pursuit of measures, whose inevitable consequence must be the overthrow and 
destruction of our government.”17 Scott concluded that “under such circumstances it does 
not behoove the State of Missouri to show the least countenance to any measure which 
                                                
15 Ibid., 583. 
16 Ibid., 586. 
17 Ibid. 
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might gratify this spirit.”18 Scott thus argued that in excited situations, construction 
should answer present needs, rather than blindly follow precedential decision.  
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Hamilton Rowan Gamble dismissed the 
importance of change and instead appealed to static principles tied to precedent.19 He 
protested that “there is with me, nothing in the law relating to slavery, which 
distinguishes it from the law on any other subject, or allows any more accommodation to 
the temporary public excitements which are gathered around it.”20 The established law 
should not accommodate itself to contemporary developments. Indeed, Gamble 
proceeded to argue that “the judicial mind, calm and self balanced, should adhere to 
principles established when there was no feeling to disturb the view of the legal questions 
upon which the rights of parties depend."21 Cases that should serve as precedent were 
“decided when the public mind was tranquil, and when the tribunals maintained in their 
decisions, the principles which had always received the approbation of an enlightened 
public opinion.”22 Gamble indicted the Court for wavering in the midst of a public 
maelstrom, arguing that “times may have changed, public feeling may have changed, but 
principles have not and do not change; and, in my judgment, there can be no safe basis 
for judicial decisions, but in those principles, which are immutable.”23 Both sides 
acknowledged change, but while one delivered an opinion in response to it, the other 
contended that law must function outside of and above change. 
                                                
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., 587-92. 
20 Ibid., 589. 
21 Ibid., 590. 
22 Ibid., 591. 
23 Ibid., 591-92. 
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In Scott v. Emerson the judge ruling against Dred Scott crafted his opinion as a 
response to change while the judge opining in his favor formulated a position 
independent of change and centered in static legal principles. In Scott v. Sandford the side 
ruling against Scott dismissed changes since the founding era as irrelevant and rested its 
opinion on static legal principles while the side opining in favor of Scott appealed, at 
least in part, to an original expectation of change. The cases’ different central sources of 
legal instruction—precedent in Scott v. Emerson and the Constitution in Scott v. 
Sandford—largely account for this apparent irony. Politics and public sentiment informed 
both decisions. Indeed, Chief Justice Taney’s historically based constitutional decision 
suggests that antislavery historical readings of the Constitution shaped his ruling. But 
rather than point those readings as informative in construction, as Judge Scott had 
identified “a dark and fell spirit in relation to slavery” as the circumstance controlling 
construction in his decision, Taney joined the conversation. In doing so, his appeal to the 
highest law of the land and its static original ideas led him to dismiss as irrelevant 
evolving public opinion even as it incited his response. Judge Scott, in contrast, had 
turned to precedent, which he dismissed in favor of circumstance, thanks to Taney’s 
recent ruling in Strader v. Graham. Without a fixed point in the past to compare with the 
present, and to thus recognize substantial changes from one period to another, Scott v. 
Emerson did not hold the same potential to draw attention to historical distance as Scott v. 
Sandford. Soon, that potential began to surface.  
During the time of this ruling Eliza moved to Massachusetts and Emerson’s estate 
seems to have been transferred to her brother, John F. A. Sanford (misspelled as Sandford 
in the court records), who returned from Missouri to New York, where he was a resident, 
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in 1853. On the basis of diverse citizenship, wherein a case involving citizens from 
different states placed it under federal jurisdiction, Scott’s lawyers obtained a hearing 
before the federal district court in Missouri. This brought the question of Scott’s 
citizenship to the forefront. The judge directed the jury to rely on Missouri law and to 
decide in favor of Sanford, who rejected Scott’s citizenship claims because “his ancestors 
were of pure African blood, and were brought into this country and sold as negro 
slaves.”24 This decision centered the case on historical readings of the founding era. On a 
writ of error, Scott’s attorneys appealed to the US Supreme Court. The stage was nearly 
set for Taney’s decision, though a few more crucial pieces had to be put in place. 
The ramping up of conflict between political parties in the 1840s and 50s 
contributed to politically motivated legal rulings. The political nature of Dred Scott 
hinged on the Court’s decision to deliver a broad ruling addressing the issue of slavery in 
the territories. James Buchanan, whose election as President in 1856 came in the midst of 
rising sectional tensions, believed that resolving the territorial problem would help avert 
the ominous collision. He and other politicians looked to the Supreme Court for an 
answer. An opportunity presented itself in Scott v. Sandford. The President-elect hoped 
that before taking up residence in the White House in the spring of 1857, the Court would 
settle the debate for all time, or at least for his term, and he took steps to ensure bipartisan 
support for a broad decision. In February, he wrote to Justice John Catron, a Jackson 
appointee, inquiring about the forthcoming ruling and pointing out the timely and lasting 
benefits of a broad decision. Catron’s first few responses promised little. Initially, the 
                                                
24 Dred Scott, Pl[ainti]ff in Er[ror] v. John F.A. Sandford. In Error to the Circuit 
Court U.S. for the District of Missouri, in Southern Slaves in Free State Courts: The 
Pamphlet Literature, ed. Paul Finkelman, 3 vols. (New York: Garland: 1988), 3:5-6. 
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Court decided to have Justice Samuel Nelson of New York write a narrow opinion based 
on the reasoning behind Strader v. Graham, which would return jurisdiction to Missouri 
courts. However, the threat of extensive dissenting opinions from McLean and Curtis, 
along with interest, inside and outside the Court, in a broad proslavery decision, seems to 
have led the Court to take the pen from Nelson and place it in the hand of Taney, who set 
out to build on the federal district court’s assertion that Scott’s ancestors “were brought 
into this country and sold as negro slaves.” Catron apprised Buchanan of this pleasing 
development, but noted that the decision needed northern support. He suggested that 
Buchanan implore his fellow Pennsylvanian, Justice Robert Cooper Grier, to join the 
majority. Buchanan did so and succeeded, allowing Taney to address the question of 
congressional power in the territories. In short order, Republicans attacked Buchanan and 
Taney as co-conspirators with the Slave Power and a decision meant to unite the nation 
left it further divided. Far from providing a lasting resolution, Taney’s pronouncements 
thrust the nation toward conflict.25 
The immediate background to the Dred Scott decision along with the history of 
Dred Scott’s case demonstrates a convergence of certain events and ideas that culminated 
in Taney’s deciding opinion. The initial cases focused on the question of Scott’s freedom, 
based on the fact that his owner, John Emerson, had taken him into free regions. The 
Missouri rulings focused on either using or dismissing precedential decisions to decide 
the fate of Scott and his family. The nature of the case changed when Scott’s lawyers 
obtained a hearing before the federal district court of Missouri on the basis of diverse 
citizenship. This placed the case under federal jurisdiction and highlighted the question of 
                                                
25 On the Court’s reversal and Buchanan’s involvement, see Fehrenbacher, The 
Dred Scott Case, 305-14; and Potter, The Impending Crisis, 272-74, 287-89. 
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Scott’s citizenship. Further, the district court based its ruling on a historical assertion 
about Scott’s ancestors, which focused attention on the founding era and the Constitution. 
When these developments combined with Buchanan’s push for a broad decision and the 
threat of expansive dissenting opinions from Curtis and McLean, Chief Justice Taney 
responded with a landmark constitutional decision based on historical assertions about 
the Revolutionary past. In doing so, he responded to immediate concerns and the case’s 
deeper backdrop, but he also delivered his decision in a culture where, as a result of 
decades of argumentation, interpreters had come to view contextual readings of the 
nation’s sacred legal text as definitive in deciding slavery’s fate. Taney accepted that 
conclusion and hoped to end the debates with a decisive ruling.  
 
“The Fixed Opinions Concerning That Race”: The Taney Court and the Constitution’s 
Static Proslavery Meanings 
 Taney’s reached the proslavery position he promoted in Dred Scott gradually. His 
evolving stance on slavery was somewhat representative of southerners more generally. 
In 1818, while defending abolitionist minister Jacob Gruber, who had been indicted for a 
sermon that presumably promoted rebellion, Taney condemned slavery as an institution 
in need of gradual abolishment. He did so as a slaveholding attorney from Maryland and 
that same year he began manumitting his own slaves. During this period, he also 
supported the colonization movement and voted to limit the growth of slavery while 
serving in the Maryland Senate. But these antislavery words and deeds seem to have been 
his last. In the 1820s he argued against slaves and in favor of slaveholders and in 1832, as 
US attorney general, Taney officially defended the constitutionality of South Carolina’s 
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statute that allowed for the arrest of black seamen arriving in Charleston. In response, at 
least in part, to abolitionism’s rise and events such as Nat Turner’s rebellion, he gradually 
became an emphatic proslavery supporter, as exhibited in his positions in Groves v. 
Slaughter (1841), Prigg v. Pennsylvania (1842), and Strader v. Graham (1851). The 
eagerness with which he delivered and defended his broad decision in Scott v. Sandford 
attested to the completion of a shift from a view of slavery as a domestic blot in need of 
eventual removal to a clear conviction that the institution was a civilizing blessing in 
need of vigilant protection. While change in public sentiment contributed to this personal 
change of heart, Taney was resolved to not allow the former development to cloud his 
constitutional construction, preferring rather to uncover and apply what he understood to 
be the founders’ static original ideas.26 
After deciding questions of jurisdiction, he turned to the issue of US citizenship, 
opening with a methodological appeal to “the sense in which that word [citizen] is used 
in the Constitution,” and proceeded to pose the question of whether “a negro whose 
ancestors were imported to this country and sold as slaves” could obtain citizenship.27 
The Chief Justice used a historical argument to conclude that such a descendent could not 
claim citizenship, because his ancestors “were at that time considered as a subordinate 
and inferior class of beings … whether emancipated or not.”28 To uncover the intent of 
the framers and the meaning of the Constitution, he invoked what he perceived to be the 
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understanding of the audience for whom they wrote and the popular sentiment of the 
times. The approach allowed Taney to use legal formalism to absolve the Court of any 
moral failing in sanctioning slavery: “it is not the province of the court to decide upon the 
justice or injustice … of these laws.”29 He left that responsibility to the framers and 
ratifiers. “The duty of the court,” he maintained, “is to interpret the instrument they have 
framed with the best lights we can obtain … and to administer it … according to its true 
intent and meaning when it was adopted.”30 In his reading, those of African descent were 
not citizens of states at the writing and ratification of the Constitution and, though states 
in the new nation retained the power to grant citizenship, this state-level status was 
distinct from federal citizenship. Taney later referenced the slave-trade and fugitive-slave 
clauses to demonstrate that the prevailing “opinion of the time” was that blacks were 
property.31 The privileged place that biblical scholars like Joseph Buckminster and Moses 
Stuart gave to historical explication found correspondence among antebellum legal 
theorists like Taney, who also emphasized the interpretational value of “the best lights” 
and who also found justification for slavery, or for proslavery legislation, in their favored 
past. These historical lights illuminated a founding generation’s position on slavery, 
which interpreters such as Stuart and Taney called forth to uphold the division between 
“the unhappy black race … from the white by indelible marks.”32 Such appeals claimed 
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to value historical context in discerning the Constitution’s original meaning and intent, 
but this kind of construction disregarded the interpretive value of change over time.33 
 Rather than confine his discussion to the nation’s sacred legal document, Taney 
used extra-constitutional sources from the Revolutionary era—as Buckminster had used 
extra-biblical sources from the New Testament era—including the Articles of 
Confederation, “the legislation and histories of the times, and the language used in the 
Declaration of Independence” to “show that neither the class of persons who had been 
imported as slaves nor their descendants, whether they had become free or not, were then 
acknowledged as part of the people, nor intended to be included in the general words 
used in that memorable instrument.”34 The appeal to an authoritative historical text was 
also an appeal to continuity. Just as European Americans were linked to their founding 
predecessors, and thus could claim promised constitutional privileges, so African 
Americans, free and slave, were linked to their enslaved ancestors, and thus remained 
ineligible for such privileges. Forming a new nation signaled a sharp break from the past, 
but in Taney’s reading it also froze the inequities of a particular moment and ensured 
their persistence for all succeeding time. Blacks could not be citizens at the founding, but 
could be property, and so, seventy years later, Dred Scott could be held as property, in 
both free and slave regions, but could not sue in court. Taney’s historical narration held 
Scott hostage in the present by denying his ancestors citizenship in the past. 
Perhaps in response to antislavery anti-constitutionalists, who held onto the 
ostensibly universal ideas of the Declaration as timeless truths, Taney aimed to bind it to 
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a particular moment and thus restrain its original meaning even while retaining its 
relevance. He was more likely contending with antislavery constitutionalists, who bound 
the Constitution to the Declaration and the perceived antislavery spirit of the 
Revolutionary age. In contrast, Taney subjected the Declaration to the Constitution and to 
the perceived proslavery spirit of that era. He cited the paragraph containing the phrase 
“all men are created equal,” and, in a striking acknowledgment, granted that “the general 
words … would seem to embrace the whole human family, and if they were used in a 
similar instrument at this day would be so understood.”35 Taney drew attention to 
memorable words with seemingly universal applicability and admitted that developments 
since their utterance would give them a more egalitarian meaning. However, he held that 
precisely because the inclusive signification of the phrase rested on changes subsequent 
to ratification, this signification must be dismissed for an original and more exclusive 
meaning. “It is too clear for dispute,” he asserted,  
that the enslaved African race were not intended to be included, and formed no 
part of the people who framed and adopted this declaration, for if the language, as 
understood in that day, would embrace them, the conduct of the distinguished 
men who framed the Declaration of Independence, would have been utterly and 
flagrantly inconsistent with the principles they asserted, and instead of sympathy 
of mankind to which they so confidently appealed, they would have deserved and 
received universal rebuke and reprobation.36  
 
Aware of changing perceptions and sympathies, which gave old words new 
significations, Taney explicitly rendered them irrelevant to constitutional interpretation 
and construction. He appealed to the period’s domestic and international audience, using 
late eighteenth-century Western public sentiment to establish that the framers “spoke and 
acted according to the then established doctrines and principles, and in the ordinary 
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language of the day, and no one misunderstood.”37 Many antislavery biblical and 
constitutional readers had posited that the Christian and national founders, respectively, 
had used discretion in undermining slavery, and thus some of their words and actions 
might be misconstrued as revealing that they had intended to sanction and preserve the 
institution when, in fact, they hoped for and expected its deterioration. William Garrison 
and Wendell Phillips rejected such explanations as naïve and so did Taney. 
Taney needed the founders to speak for slavery. “We refer to these historical 
facts” he explained, “for the purpose of showing the fixed opinions concerning that race 
upon which the statesmen of that day spoke and acted.”38 The thrust of Taney’s opinion 
relied on fixed ideas, but he also drew on historical continuity for support. He cited 
legislation forbidding interracial marriage in the northern states of Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island, from before ratification up to 1844.39 
He identified and dismissed historical change in applying the Constitution, but used 
historical continuity to assert the utter improbability that the framers intended to bless 
blacks or their descendants with the rights and privileges of citizenship.  
Taney outlined the “historical facts” of popular perceptions of blacks from the 
Revolutionary and post-Revolutionary pasts, which he then used as binding truths in the 
present. Far from neglecting historical change, he highlighted it, but only to warn that 
deviating developments might obscure one’s vision of the founding moment. Precisely 
because he believed “it is difficult at this day to realize the state of public opinion … at 
the time of the Declaration of Independence and when the Constitution of the United 
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States was framed and adopted,” Taney stressed the clarifying value of his historical 
lesson.40 Like Frederick Douglass, he referenced the challenge of unearthing past 
thought, but he was much more confident in his ability to bring that thought to light and 
much more emphatic in stressing its determinative value. He presumed that “no one … 
supposes that any change in public opinion or feeling, in relation to this unfortunate race, 
in the civilized nations of Europe or in this country, should induce the court to give the 
words of the Constitution a more liberal construction in their favor than they were 
intended to bear when the instrument was framed and adopted.”41 Taney’s mention of “no 
one” was more wishful mandate than accurate accounting, as the dissenters soon 
demonstrated, but in a clash of historical modes, Taney’s constitutional construction 
determined that the synchronic trumped the diachronic, unless the diachronic revealed 
continuity. The opinions of the founding era trumped those of the present, unless those of 
the present matched them, in which case the historical eras complemented rather than 
contradicted each other. If the Constitution itself proved unjust, a problem when justice 
was placed in the hands of the framers, then “there is a mode prescribed in the instrument 
itself by which it may be amended.”42 But readers should not force current ideas about 
blacks into the text, for “it is obvious,” in the light of Taney’s historical rendering, “that 
they were not even in the minds of the framers of the Constitution when they were 
conferring special rights and privileges on citizens.”43 Like an archaeologist in search of a 
relic, Taney brushed aside the accruing dirt and dross that threatened to hide original 
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truths. Scott, historical excavation showed, would have been a non-citizen when the 
document was written, and as such, could not now sue in federal court. 
 Having provided his lengthy historical lesson, Taney concluded that the case 
rested outside federal jurisdiction. He thus relied on the precedent set by the Supreme 
Court of Missouri, which wielded state law to cast Scott as a slave. For all intents and 
purposes, Taney had ruled on the matter at hand and might have closed his decision. 
Instead, he took the opportunity to deliver an executive-backed pronouncement, 
dismissed by the dissenters as lacking authority and attacked in the press as obiter 
dictum, on the question of Congress’s power over slavery in the territories.44  
On this matter, too, Taney stressed the value of uncovering particular 
circumstances in revealing the framers’ intent. He again rested his argument on an 
examination of the “history of the times,” which led him to narrowly argue that the 
constitutional clause granting Congress governmental power in the territories referred 
strictly to the land held in common at the time of ratification and did not apply to 
territories that the nation might subsequently acquire.45 In contrast to his ruling on 
African American citizenship, he argued that the Constitution restricted application to a 
set time in the past rather than stretching into the present. In an extended discussion, 
Taney aimed to establish that the power granted in said clause “has no bearing on the 
present controversy” but “is confined, and was intended to be confined, to the territory 
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which at that time belonged to, or was claimed by, the United States.”46 He emphasized 
the importance of bringing “this part of the history of these cessions” to bear on 
constitutional phraseology.47 Throughout this portion of his historical lesson, Taney 
emphasized the “specific,” “particular,” and “local” nature of the powers in question.48 
This construction let him “put aside … any argument, drawn from precedents, showing 
the extent of the power which the General Government exercised over slavery in this 
Territory.”49 Change was a double-edged sword, but in Taney’s hands the side that 
seemed to contradict the Constitution’s original meaning and intent was left blunt.  
Taney’s history dictated that blacks were not citizens at the founding, and thus 
were not citizens now, despite changes in public opinion; it also dictated that although 
Congress possessed power over the territories held at the founding, it held no power over 
property held in the territories obtained through the Louisiana Purchase and the Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo, despite divergent legal decisions. In Taney’s reading, any deviation 
from the Constitution’s narrowly construed original meanings, even a tradition of legal 
precedent granting Congress power over subsequently acquired territories, must be 
dismissed. Any continuity, then, that did not stretch back to the very moment of the 
framing, must be invalidated as change. The consistency of Taney’s position rested on 
discerning intention. If the founders intended that a principle endure as a general and 
universal rule then any departure from that principle must be deemed unconstitutional. If 
they intended that a principle answer specific and particular questions, then continued 
application of that principle must be dismissed as unconstitutional.  
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As in the biblical debates, only historical research and reasoning, or at least the 
appearance of such, could allow the interpreter to claim authority to distinguish the 
particular from the universal. In helping uncover specific and local meanings, such as the 
territorial clause, the historical reading drew attention to historical distance. In a more 
critical light, one might suggest that Taney used that distance to dismiss as specific and 
local those meanings that contradicted his position. Such usage, however, highlighted the 
difficulty of distinguishing transient from permanent and of determining what historical 
distance made or did not make irrelevant. Taney managed to avoid this messiness with 
blunt assertions about what was timeless and what was timely, as in his discussion of 
fugitive slaves. He argued that the government set up by the framers “is pledged to 
protect [a slaveholder’s right to traffic his property] in all future time if the slave 
escapes.”50 Almost in passing Taney declared the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional, 
and he did so through a historical explication.  
 While some of the justices providing concurring or separate opinions offered little 
more than their general assent—Pennsylvania native Justice Grier’s brief statement, 
which amounted to less than a page, attested to his role as the token northern supporter 
Buchanan wanted him to be—others, including proslavery Justices Peter Vivian Daniel, 
John A. Campbell, and John Catron, followed Taney in offering historical arguments.51 In 
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his opinion, Daniel asserted that “the following are truths which a knowledge of the 
history of the world, and particularly of that of our own country, compels us to know—
that the African negro race never have been acknowledged as belonging to the family of 
nations.”52 Clearly, the Court’s focus on African Americans could just as easily serve to 
spread racist proslavery positions than raise awareness of suffering slaves. To give his 
assent further credence the Virginian compared American with Roman slavery, citing 
classical precedent for not granting citizenship upon emancipation.53 In his opinion, 
Campbell also aimed to interpret the Constitution “by the light of the circumstances in 
which the Convention was placed.”54 Just as Joseph Buckminster and Moses Stuart had 
argued that Christian conversion did not alter a slave’s status, Campbell argued that “the 
American Revolution was not a social revolution. … It was a political revolution, by 
which thirteen dependent colonies became thirteen independent states.”55 As with Taney, 
Campbell of Alabama, who later served as Assistant Secretary of War for the 
Confederacy, determined that the claim granting Congress present power in the territories 
“is not supported by historical evidence drawn from the Revolution, the Confederation, or 
the deliberations which preceded the ratification of the Federal Constitution.”56 Catron, a 
Tennessee native who had fathered a slave—James P. Thomas—who had obtained 
freedom in 1851, also emphasized that “every provision in that instrument has a history 
that must be understood before the brief and sententious language employed can be 
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comprehended in the relations its authors intended.”57 “Historical facts,” he determined, 
demonstrated the specific and limited nature of congressional powers.58 The Taney Court 
gave official sanction to the priority of using the framers’ intent as paramount in 
constitutional construction and to the importance of historical explication in uncovering 
that intent. 
 Historical investigation, the Taney Court argued, demonstrated that the founders 
had intended to deny those of African heritage and their descendants federal citizenship, 
to grant Congress power only over those territories held in common at the time of 
ratification, and to protect private property, including slaves, in all acquired territories 
throughout all future time. When deemed continuous from the period of the framing, 
public sentiment and legal decisions—including, for example, racist ideas about blacks 
and marriage laws against miscegenation—illuminated original intent. When determined 
to be deviations from that period, public sentiment and legal decisions, including, for 
example, more egalitarian ideas about blacks, legislation giving Congress power over 
slavery in the territories, or precedent granting former slaves freedom, obscured original 
intent. In a way, the Taney Court allowed for change or deviation in construction, but 
only if one could determine that the framers had created a clause only for specific, local, 
and temporary application. Limiting application of the clause on congressional power, 
then, was not an appeal to change or deviation, but rather continuity, because such a 
limitation was part of the original intent. In another way, the Taney Court dismissed 
continuity as inadmissible in construction, but only if one could determine that views on 
the issue in question did not stretch back to the framers. An appeal to precedent granting 
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slaves freedom, then, was not a claim to continuity, but rather a symptom of the kind of 
change that Taney found distracting in construction. In short, the Court recognized that 
temporal differences separated the Revolutionary past from their mid-nineteenth-century 
present, but characterized those differences as an interpretational problem to be overcome 
through historical excavation rather than a reality requiring a more liberal construction. 
But deeper and more precise historical excavation might produce very different results. 
 
 
“Its Tendencies Would Greatly Ameliorate Their Condition”: John McLean and an 
Original Expectation of Change 
Dissent from the Court’s proslavery decision by northern justices was not a 
foregone conclusion and was, in some ways, a surprise. Grier of Pennsylvania, a cousin 
of Alexander H. Stephens, had his marching orders from the President. Samuel Nelson of 
New York was a political wanderer and, at present, a northern “doughface” Democrat. 
John McLean of Ohio was a Republican in 1857, but he had been associated with nearly 
every party across the antebellum political spectrum, making it difficult to discern where 
his allegiance lay. While fairly stable in their political ties, Benjamin Curtis and his 
brother George Curtis had conflicting positions on slavery-related issues. Benjamin had 
served as counsel for the defense in Commonwealth v. Aves (1836), which addressed 
whether the defendant in the North could hold a child slave for his daughter from the 
South. As counsel for Aves, Benjamin had worked to ensure continued enslavement. 
Further, as outlined above, in the early 1850s he had staunchly defended the Constitution 
and the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Law against abolitionists’ arguments and 
had issued indictments against those attempting to support fugitive slaves. Even when he 
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opined in favor of Dred Scott’s freedom in 1857, Benjamin still disapproved of 
abolitionism. As US commissioner in Boston, Benjamin’s brother George had complied 
with the Fugitive Slave Law in issuing arrest warrants and certificates of removal for the 
capture and return of various fugitive slaves. Now, as Scott’s co-counsel, he argued on 
behalf of another former slave. Although McLean was against slavery’s extension, 
neither he nor Benjamin Curtis had aligned themselves with antislavery forces. But, 
whatever their political motivations, their research convinced them that history conflicted 
with Taney’s reading of the Constitution.59  
Like the Court, McLean and Curtis based their opinions on an appeal to original 
intent, illuminated through historical research. In many ways, the justices simply differed 
on what historical investigation revealed about that intent, but the intentions they ascribed 
to the founders corresponded with crucial distinctions in historical thinking. Where the 
Court appealed to the popular opinion of the times to argue that the framers never 
intended to bless those of African descent with citizenship, McLean and Curtis argued 
that in a number of states, including North Carolina, blacks had, in fact, voted at the time 
of ratification, which they described as an outward sign of citizenship. On this point, the 
dissenting justices also cited an original expectation of change. Their reasoning echoed 
and in some ways extended the arguments of antislavery constitutionalists in opining that 
the framers had expected that future developments would expand constitutional rights 
and protections to free blacks. Where the Court highlighted particular historical 
circumstances to constrain the clause granting Congress territorial power to temporary 
and local application, the dissenters contended that the framers constructed the passage 
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with an eye toward present and future concerns. These opinions implied that because the 
framers had expected certain changes, change should be used rather than dismissed in 
constitutional interpretation. To be sure, an appeal to an original expectation of change 
might mute an awareness of its contingent nature and mitigate the realization of historical 
distance: the expectation of change removes its surprise and, if realized, suggests 
inevitability, while also drawing together the time in which those changes occur and the 
predictive moment in the past. Nevertheless, in following antislavery writers in also 
pointing out developments that militated against the realization of the framers’ 
expectations, McLean and Curtis highlighted the contingent nature of change and the 
reality of temporal difference.   
 McLean offered the shorter of the two dissenting opinions, but, covering thirty-
five pages, it was more extensive than any single concurring or separate opinion.60 He 
opened by declaring defective the plaintiff’s plea that “a free negro of the African race, 
whose ancestors were brought to this country and sold as slaves, is not a ‘citizen’ within 
the meaning of the Constitution of the United States.” McLean argued that Scott, as a 
freeman born under the Constitution and a resident of a state different from Sanford, 
could claim accesses to the privileges and immunities clause and sue in federal court. 
Defending this position required that he take apart the central components of Taney’s 
decision. McLean started, though, by questioning the relevance of the Court’s extra-legal 
assertion “that a colored citizen would not be an agreeable member of society.” By 
ascribing this view to the framers and their audience, Taney had attempted to make this a 
constitutional and thus a legal position. But McLean considered this “more a matter of 
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taste than of law,” and regardless of the merits of this assertion, evidence showed that 
African Americas had, in fact, voted as members of American states.61  
Upon labeling the plea defective and dismissing one of the Court’s central claims 
as superfluous, McLean proceeded to discuss the principles of the decision. He stressed 
that “slavery is emphatically a State institution.”62 Each justice agreed with this federal 
consensus position. However, while the majority argued that the Constitution protected 
slaveholders’ property rights in free regions, McLean argued that slaveholders lost those 
municipal rights when they entered free regions with their slaves. He explained that 
although the laws of England did not prohibit but only did not authorize slavery, the 
Somerset decision made it illegal to hold slaves taken there. And, he continued, “the 
jurisdiction which prohibits slavery is much stronger in behalf of the slave within it than 
where it only does not authorize it.”63 McLean implied that if the laws of England freed 
slaves upon arrival, then so should the laws of the US territories, which prohibited 
slavery. On the power of Congress to prohibit slavery in the territories, he contextualized 
the passage in question and argued that the Missouri Compromise was consistent with the 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787, the enactment of which rested on an act of Congress under 
the Constitution, even though it was drafted under the Articles of Confederation. McLean 
also outlined state Supreme Court decisions, mostly from Missouri, which showed that 
the common law that made Scott free in free regions protected his free status in slave 
regions. Dred Scott v. Emerson, McLean concluded, had “overruled the settled law for 
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near thirty years,” which, along with its failure to take into account the Missouri 
Compromise and the Illinois Constitution, led him to dismiss that ruling.64  
Throughout this portion of his opinion, McLean grounded his reasoning in 
historical evidence. He noted that “it is refreshing to turn to the early incidents of our 
history and learn wisdom from the acts of the great men who have gone to their 
account.”65 Like Taney, McLean valued legislative actions deemed continuous with the 
founding, but he also valued the consistency of post-founding judicial decisions. He 
upheld case law as constitutional, but placed emphasis on the sequential nature of these 
rulings rather than on the continuity between them and the founding, and in this instance, 
then, he privileged the interpretive value of history’s diachronic mode.  Without the 
primacy of the Constitution, appeals to common law’s consistency valued continuity. In 
light of the founding moment, however, McLean’s appeal valued change as well.  
 As both sides appealed to original intent, both sides also held exalted views of the 
framers and aimed to extract and apply the venerable ideas found in the sacralized 
Constitution. Filiopietism, though, permitted multiple readings. The Constitution gave 
power to reclaim fugitive slaves, but, McLean argued, the right to a slave as property was 
municipal. He insisted, as a number of moderate and radical antislavery constitutionalists 
had, including Lincoln, that “we know as a historical fact that James Madison, that great 
and good man … was solicitous to guard the language of that instrument so as not to 
convey the idea that there could be property in man.”66 McLean viewed the slave trade 
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and slave trafficking as relics from a bygone era and condemned interpretations which 
appealed to an outdated past. “I prefer the lights of Madison, Hamilton, and Jay as a 
means of construing the Constitution in all its bearings, rather than to look behind that 
period into a traffic which is now declared to be piracy, and punished with death by 
Christian nations.”67 McLean’s teleological sense of historical development, which was 
reminiscent of Joseph C. Warren’s depiction of a dark pre-framing era, contained more 
than a hint of exceptionalism, but it also corresponded with a view of the framers as 
creating a Constitution amenable to change. In contrast to Peter Daniel’s denial that the 
Revolution had implications for social relations, McLean, again echoing antislavery 
arguments, wrote that “our independence was a great epoch in the history of freedom, and 
while I admit the Government was not made especially for the colored race, yet many of 
them were citizens of the New England States, and exercised, the rights of suffrage when 
the Constitution was adopted, and it was not doubted by any intelligent person that its 
tendencies would greatly ameliorate their condition.”68 McLean had his eye on the 
founding era, but also on the founders’ and even the ratifying citizens’ view of the future. 
He explained how several of the new states abolished slavery in their jurisdictions, which 
confirmed the “well known fact that a belief was cherished by the leading men, South as 
well as North, that the institution of slavery would gradually decline until it would 
become extinct.”69 Such original expectations demanded that subsequent interpreters give 
the Constitution a new construction.  
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However, new contingencies arose, including the “increased value of slave labor, 
in the culture of cotton and sugar,” which “prevented the realization of this 
expectation.”70 In stark contrast to William Scott’s description of the rise of abolitionism 
as unfortunate change, McLean ascribed unfortunate change to the same sources as 
Parker and Lincoln, citing corrupt interests and the “degradation of negro slavery in our 
country.”71 Instead of emphasizing the supposed degraded state of blacks as a number of 
the justices had, the dissenters stressed the degraded nature of “negro slavery,” which had 
hindered expected increases in egalitarian sentiment and commensurate legislation. 
Similar to Taney, McLean argued that historical change might obscure original intent, or, 
in this case, original expectation, though he described such corruption as a decline of 
rather than a rise in egalitarian sentiment. However, McLean also held that the 
inevitability of historical change, as an interpretive lens gifted by the founders 
themselves, might reveal as much as it might obscure. Brushing aside unexpected change 
in the form of proslavery consolidation, then, illuminated original expectation in the form 
of the framers’ expectations of slavery’s demise. McLean’s juxtaposition of expected and 
actual developments drew attention to historical contingency and distance. 
 
“The Great Truths They Asserted on That Solemn Occasion, They Were Ready and 
Anxious to Make Effectual”: Benjamin Curtis and an Original Expectation of Change   
Reaching sixty-nine pages, Curtis’s dissenting opinion, comparable in length only 
to Taney’s fifty-four-page decision, covered much of the same material as McLean’s. It 
began with an examination of the plea, an inference of which he found problematic: 
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“That the plaintiff himself was a slave at the time of action brought is a substantive fact 
having no necessary connection with the fact that his parents were sold as slaves.”72 
Curtis summarily undermined the conflation between black slaves of the Revolutionary 
past and their living and possibly free descendants. He proceeded to address the actual 
question raised by the plea of whether one’s ancestral tie to slaves invalidated claims to 
citizenship. Curtis argued that states retained the right to determine citizenship under the 
Constitution and because the Confederation could not grant citizenship, state citizenship 
constituted federal citizenship, and thus citizens of states became federal citizens at the 
founding. So, in a number of states, free blacks gained US citizenship at birth. While 
dismissing as unfounded the fear that citizenship would lead to full civic equality, as 
made clear in the case of minors and women, Curtis concluded that “in some of the 
original thirteen states, free colored persons,” who descended from slaves, “were citizens 
of those States,” voted at the time of ratification, and had the right to sue.73 Thus he 
proved incorrect the plea that no person descending from African slaves can be a citizen. 
Rather than conflate Scott with his enslaved ancestors, Curtis linked him to the 
contingent potential that blacks at the founding could be either slave or free.  
In focusing on the relationship between blacks and their ancestors, Taney had 
broadened the terms of debate. In turn, he and a number of the other justices provided 
official sanction, not only to proslavery interpretations of the Constitution, but also to 
racist ideas about blacks from the past and the present. However, the new focus also 
allowed the dissenters to give weight to antislavery readings of the Constitution focused 
on original expectations, to demonstrate that free blacks had voted as citizens during 
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ratification, and to attack as immaterial racist assumptions about whether blacks made 
good citizens. As Stuart Streichler notes, “when Justice Curtis placed blacks at this 
extraordinary moment in American constitutional history—this novel exercise in 
republican government, with sovereignty exercised by the people in an unprecedented 
manner—he effectively repudiated the racist rationale for excluding blacks from political 
participation in the ordinary acts of government.”74 The nature of the debate further 
allowed McLean and Curtis to consider the framers’ original expectations about the place 
of African Americans in America’s future and both believed that historical research 
showed that the framers had anticipated beneficial changes for blacks. 
 In an interesting aside, Curtis distinguished between what he viewed as facts—
that “free colored persons, before and after the time of the formation of the Constitution, 
were citizens”—and what he understood as opinions irrelevant to deciding the case at 
hand.75 He would not “enter into an examination of the existing opinions of that period 
respecting the African race, nor into any discussion concerning the meaning of those who 
asserted, in the Declaration of Independence, that all men are created equal; that they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”76 While casting this particular historical discussion 
as superfluous, Curtis still felt obliged to offer his  
own opinion … that a calm comparison of these assertions of universal abstract 
truths and of their own individual opinions and acts would not leave these men 
under any reproach of inconsistency; that the great truths they asserted on that 
solemn occasion, they were ready and anxious to make effectual, wherever a 
necessary regard to circumstances, which no statesman can disregard without 
producing more evil than good, would allow; and that it would not be just to them 
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nor true in itself to allege that they intended to say that the Creator of all men had 
endowed the white race, exclusively, with the great natural rights which the 
Declaration of Independence asserts. But this is not the place of [sic] vindicate 
their memory. As I conceive, we should deal here not with such disputes, if there 
can be a dispute concerning this subject, but with those substantial facts evinced 
by the written Constitutions of States and by the notorious practice under them.77  
 
Curtis agreed with McLean about the Revolutionary period’s egalitarian “tendencies” 
but, in essence, conceded that had Jefferson meant to include those of African descent in 
the designation “all men,” the founders well might have, in Taney’s words, “received 
universal rebuke and reprobation,” thus “producing more evil than good.” And yet, Curtis 
thought that the founders’ conscious “regard to circumstances” signaled their desire to 
“make effectual” the egalitarian principles for all Americans, including blacks, when 
circumstances allowed. In essence, Curtis’s reading of the Constitution, which he seemed 
content to read in light of the Declaration, matched antislavery readings of the New 
Testament, including those of William Channing and Francis Wayland, and Lincoln’s 
reading of the Declaration, each of which stressed the expediency of their authors. He 
contradicted Taney’s interpretive directive to dismiss changes in popular sentiment when 
it could be shown that the framers expected those changes. In other words, precisely 
because they anticipated alterations to their historical setting, changes in that context 
should allow their descendants to adapt the meaning of the Constitution’s language to the 
circumstances of the times. Indeed, although Curtis did not believe that all change, 
including proslavery advances, should inform construction, he applied his understanding 
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of common law to the Constitution, holding that in general terms constitutional 
application should evolve in relation to historical development.78 
 Following his discussion of the plea, Curtis shifted attention to the questions of 
Scott’s status and Congress’s powers. As with McLean, he cited decisions showing that 
“in the absence of positive law to the contrary,” Missouri common law should comply 
with “foreign [state] laws” prohibiting slavery, regardless of “any impressions it may 
have that a change in foreign opinion and action on the subject of slavery may afford a 
reason why the State should change its own action.”79 In direct opposition the prior ruling 
of Missouri’s Judge William Scott and in agreement with Missouri’s dissenting Judge 
Hamilton Gamble, Curtis argued that comity was not a matter of “discretion” to be 
“controlled by circumstances.”80 Although he believed that the Constitution should adapt 
in relation to expected, natural and sustained developments, Curtis believed that 
temporary excitements and political motivations should not lead to changes in 
constitutional application. And he, as with Lincoln, believed that sudden departures in 
terms of legislative and judicial decisions about slavery’s extension had resulted from 
temporary excitements. 
In dealing with Scott’s status, Curtis further argued that, coupled with his 
residence in a free region, Scott’s marriage to Harriet equated to irrevocable 
emancipation on the part of John Emerson. Regarding the powers of Congress, Curtis 
stressed the importance of attending “to some facts respecting this subject which existed 
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when the Constitution was framed and adopted,” an approach which would “shed much 
light” on the issue.81 Like McLean, he aimed to evidence the Convention’s familiarity 
with the Northwest Ordinance and while allowing that the clause referred to immediate 
concerns, he argued that it was also meant to apply to later land acquisitions. In Curtis’s 
reading, the drafters of the Constitution attended to present circumstances while also 
making provisions for future developments. Similar to biblical interpreter Moses Stuart, 
he coupled historical with grammatical interpretation, noting that “there is not, in my 
judgment, anything in the language, the history, or the subject matter of this article which 
restricts its operation to territory owned by the United States when the Constitution was 
adopted.”82 In response to the claim that the territorial powers granted Congress excluded 
legislation on slavery, Curtis argued that “when the Constitution of the United States was 
framed and adopted, the allowance and the prohibition of negro slavery were recognised 
subjects of municipal legislation” before adding, in reference to the intent of the 
congressional clause, that “the allowance or the prohibition of slavery comes within the 
known and recognised scope of that purpose and object.”83 As proof, he traced eight 
instances in which Congress had prohibited slavery and six in which it had allowed 
slavery, citing examples stretching from the presidency of George Washington to that of 
John Quincy Adams, “including all who were in public life when the Constitution was 
adopted.”84 Again, like Taney, Curtis valued historical continuity: “If the practical 
construction of the Constitution contemporaneously with its going into effect, by men 
intimately acquainted with its history from their personal participation in framing and 
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adopting it, and continued by them through a long series of acts of the gravest 
importance, be entitled to weight in the judicial mind on a question of construction, it 
would seem to be difficult to resist the force of the acts above adverted to.”85 Curtis used 
historical argumentation to contend that legislation since ratification corresponded with 
the framers’ original intention that the clause referring to congressional power include 
decisions relative to slavery and extend to territories acquired in the future. 
Pausing on this point, Curtis censured what he viewed as a new reading resulting 
from political passion. He outlined three political responses to the question, including an 
antislavery argument positing that Congress can prohibit but not establish slavery in the 
territories, the popular sovereignty position, which would leave the decision up to the 
people who inhabit a territory, and the proslavery argument that slaveholders can take 
slaves into any territory without fear of being deprived of their property. Each of these 
arguments denied Congress power either to allow or to prohibit slavery in the territories. 
“The question” was whether such arguments “are sufficient to authorize this court to 
insert into this clause … an exception of the exclusion or allowance of slavery not found 
therein.” Because he believed that the framers had been clear on the clause’s present and 
future purpose, Curtis demanded a strict reading and application. To introduce an 
exception into the Constitution, “upon reasons purely political, renders its judicial 
interpretation impossible.”86 Curtis explained, “Political reasons have not the requisite 
certainty to afford rules of judicial interpretation. They are different in different men. 
They are different in the same men at different times. And when a strict interpretation of 
the Constitution, according to the fixed rules which govern the interpretation of laws, is 
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abandoned, and the theoretical opinions of individuals are allowed to control its meaning, 
we have no longer a Constitution.”87 In such cases, government becomes “an exponent of 
the will of Congress,” or “of the individual political opinions of the members of this 
court.”88 If “the Constitution itself” or “the history of this provision” showed intent on the 
part of the framers and ratifiers to introduce an exception, Curtis must carefully weigh 
“such considerations. … But where the Constitution has said all needful rules and 
regulations,” he required something other than volatile “abstract political reasoning” to 
alter his construction.89 Curtis implied that he would have also dissented if the Court had 
sanctioned the antislavery contention that Congress could prohibit but not allow slavery 
in the territories, but his historical narration tracing restrictions on slavery’s extension 
from the founding era suggested that he might have accepted that reading as consistent 
with the framers’ and ratifiers’ intent and with the continuous practice of government. 
Political interests and, it seems, the prospect of a broad dissent motivated Taney’s 
historically based decision. Perhaps he had perceived that Curtis planned on making a 
historical argument. Perhaps Curtis’s historical argument only came in response to 
Taney’s decision. Regardless, that decision led Curtis to fault the Court not only for what 
he described as a politically motivated ruling, but also because he understood those 
motivations and that ruling to be deviations from original meanings and subsequent 
practices consistent with those meanings.   
Restating his position, Curtis found it “rational to conclude” that because “they 
who framed and adopted the constitution” were aware of the municipal legality of slavery 
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“it was their intention to leave to the discretion of Congress what regulations, if any, 
should be made concerning slavery therein.”90 Clearly, Curtis, as well as McLean, aimed 
to recover the Constitution’s treasured timeless meanings, and to draw on legislative acts 
and judicial decisions continuous with the period in which the framers had crafted it. But, 
in the view of these dissenters, some of those timeless meanings allowed for and even 
required that the Constitution to evolve with historical development.  
In both the decision and the dissent the justices recognized the reality of temporal 
change and historical distance, but the two sides valued these realities differently. Taney 
argued that some constitutional passages referred strictly to temporary and local 
concerns—such as that conferring upon Congress power in the territories—thus rendering 
unconstitutional subsequent legislative uses of those clauses. On the surface this reading 
seems to prescribe interpretational changes in relation to historical developments, but in 
fact it proscribes these changes by implying that the framers had not made provisions for 
such developments, including, in this instance, new land acquisitions. In essence, the 
clause still applied, but in the negative: because the passage did not positively grant 
Congress power over slavery in territories subsequently acquired, succeeding use of that 
power was unconstitutional. In such cases, provisions that the framers did make for the 
future, including the protection of individual property rights, came into play. Historical 
change, in short, must not lead to changes in constitutional interpretation or application, 
but must yield to static meanings.  
In contrast, McLean and Curtis opined that the framers crafted the Constitution 
with an awareness that the future might, owing to historical changes—such as expected 
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land acquisitions or shifts in public opinion—require new interpretations, or, more 
specifically, new constructions. Theirs was not the full-blown living constitutionalism 
that emerged much later, but rather an appeal to original intent wherein the framers’ 
conceived of the potential need for a constitution adaptable to temporal changes and 
amenable to new circumstances. The amendment mechanism, which Taney referenced, 
spoke to the future-oriented nature of the framers’ project and of law-making in general. 
And yet, the prospect of emendation called for interpretive restraint. Precisely because a 
mechanism existed for official changes in the form of amendments, informal changes in 
the form of new interpretations and constructions seemed illegitimate.91 But there had not 
been an amendment since 1804, and the two that followed the 1789 Bill of Rights seemed 
more like administrative alterations than drastic constitutional changes, which suggested 
that weighty formal emendations were a thing of the past. Perhaps the growing gap since 
such changes, like the historical distance from the founding era, opened up space for 
interpretive freedom. The dissenters’ opinions implied that if one found that the framers 
created a document with an expectation of change then the main text of the Constitution 
could and should, of necessity, be molded to the exigencies of the times in which it 
persisted. Indeed, in this formulation, endurance depended on adaptability. This kind of 
an appeal to original intent countenanced and even required a Constitution amenable to 
change, or, at least, to expected changes.  
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 As noted above, searching out an original expectation of change tends to qualify 
or dismiss its interpretive value. The justices revered and upheld the Constitution; and 
their historical arguments, far from undermining its present applicability, aimed to 
illuminate its original meaning for contemporary use. While one side dismissed change as 
irrelevant because it was inconsistent with original meaning, intent, and understanding, 
the other posited the importance of change because it was grounded in the framers’ 
original expectations. Both sides, though, highlighted historical change in tracing 
deviations from original intent and original expectation, respectively. Taney’s earnest 
attempts to set aside perceived deviations from original ideas (e.g. shifts in public opinion 
to more egalitarian views about blacks) and to collapse the time between the present and 
the founding era to reclaim those ideas attested to the realities of historical change and 
distance. Similarly, when present circumstances seemed to contradict the original 
expectations of change identified by Curtis and McLean (i.e. when the period saw the rise 
of the Slave Power instead of witnessing slavery’s demise and when the Court relied on 
emerging proslavery political stances to craft innovative readings of the congressional 
clause) it also drew attention to temporal vicissitude and dislocation. These contestations 
highlighted historical contingency and, regardless of their view of change, when both 
sides discussed and dealt with it in opposing ways it exposed the reality of the historical 
distance separating the founding era from their present. The relatively short time between 
the two periods protected the revered Constitution from widespread cries of 
obsolescence, but such discussions raised questions about its relationship to temporal 
evolution, which, in turn, cultivated a realization that changes since the founding era had 
created a vast temporal gap between present and favored past. 
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While McLean and Curtis grounded their positions in historical arguments, both 
also appealed, if only once or twice, to the kind of legal and extra-legal reasoning that 
some antislavery thinkers embraced in their attacks on the Slave Power. The dissenters 
seemed to follow Lord Mansfield’s condemnation of slavery as “so odious, that nothing 
can be suffered to support it, but positive law.”92 Curtis echoed Mansfield in stating that 
“slavery, being contrary to natural right, is created only by municipal law.”93 McLean 
agreed that “all slavery has its origin in power, and is against right.”94 Slavery, in their 
view, as with Lysander Spooner’s, contradicted natural law, and thus was only protected 
by local law.95 The appeal to abstract truths, used by slavery’s opponents to supplement 
or cast aside traditional sources of religious, moral, political, and legal reasoning, also 
found its way into more orthodox settings. McLean contended that “a slave is not a mere 
chattel. He bears the impress of his Maker, and is amenable to the laws of God and man, 
and he is destined to an endless existence.”96 McLean’s statement seemed to suggest that 
while prior circumstances had placed blacks in an unfavorable position in relation to 
divine and human laws, their static and universal connection to the divine meant that 
changes in historical circumstances could alter blacks’ relationship to the laws of God 
and man. Even though the thrust of the dissenters’ opinions was moderate, McLean 
seemed to suggest that not only did Scott and his fellow African Americans, free and 
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enslaved, possess the potential for citizenship, which both historical and extra-historical 
sources revealed, but developments indicated that the requisite circumstances were now, 
or soon would be, in place for the realization of that potential. 
 
 
“It Was an Inconsistency … Which It Was Supposed the Progress of Events Would 
Remove:” The Antislavery Response and the Revolutionary Past as an “Epoch for All 
Coming Time” 
 Such circumstances depended, in part, on the public response. The Republican 
press did not wait for the decision to denounce the Court. In the spring of 1856, a few 
northern newspapers learned that the ruling would, in all likelihood, not favor Scott and 
began their attack in advance. Before and after the decision, detractors leveled their 
assaults on the Court, depicted as overreaching and conspiratorial, rather than the 
specifics of the decision. The historical debate between Taney and Curtis continued with 
the publication of the dissenting opinions and the revision and publication of the Chief 
Justice’s decision, which he bolstered with historical evidence. However, newspapers like 
Horace Greeley’s New York Tribune focused on the decision’s breadth instead of its 
content.97 Rather than attend to the question of citizenship or the authority of precedent, 
the Court’s critics determined that Taney’s ruling on the territorial question was 
unwarranted. One historian suggests that this allowed Republicans who were eager to 
disassociate themselves from radical abolitionists to damn much of the opinion as dicta 
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without appearing to dismiss the law in toto.98 A number of southern and northern 
Democratic newspapers heralded the opinion and, to the chagrin of the Republicans, tied 
criticism of the Court with that of the Constitution. The Iowa State Democrat concluded 
that the Republicans “hate the Constitution, the Bible, and God.”99 The polemical and 
political nature of the response worked against a close examination of the decision, but 
some critical observers took notice of its historical components.  
Most legal respondents focused on the jurisdictional and territorial questions, the 
latter of which raised historical issues that Thomas Hart Benton, a rare antislavery 
Democrat, addressed in his lengthy Historical and Legal Examination (1857). Benton 
agreed with Taney that the clause on congressional power referred specifically to the 
disposal of public lands held at the time of ratification, but he directly countered the 
Chief Justice in dismissing the importance of the constitutional debate and positing that 
historical evidence demonstrated Congress’s repeated use of power in the territories. That 
fact sanctioned Congress’s continued use. Benton highlighted the importance of historical 
continuity, not from the period of the Constitution’s creation and ratification, but from 
the first instances in which Congress asserted its territorial powers. The issue rested in 
federal government’s sovereignty rather than the Constitution’s meaning. In appealing to 
congressional action rather than original meaning, intent, understanding, or expectation, 
the aged Benton—he died at the age of 76 in April of 1858—showed that he was out of 
step with his contemporaries’ emphasis on contextual readings of the Constitution. He 
largely left unattended the question of whether or not the Constitution forbade or 
warranted a new construction resulting from change. In making the issue non-
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constitutional, however, his examination suggested that on this question, and perhaps on 
others as well, legal scholars needed to look to post-founding extra-constitutional 
developments for direction. Benton’s argument called into question the Constitution’s 
reach and scope, though he had no intention of casting it on the scrap heap of history.100 
After Dred Scott, however, more abolitionists were ready to follow Garrison and 
Phillips in challenging aloud the relevance of a tired old document in the vibrant new 
nineteenth century. Such responses arose most comfortably among those whose reliance 
on abstract sources of truth extended far beyond McLean’s brief appeal to divine law. For 
example, the Oneida Circular, a product of John Humphrey Noyes’s perfectionist 
community, was among the first papers to respond to Dred Scott by tossing aside the 
Constitution in favor of a higher guide. Back in 1854, the paper had joined with figures 
such as Parker and Douglass in critiquing the “undue veneration for the codes and 
formulas of our forefathers” and, with Garrisonians, assented to the position that the 
Constitution should bend to the dictates of man rather than the reverse.101 In its March 
1857 issue, it perceived that “there is an instinct for broader freedom growing in the 
country, than that which became embodied in the Constitution of the United States. 
Musty precedent and time-honored institutions,” it contended, “have not stood, and in the 
long run cannot stand, against the instinct of freedom.”102 The outdated Constitution and 
the antiquated slave institution would give way to the voice of the people and the 
progress of freedom. In the same issue, another writer observed that “all profess to 
venerate that instrument, and worship the same long list of saints of the American 
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calendar who made it. And yet,” the perfectionist continued, “that same instrument, in 
plain words … binds each State, through all time, to respect all the laws that every other 
State may make to hold men to service.” Rather than attempting to salvage the 
Constitution and its creators by proposing formal or informal emendation, the author 
contended that “if the ‘Expounders’ of the Constitution would cease their quarrel about 
its meaning, and begin to criticize the instrument itself, and the virtues and talents of the 
men who made it, there would be more hope of progress, if not of peace.”103 A growing 
number of higher-law idealists were ready to accept as historically sound the proslavery 
interpretation and then dismiss the Constitution, its creators, and their views as outdated.  
As expected, Garrison’s Liberator also gave voice to critics of the nation’s 
founding document, some of whose patience with the appeal to legal means had worn 
out. In May, it published the proceedings of the AASS’s recent annual meeting in New 
York City, which featured speakers such as Garrison, Wendell Phillips, Thomas 
Wentworth Higginson, and Robert Purvis. Even though he decried Taney’s decision as 
marked by “a daring disregard of all historical verity” and “a wanton perversion of the 
Constitution of the United States,” Garrison outlined the proslavery nature of the 
document and traced the history of its proslavery use before reaffirming that it “is nothing 
better than ‘a covenant with death and an agreement with hell.”104 Higginson was less 
ready to damn the Constitution, but only because he believed it could be used as a means 
to an end. “Give us a Supreme Court that is favorable to liberty,” he declared, “and the 
Constitution is an anti-slavery document to-morrow.” His approval of interpretive 
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relativism stood in stark opposition to Curtis’s critique of the Court’s politically 
motivated decision. Unsurprisingly, Higginson approved of whatever methods needed to 
achieve emancipation, “Constitution or no Constitution.”105 Purvis, an African American 
abolitionist who helped Garrison found the AASS in 1833, viewed “the doctrine of the 
anti-slavery character of the American Constitution” as “one of the most absurd and 
preposterous that ever was broached. It is so contrary to history and common sense.”106 
Phillips, directing his comments to antislavery constitutionalists, expressed a desire to 
“exercise” the “timidity” of “a set of men who are exceedingly tender of the flower-pot—
the Constitution.”107 Two evening speakers, namely William H. Furness and J. R. W. 
Sloane, recognized the problem Phillips had highlighted. Furness noted that “the 
reverence existing in our day for the Constitution and the Union is like that of the ancient 
Jews for the Temple.”108 Sloane lamented that a “man who had sworn to support that 
instrument could recognize no higher law” but must “either to obey the Constitution and 
disregard his conscience, or obey his conscience and forsake the Constitution.”109 This 
group left no doubt about which source held their allegiance.  
On June 16, 1858, a group of African Americans in New Bedford dismissed 
Taney’s decision as “a palpably vain, arrogant assumption, unsustained by history, 
justice, reason or common sense.” This collection of “Colored Citizens” resolved to 
“neither recognize nor respect any laws for slavery, whether from Moses, Paul, or Taney. 
We spurn and trample them all under our feet as in violation of the laws of God and the 
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rights of men.” On this issue, at least, certain pasts, including the revered Mosaic and 
Apostolic pasts, no longer spoke to the needs of present. Still, with Frederick Douglass, 
the group held out hope for a constitutional resolution, resolving to “begin and continue 
to petition and memorialize Congress until our grievances are heard and redressed.”110 
Although the Garrisonian reading of the Constitution rang out more loudly and 
more frequently than ever, it issued from ever more isolated venues. Rather than reject 
the Constitution as a proslavery instrument, most antislavery respondents to Dred Scott 
upheld it and its creators by reiterating the alternative antislavery historical accounts and 
again contending that the framers had expected change. This obviated the choice between 
conscience and Constitution. A number of Taney’s critics focused on the stark 
distinctions in historical understanding and argumentation between the Chief Justice and 
Curtis. While southerners upheld the decision as historically sound, their opponents 
dismissed Taney’s opinion and those of his concurring colleagues as historically faulty. 
One commenter, at least, even challenged Justice Peter Daniel’s appeal to the classical 
past.111 Most centered their historical discussions on the founding era, its documents, and 
relevant developments since that period. They did so, in part, due to the belief that while 
few could follow legal reasoning, almost all could understand American history, and, as 
one newspaper writer put it, Taney’s decision “does not rest so much upon any 
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interpretation of the law as it does upon a construction of the facts of history.”112 Taney 
had made constitutional interpretation as much a matter of history as of law, and most 
respondents, including dissenters, met him on those grounds, grounds that a growing 
number of commentators felt comfortable surveying. The nature of Taney’s reasoning 
allowed abolitionist papers like The Independent, a New York weekly, to argue that the 
decision contradicted “the notorious facts of history.”113 In rebutting Taney, critics 
followed Curtis’s contention that free blacks were citizens at the founding and further 
proposed that the period saw an evolution in public sentiment with respect to African 
Americans. 
In May of 1857, Putnam’s, a New York monthly literary magazine, carried an 
article that put forth the central critiques of those aiming to uphold a static antislavery 
view of the founding era. Following the contention that the case rested more in historical 
facts than in legal reasoning, the author countered Taney’s portrayal of the founding era 
in asserting that “no period in the world’s development has won for itself a more distinct 
and signal character than the latter half of the eighteenth century.”114 As William Goodell 
had, the writer saw the Revolutionary period as an egalitarian age. In particular, the piece 
referred to the growing application of “the ideas of human rights” and designated 1776 as 
“an epoch for all coming time.”115 A writer for the National Era, a Washington based 
abolition paper, agreed, labeling “the Revolutionary era” as “an Antislavery era: an era in 
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which the Public Opinion in all the Colonies, expect Georgia and South Carolina, was as 
repugnant to the idea of property in human beings, black or white, as it is now in the Free 
States of this Union.”116 While recovering static Revolutionary ideals, these articles 
echoed histories like those of George Bancroft in positing pre-Revolutionary progress 
toward an epochal break. The author of the Putnam article further complained that Taney 
“post-dates the period of the black-plague which ravaged human conscience by a half 
century at least; just as the spirit of his decision is a whole century behind his own 
times.”117 It seemed that, not only did Taney’s historical account contain anachronisms, 
but his decision itself was anachronistic. This author went beyond figures such as Parker 
and Douglass in conflating the Revolutionary era with the nineteenth century, but he 
joined them in positing that the Chief Justice’s opinion stood in direct opposition to the 
antislavery spirit of the age.  
Incorporating and expanding a major component of the antislavery constitutional 
readings that had emerged during the previous two decades, the writer proceeded to trace 
“changes in opinion in regard to slavery” from the sixteenth century forward, citing 
European and English developments before echoing previous writers in turning to 
revered statesmen such as Jefferson and Madison whose language in the Declaration and 
the Constitution suggested that they “looked towards a speedy and universal freedom.”118 
Going much further than Curtis had, the author proposed that Taney had misrepresented 
“the prevailing sentiment of the Fathers of the Republic and of the civilized world” and 
had also erred in “his special application of that sentiment to the exclusion of Africans 
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from the rank of citizens.”119 As the dissenters had explained, historical evidence showed 
that voting restrictions were based on property ownership rather than color and that free 
blacks had voted as citizens to ratify the Constitution.120 This historical review and 
revision aimed “to vindicate the truth of history, and, above all, to rescue the good names 
of our fathers and from abuse that immortal document—the Declaration of 
Independence.”121 The desire to defend the founders differed from the arguments of 
abolitionist such as Parker and Douglass, though this stress on the Declaration, aimed to 
counter Taney’s usage, was symptomatic of the popular antislavery reading that placed 
the Constitution in the light of the Declaration’s universal promises. While holding onto 
the Constitution, this move harnessed the power that anti-constitutionalists like Garrison 
and Phillips found in the Declaration. As with some antislavery biblical readers, when 
historical research raised questions about canonical choices, some antislavery readers of 
the nation’s founding texts managed to retain a belief in the more troublesome document 
by reading it through the lens of the more helpful document. That process, however, 
could also lend credence to the decision among some to discard most teachings from the 
founding era as transient while locating fewer and fewer permanents truths in that 
presumably timeless favored past.  
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An article in a later edition of Putnam’s also exhibited the common desire to 
assert the continued relevance of the founders and their most timeless statements. The 
author aimed not only to vindicate the names of the founding fathers but also to make 
some of them, specifically Jefferson and Adams, stand alongside Taney’s antislavery 
critics. It asked: “Were they with us to-day, is there a doubt that they would unite in the 
most determined resistance to the effort … to establish … a custom which they 
considered to be wholly an evil, and for a speedy extirpation of which their hope was 
coördinate with their faith in the progressive civilization of mankind?”122 A careful 
redaction of the framers’ writings allowed the writer to conflate time and claim the 
continuity of antislavery sentiment. Just as Moses Stuart had called on the Christian and 
national founders to support the Fugitive Slave Law, this author called on the founding 
fathers to support abolitionism. Again, the traditional tendency to conflate historical 
distance from the favored past persisted. And yet, though less nuanced than the 
arguments of McLean and Curtis, the article also posited an original expectation that the 
extinction of slavery would parallel the predicted advance of American civilization. This 
insistence suggested that the author did not hope for a return to an era in which slavery 
was countenanced. Further, that the expectation of slavery’s demise remained a 
potentiality rather than a realization called into question the nation’s direction since the 
founding era and signaled dissonance and distance from that period.  
Whereas some detractors depicted the Revolutionary period as “an Anti-Slavery 
era,” others harnessed the other component of antislavery historical argumentation, 
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narrating a tale of declension since that promising period, engaging not only the justices’ 
debate of historical facts but also their sense of historical development. An article from 
the August edition of the New Haven antislavery New Englander critiqued Taney’s 
decision in a review of the published report. Following Curtis, the author mustered 
historical evidence to establish both state and federal citizenship of free blacks under the 
Confederation and the Constitution. The writer, who later critiqued Taney for failing to 
distinguish between free and enslaved blacks, contended that the “present body of 
citizens of the United States is made up in part of the descendants of these original 
citizens, both white and black. The children of the original citizens were born citizens, 
and the same is true of their descendants down to the present time.”123 While Taney had 
conflated Dred Scott with enslaved blacks at the founding to posit his unfitness for 
citizenship, this writer brought together free blacks from that era with their free 
descendants in the present to assert their right to citizenship. And those citizens warranted 
protection, including the right to sue, under the immunities and privileges clause. 
“Historical facts,” the author argued, formed the bedrock of this historical account and 
this interpretation of the Constitution.124 
Turning to Taney’s argument, the writer examined the various historical sources, 
beginning with the laws of the colonies, used by the Chief Justice to demonstrate black 
degradation. Like McLean, the reviewer dismissed this portion of the decision as 
irrelevant, noting that blacks were citizens despite such views, and proceeded to analyze 
the language of the Declaration and the Constitution. Rather than argue that the 
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phraseology matched a growing antislavery sentiment, he proposed that “these great men 
were inconsistent. Their inconsistency, however, was precisely the inconsistency of all 
great, philosophical statesmen, whose views are in advance of the age in which they live, 
and the circumstances which surround them. Moreover, it was an inconsistency which 
was acknowledged at the time, but which it was supposed the progress of events would 
remove.”125 Similar to antislavery biblical and constitutional interpreters who put forth 
arguments from expediency, the reviewer depicted the founders as ahead of their time in 
terms of their egalitarian sentiments. In essence, such readings suggested that the framers 
themselves ratified a sense of historical awareness and that a recognition of the 
limitations of the framers’ context required allegiance to a construction open to historical 
change. The author heralded the founders as hopeful prophets and posited an original 
expectation that events would result in the spread of inclusive and egalitarian principles. 
As with so many others, the writer found declension instead of progress, noting that 
Taney “speaks as if there had been a great change in this country in favor of the blacks, 
since the Revolution, so great that, while in 1776, the sentence that ‘all men are created 
equal,’ would of course be understood to mean only white men, now it would be 
understood to embrace the whole human family. We wish we could think so, but we 
believe the reverse is nearer the reality.”126 Citing the disenfranchisement of blacks in 
several states, the author traced “a great apostasy … from the opinions of the 
Revolutionary era.”127 Instead of outlining an increase in liberal sentiment, which masked 
more racially exclusive original meanings, the writer, like Lincoln, rejected Taney’s 
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reference to the spread of antislavery thought and instead outlined a growth of prejudicial 
feeling, which obscured more inclusive original expectations.  
The reviewer also examined Taney’s appeal to state laws and found there an even 
greater “misapprehension of historical facts.”128 The writer perceived a presentist analysis 
in Taney’s discussion of southern states, such as Virginia, and northern states, such as 
Connecticut. The author believed that the Chief Justice was a better politician than a 
historian, or, consequently, a constitutional interpreter, understanding him as “manifestly 
judging of the Virginia of the Revolution, and of the other slave states of that period, by 
the Virginia of to-day.”129 With respect to the North, the writer noted that free blacks had 
been citizens and even electors in Connecticut until 1818, before making a strikingly 
modernist critique of Taney’s historical method, questioning, “is it not obvious that Judge 
Taney is interpreting past history with the feelings of the present?”130  The availability of 
this critique depended on an awareness and even an assumption of historical distance.  
While depicting Taney’s historical argument as presentist, the author portrayed 
the framers as forward-thinking personalities who promoted advanced principles. Thus, 
the reviewer remained consistent in critiquing as misguided Taney’s attempt to overlook 
the “plainest language of the Constitution” and determine “what the circumstances of the 
case show they must have meant,” and then positing that “it is but fair to take into view 
the new emergencies which have arisen, and act as we are sure they would have acted if 
these circumstances had existed then.”131 The obvious implication of this statement was 
that different circumstances existed in 1857 than existed in 1787, but the author also 
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implied that if the framers had predicted the emergence of the Slave Power rather than 
expecting the advance and spread of egalitarian sentiment, they would have taken greater 
measures to ensure slavery’s demise. The founders, despite their progressive ideals, were 
not prophets. Northerners, then, should feel secure in their allegiance to the founding 
generation by taking measures to abolish slavery themselves. The reviewer appealed to 
the framers’ original intent and expectations as more important than the potentially 
obscuring original meaning and understanding, including the period’s reigning racist 
sentiment.  The author also held that change, in the form of corrupting proslavery 
ideology, suppressed those original expectations, in the form of progressive antislavery 
ideals. In attributing uniquely held egalitarian principles to specific historical figures and 
in tracing the failure rather than fruition of those principles, this account drew attention to 
the historical distance from the favored founding era that resulted not only from rot but 
also from the inevitable passage of time. 
 
Conclusion  
By the spring of 1857, politicians looked to the Supreme Court to resolve the 
historical debate over the constitutionality of southern slavery. Dred Scott’s case, like no 
prior legal development, led the Court to fixate on the Revolutionary past in an attempt to 
discern and explain the framer’s original intent, the Constitution’s original meaning, and 
the people’s original understanding. The Dred Scott decision, as with no other event, led 
American observers and commentators to engage this historical debate. 
Constitutionalizing issues was common in the antebellum era, but this issue, in particular, 
required a sustained struggle to ascertain the meaning of the founding era and founding-
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era documents. As with biblical interpretation, most found what they were looking for in 
the founding period, the founders, and the Constitution. Most interpreters held that if one 
could only read the supreme legal text in the light of historical context, one could resolve 
the slavery issue now and for all time. This approach allowed for a surprisingly rich range 
of interpretations, just as it had in the biblical debates, the analysis of which reveals a 
spectrum of readings that exposed the presence of historical distance from the founding 
era even while limiting its interpretational value.  
Justices and respondents on both sides of the widening sectional divide 
understood that the Dred Scott case was bound up with questions of history and time. 
Taney’s decision verified and amplified the decidedly historical nature of the 
battleground that had been chosen in the constitutional debates over slavery of the 
preceding two decades. He used a historical argument to contend that the framers 
intended to deny African Americans federal citizenship then and in the future, to restrict 
congressional power to lands held at the time of ratification, and to protect private 
property in territories held or acquired for all succeeding time. These static and original 
meanings, supported by public understanding and legal decisions deemed continuous 
with the founding era, trumped the new meanings that subsequent discontinuous 
deviations, including shifting public opinion or new legislation, imposed on the 
Constitution. Historical distance was recognized but then dismissed in the name of legal 
truth. McLean and Curtis met Taney on the chosen historical grounds. They also sought 
to recover original meaning, intent, and understanding but their view included original 
expectation too, as they believed that the framers anticipated changes on such issues as 
the status of African Americans and territorial acquisition. The purpose of constitutional 
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construction was to rescue the permanent from the transient, as in biblical interpretation, 
but if one of the recovered permanent ideas included an openness to change, then the 
Constitution should be construed in the light of expected developments.  
Although most critics condemned Taney’s decision by dismissing the Court as 
conspiratorial or the ruling as overreaching, some addressed his constitutional 
construction and the historical questions it raised. Thomas Hart Benton concentrated on 
the territorial issue, which he made non-constitutional. He privileged successive post-
founding congressional action over static constitutional meanings, thus valuing 
diachronic development over synchronic stasis. Most abolitionists focused on African 
American citizenship and attacked Taney’s historical narrative of the Revolutionary era. 
They depicted the framers as crafting an antislavery Declaration and Constitution to an 
increasingly antislavery Western world. Such respondents appealed to static original 
meanings, as Taney had, but ones critical rather than supportive of the proslavery 
position. Their creative historical revisions made the founders look as much like 
contemporary northern abolitionists as Taney had made them look like contemporary 
proslavery southerners. This narrative implied that reversals had taken place since the 
founding era—which signaled a kind of historical change—but failed to account for those 
reversals.  
Rather than paint with such broad strokes, some antislavery respondents, 
including the author of the article on “Negro Citizenship” in the New Englander, depicted 
the founding fathers as forward thinking in their antislavery positions—as creating an 
antislavery Constitution in spite of their proslavery constituents and audiences. This 
permitted these respondents to posit the failure of the founders’ original expectation that 
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their egalitarian principles would find more adherents among later generations, a view 
obscured by an apostasy from these ideas. Historical progress should have spurred the 
growth of progressive sentiments, but decline incited the spread of old corrupting power 
relations. The founders’ exceptional ideas remained hidden behind the common views of 
their contemporaries and descendants. Similar to the opinions of McLean and Curtis, this 
narrative valued changes that were consistent with original expectation while 
condemning those that deviated from that expectation. More than those who depicted the 
founding era as either a static proslavery or antislavery age, these narratives drew 
attention to historical distance even as they sought to collapse time and reclaim the rare 
pure and permanent principles that they located in the past.  
In contrast to these positions, Oneida perfectionists and Garrisonian abolitionists, 
even while condemning Taney’s narrative as a perversion of history and a misreading of 
the Constitution, grew louder in dismissing the Constitution as an outdated creed that was 
unable to keep up with the march of freedom’s progress. They insisted that the document 
was created and functioned as a proslavery legal text and that it stood in the way of 
freedom. A timeless conscience trumped a time-bound Constitution. Their appeal to the 
Declaration’s universal assertions and the Revolution’s immediacy was an attempt to 
snatch universal truths from the clutches of a past, the pastness of which seemed more 
and more clear. In their case, the realization of historical change and distance did not 
inform constitutional interpretation, it made the interpreted text irrelevant. 
None of the pro-constitutional approaches fully valued change as a viable 
interpretive tool. Taney cast changes that were inconsistent with his conception of 
founding-era ideas as confusing to construction. Most abolitionist critics discovered 
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antislavery advocates where Taney had found proslavery proponents, which often had the 
effect of ignoring changes and collapsing temporal distinction. Even though McLean, 
Curtis, and a number of antislavery respondents pointed to the framers’ original 
expectation of change, binding change to expectation undermined an appreciation of its 
contingent nature. Depicting change as positive or negative and measuring it as consistent 
or inconsistent with founding ideals qualified its interpretational value.  
However, even attempts to dismiss change as irrelevant or efforts to value it only 
in relation to original expectations brought new attention to its existence as a historical 
reality. Indeed, although change more openly informed the decision in Scott v. Emerson 
than in Scott v. Sandford, and while radical abolitionists like Garrison more directly 
stressed the Constitution’s time-bound nature than did the Court or the dissenters, Dred 
Scott held a unique potential to cultivate an awareness of historical change. Argued on a 
national stage, the opposing justices’ contrasting identifications of deviations from the 
original intent, meaning, understanding, and expectations of historical figures from a set 
historical period uniquely spotlighted change and highlighted its contingent nature. The 
opposing emphases on deviations from the founding era, in terms of antislavery 
innovation and proslavery consolidation, drew more attention to the reality of historical 
change than the opposing foci on continuities, in terms of popular antislavery sentiment 
and proslavery government protection, from that same period. The call to disregard 
unwanted and unexpected change spotlighted its presence and signaled its power to 
divide the present from the past.  
At times, the focus on negative change in Dred Scott and in the responses to that 
decision signaled a hope to return to the favored founding era and a belief in the 
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possibility of recreating the circumstances of that time. It certainly exhibited a desire to 
ignore changes in the application of the nation’s sacred legal text. However, opposing 
arguments about the framers’ intent and opposing narratives about developments since 
ratification belied the assumption that one could collapse time. That realization expanded 
as Dred Scott provided a public stage for pre-existing arguments and invited more 
participants to the debate, despite the Court’s attempt to close the discussion. Some 
continued to ignore the historical differences between past and present or to insist on the 
need to view the founding era as either proslavery or antislavery and to then read the 
Constitution as a static text. However, the antislavery narrative stressing the framers’ 
expectations of abolition eventually overwhelmed those readings. It granted slavery’s 
presence in the founding era even as it called on nineteenth-century Americans to fulfill 
the framers’ egalitarian expectations. Antebellum constitutional interpreters struggled to 
recover timeless legal truths from the Revolutionary past. That endeavor shed new light 
on historical change and drew unprecedented attention to historical distance. 
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CONCLUSION 
The foregoing narrative demonstrates that Roger Taney’s Dred Scott decision is 
best understood against the backdrop of a climactic constitutional debate that partook of 
the same kind of historical argumentation characteristic of a protracted biblical debate.1 
The explosive constitutional crises of the mid-nineteenth century seemed a world apart 
from the genteel biblical discussions of the previous generation, but, in fact, the two 
discourses, which at times involved the same participants, engaged the same central 
conceptual riddle: what to do with history. And they both touched on the same ethical 
dilemma: what to do with slavery. Indeed, slavery created overlap between these 
discourses and made more acute the antebellum confrontation with history. Prior 
exposure to and engagements with biblical criticism and the resulting emphasis on a 
historical explication of the Bible created the preconditions for that development. 
In the first decade of the nineteenth century, Joseph Stevens Buckminster 
departed from a traditional view of temporality that treated the Bible as perpetually 
contemporary and instead stressed reading biblical texts in their historical contexts, 
rejecting the assumption that each text and teaching was timeless. This emphasis brought 
new attention to historical difference and distance. However, when confronting the 
potentially incendiary issue of slavery, Buckminster ignored the distance that his reading 
revealed when he insisted on the relevance of Paul’s directive that the fugitive return to 
his master. From the start, the issue of slavery was implicated in work that promoted 
historical awareness, but not always in clear or consistent ways. In succeeding decades, 
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the proclivity to collapse time—that is, to ignore historical distance in applying historical 
texts—persisted in both biblical exegesis and constitutional interpretation even as these 
readings brought new evidence of that distance to the fore. In light of that evidence, some 
abolitionists spotlighted historical distance and threw out the sacred religious and legal 
texts as obsolete. In either accentuating or dismissing the applicability of those texts on 
the question of slavery, a wide array of American figures began to take note of historical 
distance; some adopted the position that historical awareness was essential to correct 
interpretation, some doggedly insisted it was not, but whether they rejected historical 
awareness or embraced it, all had to deal with it. In using historical arguments either to 
preserve the sacred texts and sanction slavery or to abolish both the texts and the 
institution, many interpreters drew attention to the temporal gap separating nineteenth-
century Americans from their most favored pasts. This demonstrates the emergence of a 
modern historical consciousness among a number of antebellum Americans in the form 
of an awareness of historical distance from periods with seemingly timeless appeal.   
Alongside the opposed paths that either preserved or abolished both the sacred 
texts and slavery, historical awareness produced a middle path, one that preserved the 
sacred texts and abolished slavery. In the 1830s, religious thinkers such as William 
Channing and Francis Wayland conceded slavery’s legal presence in the biblical past, but 
posited that the apostles had shown prudence by sowing the seeds of slavery’s 
destruction. Moses Stuart also believed that Christian principles would ultimately cleanse 
America of slavery’s stain, but cited the expediency of the apostles to condemn the 
immediacy of the abolitionists. In the 1840s, constitutionalists such as William Goodell 
and Lysander Spooner, even while they rejected the use of historical information as 
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extraneous, similarly averred that the founding fathers had crafted the Constitution with 
the expectation of slavery’s institutional demise. Even abolitionists Theodore Parker and 
Frederick Douglass, who granted slavery’s presence at the founding and proved willing 
to cast aside the sacred texts if necessary, maintained that those texts should adapt to 
meet the framers’ antislavery expectations. Their historical readings highlighted historical 
distance to preserve the sacred texts and position them against slavery. In a culture that 
obsessively looked to the founding generation for its cues, these abolitionists described 
founding fathers who had anticipated significant historical change and expected that 
change to influence future interpretations of their work. These interpreters, then, argued 
that the Constitution must be read as a historically situated text and further proposed that 
because the framers themselves recognized that fact, they offered attentive nineteenth-
century Americans a profound authorization to think historically. This kind of reasoning 
allowed these antislavery readers to continue to use the favored founding era. Abraham 
Lincoln’s June 1857 response to Dred Scott owed much to this reading. 
The decades of interpretive debates outlined in the foregoing chapters illuminates 
and explains the historical nature of that reading. Lincoln’s contention that Taney’s 
opinion rested “on assumed historical facts which are not really true,” was symptomatic 
of the interpretive emphasis on context that had emerged in both biblical and 
constitutional interpretation.2 Figures on all sides of the slavery issue had to deal in 
historical terms. In claiming that the Declaration’s signers “did not mean to assert the 
obvious untruth, that all were then actually enjoying that equality,” but did intend “to 
declare the right, so that the enforcement of it might follow as fast as circumstances 
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should permit,” Lincoln built on antislavery efforts to locate within the Constitution an 
original expectation of the spread of the Declaration’s egalitarian ideals.3 This was not an 
attempt to reclaim the present’s contemporaneity with a golden age but rather an 
assertion of an original expectation that change would produce different circumstances, 
ones in which original promises could be fulfilled. This position rested on the 
contention—hardly unique to Lincoln in 1857—that the founders had assumed that times 
would change and that new historical contexts would arise, introducing qualitative 
historical differences. They thought historically and so, Lincoln declared, must their 
nineteenth-century progeny. His attempt, on a national stage, to recover specific universal 
principles from an otherwise transient era drew unprecedented attention to the historical 
distance that separated America’s familiar and favored past from the present.  
As this analysis has demonstrated, this was not a straightforward development. In 
some respects, the slavery debates created a longing for the past. Lamenting the spread of 
abolitionism or condemning the rise of the Slave Power could serve to further idealize the 
biblical and founding eras as favored pasts offering up timeless proslavery or antislavery 
truths. Simply identifying change, particularly in tracing decline, does not create 
awareness of the historical distance that results with the recognition that a past constitutes 
a distinct and unrecoverable temporal era. Indeed, insisting on decline often represents an 
effort to collapse historical distance and recover the prerogatives of the past. The 
contextual interpretations and historical narratives examined herein cultivated but also 
restricted a sense of historical distance when they posited that the biblical and 
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Revolutionary eras contained original meanings with current relevance that historical 
deviations had obscured: context and change introduced a kind of distance from those 
pasts but one that Americans could and should overcome. This golden age sensibility 
tended to conflate historical difference and ignore historical change in ways characteristic 
of traditional hermeneutics. As we might expect, earlier modes of historical thought 
persisted while more modern understandings began to emerge. While the slavery debates 
encouraged interpretive approaches that revealed historical distance, they also 
encouraged attempts to collapse time and reclaim the favored biblical and founding eras.  
And yet, the process of reclaiming certain biblical and founding-era ideas through 
historical investigation indicated the irrelevance of other ideas from those periods. 
Appealing to specific parts of a past as useful indictments of the current state of affairs 
implied that the remaining parts of that past were obsolete. To leading abolitionists, 
including Parker and Douglass, the recognition of slavery’s religiously and legally 
sanctioned presence in those eras rendered them unfit for recovery. Some applicants, such 
as Richard Fuller, Roger Taney, and a number of his antislavery respondents, ignored 
problematic evidence and aimed to reclaim the whole biblical past or the entire founding 
era, including its peoples, documents, teachings, and laws, as either proslavery or 
antislavery, but many more narrowed their reclamation efforts to certain figures, texts, 
and ideas. Instead of characterizing biblical times, spanning Old and New Testament 
periods, as critical of slavery, many antislavery biblical readers upheld specific authors, 
books, and verses as unique. When historical insight undermined efforts to describe the 
Abrahamic, Mosaic, and Christian dispensations as epochs of freedom, readers such as 
Channing and Wayland restricted their focus to Christ and his apostles and their 
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antislavery principles. Some, including Parker, laid stress on specific biblical words and 
phrases, such as Christ’s injunction to treat others as one would want to be treated. 
Similarly, instead of describing the period between 1776 and 1789 as an “epoch for all 
coming time” and labeling it as “an Anti-Slavery era,” many antislavery constitutional 
interpreters upheld certain people, documents, or phrases as exceptional. When historical 
evidence complicated attempts to cast the entire period as antislavery, readers such as 
Lincoln narrowed their gaze from the sentiment of the Western audience and the 
American ratifiers to the founders of the Declaration and the framers of the Constitution 
and their original expectations of change. Some, such as Goodell and Spooner, appealed 
to the words of the Constitution alone, while others, like Garrison, used an even smaller 
lens to emphasize a specific phrase from a brief declaration of rights: “all men are created 
equal.” Clear words held more straightforward significations than complicated historical 
figures and their creations. In a period when slavery cultivated greater interest in favored 
pasts, narrow historical claims implied broad dismissals of the biblical and founding eras 
that historical explication had shown to be less than appealing. In the attempt to rescue 
universal ideas from the sands of time, this sifting process began to exhibit that both pasts 
were foreign countries. Context may or may not have mattered, depending on one’s 
interpretive preferences, but whether they argued for or against the use of historical 
sources, Americans increasingly had to consider the contexts that historical readings had 
exposed. And once they separated out timeless gems from the historical chaff of once-
familiar eras, those pasts remained favored and timeless only in a newly restricted sense.  
Most antislavery historical claims, then, did not signify a desire to collapse time 
and return to a pure past state. Their assertions of historical declension were not 
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jeremiadic calls for recovery, but rather appeals to pasts that anticipated historical 
change. Unlike their early modern forebears, slavery’s critics did not really long to 
recreate biblical times, nor did they seek a return to the founding era—periods that 
sanctioned slavery—but desired to fulfill the promises and expectations of those eras. At 
times, when finding slavery’s stranglehold on the hearts of men in the biblical period, in 
the founding era, and in the present, antislavery narrators implied that not much had 
changed after all and that the distance between then and now was not so great. But 
insisting that the circumstances now existed to realize the progressive hopes and promises 
of those periods suggested that qualitative differences distinguished the present from the 
past. The implication was that while antislavery sentiment had been an exceptional and 
proslavery sentiment a prominent feature in the Revolutionary past, proslavery sentiment 
was now the anachronistic and antislavery sentiment the characteristic element in the 
nineteenth-century present. To be sure, as this analysis has detailed, antebellum thinkers 
acknowledged historical distance in inconsistent, imprecise, and often idiosyncratic ways, 
but their interpretive debates over slavery made that distance difficult to ignore. And 
when they historicized the Bible and the Constitution (texts with the greatest purchase on 
temporal transcendence) and their pasts (epochs with timeless appeal) it suggested that if 
these texts and pasts could be historicized, everything could be historicized.  
This analysis reveals the dialectical nature of this development. Using historical 
reasoning to read America’s sacred religious and legal texts brought new attention to 
historical distance from America’s favored pasts. In turn, that awareness led antislavery 
interpreters to use historical distance in different ways. It helped some dispatch the Bible 
and the Constitution as outdated products of the past, but it also supported the more 
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consequential interpretive move to read these texts as containing hidden or abstract truths 
and principles that time and new circumstances would cause to grow and flourish. Never 
before had historical change carried with it the insight and even the imperative that one 
must read sacred texts in view of historical distance. In the case of the Bible, that 
understanding cultivated the belief in new revelations and insights—although that 
remained a somewhat isolated, if still a varied and important, phenomenon—and paved 
the way for alternatives to the literalist hermeneutic that had come to dominate Protestant 
biblical interpretation in the United States. In the case of the Constitution, awareness of 
historical distance supported an influential reading that the framers had molded the 
document to adapt to change. That approach secured its continued usefulness in an 
unstable nation. It allowed Abraham Lincoln to claim that the framers had expected 
someone like him to use the Constitution to save a nation in its moment of deepest crisis.  
  
Historical Distance and Historical Relevance 
 At times, my analysis of this particular development of American historical 
consciousness has approached the conclusion that an awareness of historical distance 
renders the past and its products, including the most favored and familiar historical eras 
and their texts, irrelevant. A few antebellum thinkers considered it best to leave behind 
most if not all of the biblical and founding periods and to discard their venerable texts, 
the contextual examination of which exposed the failings of their authors. However, to 
the extent that they had become conscious of the historical distances dividing the biblical 
and founding eras from their present, many Americans ignored them, or, in the case of a 
number of the individuals and groups discussed above, formulated ways to read those 
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historical texts and periods in light of those distances. In other words, awareness of 
historical distance allowed and allows Americans to continue to use the past. In 
concluding, then, I hope to address some of the ways in which this particular narrative 
matters because of, rather than in spite of, our recognition of the profound differences 
that separate us from the period under examination. 
 In historiographical terms, this dissertation corrects the traditional view of 
American historical thought by demonstrating the antebellum emergence of ideas 
characteristic of a modern historical consciousness. It reveals the nature of antebellum 
historical awareness through a close reading of biblical and constitutional interpretation 
rather than by examining historical methodologies or philosophical approaches to the 
past. This method demonstrates that antebellum historical awareness took the form of a 
realization of historical distance. In particular, it highlights the growing awareness of the 
chasms of temporal distance that divided Americans from the biblical and founding eras 
and made those pasts foreign rather than familiar. This non-traditional account shows the 
complicated nature of historical awareness and the uneven development of antebellum 
American historical consciousness in particular. The peculiar institution and the peculiar 
shape of American history guided that process. The slavery debates directed Americans’ 
to train their focus on their favored pasts for answers and encouraged contextual 
interpretations of the sacred texts from those periods. That attention shifted from the 
distant biblical pasts to the recent founding era, the period identified as the starting point 
of the nation’s history. A sustained focus on the Constitution created awareness of 
historical distance even from that familiar period, which signaled the near completion of 
a historicization process that grounded all epochs of existence within time. 
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Along with these historiographical concerns, the historical significance of this 
particular narrative also corresponds to the amount of light it sheds on broader historical 
developments in the antebellum era. The history of biblical criticism in America, when 
explored in terms of its contribution to contextual interpretation, suggests that European 
biblical scholarship, including German biblical criticism, had a greater influence in 
antebellum America than previously thought. While casting aspersions on European 
thinkers, including English deists and German liberals, American biblical scholars 
incorporated a number of their hermeneutical lessons, especially those that emphasized 
the use of historical tools to determine the authenticity and meaning of biblical passages. 
Some molded the historical language and lessons of biblical criticism to uphold and 
advance evidentialist thought, but biblical scholarship also introduced historical 
reasoning that Transcendentalists, often depicted as ahistorical thinkers, used to 
undermine the historical foundations of religious faith. This dissertation demonstrates 
that historical explication became standard among a wide variety of religious thinkers, 
altering our perception of orthodox figures like Charles Hodge and liberal 
Transcendentalists like Theodore Parker, both of whom used contextual interpretation to 
cultivate faith in atemporal truths. 
The focus on Parker, who acts as a hinge in this dissertation, highlights the 
important overlap between antebellum religious and legal thought in the form of biblical 
and constitutional interpretation. As these interpretive practices have constituted the 
foundations on which crucial traditions in American intellectual thought have taken 
shape, including progressivism and conservatism, examining them in tandem sheds light 
on some of the core concerns in American cultural and intellectual life. The historical 
   377 
relationship between religion and law has, of course, been traced elsewhere, but the 
continued exploration of the cross-pollination between religious and legal interpretive 
strategies, in particular, promises to bear further fruit. We might consider, for example, 
whether American religious traditions that remained open to and even expectant of new 
revelation were more attuned to historical change and distance in their constitutional 
readings than those who sought religious instruction from the Bible alone.  
The attention to interpretive strategies focused on resolving the debate over 
southern slavery also illuminates antebellum American constitutionalism. This 
dissertation shows that the passing of the founding generation and the publication of 
founding-era texts spurred along an interest in contextual readings of the Constitution 
focused on uncovering the framers’ original intent. It also shows how the slavery crisis 
further fueled that interest, resulting in interpretations stressing the framers’ original 
expectations. While a clear articulation of living constitutionalism did not emerge until 
legal positivist Oliver Wendell Holmes outlined the idea in the late nineteenth century, 
the foundations of an interpretive approach stressing adaptation to changing contexts 
stretch back to the framers themselves and to the constitutional thought of early jurists 
such as John Marshall.4 Still, the slavery crisis encouraged contextual readings of the 
Constitution in a singular way, which inspired the assertion that the framers’ had crafted 
the Constitution prospectively, with change in mind. Although the antislavery focus on 
the specific original expectation of slavery’s eventual institutional collapse restrained the 
move toward a more complete understanding of the Constitution as a flexible and living 
                                                
4 For example, in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), Marshall referenced the 
necessary and proper clause as a provision “made in a constitution intended to endure for 
ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to various crises of human affairs.” 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 US (4 Wheaton) 316, 415.  
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text, it gave Lincoln the interpretive components he needed to consider it the framers’ 
will that he read the Constitution in light of his own historical context.  
The crisis setting soon allowed Lincoln to tie the imperative to preserve the Union 
to the framers’ expectations of slavery’s abolition. Perhaps they had anticipated that a 
different set of circumstances would bring about those expectations, but regardless of 
how they had expected slavery to end, that they had expected it gave Lincoln founding-
era support to proceed along a course of emancipation once the cause of Union became 
bound up with the call for abolition. That convergence resulted from another dialectical 
process. Slavery raised the stakes of biblical and constitutional interpretation and, 
because Americans increasingly looked to the biblical and founding eras for resolutions 
to their most pressing social problems, biblical and constitutional interpretation played a 
role in raising the slavery controversy to a level of crisis and conflict. The expansion of 
American political culture in this period, which opened the door for a wider range of 
individuals and groups to discuss and debate a broader scope of issues with political 
relevance, charged this development. The interpretive debates traced herein, then, provide 
an important lens through which to view the crucial antebellum intellectual debates that 
heightened tensions between religious groups, political parties, and sections. In the tense 
decades of the 1840s and 1850s, distinct political parties and groups used the historical 
distance those debates revealed to further their purposes. 
This leads to a final point about the historical relevance of this dissertation. The 
thinkers and writers discussed in these pages, including those most willing to recognize 
and incorporate historical change and distance in their arguments, put the past to political 
uses. That can be seen most clearly in the varieties of antislavery and abolitionists uses of 
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the founding era and its texts. In attending to these varieties, this dissertation highlights 
the distinctions not only between antislavery and abolitionist thinkers, but also among 
them. For example, Parker’s and Lincoln’s views of blacks constrained their relatively 
broad conceptions of equality. The same sense of progress that convinced Parker of the 
inevitable triumph of antislavery sentiment, led him to categorize African Americans in 
racial terms, as when he argued in January of 1858 that “the African is the most docile 
and pliant of all the races of men,” before asserting that “the stroke of an axe would have 
settled the matter [of slavery] long ago. But the black man would not strike.”5 A few 
months later, in July of 1858, Lincoln made it clear that he did “not understand the 
Declaration to mean that all men were created equal in all respects,” and later concluded 
that “what I would most desire would be the separation of the white and black races.”6 
Lincoln thought it would be best if both slavery and blacks were removed from American 
soil. And while his reading of the Constitution and the founding era encouraged him to 
erase the peculiar institution from that document and that period, it also complicated 
African American efforts to remember and use their past in seeking a more expansive 
place on the nineteenth-century American stage. 
However, the constitutional debates unsettled the historical understandings of the 
founding era, which made it possible to advance readings that not only opposed 
proslavery interpretations but that also challenged the racial ideas of figures like Parker 
and Lincoln. Frederick Douglass, more than most, pointed out the difficulties involved in 
                                                
5 Theodore Parker, The Present Aspect of Slavery in America and the Immediate 
Duty of the North: A Speech Delivered in the Hall of the State House, before the 
Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Convention, on Friday Night, January 29, 1858 (Boston: 
Bela Marsh, 1858), 5, 7.  
6 Lincoln, “Speech at Springfield,” in Collected Works, 2:520, 520-21.  
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efforts to discern the framers’ intentions, which allowed him and others to reintroduce 
overlooked black Revolutionary actors in an attempt to combat racist notions about 
African American capacities as soldiers and citizens. As Douglass stated in response to 
Dred Scott, “the Constitution, as well as the Declaration of Independence, and the 
sentiments of the founders of the Republic, give us a platform broad enough, and strong 
enough, to support the most comprehensive plans for the freedom and elevation of all the 
people of this country, without regard to color, class, or clime.”7 Douglass held that a 
recognition of historical distance demanded the expansion of freedom beyond what black 
Revolutionaries had experienced or even what figures like Parker and Lincoln proposed.  
On 5 March 1858, in response to Taney’s Dred Scott decision, a group of black 
and white Americans met in Faneuil Hall to commemorate the death of Crispus Attucks, 
upheld by African Americans as “the earliest martyr of American Independence.”8 
Fittingly, African American historian William C. Nell, who had published The Colored 
Patriots of the American Revolution in 1855, organized the commemoration.9 The 
commemorative speeches made it clear that remembering the past had a clear and present 
                                                
7 Frederick Douglass, “The Dred Scott Decision: An Address Delivered, in Part, 
in New York, New York, in May 1857,” in Frederick Douglass Papers, Series One, 
3:169, 171-72. 
8 “The Boston Massacre, March 5, 1770: Commemorative Festival in Faneuil 
Hall,” Liberator, 12 March 1858, 42 (APSO). Douglass had countered white assumptions 
with similar historical appeals since the 1840s. See, for example, Douglass, “American 
Prejudice Against Color,” 1:69; and Frederick Douglass, “Slavery and America’s Bastard 
Republicanism,” 1:80. Others also critiqued Taney’s decision by pointing to black 
Revolutionaries. See, for example, William Penn, “Letter from Hon. Joshua R. Giddings 
to Judge Taney,” Liberator, 3 April 1857, 54-55 (APSO); “Colored Citizen Soldiers of 
the Revolution,” Liberator, 18 September 1857, 152 (APSO); “Spirit Meeting of the 
Colored Citizens of Philadelphia,” Liberator, 10 April 1857, 59.  
9 William C. Nell, The Colored Patriots of the American Revolution, with 
Sketches of Several Distinguished Colored Persons: To Which Is Added a Brief Survey of 
the Condition and Prospects of Colored Americans (Boston: Robert F. Wallcut, 1855).  
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purpose. A number of the speakers pointed to Attucks and his counterparts to counter 
Parker’s recent statements about black feebleness. Wendell Phillips identified “another 
ATTUCKS,” in the struggle to free Anthony Burns.10 John Stewart Rock, an African 
American doctor and abolitionist, lamented that “our fathers fought nobly for freedom, 
but they were not victorious. They fought for liberty, but they got slavery.” Rock 
predicted, however, that African Americans would be more successful in following the 
example of their forebears. “Sooner or later,” he stated, “the clashing of arms will be 
heard in this country, and the black man’s services will be needed: 150,000 freemen 
capable of bearing arms … and three quarters of a million slaves, wild with enthusiasm 
caused by the dawn of the glorious opportunity of being able to strike a genuine blow for 
freedom, will be a power which white men will be ‘bound to respect.’”11 The Civil War 
did not play out exactly as Rock had foretold, but it did allow African Americans to 
prove, once again, their military prowess and their rightful claim to citizenship.12 As Nell 
had noted in an 1857 letter to Wendell Phillips about his book Colored Patriots, “Each 
name and every past has its use.”13 An awareness of historical distance and changed 
                                                
10 “The Boston Massacre,” 43.  
11 Ibid., 42.  
12 On African American uses of Revolutionary precedents to legitimize their 
active revolutionary role in the mid-nineteenth century, see Minardi, Making Slavery 
History, 132-63. On African American historical writing in the nineteenth century, see 
John Ernest, Liberation Historiography: African American Writers and the Challenge of 
History, 1784-1861 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), Stephen G. 
Hall, A Faithful Account of the Race: African American Historical Writing in Nineteenth-
Century America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), and Laurie F. 
Maffly-Kipp, Setting Down the Sacred Past: African American Race Histories 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). 
13 William C. Nell to Wendell Phillips, 24 August 1857, in William Cooper Nell, 
William Cooper Nell: Nineteenth-Century African American Abolitionist, Historian, 
Integrationist: Selected Writings, 1832-1874, ed. Dorothy Porter Wesley and Constance 
Porter Uzelac (Baltimore: Black Classic Press, 2002), 489.  
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circumstances made those uses clearer, and, before long, demanded formal constitutional 
amendments alongside the informal emendations that preceded them.14  
 This dissertation adds a crucial component to our understanding of the rise of a 
modern American historical consciousness. It shows that even the idea of what it means 
to think historically has a history. This narrative also provides historical demonstration 
that historical awareness does not preclude the use of favored pasts and their sacred texts. 
Indeed it shows that when humans gain awareness of historical distance from favored 
pasts, those pasts and their texts remain useful in efforts to establish and maintain 
religious and political identities or to exclude or include individuals or groups from the 
benefits of claiming certain religious, legal, and political traditions. These discussions 
remain salient in our own political culture. In his second inaugural, President Barack 
Obama appealed to the American founding even as he acknowledged historical distance. 
He asserted that “we have always understood that when times change, so must we; that 
fidelity to our founding principles requires new responses to new challenges.” Reciting 
the phrase “all men are created equal,” he implored Americans to help “bridge the 
meaning of those words with the realities of our time.”15 Long before President Obama 
uttered these words, Americans, including another American president, negotiated the 
relationship between favored pasts, sacred texts, and the present, and in doing so raised 
awareness of the historical distance that we take for granted.   
                                                
14 The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, of course, officially superseded 
the Dred Scott decision, but that process was well under way during the Civil War. As the 
Liberator commented on the raising of African American regiments in early 1863, “the 
necessities of the country had reversed the Dred Scott decision.” “The Negro Regiment—
Meeting of the Colored Citizens,” Liberator, February 20, 1863, 31 (APSO). 
15 Barack Obama, “Obama’s Second Inaugural Speech,” New York Times, 21 
January 2013, www.nytimes.com/2013/01/21/us/politics/obamas-second-inaugural-
speech.html.  
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